

Attachment VI

4.2 Day-Ahead Markets and Schedules

4.2.1 Day-Ahead Load Forecasts, Bids and Bilateral Schedules

4.2.1.1 General Customer Forecasting and Bidding Requirements

Subject to the two earlier submission deadlines set forth below, by 5 a.m. on the day prior to the Dispatch Day: (i) All LSEs serving Load in the NYCA shall provide the ISO with Load forecasts for the Dispatch Day and the day after the Dispatch Day; and (ii) Customers and Transmission Customers submitting Bids in the Day-Ahead Market shall provide the ISO, consistent with ISO Procedures:

- a. Bids to supply Energy, including Bids to supply Energy in Virtual Transactions;
- b. Bids to supply Ancillary Services;
- c. Requests for Bilateral Transaction schedules;
- d. Bids to purchase Energy, including Bids to purchase Energy in Virtual Transactions and Bids to withdraw Energy by Withdrawal-Eligible Generators;
- e. For Behind-the-Meter Net Generation Resources, the forecasted Host Load for each hour of the Dispatch Day.

By 4:50 a.m. on the day prior to the Dispatch Day, all Customers or Transmission Customers shall submit Bids for External Transactions at the Proxy Generator Bus associated with the Cross-Sound Scheduled Line, the Neptune Scheduled Line, the Linden VFT Scheduled Line, ~~or the HTP Scheduled Line,~~ or the Champlain Hudson Power Express MTF.

By 4:45 a.m. on the day prior to the Dispatch Day, all Customers or Transmission Customers shall submit Bids that include revised fuel type or fuel price information to the ISO's Market Information System.

In general, the information provided to the ISO shall include the following:

4.2.1.2 Load Forecasts

The Load forecast shall indicate the predicted level of Load in MW by Point of Withdrawal for each hour.

4.2.1.3 Bids by Suppliers Using the ISO-Committed Flexible, Self-Committed Flexible or ISO-Committed Fixed Bid Modes to Supply Energy and/or Ancillary Services

4.2.1.3.1 General Rules

Day-Ahead Bids by Suppliers using the ISO-Committed Flexible, Self-Committed Flexible or ISO-Committed Fixed bid modes shall identify the Capacity, in MW, available for scheduling in the Day-Ahead Market (for every hour of the Dispatch Day) and the price(s) at which the Supplier will voluntarily enter into dispatch commitments. If the Supplier elects to participate in the Day-Ahead Market, and is within a defined electrical boundary, electrically interconnected with, and routinely serves a Host Load (which Host Load does not consist solely of Station Power) at a single PTID, it can only participate in the Day-Ahead Market as a Behind-the-Meter Net Generation Resource. If the Supplier is a Behind-the-Meter Net Generation Resource, the ISO shall only consider price-MW pairs in excess of the forecasted Host Load for the Resource.

A Supplier's Day-Ahead Bids for an Energy Storage Resource to withdraw Energy and to inject Energy shall be submitted as a single, continuous, bid curve representing the Capacity, in MW, available for scheduling in the Day-Ahead Market for each hour of the Dispatch Day, and shall indicate whether the Resource's Energy Level will be ISO- or Self-Managed. An Energy Storage Resource may not change its Energy Level Management election within the Day-Ahead Market evaluation period (*i.e.*, within a single day).

A Supplier's Day-Ahead Market Self-Committed Flexible Bid for a DER Aggregation may include Energy withdrawals if the DER Aggregation includes at least one Withdrawal-Eligible Generator. A Supplier's hourly Day-Ahead Bids for a DER Aggregation to withdraw Energy and to supply Energy shall be submitted as a single, continuous bid curve representing the Capacity, in MW, available for each hour of the Dispatch Day. When the Energy Bid for a DER Aggregation includes both Energy supply and Energy withdrawal by a Withdrawal-Eligible Generator that is a component of the Aggregation, each point of the DER Aggregation's Bid curve shall reflect the net offer, such that any Energy withdrawals reduce the Energy the DER Aggregation is capable of supplying.

Co-located Storage Resources can each offer all of their available capability into the Day-Ahead Market. The ISO will account for the CSR Scheduling Limits in the schedules if it issues to CSR Generators.

If the Supplier using the ISO-Committed Flexible or Self-Committed Flexible bid mode is eligible to provide Regulation Service or Operating Reserves under Rate Schedules 3 and 4 respectively of this ISO Services Tariff, the Supplier's Bid may specify the quantity of Regulation Capacity it is making available and shall specify an emergency response rate that determines the quantity of Operating Reserves that it is capable of providing. Offers to provide Regulation Service and Operating Reserves must comply with the rules set forth in Rate Schedules 3 and 4 of this ISO Services Tariff. If a Supplier that is eligible to provide Operating Reserves does not submit a Day-Ahead Availability Bid for Operating Reserves, its Day-Ahead Bid shall be rejected in its entirety. A Behind-the-Meter Net Generation Resource that is comprised of more than one generating unit, or an Aggregation containing at least one generating unit (unless all of the generating unit(s) use inverter-based energy storage technology) that is

dispatched as a single aggregate unit at a single PTID is not qualified to provide Regulation Service or Spinning Reserves. Aggregations may only qualify to offer the Ancillary Services that all individual Resources in the Aggregation are qualified to provide. A Supplier may resubmit a complete Day-Ahead Bid, provided that the new Bid is timely. Suppliers entering a Bid into the Day-Ahead Market may also enter Day-Ahead Bids for each of the next nine (9) Dispatch Days. If not subsequently modified or withdrawn, these offers for subsequent Dispatch Days may be used by the ISO as offers from these Suppliers in the Day-Ahead Market for these subsequent Dispatch Days. For Suppliers that are providing Unforced Capacity in the ISO-administered ICAP Market for the month in which the Dispatch Day and the nine-day advance bidding period are encompassed, the ISO may enter the eighth day offer as the Bid for that Supplier's ninth day, if there is, otherwise no ninth-day Bid.

4.2.1.3.2 Bid Parameters

Day-Ahead Bids by Suppliers using the ISO-Committed Flexible, Self-Committed Flexible or ISO-Committed Fixed bid modes may identify-variable Energy price Bids, consisting of up to eleven monotonically increasing, constant cost incremental Energy steps, and other parameters described in ISO Procedures. Day-Ahead Bids by Intermittent Power Resources that depend on wind or solar energy as their fuel shall be ISO-Committed Flexible and shall include a Minimum Generation Bid of zero megawatts and zero costs and a Start-Up Bid of zero cost.

Day-Ahead Bids by ISO-Committed Fixed and ISO-Committed Flexible Generators, other than Bids from Intermittent Power Resources that depend on wind or solar energy as their fuel, shall also include Minimum Generation Bids and hourly Start-Up Bids. Bids shall specify whether a Supplier is offering to be ISO-Committed Fixed, ISO-Committed Flexible, Self-Committed Fixed, or Self-Committed Flexible.

Co-located Storage Resources must each submit a CSR injection Scheduling Limit and a CSR withdrawal Scheduling Limit for each hour of the Day-Ahead Market to indicate the expected capability of the relevant facilities. Resources that participate as CSR shall not submit Day-Ahead Market Bids that would self-commit either of the Generators, or both of the Generators together, to inject or to withdraw a quantity of Energy that exceeds an applicable CSR Scheduling Limit. An Energy Storage Resource that, together with a Generator that submits a Minimum Generation Bid or is a Fixed Block Unit, participates as Co-located Storage Resources shall not submit Day-Ahead Market Bids that would self-commit the Energy Storage Resource to inject Energy such that the Generator's Minimum Generation (or full output for a Fixed Block Unit), plus the Energy Storage Resource's self schedule, exceeds the CSR injection Scheduling Limit.

When a Generator that submits a Minimum Generation Bid or that is a Fixed Block Unit participates as a Co-located Storage Resource, the ISO will treat the Generator as operating at, at least, its Minimum Generation Level (or full output for a Fixed Block Unit) for the purpose of scheduling the Energy Storage Resource whenever the Generator is scheduled, including during start-up and shut-down periods.

4.2.1.3.3 Upper Operating Limits, Lower Operating Limits, and Response Rates

All Bids to supply Energy and Ancillary Services must specify a UOL_N and a UOL_E for each hour. A Resource's UOL_E may not be lower than its UOL_N . Bids from Withdrawal-Eligible Generators, and Aggregations containing at least one Withdrawal-Eligible Generator, shall also specify the Generator's Lower Operating Limit for each hour.

Bids from Suppliers for Generators and Aggregations supplying Energy and Ancillary Services must specify a normal response rate and may provide up to three normal response rates

provided the minimum normal response rate may be no less than one percent (1%) of the Generator's or Aggregation's Operating Capacity per minute. All Bids from Suppliers for Generators and Aggregations supplying Energy and Ancillary Services must also specify an emergency response rate which shall be equal to or greater than the maximum normal response rate of the Generator or Aggregation.

4.2.1.3.4 Additional Parameters for Energy Storage Resources and Aggregations Comprised only of Energy Storage Resources

In addition to the parameters that Suppliers submit for Energy Storage Resources because they are Generators, specific parameters may apply to some Bids for Energy Storage Resources. Consistent with the ISO Procedures, Bids from Suppliers for Energy Storage Resources supplying Energy and Ancillary Services may be required to specify the Beginning Energy Level and the Energy Storage Resource's Roundtrip Efficiency, and must specify its Upper and Lower Storage Limits. The Energy Level for an Energy Storage Resource shall be managed by the Supplier unless the Supplier elects, in its Bids, to be ISO-Managed.

The Day-Ahead Schedule for Energy Storage Resources with ISO-Managed Energy Levels will reflect the Resource's Energy Level constraints, including the Beginning Energy Level, the Upper and Lower Storage Limits, and the Resource's Roundtrip Efficiency. An Energy Storage Resource that self-manages its Energy Level is obligated to submit Bids that are consistent with its Energy Level constraints, and the Day-Ahead optimization will not honor the above-identified Energy Level constraints.

The rules in this section 4.2.1.3.4 shall also apply to Aggregations comprised entirely of Energy Storage Resources.

4.2.1.4 Offers to Supply Energy from Self-Committed Fixed Generators and Aggregations

Self-Committed Fixed Generators and Aggregations shall provide the ISO with a schedule of their expected Energy output and withdrawals (when applicable) for each hour. Self-Committed Fixed Generators and Aggregations are responsible for ensuring that any hourly changes in output are consistent with their response rates. Self-Committed Fixed Generators and Aggregations shall also submit UOL_{NS}, UOL_{ES} and variable Energy Bids for possible use by the ISO in the event that RTD-CAM initiates a maximum generation pickup, as described in Section 4.4.3 of this ISO Services Tariff.

A Supplier may submit a Day-Ahead Market Self-Committed Fixed Bid for a DER Aggregation to withdraw Energy if the DER Aggregation includes at least one Withdrawal-Eligible Generator. When a Self-Committed Fixed Bid for a DER Aggregation reflects both Energy supply and Energy withdrawals by a Withdrawal-Eligible Generator that is a component of the Aggregation, the DER Aggregation's Bid shall reflect the net offer, such that any Energy withdrawals reduce the Energy the DER Aggregation is capable of supplying.

4.2.1.5 Bids to Supply Energy in Virtual Transactions

Customers submitting Bids to supply Energy in Virtual Transactions shall identify the Energy, in MW, available in the Day-Ahead Market (for every hour of the Dispatch Day) and the price(s) at which the Customer will voluntarily make it available.

4.2.1.6 Bids to Purchase Energy in Virtual Transactions

Customers submitting bids to purchase Energy in Virtual Transactions shall identify the Energy, in MW, to be purchased in the Day-Ahead Market (for every hour of the Dispatch Day) and the price(s) at which the Customer will voluntarily purchase it.

4.2.1.7 Bilateral Transactions

Transmission Customers requesting Bilateral Transaction schedules shall identify hourly Transaction quantities (in MW) by Point of Injection and Point of Withdrawal, minimum run times associated with Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service, if any, and shall provide other information (as described in ISO Procedures). A Generator can be the Point of Injection for a Bilateral Transaction. A Withdrawal-Eligible Generator can be the Point of Injection or the Point of Withdrawal for a Bilateral Transaction, but it cannot be both the Point of Injection and the Point of Withdrawal for the same Bilateral Transaction. An Aggregation containing one or more Withdrawal-Eligible Generators can be the Point of Injection or the Point of Withdrawal for a Bilateral Transaction, but it cannot be both the Point of Injection and the Point of Withdrawal for the same Bilateral Transaction. An Aggregation containing one or more Demand Side Resources shall not be the Point of Injection or the Point of Withdrawal for a Bilateral Transaction.

4.2.1.8 Bids to Purchase LBMP Energy in the Day-Ahead Market

Each purchaser shall submit Bids indicating the hourly quantity of Energy, in MW, that it will purchase from the Day-Ahead Market for each hour of the following Dispatch Day. These Bids shall indicate the quantities to be purchased by Point of Withdrawal. The Bids may identify prices at which the purchaser will voluntarily enter into the Transaction.

4.2.2 ISO Responsibility to Establish a Statewide Load Forecast

By 8 a.m., or as soon thereafter as is reasonably possible, the ISO will develop and publish its statewide Load forecast on the OASIS. The ISO will use this forecast to perform the SCUC for the Dispatch Day.

4.2.3 Security Constrained Unit Commitment (“SCUC”)

Subject to ISO Procedures and Good Utility Practice, the ISO will develop a SCUC schedule over the Dispatch Day using a computer algorithm which simultaneously minimizes the total Bid Production Cost of: (i) supplying Energy to satisfy accepted purchasers’ Bids to buy Energy from the Day-Ahead Market; (ii) providing sufficient Ancillary Services to support Energy purchased from the Day-Ahead Market consistent with the Regulation Service Demand curve and Operating Reserve Demand Curves set forth in Rate Schedules 3 and 4 respectively of this ISO Services Tariff; (iii) committing sufficient Capacity to meet the ISO’s Load forecast and provide associated Ancillary Services; and (iv) meeting Bilateral Transaction schedules submitted Day-Ahead excluding schedules of Bilateral Transactions with Trading Hubs or Withdrawal-Eligible Generators as their POWs.

The ISO shall compute all NYCA Interface Transfer Capabilities prior to scheduling Transmission Service Day-Ahead. The ISO shall run the SCUC utilizing the computed Transfer Capabilities, submitted Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service requests, Load forecasts, and submitted Incremental Energy Bids, Decremental Bids and Sink Price Cap Bids.

The schedule will include commitment of sufficient Generators and/or Aggregations to provide for the safe and reliable operation of the NYS Power System. SCUC will treat Behind-the-Meter Net Generation Resources, Energy Storage Resources, and Aggregations as already being committed and available to be scheduled. Pursuant to ISO Procedures, the ISO may schedule any Resource to run above its UOL_N up to the level of its UOL_E . In cases in which the sum of all Bilateral Schedules, excluding Bilateral Schedules for Transactions with Trading Hubs or Withdrawal-Eligible Generators as their POWs, and all Day-Ahead Market purchases to serve Load within the NYCA in the Day-Ahead schedule is less than the ISO’s Day-Ahead forecast of Load, the ISO will commit Resources in addition to the Operating Reserves it

normally maintains to enable it to respond to contingencies. The purpose of these additional resources is to ensure that sufficient Capacity is available to the ISO in real-time to enable it to meet its Load forecast (including associated Ancillary Services). In considering which additional Resources to schedule to meet the ISO's Load forecast, the ISO will evaluate unscheduled Imports, and will not schedule those Transactions if its evaluation determines the cost of those Transactions would effectively exceed a Bid Price cap in the hours in which the Energy provided by those Transactions is required. In addition to all Reliability Rules, the ISO shall consider the following information when developing the SCUC schedule: (i) Load forecasts; (ii) Ancillary Service requirements as determined by the ISO given the Regulation Service Demand Curve and Operating Reserve Demand Curves referenced above; (iii) Bilateral Transaction schedules excluding Bilateral Schedules for Transactions with Trading Hubs or Withdrawal-Eligible Generators as their POWs; (iv) price Bids and operating Constraints submitted for Generators or for Aggregations; (v) price Bids for Ancillary Services; (vi) Decremental Bids and Sink Price Cap Bids for External Transactions; and (vii) Bids to purchase or sell Energy from or to the Day-Ahead Market. External Transactions with minimum run times greater than one hour will only be scheduled at the requested Bid for the full minimum run time. External Transactions with identical Bids and minimum run times greater than one hour will not be prorated. The SCUC schedule shall list the hourly injections and withdrawals for: (a) each Customer whose Bid the ISO accepts for the Dispatch Day; and (b) each Bilateral Transaction scheduled Day-Ahead excluding Bilateral Transactions with Trading Hubs or Withdrawal-Eligible Generators as their POWs.

In the development of its SCUC schedule, the ISO may commit and de-commit Generators and Aggregations, based upon any flexible Bids, including Minimum Generation

Bids, Start-Up Bids, Curtailment Initiation Cost Bids, Energy, and Incremental Energy Bids and Decremental Bids received by the ISO provided however that for Behind-the-Meter Net Generation Resources, the ISO will consider for dispatch only those segments of the Resource's Incremental Energy Bids above the forecasted Host Load and subject to the Injection Limit.

The ISO may disable the ISO-Managed Energy Level bid parameter that is ordinarily available to Energy Storage Resources if it determines that there is a significant risk that including the ISO-Managed Energy Level bid parameter in the SCUC evaluation could delay the completion and posting of the Day-Ahead Market beyond the 11:00 a.m. deadline specified in Section 4.2.5 of this Services Tariff. The ISO shall post a notice to its public website by 4:00 p.m. on the day before the Day-Ahead Market closes if it decides to disable the ISO-Managed Energy Level bid parameter. The ISO-Managed Energy Level bid parameter shall remain disabled until the ISO posts a notice that complies with the notice requirement specified above reinstating the bid parameter's availability.

When the ISO-Managed Energy Level bid parameter is disabled, Bids that utilized the ISO-Managed Energy Level functionality that were submitted prior to the issuance of the ISO's notice will be rejected. The ISO will inform affected Suppliers, so that the Suppliers will have the opportunity to resubmit their Day-Ahead Market Bids using Self-Managed Energy Levels prior to the deadlines specified in Section 4.2.1.1 of the Services Tariff. Bids that utilize ISO-Managed Energy Levels will continue to be rejected until the ISO reinstates the ISO-Managed Energy Level bid parameter, following notice.

The ISO will select the least cost mix of Ancillary Services and Energy from Suppliers, and Customers submitting Virtual Transactions bids. The ISO may substitute higher quality Ancillary Services (*i.e.*, shorter response time) for lower quality

Ancillary Services when doing so would result in an overall least bid cost solution. For example, 10-Minute Non-Synchronized Reserve may be substituted for 30-Minute Reserve if doing so would reduce the total bid cost of providing Energy and Ancillary Services.

4.2.3.1 Reliability Forecast for the Dispatch Day

At the request of a Transmission Owner to meet the reliability of its local system, the ISO may incorporate into the ISO's Security Constrained Unit Commitment constraints specified by the Transmission Owner.

A Transmission Owner may request commitment of certain Generators for a Dispatch Day if it determines that certain Generators are needed to meet the reliability of its local system. Such request shall be made before the Day-Ahead Market for that Dispatch Day has closed if the Transmission Owner knows of the need to commit certain Generators before the Day-Ahead Market close. The ISO may commit one or more Generator(s) in the Day-Ahead Market for a Dispatch Day if it determines that the Generator(s) are needed to meet NYCA reliability requirements.

A Transmission Owner may request commitment of additional Generators and/or Aggregations for a Dispatch Day following the close of the Day-Ahead Market to meet changed or local system conditions for the Dispatch Day that may cause the Day-Ahead schedules for the Dispatch Day to be inadequate to ensure the reliability of its local system. The ISO will use SRE to fulfill a Transmission Owner's request for additional Resources.

All Generator and/or Aggregation commitments made in the Day-Ahead Market pursuant to this Section 4.2.3.1 shall be posted on the ISO website following the close of the Day-Ahead Market, in accordance with ISO procedures. In addition, the ISO shall post on its website a non-binding, advisory notification of a request, or any modifications thereto, made pursuant to this

Section 4.2.3.1 in the Day-Ahead Market by a Transmission Owner to commit a Generator and/or Aggregation that is located within a Constrained Area, as defined in Attachment H of this Services Tariff. The advisory notification shall be provided upon receipt of the request and in accordance with ISO procedures. The postings described here may be included with the operator-initiated commitment report that the ISO posts in accordance with Section 4.1.3.4 of this Services Tariff.

After the Day-Ahead schedule is published, the ISO shall evaluate any events, including, but not limited to, the loss of significant Generators, Aggregations, or transmission facilities that may cause the Day-Ahead schedules to be inadequate to meet the Load or reliability requirements for the Dispatch Day.

Prior to the Capability Period beginning May 1, 2025, in order to meet Load or reliability requirements in response to such changed conditions the ISO may: (i) commit additional Resources, beyond those committed Day-Ahead, using a SRE and considering (a) Bids submitted to the ISO that were not previously accepted but were designated by the bidder as continuing to be available; or (b) new Bids from all Suppliers, including neighboring systems; or (ii) take the following actions: (a) after providing notice, require all Resources to run above their UOL_{NS}, up to the level of their UOL_{ES} (pursuant to ISO Procedures) and/or raise the UOL_{NS} of Capacity Limited Resources and Energy Limited Resources to their UOL_E levels, or (b) cancel or reschedule transmission facility maintenance outages when possible. Actions taken by the ISO in performing supplemental commitments will not change any financial commitments that resulted from the Day-Ahead Market.

Beginning with the Capability Period beginning May 1, 2025, in order to meet Load or reliability requirements in response to such changed conditions the ISO may: (i) commit

additional Resources, beyond those committed Day-Ahead, using a SRE and considering (a) Bids submitted to the ISO that were not previously accepted but were designated by the bidder as continuing to be available; or (b) new Bids from all Suppliers, including neighboring systems; or (ii) take the following actions: (a) after providing notice, require all Resources to run above their UOL_{NS}, up to the level of their UOL_{ES} (pursuant to ISO Procedures) and/or raise the UOL_{NS} of Energy Limited Resources to their UOL_E levels, or (b) cancel or reschedule transmission facility maintenance outages when possible. Actions taken by the ISO in performing supplemental commitments will not change any financial commitments that resulted from the Day-Ahead Market.

4.2.4 Reliability Forecast for the Six Days Following the Dispatch Day

In the SCUC program, system operation shall be optimized based on Bids over the Dispatch Day. However, to preserve system reliability, the ISO must ensure that there will be sufficient resources available to meet forecasted Load and reserve requirements over the seven (7)-day period that begins with the next Dispatch Day. The ISO will perform a Supplemental Resource Evaluation (“SRE”) for days two (2) through seven (7) of the commitment cycle. If it is determined that a long start-up time Generator (*i.e.*, a Generator that cannot be scheduled by SCUC to start up in time for the next Dispatch Day) is needed for reliability, the ISO shall accept a Bid from the Generator and the Generator will begin its start-up sequence. During each day of the start-up sequence, the ISO will perform an SRE to determine if long start-up time Generators will still be needed as previously forecasted. If at any time it is determined that the Generator will not be needed as previously forecasted, the ISO shall order the Generator to abort its start-up sequence.

The ISO will commit to long start-up time Generators to preserve reliability. However, the ISO will not commit resources with long start-up times to reduce the cost of meeting Loads that it expects to occur in days following the next Dispatch Day.

A Supplier that bids on behalf of a long start-up time Generator, including one that is committed and whose start is subsequently aborted by the ISO as described in this Section 4.2.4, may be eligible for a Bid Production Cost Guarantee pursuant to the provisions of Section 4.6.6 and Attachment C of this ISO Services Tariff. The costs of such a Bid Production Cost guarantee will be recovered by the ISO under Rate Schedule 1 of the ISO OATT.

The ISO shall perform the SRE as follows: (1) The ISO shall develop a forecast of daily system peak Load for days two (2) through seven (7) in this seven (7)-day period and add the appropriate reserve margin; (2) the ISO shall then forecast its available Generators for the day in question by summing the Operating Capacity for all Generators currently in operation that are available for the commitment cycle, the Operating Capacity of all other Generators capable of starting on subsequent days to be available on the day in question, and an estimate of the net Imports from External Bilateral Transactions; (3) if the forecasted peak Load plus reserves exceeds the ISO's forecast of available Generators for the day in question, then the ISO shall commit additional Generators capable of starting prior to the day in question (*e.g.*, start-up period of two (2) days when looking at day three (3)) to assure system reliability; (4) in choosing among Generators with comparable start-up periods, the ISO shall schedule Generators to minimize Minimum Generation Bid and Start-Up Bid costs of meeting forecasted peak Load plus Ancillary Services consistent with the Reliability Rules; (5) in determining the appropriate reserve margin for days two (2) through seven (7), the ISO will supplement the normal reserve

requirements to allow for forced outages of the short start-up period units (*e.g.*, gas turbines) assumed to be operating at maximum output in the unit commitment analysis for reliability.

Energy Bids are binding for day one (1) only for units in operation or with start-up periods less than one (1) day. Minimum Generation Bids for Generators with start-up periods greater than one (1) day will be binding only for units that are committed by the ISO and only for the first day in which those units could produce Energy given their start-up periods. For example, Minimum Generation Bids for a Generator with a start-up period of two (2) days would be binding only for day three (3) because, if that unit begins to start up at any time during day one (1), it would begin to produce Energy forty-eight (48) hours later on day three (3). Similarly, the Minimum Generation Bids for a Generator with a start-up period of three (3) days would be binding only for day four (4).

4.2.5 Post the Day-Ahead Schedule

By 11 a.m. on the day prior to the Dispatch Day, the ISO shall close the Day-Ahead scheduling process and post on the Bid/Post System the Day-Ahead schedule for each entity that submits a Bid or Bilateral Transaction schedule. All schedules shall be considered proprietary, with the posting only visible to the appropriate scheduling Customer and Transmission Owners subject to the applicable Code of Conduct (See Attachment F to the ISO OATT). The ISO will post on the OASIS the statewide aggregate resources (Day-Ahead Energy schedules and total operating capability forecast), Day-Ahead scheduled Load, forecast Load for each Load Zone, and the Day-Ahead LBMP prices (including the Congestion Component and the Marginal Losses Component) for each Load Zone in each hour of the upcoming Dispatch Day. The ISO shall conduct the Day-Ahead Settlement based upon the Day-Ahead schedule determined in accordance with this section and Attachment B to this Services Tariff. The ISO will provide the

Transmission Owner with the Load forecast (for seven (7) days) as well as the ISO security evaluation data to enable local area reliability to be assessed.

4.2.6 Day-Ahead LBMP Market Settlements

The ISO shall calculate the Day-Ahead LBMPs for each Load Zone and at each Generator bus and Transmission Node as described in Attachment B. Each Supplier that bids a Generator or Aggregation into the ISO Day-Ahead Market and is scheduled in the SCUC to sell or purchase Energy in the Day-Ahead Market will be settled at the product of: (a) the Day-Ahead hourly LBMP at the applicable Generator bus or Transmission Node; and (b) the hourly Energy schedule. Each Supplier that bids an External Transaction into the Day-Ahead LBMP Market and is scheduled in the SCUC to sell Energy into the Day-Ahead LBMP Market will be settled at the product of (a) the Day-Ahead LBMP at the applicable Proxy Generator Bus and (b) the External Transaction schedule. Each Customer that bids into the Day-Ahead Market, including each Customer that submits a Bid for a Virtual Transaction, and has a schedule accepted by the ISO to purchase Energy in the Day-Ahead Market will pay the product of: (a) the Day-Ahead hourly Zonal LBMP at each Point of Withdrawal; and (b) the scheduled Energy at each Point of Withdrawal. Each Supplier that bids an External Transaction into the Day-Ahead LBMP Market and is scheduled in the SCUC to buy Energy from the Day-Ahead LBMP Market will pay the product of (a) the Day-Ahead LBMP at the applicable Proxy Generator Bus and (b) the External Transaction schedule. Each Customer that submits a Virtual Transaction bid into the ISO Day-Ahead Market and has a schedule accepted by the ISO to sell Energy in a Load Zone in the Day-Ahead Market will receive a payment equal to the product of (a) the Day-Ahead hourly zonal LBMP for that Load Zone; and (b) the hourly scheduled Energy for the Customer in that Load Zone. Each Trading Hub Energy Owner who bids a Bilateral Transaction into the

Day-Ahead Market with a Trading Hub as its POI and has its schedule accepted by the ISO will pay the product of: (a) the Day-Ahead hourly zonal LBMP for the Load Zone associated with that Trading Hub; and (b) the Bilateral Transaction scheduled MW. Each Trading Hub Energy Owner who bids a Bilateral Transaction into the Day-Ahead Market with a Trading Hub as its POW and has its schedule accepted by the ISO will be paid the product of: (a) the Day-Ahead hourly zonal LBMP for the Load Zone associated with that Trading Hub; and (b) the Bilateral Transaction scheduled MW.

The ISO shall publish the Day-Ahead Settlement Load Zone LBMPs for each hour in the Dispatch Day.

4.4 Real-Time Markets and Schedules

4.4.1 Real-Time Commitment (“RTC”)

4.4.1.1 Overview

RTC will make binding unit commitment and de-commitment decisions for the periods beginning fifteen minutes (in the case of Resources that can respond in ten minutes) and thirty minutes (in the case of Resources that can respond in thirty minutes) after the scheduled posting time of each RTC run, will provide advisory commitment information for the remainder of the two and a half hour optimization period, and will produce binding schedules for External Transactions to begin at the start of each quarter hour. RTC will treat Behind-the-Meter Net Generation Resources, Energy Storage Resources, and Aggregations as already being committed and available to be scheduled. RTC will co-optimize to solve simultaneously for all Load, Operating Reserves and Regulation Service and to minimize the total as-bid production costs over its optimization timeframe. RTC will consider SCUC’s Resource commitment for the day, load forecasts that RTC itself will produce each quarter hour, binding transmission constraints, and all Real-Time Bids and Bid parameters submitted pursuant to Section 4.4.1.2 below.

4.4.1.2 Bids and Other Requests

After the Day-Ahead schedule is published and before the close of the Real-Time Scheduling Window for each hour, Customers may submit Real-Time Bids into the Real-Time Market for real-time evaluation by providing all information required to permit real-time evaluation pursuant to ISO Procedures. If the Supplier elects to participate in the Real-Time Market, and is within a defined electrical boundary, electrically interconnected with, and routinely serves a Host Load (which Host Load does not exclusively consist of Station Power) at a single PTID, it can only participate in the Real-Time Market as a Behind-the-Meter Net

Generation Resource. If a Behind-the-Meter Net Generation Resource submits Bids into the Real-Time Market for real-time evaluation, such Bids shall provide the forecasted Host Load for each hour for which Bids are submitted.

An Energy Storage Resource shall indicate in its Real-Time Bids whether its Energy Level will be ISO- or Self-Managed. An Energy Storage Resource that elects to Self-Manage its Energy Level shall be responsible for managing its Energy Level through its Bids. An Energy Storage Resource, including an Energy Storage Resource that received a Day-Ahead Schedule, may change its Energy Level Management election for each operating hour in the Real-Time Market day.

A Supplier's Real-Time Market Self-Committed Flexible Bid for a DER Aggregation may include Energy withdrawals if the DER Aggregation includes at least one Withdrawal-Eligible Generator. A Supplier's Real-Time Market Bids for a DER Aggregation to withdraw Energy and to supply Energy shall be submitted in a single, continuous bid curve representing the Capacity, in MW, available. When the Energy Bid for the DER Aggregation includes both Energy supply and Energy withdrawal by a Withdrawal-Eligible Generator that is a component of the Aggregation, each point of the DER Aggregation's Bid curve shall reflect the net offer, such that any Energy withdrawals reduce the Energy the DER Aggregation is capable of supplying.

A Supplier may submit a Real-Time Market Self-Committed Fixed Bid for a DER Aggregation to withdraw Energy if the DER Aggregation includes at least one Withdrawal-Eligible Generator. When a Self-Committed Fixed Bid for a DER Aggregation reflects both Energy supply and Energy withdrawals by a Withdrawal-Eligible Generator that is a component of the Aggregation, the DER Aggregation's Bid shall reflect the net offer, such that any Energy

withdrawals reduce the Energy the DER Aggregation is capable of supplying. However, if the Monthly Net Benefit Threshold price is less than the LBMP, Demand Side Resources shall not be permitted to net Energy withdrawals of Withdrawal-Eligible Generators in the DER Aggregation.

Co-located Storage Resources can each offer all of their available capability into the Real-Time Market. RTC will account for the CSR Scheduling Limits in the schedules it determines for CSR Generators.

4.4.1.2.1 Real-Time Bids to Supply or Withdraw Energy and Supply Ancillary Services, other than External Transactions

Intermittent Power Resources and Aggregations that depend solely on wind or solar energy as their fuel submitting new or revised offers to supply Energy shall bid as ISO-Committed Flexible and shall submit a Minimum Generation Bid of zero MW and zero cost and a Start-Up Bid at zero cost.

Eligible Customers may submit new or revised Bids to supply or withdraw Energy, and to supply Operating Reserves and/or Regulation Service. Customers that submit such Bids may specify different Bid parameters in real-time than they did Day-Ahead.

Incremental Energy Bids, for portions of the Capacity of Resources that were scheduled in the Day-Ahead Market, and/or Start-Up Bids may be submitted by Suppliers bidding Resources using ISO-Committed Fixed, ISO-Committed Flexible, and Self-Committed Flexible bid modes that exceed the Incremental Energy Bids or Start-Up Bids submitted in the Day-Ahead Market or the mitigated Day-Ahead Incremental Energy Bids or Start-Up Bids where appropriate, if not otherwise prohibited pursuant to other provisions of the tariff.

The ISO will use a Fast-Start Resource's single point Start-Up Bid if one is submitted (or the mitigated Bid, where appropriate). If a Fast-Start Resource does not submit a single point Start-Up Bid in real-time, the ISO will use the point on the Fast-Start Resource's multi-point Start-Up Bid curve (or its mitigated multi-point Start-Up Bid curve, where appropriate) that corresponds to the shortest specified down time.

Minimum Generation Bids or Regulation Service Bids for any hour in which Resources received a Day-Ahead Energy schedule or a Regulation Service schedule, as appropriate, may not exceed the Minimum Generation Bids or Regulation Service Bids, as appropriate, submitted for those Resources in the Day-Ahead Market. Provided however, a Fast-Start Resource that receives a Day-Ahead schedule may submit Minimum Generation Bids using ISO-Committed Fixed, ISO-Committed Flexible, and Self-Committed Flexible bid modes that exceed the dollar component of the Bids submitted in the Day-Ahead Market, or the dollar component of the mitigated Day-Ahead Bids where appropriate, if not otherwise prohibited pursuant to other provisions of the tariff.

Additionally, Real-Time Minimum Run Qualified Gas Turbine Customers shall not increase their previously submitted Real-Time Incremental Energy Bids, Minimum Generation Bids, or Start-Up Bids within 135 minutes of the dispatch hour. Bids to supply Energy or Ancillary Services shall be subject to the rules set forth in Section 4.2.1 of this ISO Services Tariff. For Behind-the-Meter Net Generation Resources, the ISO will consider only those segments of the Resource's Incremental Energy Bids above the forecasted Host Load and subject to the Injection Limit.

Suppliers bidding on behalf of Generators or Aggregations (except Aggregations comprised of only Intermittent Power Resources) that did not receive a Day-Ahead schedule for

a given hour may offer their Generators or Aggregations, for those hours, using the ISO-Committed Flexible, Self-Committed Flexible, Self-Committed Fixed bid mode or, with ISO approval, the ISO-Committed Fixed bid modes in real-time. For Behind-the-Meter Net Generation Resources, the ISO will consider only those segments of the Resource's Incremental Energy Bids above the forecasted Host Load and subject to the Injection Limit. A Supplier bidding on behalf of a Generator or Aggregation that received a Day-Ahead schedule for a given hour may not change the bidding mode for that Generator or Aggregation for the Real-Time Market for that hour provided, however, that Generators or Aggregations that were scheduled Day-Ahead in Self-Committed Fixed mode may switch, with ISO approval, to ISO-Committed Fixed bidding mode in real-time. Generators or Aggregations that were scheduled Day-Ahead in ISO-Committed Fixed mode will be scheduled as Self-Committed Fixed in the Real-Time Market unless, with ISO approval, they change their bidding mode to ISO-Committed Fixed.

Co-located Storage Resources must each submit a CSR injection Scheduling Limit and a CSR withdrawal Scheduling Limit for each hour of the Real-Time Market to indicate the expected capability of the relevant facilities. Resources that participate as CSR shall not submit Real-Time Market Bids that would self-commit either of the Generators, or both of the Generators together, to inject or to withdraw a quantity of Energy that exceeds an applicable CSR Scheduling Limit.

An Energy Storage Resource that, together with a Generator that submits a Minimum Generation Bid or is a Fixed Block Unit, participates as Co-located Storage Resources shall not submit Day-Ahead or Real-Time Market Bids that would self-commit the Energy Storage Resource to inject Energy such that the Generator's Minimum Generation (or full output for a

Fixed Block Unit), plus the Energy Storage Resource's self schedule, exceeds the CSR injection Scheduling Limit.

When a Generator that submits a Minimum Generation Bid or that is a Fixed Block Unit participates as a Co-located Storage Resource, the ISO will treat the Generator as operating at its Minimum Generation Level (or full output for a Fixed Block Unit) for the purpose of scheduling the Energy Storage Resource whenever the Generator is scheduled, including during start-up and shut-down periods. Generators and Aggregations with a real time physical operating problem that makes it impossible for them: (a) to operate in the bidding mode in which the Generator or Aggregation was scheduled Day-Ahead; or (b) to provide all of the Energy or Ancillary Services offered in their Bids, or (c) to achieve or comply with applicable operating parameters or other requirements, shall notify the ISO. Additionally, if the Host Load of a Behind-the-Meter Net Generation Resource is greater in real-time than was forecasted Day-Ahead such that it cannot meet its Day-Ahead schedule, it must notify the ISO.

Generators and Aggregations may not submit separate Operating Reserves Availability Bids in real-time and will instead automatically be assigned a real-time Operating Reserves Availability Bid of zero for the amount of Operating Reserves they are capable of providing in light of their response rate (as determined under Rate Schedule 4).

4.4.1.2.2 Real-Time Bids Associated with Internal and External Bilateral Transactions

Customers may use Real-Time Bids to seek to modify Bilateral Transactions that were previously scheduled Day-Ahead or propose new Bilateral Transactions, including External Transactions, for economic evaluation by RTC, provided however, that Bilateral Transactions with Trading Hubs as their POWs that were previously scheduled Day-Ahead may not be

modified. Bids associated with Internal Bilateral Transactions shall be subject to the rules set forth above in Section 4.2.1.7.

Except as provided in this section, External Transaction Bids may not vary over the course of an hour. Each such Bid must offer to import, export or wheel the same amount of Energy at the same price at each point in time within that hour. At Variably Scheduled Proxy Generator Buses the ISO shall permit the submission of Bids to import or export Energy that vary the amount of Energy, and vary the price, for each quarter hour evaluation period.

The ISO may vary External Transaction Schedules at Proxy Generator Buses that are authorized to schedule transactions on an intra-hour basis if the party submitting the Bid for such a Transaction elects to permit variable scheduling. The ISO may also vary External Transaction Schedules at CTS Enabled Proxy Generator Buses. External Transaction Bids submitted to import Energy from, or export Energy to Proxy Generator Buses that are authorized to schedule transactions on either an intra-hour or hourly basis shall indicate whether the ISO may vary schedules associated with those Bids within each hour. Transmission Customers scheduling External Bilateral Transactions shall also be subject to the provisions of Section 16, Attachment J of the ISO OATT.

4.4.1.2.3 Self-Commitment Requests

Self-Committed Flexible Resources must provide the ISO with schedules of their expected minimum operating points in quarter hour increments. Self-Committed Fixed Resources must provide their expected actual operating points in quarter hour increments or, with ISO approval, bid as an ISO-Committed Fixed Generator.

4.4.1.2.4 ISO-Committed Fixed

The ability to use the ISO-Committed Fixed bidding mode in the Real-Time Market shall be subject to ISO approval pursuant to procedures, which shall be published by the ISO. Generators that have exclusively used the Self-Committed Fixed or ISO-Committed Fixed bid modes in the Day-Ahead Market or that do not have the communications systems, operational control mechanisms or hardware to be able to respond to five-minute dispatch basepoints are eligible to bid using the ISO-Committed Fixed bid mode in the Real-Time Market. Real-Time Bids by Generators using the ISO-Committed Fixed bid mode in the Real-Time Market shall provide variable Energy price Bids, consisting of up to eleven monotonically increasing, constant cost incremental Energy steps, Minimum Generation Bids, hourly Start-Up Bids and other information pursuant to ISO Procedures.

RTC shall schedule ISO-Committed Fixed Generators.

4.4.1.3 External Transaction Scheduling

RTC15 will schedule External Transactions on an hourly basis as part of its development of a co-optimized least-bid cost Real-Time Commitment. For External Transactions that are scheduled on a 15 minute basis, the amount of Energy scheduled to be imported, exported or wheeled in association with that External Transaction may change on the quarter hour. All RTC runs will schedule intra-hour External Transactions on a 15 minute basis at Variably Scheduled Proxy Generator Buses. RTC will alert the ISO when it appears that scheduled External Transactions need to be reduced for reliability reasons but will not automatically Curtail them. Curtailment decisions will be made by the ISO, guided by the information that RTC provides, pursuant to the rules established by Attachment B of this ISO Services Tariff and the ISO

Procedures. External Bilateral Transaction schedules are also governed by the provisions of Section 16, Attachment J of the OATT.

4.4.1.4 Posting Commitment/De-Commitment and External Transaction Scheduling Decisions

Except as specifically noted in Section 4.4.2, 4.4.3 and 4.4.4 of this ISO Services Tariff, RTC will make all Resource commitment and de-commitment decisions. RTC will make all economic commitment/de-commitment decisions based upon available offers assuming Suppliers internal to the NYCA have a minimum run time of at least 15 minutes, but not longer than one hour; provided however, Real-Time Minimum Run Qualified Gas Turbines shall be assumed to have a two-hour minimum run time. For Behind-the-Meter Net Generation Resources, RTC will consider only those segments of the Resource's Incremental Energy Bids above the forecasted Host Load and subject to the Injection Limit.

RTC will produce advisory commitment information and advisory real-time prices. RTC will make decisions and post information in a series of fifteen-minute "runs" which are described below.

RTC₁₅ will begin at the start of the first hour of the RTC co-optimization period and will post its commitment, de-commitment, and External Transaction scheduling decisions no later than fifteen minutes after the start of that hour. During the RTC₁₅ run, RTC will:

- (i) Commit Resources with 10-minute start-up times that should be synchronized by the time that the results of the next RTC run are posted so that they will be synchronized and running at their scheduled dispatch levels by that time;
- (ii) Commit Resources with 30-minute start-up times that should be synchronized by the time that the results of the RTC run following the next RTC run are posted so

that they will be synchronized and running at their scheduled dispatch levels by that time;

- (iii) De-commit Resources that should be disconnected from the network by the time that the results of the next RTC run are posted so that they will be disconnected by that time;
- (iv) Issue advisory commitment and de-commitment guidance for periods more than thirty minutes in the future and advisory dispatch information;
- (v) Schedule economic hourly External Transactions for the next hour;
- (vi) Schedule economic 15 minute External Transactions, for the quarter hour for which the results of the next RTC run are posted, at Variably Scheduled Proxy Generator Buses other than a CTS Enabled Proxy Generator Bus;
- (vii) Schedule economic 15 minute External Transactions, for the quarter hour for which the results of the next RTC run are posted, at a CTS Enabled Proxy Generator Bus; and
- (viii) Schedule ISO-Committed Fixed Resources.

All subsequent RTC runs in the hour, *i.e.*, RTC₃₀, RTC₄₅, and RTC₀₀ will begin executing at fifteen minutes before their designated posting times (for example, RTC₃₀ will begin in the fifteenth minute of the hour), and will take the following steps:

- (i) Commit Resources with 10-minute start-up times that should be synchronized by the time that the results of the next RTC run are posted so that they will be synchronized and running at that time;

- (ii) Commit Resources with 30-minute start-up times that should be synchronized by the time that the results of the RTC run following the next RTC run are posted so that they will be synchronized and running at that time;
- (iii) De-commit Resources that should be disconnected from the network by the time that the results of the next RTC run are posted so that they will be disconnected at that time;
- (iv) Issue advisory commitment, de-commitment, and dispatching guidance for the period from thirty minutes in the future until the end of the RTC co-optimization period;
- (v) Either reaffirm that the External Transactions scheduled by previous RTC runs should continue to flow in the next hour, or inform the ISO that External Transactions may need to be reduced;
- (vi) Schedule economic 15 minute External Transactions, for the quarter hour for which the results of the next RTC run are posted, at Variably Scheduled Proxy Generator Buses other than a CTS Enabled Proxy Generator Bus;
- (vii) Schedule economic 15 minute External Transactions, for the quarter hour for which the results of the next RTC run are posted, at a CTS Enabled Proxy Generator Bus; and
- (viii) Schedule ISO-Committed Fixed Resources.

4.4.1.5 External Transaction Settlements

Settlements for External Transactions in the LBMP Market are described in Sections 4.2.6 and 4.5 of this ISO Services Tariff. Settlements for External Bilateral Transactions are also described in Section 16, Attachment J and Rate Schedules 7 and 8 of the OATT.

The calculation of Real-Time LBMPs at Proxy Generator Buses and CTS Enabled Interfaces is described in Section 17, Attachment B to this ISO Services Tariff.

4.4.2 Real-Time Dispatch

4.4.2.1 Overview

The Real-Time Dispatch will make dispatching decisions, send Base Point Signals to Internal Generators and Aggregations, produce schedules for intra-hour External Transactions at Dynamically Scheduled Proxy Generator Buses, calculate Real-Time Market clearing prices for Energy, Operating Reserves, and Real-Time Market Prices for Regulation Service, and establish real-time schedules for those products on a five-minute basis, starting at the beginning of each hour. The Real-Time Dispatch will not make commitment decisions and will not consider start-up costs in any of its dispatching or pricing decisions, except as specifically provided in Section 4.4.2.4 below. In each interval, Real-Time Dispatch will review the Beginning Energy Level of each Energy Storage Resource and of each Aggregation comprised only of Energy Storage Resources.

Real-Time Dispatch will attempt to prevent dispatching a Self-Managed Energy Storage Resource or Aggregation composed only of Energy Storage Resources in a manner that would be infeasible based on its Beginning Energy Level. Instead, Real-Time dispatch will consider an Energy Storage Resource's or Aggregation Composed of only Energy Storage Resources' Beginning Energy Level in developing a schedule for the binding interval. An Energy Storage Resource's Beginning Energy Level will be used to ensure that Operating Reserves scheduled from the Resource can be sustained for one hour if the Operating Reserves are converted to Energy. The Real-Time Dispatch will account for the CSR Scheduling Limits in the schedules and dispatch instructions it issues to CSR Generators.

Each Real-Time Dispatch run will co-optimize to solve simultaneously for Load, Operating Reserves, and Regulation Service and to minimize the total cost of production over its bid optimization horizon (which may be fifty, fifty-five, or sixty minutes long depending on where the run falls in the hour.) In addition to producing a binding schedule for the next five minutes, each Real-Time Dispatch run will produce advisory schedules for the remaining four time steps of its bid-optimization horizon (which may be five, ten, or fifteen minutes long depending on where the run falls in the hour). An advisory schedule may become binding in the absence of a subsequent Real-Time Dispatch run. RTD will use the most recent system information and the same set of Bids and constraints that are considered by RTC.

4.4.2.2 External Transaction Scheduling

All RTD runs will schedule External Transactions on a 5 minute basis at Dynamically Scheduled Proxy Generator Buses. For External Transactions that are scheduled on a 5 minute basis, the amount of Energy scheduled to be imported, exported or wheeled in association with that External Transaction may change every 5 minutes. External Bilateral Transaction Schedules are also governed by the provisions of Attachment J of the OATT.

4.4.2.3 Calculating Real-Time Market LBMPs and Advisory Prices

RTD shall calculate *ex ante* Real-Time LBMPs at each Generator bus, Transmission Node, and for each Load Zone in each RTD cycle, in accordance with the procedures set forth in Attachment B to this ISO Services Tariff. RTD will also calculate and post advisory Real-Time LBMPs for the next four quarter hours in accordance with the procedures set forth in Attachment B.

4.4.2.4 Real-Time Pricing Rules for Scheduling Ten Minute Resources

RTD may commit and dispatch, for pricing purposes, Resources capable of starting and meeting Minimum Generation Levels within ten minutes (“eligible Resources”) when necessary to meet load. Eligible Resources committed and dispatched by RTD for pricing purposes may be physically started through normal ISO operating processes. In the RTD cycle in which RTD commits and dispatches an eligible Resource, RTD will consider the Resource’s start-up and incremental energy costs and will assume the Resource has a zero downward response rate for purposes of calculating *ex ante* Real-Time LBMPs pursuant to Section 17, Attachment B to this ISO Services Tariff.

4.4.2.5 Post the Real-Time Schedule

Subsequent to the close of the Real-Time Scheduling Window, the ISO shall post the real-time schedule for each entity that submits a Bid or Bilateral Transaction schedule. All schedules shall be considered proprietary, with the posting only visible to the appropriate scheduling Customer, Transmission Customer and Transmission Owners subject to the applicable Code of Conduct (See Attachment F to the ISO OATT). The ISO will post on the OASIS the real-time Load for each Load Zone, and the Real-Time LBMP prices (including the Congestion Component and the Marginal Losses Component) for each Load Zone for each hour of the Dispatch Day. The ISO shall conduct the real-time settlement based upon the real-time schedule determined in accordance with this Section.

4.4.3 Real-Time Dispatch - Corrective Action Mode

When the ISO needs to respond to system conditions that were not anticipated by RTC or the regular Real-Time Dispatch, *e.g.*, the unexpected loss of a major Generator or Transmission line, it will activate the specialized RTD-CAM program. RTD-CAM runs will be nominally

either five or ten minutes long, as is described below. Unlike the Real-Time Dispatch, RTD-CAM will have the ability to commit certain Resources, and schedule intra-hour External Transactions at Dynamically Scheduled Proxy Generator Buses. When RTD-CAM is activated, the ISO will have discretion to implement various measures to restore normal operating conditions. These RTD-CAM measures are described below.

The ISO shall have discretion to determine which specific RTD-CAM mode should be activated in particular situations. In addition, RTD-CAM may require Resources to run above their UOL_{NS}, up to the level of their UOL_{ES} as is described in the ISO Procedures. Self-Committed Fixed Resources will not be expected to move in response to RTD-CAM Base Point Signals except when a maximum generation pickup is activated.

Except as expressly noted in this section, RTD-CAM will dispatch the system in the same manner as the normal Real-Time Dispatch.

4.4.3.1 RTD-CAM Modes

4.4.3.1.1 Reserve Pickup

The ISO will enter this RTD-CAM mode when necessary to re-establish schedules when large area control errors occur. When in this mode, RTD-CAM will send 10-minute Base Point Signals and produce schedules for the next ten minutes. RTD-CAM may also commit, or if necessary de-commit, Resources capable of starting or stopping within 10-minutes. The ISO will continue to optimize for Energy and Operating Reserves, will recognize locational Operating Reserve requirements and Scarcity Reserve Requirements, but will set all Regulation Service schedules to zero. If Resources are committed or de-committed in this RTD-CAM mode the schedules for them will be passed to RTC and the Real-Time Dispatch for their next execution.

Resources that are eligible to provide Operating Reserves and that are available to the ISO for dispatch in real-time are required to be able to meet the energy sustainability requirements set forth in applicable NERC, NPCC and/or NYSRC reliability requirements. When the ISO enters a reserve pickup RTD-CAM mode it will determine sustainable Energy schedules for Energy Storage Resources that are eligible to provide Operating Reserves and that are available to the ISO for dispatch based on their telemetered state of charge.

The ISO will have discretion to classify a reserve pickup as a “large event” or a “small event.” In a small event the ISO will have discretion to reduce Base Point Signals in order to reduce transmission line loadings. The ISO will not ordinarily have this discretion in large events, except that it may determine Energy schedules that satisfy Operating Reserve energy sustainability requirements for Energy Storage Resources. The distinction also has significance with respect to a Supplier’s eligibility to receive Bid Production Cost guarantee payment in accordance with Section 4.6.6 and Attachment C of this ISO Services Tariff.

4.4.3.1.2 Maximum Generation Pickup

The ISO will enter this RTD-CAM mode when an Emergency makes it necessary to maximize Energy production in one or more location(s), i.e., Long Island, New York City, Southeastern New York, East of Central East and/or NYCA-wide. RTD-CAM will produce schedules directing all Generators and Aggregations located in a targeted location to increase production at their emergency response rate up to their UOL_E level and to stay at that level until instructed otherwise. Security constraints will be obeyed to the extent possible. The ISO will continue to optimize for Energy and Operating Reserves, will recognize locational Operating Reserve requirements and Scarcity Reserve Requirements, but will set all Regulation Service schedules to zero.

4.4.3.1.3 Base Points ASAP -- No Commitments

The ISO will enter this RTD-CAM mode when changed circumstances make it necessary to issue an updated set of Base Point Signals. Examples of changed circumstances that could necessitate taking this step include correcting line, contingency, or transfer overloads and/or voltage problems caused by unexpected system events. When operating in this mode, RTD-CAM will produce schedules and Base Point Signals for the next five minutes but will only redispatch Generators and Aggregations that are capable of responding within five minutes. RTD-CAM will not commit or de-commit Resources in this mode.

4.4.3.1.4 Base Points ASAP -- Commit As Needed

This operating mode is identical to Base Points ASAP – No Commitments, except that it also allows the ISO to commit Generators that are capable of starting within 10 minutes when doing so is necessary to respond to changed system conditions.

4.4.3.1.5 Re-Sequencing Mode

When the ISO is ready to de-activate RTD-CAM, it will often need to transition back to normal Real-Time Dispatch operation. In this mode, RTD-CAM will calculate normal five-minute Base Point Signals and establish five minute schedules. Unlike the normal RTD-Dispatch, however, RTD-CAM will only look ahead 10-minutes. RTD-CAM re-sequencing will terminate as soon as the normal Real-Time Dispatch software is reactivated and is ready to produce Base Point signals for its entire optimization period.

4.4.3.2 Calculating Real-Time LBMPs

When RTD-CAM is activated, RTD shall calculate *ex ante* Real-Time LBMPs at each Generator bus, Transmission Node, and for each Load Zone in accordance with the procedures set forth in Section 17, Attachment B of this ISO Services Tariff.

4.4.4 Identifying the Pricing and Scheduling Rules That Apply to External Transactions

LBMPs will be determined and External Transactions will be scheduled at external Proxy Generator Buses consistent with the table below.

Proxy Generator Bus	PTID	Scheduled Line	Designated Scheduled Line	Non-Competitive	CTS Enabled Proxy Generator Bus		Scheduling Frequencies		
					Requires CTS Bids	Permits CTS Bids	Hourly Scheduled	Variably Scheduled	Dynamically Scheduled (Not Presently Available)
Hydro Quebec									
HQ_GEN_IMPORT	323601			✓			✓	✓	
HQ_LOAD_EXPORT	355639			✓			✓	✓	
HQ_GEN_CEDARS_PROXY	323590	Dennison Scheduled Line		✓			✓		
HQ_LOAD_CEDARS_PROXY	355586	Dennison Scheduled Line		✓			✓		
HQ_GEN_WHEEL	23651			✓			✓		
HQ_LOAD_WHEEL	55856			✓			✓		
<u>HQ_CHPE_GEN</u>	<u>323851</u>	<u>Champlain Hudson Power Express MTF</u>		<u>✓</u>			<u>✓*+</u> <u>(See Notes)</u>	<u>✓</u>	
<u>HQ_CHPE_LOAD</u>	<u>356515</u>	<u>Champlain Hudson Power Express MTF</u>		<u>✓</u>			<u>✓*+</u> <u>(See Notes)</u>	<u>✓</u>	
PJM									
PJM_GEN_KEYSTONE	24065					✓	✓* (See Notes)	✓	
PJM_LOAD_KEYSTONE	55857					✓	✓* (See Notes)	✓	
PJM_GEN_NEPTUNE_PROXY	323594	Neptune Scheduled Line	✓			✓	✓* (See Notes)	✓	
PJM_LOAD_NEPTUNE_PROXY	355615	Neptune Scheduled Line	✓			✓	✓* (See Notes)	✓	

Proxy Generator Bus	PTID	Scheduled Line	Designated Scheduled Line	Non-Competitive	CTS Enabled Proxy Generator Bus		Scheduling Frequencies		
					Requires CTS Bids	Permits CTS Bids	Hourly Scheduled	Variably Scheduled	Dynamically Scheduled (Not Presently Available)
PJM_GEN_VFT_PROXY	323633	Linden VFT Scheduled Line	✓			✓	✓*	✓	
PJM_LOAD_VFT_PROXY	355723	Linden VFT Scheduled Line	✓			✓	✓*	✓	
PJM_HTP_GEN	323702	HTP Scheduled Line	✓			✓	✓*	✓	
HUDSONTP_345KV_HTP_LOAD	355839	HTP Scheduled Line	✓			✓	✓*	✓	
ISO New England									
N.E._GEN_SANDY_POND	24062				✓		✓**	✓	
NE_LOAD_SANDY_PD	55858				✓		✓**	✓	
NPX_GEN_CSC	323557	Cross Sound Scheduled Line	✓				✓		
NPX_LOAD_CSC	355535	Cross Sound Scheduled Line	✓				✓		
NPX_GEN_1385_PROXY	323591	Northport Norwalk Scheduled Line					✓		

Proxy Generator Bus	PTID	Scheduled Line	Designated Scheduled Line	Non-Competitive	CTS Enabled Proxy Generator Bus		Scheduling Frequencies		
					Requires CTS Bids	Permits CTS Bids	Hourly Scheduled	Variably Scheduled	Dynamically Scheduled (Not Presently Available)
NPX_LOAD_1385_PROXY	355589	Northport Norwalk Scheduled Line					✓		
Ontario									
OH GEN PROXY	24063						✓		
OH LOAD PROXY	55859						✓		

Notes:

* At specifically identified Proxy Generator Buses (“* See Notes”), only Wheels Through (the NYCA) are scheduled on an hourly basis.

** At specifically identified Proxy Generator Buses (“** See Notes”), only wheels through the NYCA or a neighboring Control Area are scheduled on an hourly basis.

⁺ The Champlain Hudson Power Express MTF, Neptune Scheduled Line and HTP Scheduled Line are all unidirectional transmission facilities. Only Imports of Energy to the NYCA can be scheduled over these facilities.

Pricing rules for Proxy Generator Buses are set forth in Section 17 of the Services Tariff.

The ISO may offer a more frequent scheduling option at a Proxy Generator Bus identified on the table. The ISO shall inform its Market Participants of the availability of such an option by providing notice at least two weeks in advance of the implementation of any such change. At the same time, the ISO shall update the above table to reflect the change in scheduling options by submitting a compliance filing in FERC Docket No. ER11-2547. Unless FERC acts on the ISO's compliance filing, the ISO shall effectuate the change in scheduling capability on the date it proposed in its compliance filing. The addition of new Proxy Generator Buses to the table, or changing the pricing rules that apply at a Proxy Generator Bus, may not be accomplished by submitting a compliance filing in Docket No. ER11-2547. The ISO may revert to establishing hourly Import and Export schedules using all available External Transaction Bids at a Proxy Generator Bus that is identified as a Dynamically or Variably Scheduled Proxy Generator Bus when the ISO or a neighboring Balancing Authority is not able to implement schedules as expected, or when necessary to ensure or preserve system reliability. When it reverts to hourly Import and Export schedules at a Dynamically or Variably Scheduled Proxy Generator Bus, the ISO shall apply the pricing rules for a corresponding Proxy Generator Bus that is not Dynamically Scheduled or Variably Scheduled. The ISO may cease evaluating CTS Interface Bids at CTS Enabled Proxy Generator Buses when the ISO or a neighboring Balancing Authority is not able to implement schedules as expected, or when necessary to ensure or preserve system reliability.

17.1 LBMP Calculation

The Locational Based Marginal Prices (“LBMPs” or “prices”) for Suppliers and Loads in the Real-Time Market will be based on the system marginal costs produced by the Real-Time Dispatch (“RTD”) program and during intervals when certain conditions exist at Proxy Generator Buses, the Real-Time Commitment (“RTC”) program. LBMPs for Suppliers and Loads in the Day-Ahead Market will be based on the system marginal costs produced by the Security Constrained Unit Commitment (“SCUC”). LBMPs calculated by SCUC and RTD will incorporate the incremental dispatch costs of Dispatchable Resources that would be scheduled to meet an increment of Load. For pricing purposes, the incremental dispatch costs of Fast-Start Resources that Bid ISO-Committed Flexible shall be adjusted to include start-up costs and minimum generation costs based on the Start-Up Bids and Minimum Generation Bids or mitigated Start-Up Bids and Minimum Generation Bids of each such Resource, as described in Section 17.1.1.2 below.

To the extent that tradeoffs exist between scheduling providers to produce Energy or reduce demand, and scheduling them to provide Regulation Service or Operating Reserves, LBMPs shall reflect the effect of meeting an increment of Load, given those tradeoffs, at each location on the Bid Production Cost associated with those services. As such, those LBMPs may incorporate: (i) Bids for Regulation Service or Operating Reserves; or (ii) shortage costs associated with the inability to meet a Regulation Service or Operating Reserves requirement under the Regulation Service Demand Curve set forth in Rate Schedule 3 of this ISO Services Tariff and Operating Reserve Demand Curves and Scarcity Reserve Demand Curve set forth in Rate Schedule 4 of this ISO Services Tariff. For the purposes of calculating LBMPs under this

Services Tariff Section 17, Energy withdrawals by Withdrawal-Eligible Generators are treated as negative generation, and can set price.

Additionally, for the purpose of calculating Real-Time LBMPs when RTD is committing and dispatching Resources meeting Minimum Generation Levels and capable of starting in ten minutes pursuant to Section 4.4.2.4 of this ISO Services Tariff, RTD shall include in the incremental dispatch cost of each such Resource a start-up cost based on the Start-Up Bid of each such Resource and shall assume for each such Resource a zero downward response rate.

17.1.1 LBMP Bus Calculation Method

System marginal costs will be utilized in an *ex ante* computation to produce Day-Ahead and Real-Time LBMP bus prices using the following equations.

The LBMP at bus i can be written as:

$$\gamma_i = \lambda^R + \gamma_i^L + \gamma_i^C$$

Where:

γ_i	=	LBMP at bus i in \$/MWh
λ^R	=	the system marginal price at the Reference Bus
γ_i^L	=	Marginal Losses Component of the LBMP at bus i which is the marginal cost of losses at bus i relative to the Reference Bus
γ_i^C	=	Congestion Component of the LBMP at bus i which is the marginal cost of Congestion at bus i relative to the Reference Bus

The Marginal Losses Component of the LBMP at any bus i is calculated using the equation:

$$\gamma_i^L = (DF_i - 1)\lambda^R$$

Where:

DF_i = delivery factor for bus i to the system Reference Bus and:

$$DF_i = \left(1 - \frac{\partial L}{\partial P_i}\right)$$

Where:

- L = NYCA losses; and
 P_i = injection at bus i

The Congestion Component of the LBMP at bus i is calculated using the equation:

$$\gamma_i^c = - \left(\sum_{k \in K}^n GF_{ik} \mu_k \right)$$

Where:

- K = the set of Constraints;
 GF_{ik} = Shift Factor for bus i on Constraint k in the pre- or post-Contingency case which limits flows across that Constraint (the Shift Factor measures the incremental change in flow on Constraint k , expressed in per unit, for an increment of injection at bus i and a corresponding withdrawal at the Reference Bus); and
 μ_k = the Shadow Price of Constraint k expressed in \$/MWh, provided however, this Shadow Price shall not exceed the Transmission Shortage Cost.

Substituting the equations for γ_i^L and γ_i^c into the first equation yields:

$$\gamma_i = \lambda^R + (DF_i - 1)\lambda^R - \sum_{k \in K} GF_{ik} \mu_k$$

LBMPs will be calculated for the Day-Ahead and the Real-Time Markets. In the Day-Ahead Market, the three components of the LBMP at each location will be calculated from the SCUC results and posted for each of the twenty four (24) hours of the next day. The Real-Time LBMPs will be calculated and posted for each execution of RTD.

17.1.1.1 Determining Shift Factors and Incremental System Losses

For the purposes of pricing and scheduling, Shift Factors, GF_{ik} , and loss delivery factors, DF_i , will reflect expected power flows, including expected unscheduled power flows. When determining prices and schedules, SCUC, RTC and RTD shall include both the expected power flows resulting from NYISO interchange schedules (*see* Section 17.1.1.1.2), and expected unscheduled power flows (*see* Section 17.1.1.1.1). All NYCA Resource, NYCA Load and Proxy Generator Bus Shift Factors and loss delivery factors will incorporate internal and coordinated external transmission facility outages, power flows due to schedules, and expected unscheduled power flows.

17.1.1.1.1 Determining Expected Unscheduled Power Flows

In the Day-Ahead Market, expected unscheduled power flows will ordinarily be determined based on historical, rolling 30-day on-peak and off-peak averages. To ensure expected unscheduled power flows accurately reflect anticipated conditions, the frequency and/or period used to determine the historical average may be modified by the NYISO to address market rule, system topology, operational, or other changes that would be expected to significantly impact unscheduled power flows. The NYISO will publicly post the Day-Ahead on-peak and off-peak unscheduled power flows on its web site.

In the Real-Time Market, expected unscheduled power flows will ordinarily be determined based on current power flows, modified to reflect expected changes over the real-time scheduling horizon.

17.1.1.1.2 Determining Expected Power Flows Resulting from NYISO Interchange Schedules

In the Day-Ahead Market, for purposes of scheduling and pricing, SCUC will establish expected power flows for the ABC interface, JK interface and Hopatcong-Ramapo interconnection based on the following:

- a. The percentage of PJM-NYISO scheduled interchange that is expected to flow over the Hopatcong-Ramapo interconnection;
 - 1) The expected flow over the Hopatcong-Ramapo interconnection may also be adjusted by a MW offset to reflect expected operational conditions;
- b. The percentage of PJM-NYISO scheduled interchange that is expected to flow over the ABC interface;
 - 1) The expected flow over the ABC interface will include an additional Operational Base Flow as described in Attachment CC to the OATT;
- c. The percentage of PJM-NYISO scheduled interchange (if any) that is expected to flow over the JK interface;
 - 1) The expected flow over the JK interface will include an additional Operational Base Flow as described in Attachment CC to the OATT.

The terms “ABC interface” and “JK interface” have the meaning ascribed to them in Attachment CC to the OATT.

The NYISO shall post the interchange percentage and Operational Base Flow values it is currently using to establish Day-Ahead and real-time expected Hopatcong-Ramapo interconnection, ABC interface and JK interface flows for purposes of scheduling and pricing on its web site. If the NYISO determines it is necessary to change the posted Hopatcong-Ramapo,

ABC or JK interchange percentage or Operational Base Flow values, it will provide notice to its Market Participants as far in advance of the change as is practicable under the circumstances.

In the Day-Ahead Market, scheduled interchange that is not expected to flow over the ABC interface, JK interface or Hopatcong-Ramapo interconnection (or on Scheduled Lines) will be expected to flow over the NYISO's other interconnections. Expected flows over the NYISO's other interconnections will be determined consistent with the expected impacts of scheduled interchange and consistent with shift factors and delivery factors calculated in accordance with Section 17.1.1.1, above.

For pricing purposes, flows in the Real-Time Market will be established for the ABC interface, JK interface, and Hopatcong-Ramapo interconnection based on the current flow, modified to reflect the expected incremental impacts of changes to interchange schedules over the forward scheduling horizon in a manner that is consistent with the method used to establish Day-Ahead power flows over these facilities. Expected flows over the NYISO's other interconnections will be determined based on the current flow, modified to reflect the expected incremental impacts of changes to interchange schedules over the forward scheduling horizon, and shall be consistent with shift factors and delivery factors calculated in accordance with Section 17.1.1.1, above.

17.1.1.1.3 Scheduled Lines and Chateaugay Interconnection with Hydro Quebec

For purposes of scheduling and pricing, the NYISO expects that power flows will ordinarily match the interchange schedule at Scheduled Lines, and at the NYCA's Chateaugay interconnection with Hydro Quebec, in both the Day-Ahead and Real-Time Markets.

17.1.1.2 Incremental Dispatch Costs for Pricing Fast-Start Resources

For the purpose of calculating LBMPs for the Day-Ahead and Real-Time Markets, the incremental dispatch costs of Fast-Start Resources that Bid ISO-Committed Flexible shall be adjusted to include start-up costs and minimum generation costs based on the Start-Up Bids and Minimum Generation Bids or mitigated Start-Up Bids and Minimum Generation Bids of each such Resource (“Adjusted Dispatch Costs”). For start-up costs, the ISO will use a Fast-Start Resource’s single point Start-Up Bid if one is submitted (or the mitigated Bid, where appropriate). If a Fast-Start Resource does not submit a single point Start-Up Bid in the Real-Time Market, the ISO will use the point on the Fast-Start Resource’s multi-point Start-Up Bid curve (or its mitigated multi-point Start-Up Bid curve, where appropriate) that corresponds to the shortest specified down time.

The ISO will use the following procedure to determine a Fast-Start Resource’s Adjusted Dispatch Costs for each pricing interval in the Day-Ahead and Real-Time Markets. The ISO will determine the “cost-minimizing output level” that minimizes the average as-Bid operating cost (“minimum average cost”) for that Fast-Start Resource in each hour of the Day-Ahead Market and in each RTD interval of the Real-Time Market. The average as-Bid operating cost for a Fast-Start Resource at a given operating level shall include the Fast-Start Resource’s minimum generation costs and incremental energy costs to provide Energy at that operating level, based on the Resource’s Bids, or mitigated Bids as appropriate. The average as-Bid operating cost may also include some or all of the Fast-Start Resource’s start-up costs based on the Resource’s Bids, or mitigated Bids as appropriate, in a given hour, to be determined as follows: (1) for the Day-Ahead Market, a Fast-Start Resource’s average as-Bid operating cost to operate in a given hour will include start-up costs for the hour the Resource is scheduled to start; or (2) for the Real-Time Market, a Fast-Start Resource’s average as-Bid operating cost to operate in a given RTD

interval will include the start-up costs for approximately the first fifteen minutes, among consecutive operating intervals, after the Resource is scheduled to start, *i.e.*, for each RTD interval that starts within the first fifteen minutes after the Resource is scheduled to start, the average as-Bid operating cost to operate in that interval will include start-up costs.

For all output levels less than or equal to the cost-minimizing output level, the ISO will set the Adjusted Dispatch Cost equal to the minimum average cost. For all output levels greater than the cost-minimizing output level, the ISO will set the Adjusted Dispatch Cost equal to the price on the Resource's Bid curve. The ISO will calculate Adjusted Dispatch Costs for each output level between the Fast-Start Resource's minimum operating level and its UOL_N or UOL_E (whichever is applicable).

For the purpose of calculating LBMPs for the Day-Ahead and Real-Time Markets, all Fast-Start Resources that Bid ISO-Committed Flexible are treated as flexible and able to be dispatched anywhere between zero (0) MW and their UOL_N or UOL_E (whichever is applicable). The dispatch for Fast-Start Resources, including Fixed Block Units, that participate as Co-located Storage Resources will consider CSR Scheduling Limits.

Additional rules for Fixed Block Units are set forth below in Section 17.1.2.1.2.

17.1.2 Real-Time LBMP Calculation Procedures

For each RTD interval, the ISO shall use the procedures described below in Sections 17.1.2.1-17.1.2.1.4 to calculate Real-Time LBMPs at each Load Zone, Generator bus and Transmission Node. The LBMP bus and zonal calculation procedures are described in Sections 17.1.1 and 17.1.5 of this Attachment B, respectively. Procedures governing the calculation of LBMPs at Proxy Generator Buses are set forth below in Section 17.1.6 of this Attachment B.

17.1.2.1 General Procedures

17.1.2.1.1 Overview

The ISO shall calculate Real-Time Market LBMPs using the three passes of each RTD run, except as noted below in Section 17.1.2.1.3. A new RTD run will initialize every five minutes and each run will produce prices and schedules for five points in time (the optimization period). Only the prices and schedules determined for the first time point of the optimization period will be binding. Prices and schedules for the other four time points of the optimization period are advisory.

Each RTD run shall, depending on when it occurs during the hour, have a bid optimization horizon of fifty, fifty-five, or sixty minutes beyond the first, or binding, point in time that it addresses. The posting time and the first time point in each RTD run, which establishes binding prices and schedules, will be five minutes apart. The remaining points in time in each optimization period can be either five, ten, or fifteen minutes apart depending on when the run begins within the hour. The points in time in each RTD optimization period are arranged so that they parallel as closely as possible RTC's fifteen minute evaluations.

For example, the RTD run that posts its results at the beginning of an hour ("RTD₀") will initialize at the fifty-fifth minute of the previous hour and produce schedules and prices over a fifty-five minute optimization period. RTD₀ will produce binding prices and schedules for the RTD interval beginning when it posts its results (i.e., at the beginning of the hour) and ending at the first time point in its optimization period (i.e., five minutes after the hour). It will produce advisory prices and schedules for its second time point, which is ten minutes after the first time point in its optimization period, and advisory prices and schedules for its third, fourth and fifth time points, each of which would be fifteen minutes apart. The RTD run that posts its results at five minutes after the beginning of the hour ("RTD₅") will initialize at the beginning of the hour

and produce prices over a fifty minute optimization period. RTD₅ will produce binding prices and schedules for the RTD interval beginning when it posts its results (i.e., at five minutes after the hour) and ending at the first time point in its optimization period (i.e., ten minutes after the hour.) It will produce advisory prices and schedules for its second time point (which is five minutes after the first time point), and advisory prices and schedules for its third, fourth and fifth time points, each of which would be fifteen minutes apart. The RTD run that posts its results at ten minutes after the beginning of the hour (“RTD₁₀”) will initialize at five minutes after the beginning of the hour and produce prices over a sixty minute optimization period. RTD₁₀ will produce binding prices and schedules for the interval beginning when it posts its results (i.e., at ten minutes after the hour) and ending at the first time point in its optimization period (i.e., fifteen minutes after the hour.) It will produce advisory prices and schedules for its second, third, fourth and fifth time points, each of which would be fifteen minutes after the preceding time point.

17.1.2.1.2 Description of the Real-Time Dispatch Process

17.1.2.1.2.1 The First Pass

The first RTD pass consists of a least bid cost, multi-period co-optimized dispatch for Energy, Regulation Service and Operating Reserves that treats all Fixed Block Units that are committed by RTC, or are otherwise instructed to be online or remain online by the ISO as if they were blocked on at their UOL_N or UOL_E, whichever is applicable. Fixed Block Units that do not participate in a Co-located Storage Resource, are capable of being started and meeting Minimum Generation Levels in ten minutes or less, and that have not been committed by RTC, are treated as flexible (i.e. able to be dispatched anywhere between zero (0) MW and their UOL_N or UOL_E, whichever is applicable). The first pass establishes “physical base points” (i.e., real-

time Energy schedules) and real-time schedules for Regulation Service and Operating Reserves for the first time point of the optimization period. Physical base points and schedules established for the first time point shall be binding and shall remain in effect until the results of the next run are posted. Physical base points and schedules established for all subsequent time points shall be advisory. The first pass also produces information that is used to calculate the RTD Base Point Signals that the ISO sends to Suppliers.

RTD will consider CSR Scheduling Limits when setting physical base points for Generators that participate as Co-located Storage Resources.

When establishing physical base points, the ISO shall assume that each Generator and Aggregation will move toward the physical base point established during the first pass of the prior RTD run at its specified response rate.

17.1.2.1.2.1.1 Upper and Lower Dispatch Limits for Dispatchable Resources Other Than Intermittent Power Resources That Depend on Wind or Solar Energy as Their Fuel

When setting physical base points for a Dispatchable Resource at the first time point, the ISO shall ensure that they do not fall outside of the bounds established by the Dispatchable Resource's lower and upper dispatch limits. A Dispatchable Resource's dispatch limits shall be determined based on whether it was feasible for it to reach the physical base point calculated by the last RTD run given its: (A) metered output level and metered Energy Level (if applicable) at the time that the RTD run was initialized; (B) response rate; (C) minimum generation level/LOL; (D) USL and LSL (if applicable); and (E) UOL_N or UOL_E, whichever is applicable. If it was feasible for the Dispatchable Resource to reach that base point, then its upper and lower dispatch limits shall reflect the highest and lowest output levels it could achieve over the next RTD interval starting from its previous base point, subject to factors (A) through (E) specified above.

If it was not feasible for the Dispatchable Resource to reach that base point, then its upper and lower dispatch limits shall reflect the highest and lowest output levels it could achieve over the next RTD interval, subject to factors (A) through (E) specified above, but instead starting from the feasible output level closest to its previous base point.

When setting physical base points for a Dispatchable Resource at later time points, the ISO shall ensure that they do not fall outside of the bounds established by the Resource's lower and upper dispatch limits for that time point. A Resource's dispatch limits at later time points shall be based on its: (A) dispatch limits from the first time point; (B) response rate; (C) minimum generation level/LOL; (D) Energy Level, USL and LSL (if applicable); and (E) UOL_N or UOL_E, whichever is applicable.

The upper dispatch limit for a Dispatchable Resource at later time points shall be determined by adjusting the upper dispatch limit from the first time point at the Resource's response rate, up to its UOL_N or UOL_E, whichever is applicable, considering Energy Level limitations for ISO-Managed ESRs. The lower dispatch limit for a Dispatchable Resource at later time points shall be determined by adjusting the lower dispatch limit from the first time point at the Resource's response rate, down to its minimum generation level/LOL considering applicable Energy Level limitations for ISO-Managed ESRs, or to a Demand Side Resource's Demand Reduction level.

The RTD Base Point Signals sent to Dispatchable Resources shall be the same as the physical base points determined above.

17.1.2.1.2.1.2 Upper and Lower Dispatch Limits for Intermittent Power Resources That Depend on Wind or Solar Energy as Their Fuel

For all time points of the optimization period, the Lower Dispatch Limit shall be the higher of (a) an Intermittent Power Resource's metered output level at the time that the RTD run

was initialized reduced by its response rate, or (b) zero. The Upper Dispatch Limit shall be the Wind and Solar Energy Forecast for that Resource. For Intermittent Power Resources depending on wind as their fuel in commercial operation as of January 1, 2002 with a name plate capacity of 12 MWs or fewer, the Upper and Lower Dispatch Limits shall be the output level specified by the Wind and Solar Energy Forecast.

17.1.2.1.2.1.3. Setting Physical Basepoints for Fixed Generators and Aggregations

When setting physical base points for Self-Committed Fixed Generators and Aggregations in any time point, the ISO shall consider the feasibility of the Resource reaching the output levels that it specified in its self-commitment request for each time point in the RTD run given: (A) its metered output at the time that the run was initialized; and (B) its response rate.

When setting physical base points for ISO-Committed Fixed Generators and Aggregations in any time point, the ISO shall consider the feasibility of the Resource reaching the output levels scheduled for it by RTC for each time point in the RTD run given: (A) its metered output at the time that the run was initialized; and (B) its response rate.

The RTD Base Point Signals sent to Self-Committed Fixed Generators and Aggregations shall follow the quarter hour operating schedules that those Generators and Aggregations submitted in their real-time self-commitment requests.

The RTD Base Point Signals sent to ISO-Committed Fixed Generators shall follow the quarter hour operating schedules established for those Generators by RTC, regardless of their actual performance. To the extent possible, the ISO shall honor the response rates specified by such Generators when establishing RTD Base Point Signals. If a Self-Committed Fixed Generator's or Aggregation's operating schedule is not feasible based on its real-time self-

commitment requests then its RTD Base Point Signals shall be determined using a response rate consistent with the operating schedule changes.

17.1.2.1.2.2 The Second Pass

The second RTD pass consists of a least bid cost, multi-period, co-optimized dispatch for Energy, Regulation Service, and Operating Reserves that treats: (i) all Fast-Start Resources that are committed by RTC; (ii) Fixed Block Units that do not participate in a Co-located Storage Resource, are capable of starting and meeting Minimum Generation Levels in ten minutes, and have not been committed by RTC; and (iii) all Fixed Block Units otherwise instructed to be online or remain online by the ISO, as flexible (i.e., able to be dispatched anywhere between zero (0) MW and their UOL_N or UOL_E , whichever is applicable), regardless of their minimum run-time status. The dispatch of Generators, including Fast-Start Resources and Fixed Block Units, that participate as Co-located Storage Resources will consider CSR Scheduling Limits. The second pass calculates real-time Energy prices and real-time Shadow Prices for Regulation Service and Operating Reserves that the ISO shall use for settlement purposes pursuant to Section 4, Rate Schedule 15.3, and Rate Schedule 15.4 of this ISO Services Tariff respectively. The ISO will not use schedules for Energy, Regulation Service and Operating Reserves established in the second pass to dispatch Resources.

The upper and lower dispatch limits used for ISO-Committed Fixed and Self-Committed Fixed Resources shall be the same as the physical base points calculated in the first pass.

17.1.2.1.2.2.1 Upper and Lower Dispatch Limits for Dispatchable Resources Other Than Intermittent Power Resources That Depend on Wind or Solar Energy as Their Fuel

The upper dispatch limit for the first time point of the second pass for a Dispatchable Resource shall be the higher of: (A) its upper dispatch limit from the first pass; or (B) its “pricing

base point” from the first time point of the prior RTD interval adjusted up within its Dispatchable range for any possible ramping since that pricing base point was issued less the higher of: (i) the physical base point established during the first pass of the RTD immediately prior to the previous RTD minus the Resource’s metered output level at the time that the current RTD run was initialized, or (ii) zero.

The lower dispatch limit for the first time point of the second pass for a Dispatchable Resource shall be the lower of: (A) its lower dispatch limit from the first pass; or (B) its “pricing base point” from the first time point of the prior RTD interval adjusted down within its Dispatchable range to account for any possible ramping since that pricing base point was issued plus the higher of: (i) the Resource’s metered output level at the time that the current RTD run was initialized minus the physical base point established during the first pass of the RTD immediately prior to the previous RTD, considering the metered Energy Level if applicable; or (ii) zero.

The upper dispatch limit for the later time points of the second pass for a Dispatchable Resource shall be determined by adjusting its upper dispatch limit from the first time point at the Resource’s response rate, up to its UOL_N or UOL_E , whichever is applicable, considering Energy Level limitations for ISO-Managed ESRs. The lower dispatch limit for the later time points of the second pass for a Dispatchable non-Fast-Start Resource shall be determined by adjusting its lower dispatch limit from the first time point at the Resource’s response rate, down to its minimum generation level/LOL, considering Energy Level limitations for ISO-Managed ESRs. The lower dispatch limit for the later time points of the second pass for a Fast Start Resource shall be determined by decreasing its lower dispatch limit from the first time point at the Resource’s response rate, down to zero.

17.1.2.1.2.2.2 Upper and Lower Dispatch Limits for Intermittent Power Resources That Depend on Wind or Solar Energy as Their Fuel

For the first time point and later time points for Intermittent Power Resources that depend on wind or solar energy as their fuel, the Lower Dispatch Limit shall be zero and the Upper Dispatch Limit shall be the Wind and Solar Energy Forecast for that Resource. For Intermittent Power Resources depending on wind as their fuel in commercial operation as of January 1, 2002 with a name plate capacity of 12 MWs or fewer, the Upper and Lower Dispatch Limits shall be the output level specified by the Wind and Solar Energy Forecast.

17.1.2.1.2.3 The Third Pass

The third RTD pass is reserved for future use.

17.1.2.1.3 Variations in RTD-CAM

When the ISO activates RTD-CAM, the following variations to the rules specified above in Sections 17.1.2.1.1 and 17.1.2.1.2 shall apply.

First, if the ISO enters reserve pickup mode: (i) the ISO will produce prices and schedules for a single ten minute interval (not for a multi-point co-optimization period); (ii) the ISO shall set Regulation Service schedules to zero as described in Rate Schedule 15.3 of this ISO Services Tariff; (iii) the ISO will have discretion to make additional Generator and Aggregations commitments before executing the three RTD passes; and (iv) the ISO will have discretion to allow the RTD Base Point Signal of each Dispatchable Generator or Aggregation to be set to the higher of the Generator's or Aggregation's physical base point or its actual supply level.

Second, if the ISO enters maximum generation pickup mode: (i) the ISO will produce prices and schedules for a single five minute interval (not for a multi-point co-optimization period); (ii) the ISO shall set Regulation Service schedules to zero as described in Rate Schedule

15.3 of this ISO Services Tariff; (iii) the ISO will have discretion to make additional Generator and Aggregation commitments in the affected area before executing the three RTD passes; and (iv) the ISO will have discretion to either move the RTD Base Point Signal of each Generator and Aggregation within the affected area towards its UOL_E at its emergency response rate or set it at a level equal to its physical base point.

Third, if the ISO enters basepoints ASAP – no commitments mode it will produce prices and schedules for a single five minute interval (not for a multi-point co-optimization period).

Fourth, if the ISO enters basepoints ASAP – commit as needed mode: (i) the ISO will produce price and schedules for a single five minute interval (not for a multi-point co-optimization period); and (ii) the ISO may make additional commitments of Generators and Aggregations that are capable of starting within ten minutes before executing the three RTD passes.

Fifth, and finally, if the ISO enters re-sequencing mode it will solve for a ten-minute optimization period consisting of two five-minute time points.

17.1.2.1.4 The Real-Time Commitment (“RTC”) Process and Automated Mitigation

Attachment H of this Services Tariff shall establish automated market power mitigation measures that may affect the calculation of Real-Time LBMPs. To the extent that these measures are implemented they shall be incorporated into the RTC software through the establishment of a second, parallel, commitment evaluation that will assess the impact of the mitigation measures. The first evaluation, referred to as the “RTC evaluation,” will determine the schedules and prices that would result using an original set of offers and Bids before any additional mitigation measures, the necessity for which will be considered in the RTC evaluation, are applied. The second evaluation, referred to as the “RT-AMP” evaluation, will

determine the schedules and prices that would result from using the original set of offers and bids as modified by any necessary mitigation measures. Both evaluations will follow the rules governing RTC's operation that are set forth in Section 4 of and this Attachment B to this ISO Services Tariff.

In situations where Attachment H specifies that real-time automated mitigation measures be utilized, the ISO will perform the two parallel RTC evaluations in a manner that enables it to implement mitigation measures one RTC run (i.e., fifteen minutes) in the future. For example, RTC_{15} and $RT-AMP_{15}$ will perform Resource commitment evaluations simultaneously. $RT-AMP_{15}$ will then apply the mitigation "impact" test, account for reference bid levels as appropriate and determine which Resources are actually to be mitigated. This information will then be conveyed to RTC_{30} which will make Resource commitments consistent with the application of the mitigation measures (and will thus indirectly be incorporated into future RTD runs).

17.1.3 Day-Ahead LBMP Calculation Procedures

LBMPs in the Day-Ahead Market are calculated using five passes. The first two passes are commitment and dispatch passes; the last three are dispatch only passes.

Pass 1 consists of a least cost commitment and dispatch to meet Bid Load and reliable operation of the NYS Power System that includes Day-Ahead Reliability Units.

It consists of several steps. Step 1A is a complete Security Constrained Unit Commitment ("SCUC") to meet Bid Load. At the end of this step, committed Fast-Start Resources, Imports, Exports, Virtual Supply, Virtual Load, and non-Fast-Start Resources are dispatched to meet Bid Load. Fast-Start Resources are treated as dispatchable between zero MW and their UOL_N or UOL_E , whichever is applicable. For mitigation purposes, LBMPs are

calculated from this dispatch. Following Step 1A, SCUC tests for automated mitigation procedure (“AMP”) activation.

If AMP is activated, Step 1B tests to determine if the AMP will be triggered by mitigating offer prices subject to mitigation that exceed the conduct threshold to their respective reference prices. These mitigated offer prices together with all originally submitted offer prices not subject to automatic mitigation are then used to commit generation and dispatch energy to meet Bid Load. This step is another iteration of the SCUC process. At the end of Step 1B, committed Fast-Start Resources, Imports, Exports, Virtual Supply, Virtual Load, and non-Fast-Start Resources are again dispatched to meet Bid Load using the same mitigated or unmitigated Bids used to determine the commitment to meet Bid Load. Fast-Start Resources are treated as dispatchable between zero MW and their UOL_N or UOL_E , whichever is applicable. For mitigation purposes, LBMPs are again calculated from this dispatch. The LBMPs determined at the end of Step 1B are compared to the LBMPs determined at the end of Step 1A to determine the hours and zones in which the impact test is met.

In Step 1C, generation offer prices subject to mitigation that exceed the conduct threshold are mitigated for those hours and zones in which the impact test was met in Step 1B. The mitigated offer prices, together with the original unmitigated offer price of units whose offer prices were not subject to mitigation, or did not trigger the conduct or impact thresholds, are used to commit generation and dispatch energy to meet Bid Load. This step is also a complete iteration of the SCUC process. At the end of Step 1C, committed Fast-Start Resources, Imports, Exports, virtual supply, virtual load, and non- Fast-Start Resources are again dispatched to meet Bid Load. Fast-Start Resources are treated as dispatchable between zero MW and their UOL_N or UOL_E , whichever is applicable. The dispatch for Generators, including Fast-Start Resources and

Fixed Block Units, that participate as Co-located Storage Resources will consider CSR Scheduling Limits. For mitigation purposes, LBMPs are again calculated from this dispatch.

All non-Fast-Start Resources committed in the final step of Pass 1 (which could be either step 1A, 1B, or 1C depending on activation of the AMP) are blocked on at least to minimum generation level in Passes 4 through 6. All Energy Storage Resources and Aggregations dispatched in the final step of Pass 1 (which could be either Step 1A, 1B, or 1C depending on activation of the AMP) are blocked on at the dispatch that was determined in Pass 1 in Passes 2 through 4. The resources required to meet local system reliability are determined in Pass 1.

Pass 2 consists of a least cost commitment and dispatch of Fast-Start Resources, Imports, Exports, and non- Fast-Start Resources to meet forecast Load requirements in excess of Bid Load, considering the Wind and Solar Energy Forecast, that minimizes the cost of incremental Minimum Generation and Start Up Bids, given revenues for Minimum Generation Energy based on LBMPs calculated in Pass 1, and assumes all Fast-Start Resources are dispatchable between zero MW and their UOL_N or UOL_E , whichever is applicable. The dispatch for Generators, including Fast-Start Resources, that participate as Co-located Storage Resources will consider CSR Scheduling Limits. Incremental Import Capacity needed to meet forecast Load requirements is determined in Pass 2. Fixed Block Units committed in this pass are not included in the least cost dispatches of Passes 5 or 6. Non-Fast-Start Resources committed in this step are blocked on at least to minimum generation level in Passes 4 through 6. Intermittent Power Resources that depend on wind or solar energy as their fuel committed in this pass as a result of the consideration of the Wind and Solar Energy Forecast are not blocked in Passes 5 or 6.

Pass 3 is reserved for future use.

Pass 4 consists of a least cost dispatch to forecast Load. It is not used to set schedules or prices. It is used for operational purposes and provides a dispatch of Fast-Start Resources, Imports, Exports, and non- Fast-Start Resources committed in Passes 1 or 2. Incremental Import Capacity committed in Pass 2 is re-evaluated and may be reduced if no longer required.

Pass 5 consists of a least cost dispatch of Fast-Start Resources, Imports, Exports, Virtual Supply, Virtual Load, and non- Fast-Start Resources committed to meet Bid Load, based where appropriate on offer prices as mitigated in Pass 1. Fast-Start Resources are treated as dispatchable between zero MW and their UOL_N or UOL_E , whichever is applicable. LBMPs used to settle the Day-Ahead Market are calculated from this dispatch. The Shadow Prices used to compute Day-Ahead Market clearing prices for Regulation Service and for Operating Reserves in Rate Schedules 3 and 4 of this ISO Services Tariff are also calculated from this dispatch. Final schedules for all Imports, Exports, Virtual Supply, Virtual Load, and non-Fast-Start Resources in the Day-Ahead Market are calculated from this dispatch.

Pass 6 consists of a least cost dispatch of all Day-Ahead committed Resources, Imports, Exports, Virtual Supply, Virtual Load, based where appropriate on offer prices as mitigated in Pass 1, with the schedules of all Fixed Block Units committed in the final step of Pass 1 blocked on at maximum Capacity. Final schedules for Fast-Start Resources in the Day-Ahead Market are calculated from this dispatch.

17.1.4 Determination of Transmission Shortage Cost

The applicable Transmission Shortage Cost depends on whether a particular transmission Constraint is associated with a transmission facility or Interface that includes a non-zero constraint reliability margin value. The ISO shall establish constraint reliability margin values for transmission facilities and Interfaces. Non-zero constraint reliability margin values

established by the ISO are normally equal to 20 MW. The ISO assigns a non-zero constraint reliability margin value (normally equal to 5 MW) to certain transmission facilities accommodating power flows out of export constrained areas (or “generation pockets”) that, as further described below, are subject to a different Transmission Shortage Cost (for purposes of this Section 17.1.4, the aforementioned facilities are hereinafter referred to as “Identified Facilities”). The ISO shall post to its website a list of transmission facilities and Interfaces assigned a constraint reliability margin value other than 20 MW. The list posted by the ISO shall also include Identified Facilities and the applicable constraint reliability margin value assigned to each such facility.

Except for Identified Facilities, when evaluating transmission Constraints associated with transmission facilities and Interfaces assigned a non-zero constraint reliability margin value, SCUC, RTC, and RTD shall include consideration of a six-step demand curve consisting of the following components: (1) a MW value of additional available resource capacity equal to or less than 20% of the applicable constraint reliability margin value, at a cost of \$200/MWh; (2) a MW value of additional available resource capacity equal to or less than 40% of the applicable constraint reliability margin value, but greater than 20% of such value, at a cost of \$350/MWh; (3) a MW value of additional available resource capacity equal to or less than 60% of the applicable constraint reliability margin value, but greater than 40% of such value, at a cost of \$600/MWh; (4) a MW value of additional available resource capacity equal to or less than 80% of the applicable constraint reliability margin value, but greater than 60% of such value, at a cost of \$1,500/MWh; (5) a MW value of additional available resource capacity equal to or less than 100% of the applicable constraint reliability margin value, but greater than 80% of such value, at

a cost of \$2,500/MWh; and (6) any MW value of additional available resource capacity greater than the applicable constraint reliability margin value, at a cost of \$4,000/MWh.

When evaluating transmission Constraints associated with Identified Facilities, SCUC, RTC, and RTD shall include consideration of a two-step demand curve consisting of the following components: (1) a MW value of additional available resource capacity equal to or less than the applicable constraint reliability margin value, at a cost of \$100/MWh; and (2) any MW value of additional available resource capacity greater than the applicable constraint reliability margin value, at a cost of \$250/MWh.

For transmission facilities and Interfaces assigned a non-zero constraint reliability margin value, the applicable demand curve, as described above, shall be applied in a manner such that it is considered in resolving, collectively, all applicable transmission Constraints associated with a particular transmission facility or Interface rather than applying a distinct demand curve individually to each such transmission Constraint. In the event of redundant transmission Constraints on in-series transmission facilities or parallel transmission facilities, the most limiting of such redundant transmission Constraints shall be deemed binding and utilized for the purposes of determining the applicable Shadow Price for the redundant transmission Constraints at issue. The less limiting of such redundant transmission Constraints on in-series transmission facilities or parallel transmission facilities shall be deemed non-binding and assigned a zero value Shadow Price. The MW value of the additional available resource capacity associated with each step of the applicable demand curve, as described above, shall be rounded to the nearest whole number.

For transmission facilities and Interfaces with a constraint reliability margin value of zero, the Shadow Price for transmission Constraints associated with such facilities and Interfaces

shall not exceed \$4,000/MWh. SCUC, RTC, and RTD shall not include consideration of additional available resource capacity provided by a demand curve mechanism for such transmission Constraints.

In evaluating transmission Constraints for transmission facilities and Interfaces with a constraint reliability margin value of zero, the ISO will determine whether sufficient available resource capacity exists to solve each transmission Constraint at its applicable limit. If sufficient available resource capacity does not exist to solve the transmission Constraint at its otherwise applicable limit, the ISO shall increase the applicable limit for such transmission Constraint to an amount achievable by the available resource capacity plus 0.2 MW.

Notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein, in circumstances where the ISO is the “Non-Monitoring RTO” with respect to a transmission Constraint associated with a “Flowgate” subject to “M2M” coordination, the ISO’s evaluation of such transmission Constraint in the Real-Time Market shall be consistent with the rules and procedures specified in Section 35.23 of Attachment CC of the ISO OATT. For purposes of this Section 17.1.4, the terms “Non-Monitoring RTO,” “Flowgate,” and “M2M” shall have the meaning specified in Section 35.2.1 of Attachment CC of the ISO OATT.

The ISO may periodically evaluate the Transmission Shortage Cost to determine whether it is necessary to modify the Transmission Shortage Cost to avoid future operational or reliability problems. The ISO will consult with its Market Monitoring Unit after it conducts this evaluation. If the ISO determines that it is necessary to modify the Transmission Shortage Cost in order to avoid future operational or reliability problems the resolution of which would otherwise require recurring operator intervention outside normal market scheduling procedures, in order to avoid among other reliability issues, a violation of NERC Interconnection Reliability

Operating Limits or System Operating Limits, it may temporarily modify it for a period of up to ninety days, provided however the ISO shall file such change with the Commission pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act within 45 days of such modification. If circumstances reasonably allow, the ISO will consult with its Market Monitoring Unit, the Business Issues Committee, the Commission, and the PSC before implementing any such modification. In all circumstances, the ISO will: (i) consult with those entities as soon as reasonably possible after implementing a temporary modification and shall explain the reasons for the change; and (ii) notify Market Participants of any temporary modification.

The responsibilities of the ISO and the Market Monitoring Unit in evaluating and modifying the Transmission Shortage Cost, as necessary are addressed in Attachment O, Section 30.4.6.8.1 of this Market Services Tariff (“Market Monitoring Plan”).

17.1.5 Zonal LBMP Calculation Method

The computation described in Section 17.1.1 of this Attachment B is at the bus level. An eleven (11) zone model will be used for the LBMP billing related to Loads, except for Energy withdrawals by Eligible Generators for later injection onto the grid. The LBMP for a zone will be a Load weighted average of the Load bus LBMPs in the Load Zone. The Load weights which will sum to unity will be calculated from the load bus MW distribution. Each component of the LBMP for a zone will be calculated as a Load weighted average of the Load bus LBMP components in the zone. The LBMP for a zone j can be written as:

$$\gamma_j^Z = \lambda^R + \gamma_j^{L,Z} + \gamma_j^{C,Z}$$

where:

$$\gamma_j^Z = \text{LBMP for zone } j,$$

$\gamma_j^{L,Z} = \sum_{i=1}^n W_i \gamma_i^L$ is the Marginal Losses Component of the LBMP for zone j;

$\gamma_j^{C,Z} = \sum W_i \gamma_i^L$ is the Congestion Component of the LBMP for zone j;

$n =$ number of Load buses in zone j for which LBMPs are calculated; and

$W_i =$ Load weighting factor for bus i.

The NYISO also calculates and posts zonal LBMP for four (4) external zones for informational purposes only. Settlements for External Transactions are determined using the Proxy Generator Bus LBMP. Each external zonal LBMP is equal to the LBMP of the Proxy Generator Bus associated with that external zone. The table below identifies which Proxy Generator Bus LBMP is used to determine each of the posted external zonal LBMPs.

External Zone	External Zone PTID	Proxy Generator Bus	Proxy Generator Bus PTID
HQ	61844	HQ_GEN_WHEEL	23651
NPX	61845	N.E._GEN_SANDY_POND	24062
OH	61846	O.H._GEN_PROXY	24063
PJM	61847	PJM_GEN_KEYSTONE	24065

Consistent with the ISO Services Tariff, LBMPs at Proxy Generator Buses are determined using calculated bus prices as described in this Section 17.1. However, no congestion costs due to Interface ATC Constraints shall be included for the Champlain Hudson Power Express MTF in either the Day-Ahead or Real-Time Market.

17.1.6 Real Time LBMP Calculation Methods for Proxy Generator Buses, Non-Competitive Proxy Generator Buses and Proxy Generator Buses Associated with Designated Scheduled Lines

17.1.6.1 Definitions

Interface ATC Constraint: An Interface ATC Constraint exists when proposed economic transactions over an Interface between the NYCA and the Control Area with which one or more Proxy Generator Bus(es) are associated would exceed the transfer capability for the Interface or for an associated Proxy Generator Bus.

Interface Ramp Constraint: An Interface Ramp Constraint exists when proposed interchange schedule changes pertaining to an Interface between the NYCA and the Control Area with which one or more Proxy Generator Bus(es) are associated would exceed any Ramp Capacity limit imposed by the ISO for the Interface or for an associated Proxy Generator Bus.

NYCA Ramp Constraint: A NYCA Ramp Constraint exists when proposed interchange schedule changes pertaining to the NYCA as a whole would exceed any Ramp Capacity limits in place for the NYCA as a whole.

Proxy Generator Bus Constraint: Any of an Interface ATC Constraint, an Interface Ramp Constraint, or a NYCA Ramp Constraint (individually and collectively).

External Interface Congestion: The product of: (i) the portion of the Congestion Component of the LBMP at a Proxy Generator Bus that is associated with a Proxy Generator Bus Constraint and (ii) a factor, between zero and 1, calculated pursuant to ISO Procedures.

Proxy Generator Bus Border LBMP: The LBMP at a Proxy Generator Bus minus External Interface Congestion at that Proxy Generator Bus.

Unconstrained RTD LBMP: The LBMP as calculated by RTD less any congestion associated with a Proxy Generator Bus Constraint.

17.1.6.2 General Rules

Transmission Customers and Customers with External Generators and Loads can bid into the LBMP Market or participate in Bilateral Transactions. Those with External Generators may arrange LBMP Market sales and/or Bilateral Transactions with Internal or External Loads and External Loads may arrange LBMP Market purchases and/or Bilateral Transactions with Internal Generators.

The Generator and Load locations for which LBMPs will be calculated will initially be limited to a pre-defined set of Proxy Generator Buses. LBMPs will be calculated for each Proxy

Generator Bus within this limited set. When an Interface with multiple Proxy Generator Buses is constrained, the ISO will apply the constraint to all of the Proxy Generator Buses located at that Interface. Except as set forth in Sections 17.1.6.3 and 17.1.6.4, the NYISO will calculate the three components of LBMP for Transactions at a Proxy Generator Bus as provided in the tables below.

When determining the External Interface Congestion, if any, to apply to determine the LBMP for RTD intervals that bridge two RTC intervals, the NYISO shall use the External Interface Congestion associated with the second (later) RTC interval.

17.1.6.2.1 Pricing rules for Dynamically Scheduled Proxy Generator Buses

The pricing rules for Dynamically Scheduled Proxy Generator Buses are to be determined.

17.1.6.2.2 Pricing rules for Variably Scheduled Proxy Generator Buses

The pricing rules for Variably Scheduled Proxy Generator Buses are provided in the following table.

Rule No.	Proxy Generator Bus Constraint affecting External Schedules at location <i>a</i>	Direction of Proxy Generator Bus Constraint	Real-Time Pricing Rule (for location <i>a</i>)
1	Unconstrained in RTC ₁₅ , Rolling RTC and RTD	N/A	Real-Time $LBMP_a = RTD LBMP_a$
2	The Rolling RTC used to schedule External Transactions in a given 15-minute interval is subject to a Proxy Generator Bus Constraint	Into NYCA or out of NYCA (Import or Export)	Real-Time $LBMP_a = RTD LBMP_a + \text{Rolling RTC External Interface Congestion}_a$

17.1.6.2.3 Pricing rules for Proxy Generator Buses that are not Dynamically Scheduled or Variably Scheduled

The pricing rules for Proxy Generator Buses that are not Dynamically Scheduled or Variably Scheduled Proxy Generator Buses are provided in the following table.

Rule No.	Proxy Generator Bus Constraint affecting External Schedules at location a	Direction of Proxy Generator Bus Constraint	Real-Time Pricing Rule (for location a)
1	Unconstrained in RTC ₁₅ , Rolling RTC and RTD	N/A	Real-Time LBMP _{a} = RTD LBMP _{a}
3	RTC ₁₅ is subject to a Proxy Generator Bus Constraint	Into NYCA or out of NYCA (Import or Export)	Real-Time LBMP _{a} = RTD LBMP _{a} + RTC ₁₅ External Interface Congestion _{a}

17.1.6.3 Rules for Non-Competitive Proxy Generator Buses and Associated Interfaces

Real-Time LBMPs for an Interface that is associated with one or more Non-Competitive Proxy Generator Buses or for a Non-Competitive Proxy Generator Bus shall be determined as provided in the tables below. Non-Competitive Proxy Generator Buses are identified in Section 4.4.4 of the Services Tariff.

17.1.6.3.1 Pricing rules for Non-Competitive, Dynamically Scheduled Proxy Generator Buses

The pricing rules for Non-Competitive, Dynamically Scheduled Proxy Generator Buses are to be determined.

17.1.6.3.2 Pricing rules for Non-Competitive, Variably Scheduled Proxy Generator Buses

The pricing rules for Non-Competitive, Variably Scheduled Proxy Generator Buses are provided in the following table.

Rule No.	Proxy Generator Bus Constraint affecting External Schedules at location <i>a</i>	Direction of Proxy Generator Bus Constraint	Real-Time Pricing Rule (for location <i>a</i>)
1	Unconstrained in RTC ₁₅ , Rolling RTC and RTD	N/A	Real-Time LBMP _{<i>a</i>} = RTD LBMP _{<i>a</i>}
4	The Rolling RTC used to schedule External Transactions in a given 15-minute interval is subject to an Interface ATC* or Interface RampConstraint	Into NYCA (Import)	If Rolling RTC Proxy Generator Bus LBMP _{<i>a</i>} > 0, then Real-Time LBMP _{<i>a</i>} = RTD LBMP _{<i>a</i>} + Rolling RTC External Interface Congestion _{<i>a</i>} Otherwise, Real-Time LBMP _{<i>a</i>} = Minimum of (i) RTD LBMP _{<i>a</i>} and (ii) zero
5	The Rolling RTC used to schedule External Transactions in a given 15-minute interval is subject to an Interface ATC* or Interface Ramp Constraint	Out of NYCA (Export)	If Rolling RTC Proxy Generator Bus LBMP _{<i>a</i>} < 0, then Real-Time LBMP _{<i>a</i>} = RTD LBMP _{<i>a</i>} + Rolling RTC External Interface Congestion _{<i>a</i>} Otherwise, Real-Time LBMP _{<i>a</i>} = RTD LBMP _{<i>a</i>}

* However, no congestion costs due to Interface ATC Constraints shall be included for the Champlain Hudson Power Express MTF.

17.1.6.3.3 Pricing rules for Non-Competitive Proxy Generator Buses that are not Dynamically Scheduled or Variably Scheduled Proxy Generator Buses

The pricing rules for Non-Competitive Proxy Generator Buses that are not Dynamically Scheduled or Variably Scheduled Proxy Generator Buses are provided in the following table.

Rule No.	Proxy Generator Bus Constraint affecting External Schedules at location <i>a</i>	Direction of Proxy Generator Bus Constraint	Real-Time Pricing Rule (for location <i>a</i>)
1	Unconstrained in RTC ₁₅ , Rolling RTC and RTD	N/A	Real-Time LBMP _{<i>a</i>} = RTD LBMP _{<i>a</i>}
6	RTC ₁₅ is subject to an Interface ATC or Interface Ramp Constraint	Into NYCA (Import)	If RTC ₁₅ Proxy Generator Bus LBMP _{<i>a</i>} > 0, then Real-Time LBMP _{<i>a</i>} = RTD LBMP _{<i>a</i>} + RTC ₁₅ External Interface Congestion _{<i>a</i>} Otherwise, Real-Time LBMP _{<i>a</i>} = Minimum of (i) RTD LBMP _{<i>a</i>} and (ii) zero
7	RTC ₁₅ is subject to an Interface ATC or Interface Ramp Constraint	Out of NYCA (Export)	If RTC ₁₅ Proxy Generator Bus LBMP _{<i>a</i>} < 0, then Real-Time LBMP _{<i>a</i>} = RTD LBMP _{<i>a</i>} + RTC ₁₅ External Interface Congestion _{<i>a</i>} Otherwise, Real-Time LBMP _{<i>a</i>} = RTD LBMP _{<i>a</i>}

17.1.6.4 Special Pricing Rules for Proxy Generator Buses Associated with Designated Scheduled Lines

Real-Time LBMPs for the Proxy Generator Buses associated with designated Scheduled Lines shall be determined as provided in the tables below. The Proxy Generator Buses that are associated with designated Scheduled Lines are identified in Section 4.4.4 of the Services Tariff.

17.1.6.4.1 Pricing rules for Dynamically Scheduled Proxy Generator Buses that are associated with Designated Scheduled Lines

The pricing rules for Dynamically Scheduled Proxy Generator Buses that are associated with designated Scheduled Lines are to be determined.

17.1.6.4.2 Pricing rules for Variably Scheduled Proxy Generator Buses that are associated with Designated Scheduled Lines

The pricing rules for Variably Scheduled Proxy Generator Buses that are associated with designated Scheduled Lines are provided in the following table.

Rule No.	Proxy Generator Bus Constraint affecting External Schedules at location a	Direction of Proxy Generator Bus Constraint	Real-Time Pricing Rule (for location a)
1	Unconstrained in RTC_{15} , Rolling RTC and RTD	N/A	Real-Time $LBMP_a = RTD LBMP_a$
4	The Rolling RTC used to schedule External Transactions in a given 15-minute interval is subject to an Interface ATC Constraint	Into NYCA (Import)	If Rolling RTC Proxy Generator Bus $LBMP_a > 0$, then Real-Time $LBMP_a = RTD LBMP_a + \text{Rolling RTC External Interface Congestion}_a$ Otherwise, Real-Time $LBMP_a = \text{Minimum of (i) } RTD LBMP_a \text{ and (ii) zero}$
5	The Rolling RTC used to schedule External Transactions in a given 15-minute interval is subject to an Interface ATC Constraint	Out of NYCA (Export)	If Rolling RTC Proxy Generator Bus $LBMP_a < 0$, then Real-Time $LBMP_a = RTD LBMP_a + \text{Rolling RTC External Interface Congestion}_a$ Otherwise, Real-Time $LBMP_a = RTD LBMP_a$

17.1.6.4.3 Pricing rules for Proxy Generator Buses that are associated with Designated Scheduled Lines that are not Dynamically Scheduled or Variably Scheduled Proxy Generator Buses

The pricing rules for Proxy Generator Buses that are associated with designated Scheduled Lines that are not Dynamically Scheduled or Variably Scheduled Proxy Generator Buses, are provided in the following table.

Rule No.	Proxy Generator Bus Constraint affecting External Schedules at location a	Direction of Proxy Generator Bus Constraint	Real-Time Pricing Rule (for location a)
1	Unconstrained in RTC_{15} , Rolling RTC and RTD	N/A	Real-Time $LBMP_a = RTD LBMP_a$
6	RTC_{15} is subject to an Interface ATC Constraint	Into NYCA (Import)	If RTC_{15} Proxy Generator Bus $LBMP_a > 0$, then Real-Time $LBMP_a = RTD LBMP_a + RTC_{15} \text{ External Interface Congestion}_a$ Otherwise, Real-Time $LBMP_a = \text{Minimum of (i) } RTD LBMP_a \text{ and (ii) zero}$

Rule No.	Proxy Generator Bus Constraint affecting External Schedules at location <i>a</i>	Direction of Proxy Generator Bus Constraint	Real-Time Pricing Rule (for location <i>a</i>)
7	RTC ₁₅ is subject to an Interface ATC Constraint	Out of NYCA (Export)	If RTC ₁₅ Proxy Generator Bus LBMP _a < 0, then Real-Time LBMP _a = RTD LBMP _a + RTC ₁₅ External Interface Congestion _a Otherwise, Real-Time LBMP _a = RTD LBMP _a

17.1.6.5 Method of Calculating Marginal Loss and Congestion Components of Real-Time LBMP at Non-Competitive Proxy Generator Buses and Proxy Generator Buses that are Subject to the Special Pricing Rule for Designated Scheduled Lines

Under the conditions specified below, the Marginal Losses Component and the Congestion Component of the Real-Time LBMP, calculated pursuant to the preceding paragraphs in Sections 17.1.6.3 and 17.1.6.4, shall be constructed as follows:

When the Real-Time LBMP is set to zero and that zero price was not the result of using the RTD, RTC or SCUC-determined LBMP;

$$\text{Marginal Losses Component of the Real-Time LBMP} = \text{LOSSES}_{\text{RTD PROXY GENERATOR BUS}}$$

and

$$\text{Congestion Component of the Real-Time LBMP} = -(\text{Energy}_{\text{RTD REF BUS}} + \text{LOSSES}_{\text{RTD PROXY GENERATOR BUS}})$$

where:

$\text{Energy}_{\text{RTD REF BUS}}$ = The marginal Bid cost of providing Energy at the reference Bus, as calculated by RTD for that 5-minute interval; and

$\text{LOSSES}_{\text{RTD PROXY GENERATOR BUS}}$ = The Marginal Losses Component of the LBMP as calculated by RTD for that 5-minute interval at the Non-Competitive Proxy Generator Bus or Proxy Generator Bus associated with a designated Scheduled Line.

23.2 Conduct Warranting Mitigation

23.2.1 Definitions

The following definitions are applicable to this Attachment H:

For purposes of Section 23.4.5 of this Attachment H, “**Additional CRIS MW**” shall mean the MW of Capacity for which CRIS was requested for an Examined Facility pursuant to the provisions in ISO OATT Sections 25, 30, 32, or 40 (OATT Attachments S, X, Z, or HH), including either: (i) all, or a portion, of the MW of Capacity of that Examined Facility for which CRIS had not been obtained in prior Class Years through a prior Class Year process, in prior Cluster Studies through a prior Cluster Study Process, or through a transfer completed in accordance with OATT Sections 25 or 40 (OATT Attachment S or HH); and/or (ii) all, or a portion, of an increase in the Capacity of that Examined Facility. Additional CRIS MW does not include any MW quantity of CRIS that is exempt from an Offer Floor pursuant to Section 23.4.5.7.7(a) or (b), Section 23.4.5.7.8, or an increase of 2 MW or less in an Examined Facility’s MW quantity of CRIS obtained pursuant to Section 30.3.2.6 of Attachment X or Section 40.5.6.6 of Attachment HH to the OATT.

“**Additional SDU Study**” shall mean a deliverability study that an Interconnection Customer may elect to pursue as that term is defined in, as applicable, OATT Section 25 or 40 (OATT Attachment S or HH).

For purposes of Section 23.4.5 of this Attachment H, “**Affiliated Entity**” shall mean, with respect to a person or Entity:

- i) all persons or Entities that directly or indirectly control such person or Entity;
- ii) all persons or Entities that are directly or indirectly controlled by or under common control with such person or Entity, and (1) are authorized under ISO Procedures to participate in a market for Capacity administered by the ISO, or (2) possess, directly or indirectly, an ownership, voting or equivalent interest of ten percent or more in a Mitigated Capacity Zone Installed Capacity Supplier;
- iii) all persons or Entities that provide services to such person or Entity, or for which such person or Entity provides services, if such services relate to the determination or submission of offers for Unforced Capacity in a market administered by the ISO or offers of capacity from a Generator electrically located in a MCZ Import Constrained Locality; or
- iv) all persons or Entities, except if for ISP UCAP MW or an RMR Generator, with which such person or Entity has any form of agreement under which such person or Entity has retained or has conferred rights of (i) Control of Unforced Capacity or (ii) the ability to determine the quantity or price of offers to supply capacity from a Generator that has Capacity Resource Interconnection Service, pursuant to the applicable provisions of Attachments S, X, Z, or HH to the ISO OATT and is electrically located in an MCZ Import Constrained Locality, even if such capacity does not meet the requirements to be Unforced Capacity.

In the foregoing definition, “**control**” means the possession, directly or indirectly, of the power to direct the management or policies of a person or Entity, and shall be rebuttably presumed from an ownership, voting or equivalent interest of ten percent or more.

Catastrophic Failure: shall mean a Forced Outage initially suffered by a Generator which would have reasonably required a repair time of at least 270 days, from the date of the event resulting in the Forced Outage, had it, or a comparable Forced Outage been suffered at a generating facility that is reasonably the same as or similar to the Generator’s, the owner of which is intending to return it to service. Repair time includes the reasonable number of days for initial clean up, safety inspections, engineering assessment; damage assessment, cost estimates; site prep and clean up, equipment orders, and actual repair, provided the foregoing are necessitated by the Catastrophic Failure. The determination that a Generator has suffered a Catastrophic Failure shall be based on a technical/engineering evaluation, shall be made by the ISO, and may be made at any time following the event that caused the Forced Outage provided that adequate information is provided to the ISO to support such determination.

“**Class Year Study**” means a Class Year Interconnection Facilities Study as that term is defined in OATT Section 25 (OATT Attachment S).

“**Cleared UCAP**” means the amount of MW (rounded down to the nearest tenth of a MW) that had been subject to an Offer Floor but has cleared in accordance with Section 23.4.5.7.

Cluster Baseline Assessment means an assessment conducted by the ISO as defined, as applicable, in OATT Section 25 or 40 (OATT Attachment S or HH). Cluster Baseline Assessment shall include the term “Annual Transmission Baseline Assessment” as that term is defined in Section 25 of the ISO OATT (Attachment S).

“**Cluster Study**” means a Cluster Study as that term is defined in OATT Section 40 (OATT Attachment HH).

“Cluster Study Phase I Start Date” shall mean the Phase 1 Study Start Date as that term defined in Section 40.1 to the ISO OATT.

“**Commenced Construction**” shall mean (a) all of the following site preparation work is completed: ingress and egress routes exist; the site on which the Project will be located is cleared and graded; there is power service to the site; footings are prepared; and foundations have been poured consistent with purchased equipment specifications and project design; or (b) the following financial commitments have been made: (i) (A) an engineering, procurement, and construction contract (“EPC”) has been executed by all parties and is effective; or (B) contracts (collectively, “EPC Equivalents”) for all of the following have been executed by all parties and is effective: (1) project engineering, (2) procurement of all major equipment, and (3) construction of the Project, and (ii) the cumulative payments made by the Interconnection Customer under the EPC or EPC Equivalents to the counterparties to those respective agreements is equal to at least thirty (30) percent of the total costs of the EPC or EPC Equivalents.

“**Competitive and Non-Discriminatory Hedging Contract**” shall mean a contract to hedge a risk associated with a product offered in the ISO Administered Markets between a Non-Qualifying Entry Sponsor and the Interconnection Customer, Owner or Operator of an Examined

Facility with a term that shall not exceed three years (inclusive of all options to extend and extensions) and that the ISO determines has been executed pursuant to a procurement process that satisfies the requirements enumerated below. Competitive and Non-Discriminatory Hedging Contracts shall not be deemed to be a non-qualifying contractual relationship that would prevent an Examined Facility from obtaining a Competitive Entry Exemption pursuant to 23.4.5.7.9 of Attachment H of this Services Tariff. The ISO shall determine that a contract is a Competitive and Non-Discriminatory Hedging Contract only if it concludes, and the Non-Qualifying Entry Sponsor executes a certification confirming that, the contract was executed through a procurement process that met all of the following requirements: (A) both new and existing resources satisfy the requirements of the procurement; (B) the requirements of the procurement were fully objective and transparent; (C) the contract was awarded based on the lowest cost offers of qualified bidders that responded to the solicitation; (D) the procurement terms did not restrict the type of capacity resources that may participate in, and satisfy the requirements of, the procurement; (E) the procurement terms did not include selection criteria that could otherwise give preference to new resources; and (F) the procurement terms did not use indirect means to discriminate against existing resources, including, but not limited to, by imposing geographic constraints, unit fuel requirements, maximum unit heat-rate requirements or requirements for new construction.

“**Constrained Area**” shall mean: (a) the In-City area, including any areas subject to transmission constraints within the In-City area that give rise to significant locational market power; and (b) any other area in the New York Control Area that has been identified by the ISO as subject to transmission constraints that give rise to significant locational market power, and that has been approved by the Commission for designation as a Constrained Area.

For purposes of Section 23.4.5 of this Attachment H, “**Control**” with respect to Unforced Capacity shall mean the ability to determine the quantity or price of offers to supply Unforced Capacity from a Mitigated Capacity Zone Installed Capacity Supplier submitted into an ICAP Spot Market Auction; but excluding ISP UCAP MW or UCAP from an RMR Generator.

For purposes of Section 23.4.5.6 of this Attachment H, “**CRIS Transfer Confirmation Date**” shall mean the date in which the transferor and transferee confirms the proposed CRIS transfer (e.g., through a CRIS transfer notification form submitted prior to August 1st for same location CRIS transfers for active facilities looking to transfer CRIS rights for the next Capability Year) and is considered by ISO, in consultation with the Market Monitoring Unit, to be a date which will become, essentially and practicably, an irreversible action for the transferor with respect to effectuating the CRIS transfer and for purposes with respect to the ISO’s issuance of a final physical withholding determination to the transferor.

For purposes of Section 23.4.5.7 “**CRIS MW**” shall mean the MW of Capacity for which CRIS was assigned to a Generator or UDR project pursuant to ISO OATT Sections 25, 30, 32, or 40 (OATT Attachments S, X, Z, or HH).

“**Electric Facility**” shall mean a Generator, an Aggregation or an electric transmission facility.

For purposes of Section 23.4.5 of this Attachment H, “**Entity**” shall mean a corporation, partnership, limited liability corporation or partnership, firm, joint venture, association, joint-

stock company, trust, unincorporated organization or other form of legal or juridical organization or entity.

“Examined Facility” shall mean (I) each proposed new Generator and proposed new UDR project, and each existing Generator that has ERIS only and no CRIS, that is a member of the Class Year Study or Cluster Study, Additional SDU Study or Expedited Deliverability Study that requested CRIS , or that requested an evaluation of the transfer of CRIS rights from another location in the Class Year Study or Cluster Study commencing in the calendar year in which the Class Year Study determination is being made (the Capability Periods of expected entry as further described below in this Section, the “Mitigation Study Period”), and (II) each (i) existing Generator that did not have CRIS rights, and (ii) proposed new Generator and proposed new UDR project, provided such Generator under Subsection (i) or (ii) is an expected recipient of transferred CRIS rights at the same location regarding which the ISO has been notified by the transferor or the transferee of a transfer pursuant to, as applicable, Section 25.9.4 of Attachment S or Section 40.18.3 of Attachment HH to the ISO OATT that will be effective on a date within the Mitigation Study Period (“Expected CRIS Transferee”). The term “Examined Facilities” does not include any facility exempt from an Offer Floor pursuant to the provisions of Section 23.4.5.7.7; or any Generator or UDR project that meets the definition of Excluded Facilities below. The term “Generator” includes each Generator that plans to participate in a DER Aggregation. In the case of a Project that is comprised of Co-located Storage Resources or a Project that is a Hybrid Storage Resource, each participating Generator or component facility shall be treated as a separate Examined Facility unless the Developer of the Project certifies that all of the Project’s participating Generators or component facilities qualify as an Excluded Facility, as defined in this Services Tariff, and it is determined to meet the criteria provided in that definition.

“Exceptional Circumstances”: shall mean one or more unavoidable circumstances, as determined by the ISO, that individually or collectively render as unavailable the data necessary for the ISO to perform an audit and review of a Market Party, pursuant to Section 23.4.5.6.2 of this Services Tariff. Exceptional Circumstances may include, but are not limited to: the inaccessibility of the physical facility; the inaccessibility of necessary documentation or other data; and the unavailability of information regarding the regulatory obligations with which the Market Party will be required to comply in order to return its Generator to service which regulatory obligations are not yet known but which will be made known by the applicable regulatory authority under existing laws and regulations provided that none of the above described circumstances are the result of delay or inaction by the Market Party. The magnitude of the repair cost, alone, shall not be an Exceptional Circumstance.

Excluded Facilities shall mean Resources or UDR project(s) that are qualified to satisfy the goals specified in the New York State Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act, Chapter 106 of the Laws of 2019, as may be amended (“CLCPA”) and such Resources and UDR Projects will not be subject to review by the NYISO under the BSM rules or otherwise subject to an Offer Floor. Excluded Facilities shall include but are not limited to Resources comprised exclusively of one or more the following technologies: energy storage, demand response, wind generation, solar generation, geothermal generation, hydroelectric generation (which may also include generation created by tidal, wave and other ocean activity), and fuel cells that operate without utilizing fossil fuel. Excluded Facilities will also include Resources using additional

technology types not explicitly listed above and UDR projects that satisfy the CLCPA goals, if the Developer, Owner or Operator of the Resource or UDR project certifies in accordance with Section 23.4.5.7.5 of this Services Tariff and ISO Procedures that the Resource or UDR Project meets one of the following criteria:(i) the Resource technology type is specifically identified by the CLCPA or is publicly identified by New York State as supporting the goals of the CLCPA; (ii) the Resource or UDR project has a contract with the State of New York to achieve the goals of the CLCPA (such as a Tier 1 or Tier 4 contract with NYSERDA); or (iii) the Resource or UDR project is eligible to receive a contract authorized by New York State that is supporting the goals of the CLCPA (such as a Tier 1 or Tier 4 contract with NYSERDA).

“Expedited Deliverability Study” shall mean a deliverability study that an eligible Interconnection Customer may elect to pursue as that term is defined in OATT Section 40 (OATT Attachment HH) that may determine the extent to which an existing or proposed facility satisfies the NYISO Deliverability Interconnection Standard at its requested CRIS level without the need for System Deliverability Upgrades. The schedule and scope of the study is defined in Attachment HH.

“Final Decision Round” shall have the meaning specified, as applicable, in Section 25 or 40 (Attachment S or HH) of the ISO’s Open Access Transmission Tariff.

For purposes of Section 23.4.5 of this Attachment H, **“Going-Forward Costs”** shall mean: either (a) the costs, including but not limited to mandatory capital expenditures necessary to comply with federal or state environmental, safety or reliability requirements that must be met in order to supply Installed Capacity, net of anticipated energy and ancillary services revenues, as determined by the ISO as specified in Section 23.4.5.3, for each of the following instances, as applicable, of supplying Installed Capacity that could be avoided if an Installed Capacity Supplier otherwise capable of supplying Installed Capacity were either (1) to cease supplying Installed Capacity and Energy for a period of one year or more while retaining the ability to re-enter such markets, or (2) to retire permanently from supplying Installed Capacity and Energy; or (b) the opportunity costs of foregone sales outside of a Mitigated Capacity Zone, net of costs that would have been incurred as a result of the foregone sale if it had taken place.

For purposes of Section 23.4.5 of this Attachment H, **“Indicative Mitigation Net CONE”** shall mean the capacity price calculated by the ISO for informational purposes only if there is not an effective ICAP Demand Curve and the Commission (i) has accepted an ICAP Demand Curve for the Mitigated Capacity Zone that will become effective when the Mitigated Capacity Zone is first effective, in which case, the Indicative Mitigation Net CONE shall be the capacity price on such ICAP Demand Curve for the Mitigated Capacity Zone corresponding to the average amount of excess capacity above the Indicative NCZ Locational Minimum Installed Capacity Requirement, as applicable, expressed as a percentage of that requirement that formed the basis for the ICAP Demand Curve accepted by the Commission; or, (ii) has not accepted an ICAP Demand Curve for the Mitigated Capacity Zone, but the ISO has filed an ICAP Demand Curve for the Mitigated Capacity Zone pursuant to Services Tariff Section 5.14.1.2.2.4.11, in which case the Indicative Mitigation Net CONE shall be the capacity price on such ICAP Demand Curve corresponding to the average amount of excess capacity above the Indicative NCZ Locational Minimum Installed Capacity Requirement, expressed as a percentage of that requirement, that formed the basis for such ICAP Demand Curve.

“**Initial Decision Round**” shall have the meaning specified in Section 40 (Attachment HH) of the ISO OATT. Initial Decision Round shall include the term Initial Decision Period as that term is defined in Section 25 of the ISO OATT (Attachment S).

“**Interconnection Customer**” shall have the meaning specified in Section 40 (Attachment HH) of the ISO’s Open Access Transmission Tariff. Interconnection Customer shall include the term Developer as that term is defined in Section 25 or 30 of the ISO OATT (Attachment S or X).

“**Interconnection Facilities Study Agreement**” shall have the meaning specified in Section 30 (Attachment X) of the ISO’s Open Access Transmission Tariff.

“**Market Monitoring Unit**” shall have the same meaning in these Mitigation Measures as it has in Attachment O.

“**Market Party**” shall mean any person or entity that is, or for purposes of the determinations to be made pursuant to Section 23.4.5.7 of this Attachment H proposes or plans a Project that would be, a buyer and/or a seller in; or that makes bids or offers to buy or sell in; or that schedules or seeks to schedule Transactions with the ISO in or affecting any of the ISO Administered Markets including through the submission of bids or offers into any External Control Area, or any combination of the foregoing.

For purposes of Section 23.4.5 of this Attachment H, “**Mitigated UCAP**” shall mean one or more megawatts of Unforced Capacity that are subject to Control by a Market Party that has been identified by the ISO as a Pivotal Supplier.

For purposes of Section 23.4.5 of this Attachment H, “**Mitigation Net CONE**” shall mean the capacity price on the currently effective ICAP Demand Curve for the Mitigated Capacity Zone corresponding to the average amount of excess capacity above the Mitigated Capacity Zone Installed Capacity requirement, expressed as a percentage of that requirement, that formed the basis for the ICAP Demand Curve approved by the Commission.

“**Mitigation Study Period**” shall mean the duration of time extending six consecutive Capability Periods and beginning with the Starting Capability Period associated with a Class Year Study, Cluster Study, Additional SDU Study, and/or Expedited Deliverability Study.

“**NCZ Examined Project**” shall mean any Generator or UDR project that is not an Excluded Facility and that is not exempt pursuant to 23.4.5.7.8 and either (i) is in a Class Year or Cluster Study on the date the Commission accepts the first ICAP Demand Curve to apply to a Mitigated Capacity Zone or (ii) meets the criteria found in (II) of the definition of Examined Facility above. An NCZ Examined Project may be at any phase of development or in operation or an Installed Capacity Supplier.

For purposes of Section 23.4.5 of this Attachment H, “**Net Cost of New Entry**”, or “**Net CONE**” shall mean the localized levelized embedded costs of a peaking unit in a Mitigated Capacity Zone, net of the likely projected annual Energy and Ancillary Services revenues of such unit, as determined in connection with establishing the Demand Curve for a Mitigated Capacity Zone pursuant to Section 5.14.1.2 of the Services Tariff, or as escalated as specified in Section 23.4.5.7 of Attachment H.

“**New Capacity**” shall mean a new Generator, a substantial addition to the capacity of an existing Generator, or the reactivation of all or a portion of a Generator that has been out of service for five years or more that commences commercial service after the effective date of this definition.

For the purposes of Section 23.4.5 of this Attachment H, “**Non-Qualifying Entry Sponsors**” shall mean a Transmission Owner, Public Power Entity, or any other entity with a Transmission District in the NYCA, or an agency or instrumentality of New York State or a political subdivision thereof.

For purposes of Section 23.4.5 of this Attachment H, “**Offer Floor**” for a Mitigated Capacity Zone Installed Capacity Supplier that is not a Special Case Resource shall mean the lesser of (i) a numerical value equal to 75% of the Mitigation Net CONE translated into a seasonally adjusted monthly UCAP value (“Mitigation Net CONE Offer Floor”), or (ii) the numerical value that is the first year value of the Unit Net CONE determined as specified in Section 23.4.5.7, translated into a seasonally adjusted monthly UCAP value using an appropriate class outage rate, (“Unit Net CONE Offer Floor”). The Offer Floor for Additional CRIS MW shall mean a numerical value determined as specified in Section 23.4.5.7.6.

“**Owner**” shall have the meaning specified in Section 31.1.1 of the ISO’s Open Access Transmission Tariff.

“**Part A Exemption**” shall mean an exemption awarded to an Examined Facility (i) pursuant to the Part A Exemption Test conducted by the ISO prior to the Class Year immediately following Class Year 2021 as described in Section 23.4.5.7.2(a) of the Services Tariff or (ii) pursuant to the Part A Exemption Test described in Section 23.4.5.7.3.1 of the Services Tariff which shall be conducted by the ISO beginning with Class Year immediately following Class Year 2021, and in all subsequent Class Year Studies, Cluster Studies, Additional SDU Studies, and Expedited Deliverability Studies that are commenced after August 1, 2022.

“**Part A Exemption Test**” shall mean (i) for any Class Year Study that was conducted prior to the Class Year immediately following Class Year 2021, the test conducted by the ISO to determine if an Examined Facility would be exempt from an Offer Floor under Section 23.4.5.7.2 (a) of the Services Tariff; or (ii) for the Class Year immediately following Class Year 2021 and any subsequent Class Year Study, Cluster Study, Additional SDU Study, and Expedited Deliverability Study that starts after August 1, 2022, the test conducted by the ISO to determine if an Examined Facility shall be exempt from an Offer Floor in accordance with Section 23.4.5.7.3.1 of the Services Tariff.

“**Part A Group 1 Examined Facilities**” for the Class Year immediately following Class Year 2021 and any subsequent Class Year Study, Cluster Study, Additional SDU Study, and Expedited Deliverability Study that starts after August 1, 2022 shall mean the set of Examined Facilities being evaluated for the Part A Exemption Test described in Section 23.4.5.7.3.1 using the Part A Mitigation Study Period Years 1 through 3 as determined by the ISO pursuant to the criteria set forth in Section 23.4.5.7.3.1.3 of the Services Tariff.

“Part A Group 2 Examined Facilities” for the Class Year immediately following Class Year 2021 and any subsequent Class Year Study, Cluster Study, Additional SDU Study, and Expedited Deliverability Study that starts after August 1, 2022 shall mean the set of Examined Facilities being evaluated for the Part A Exemption Test described in Section 23.4.5.7.3.1 using the Part A Mitigation Study Period Years 4 through 6 as determined by the ISO pursuant to the criteria set forth in Section 23.4.5.7.3.1.3 of the Services Tariff.

“Part A Mitigation Study Period Years 1 through 3” for the Class Year immediately following Class Year 2021 and any subsequent Class Year Study, Cluster Study, Additional SDU Study, and any Expedited Deliverability Study that starts after August 1, 2022 shall mean the evaluation period applied to Part A Group 1 Examined Facilities which shall be considered concurrently to receive a Part A Exemption in accordance with Section 23.4.5.7.3.1 of the Services Tariff. Such evaluation period shall be composed of the three consecutive Capability Years starting with the first Capability Year that will commence two years from the Cluster Study Phase I Start Date.

“Part A Mitigation Study Period Years 4 through 6” for the Class Year immediately following the Class Year 2021 and any subsequent Class Year Study, Cluster Study, Additional SDU Study, and any Expedited Deliverability Study that starts after August 1, 2022 shall mean the evaluation period applied to Part A Group 2 Examined Facilities which shall be considered concurrently to receive a Part A Exemption in accordance with Section 23.4.5.7.3.1 of the Services Tariff. Such evaluation period shall be composed of the three consecutive Capability Years starting with the first Capability Year immediately following the Part A Mitigation Study Period Years 1 through 3.

“Part B Exemption Test” shall mean the test conducted by the ISO in accordance with 23.4.5.7.2 (b) and ISO Procedures for an Examined Facility in any Class Year Study, Cluster Study, Additional SDU Study, or Expedited Deliverability Study.

For purposes of Section 23.4.5 of this Attachment H, **“Pivotal Supplier”** shall mean (i) for the New York City Locality, a Market Party that, together with any of its Affiliated Entities, (a) Controls 500 MW or more of Unforced Capacity, and (b) Controls Unforced Capacity some portion of which is necessary to meet the New York City Locality Locational Minimum Installed Capacity Requirement in an ICAP Spot Market Auction; (ii) for the G-J Locality, a Market Party that, together with any of its Affiliated Entities, (a) Controls 650 MW or more of Unforced Capacity; and (b) Controls Unforced Capacity some portion of which is necessary to meet the G-J Locality Locational Minimum Installed Capacity Requirement in an ICAP Spot Market Auction; and (iii) for each Mitigated Capacity Zone except the New York City Locality and the G-J Locality, if any, a Market Party that Controls at least the quantity of MW of Unforced Capacity specified for the Mitigated Capacity Zone and accepted by the Commission. Unforced Capacity that are MW of an External Sale of Capacity shall not be included in the foregoing calculations.

“Project Cost Allocation” shall have the meaning specified, as applicable, in Section 25 or 40 (Attachment S or HH) of the ISO’s Open Access Transmission Tariff.

“Public Policy Resource” shall mean for purposes of Section 23.4.5 of this Attachment H, an Examined Facility that is determined by the ISO to be a zero-emitting resource and that does not meet the definition of Excluded Facility under Section 23.2 of this Attachment H and, where applicable, as also determined by the NYISO under Section 23.4.5.7.5.1 of this Attachment H. A resource may request an ex-ante determination from the ISO if it qualifies as a zero-emitting resource prior to their entrance into a Class Year Study, Cluster Study, or Expedited Deliverability Study. The ISO, in consultation with the MMU, shall issue a determination no later than 20 days after the necessary information has been submitted for consideration. This determination will be binding as long as the resource’s technology and characteristics are not modified before issuance of a final determination to the Examined Facility. The ISO will post such ex-ante determinations to its website concurrent with the response to the resource. Public Policy Resources shall be identified and posted on the ISO website no later than the ISO’s posting of the Part A Group 1 Examined Facilities and the Part A Group 2 Examined Facilities for the Class Year immediately following Class Year 2021, and any subsequent Class Year Study, Cluster Study, Additional SDU Study, and Expedited Deliverability Study that start after August 1, 2022, as provided in Section 23.4.5.7.3.1.4 of this Services Tariff.

“Project” shall have the meaning specified in, as applicable Section 30.1 or 40.1 of the ISO’s Open Access Transmission Tariff.

For purposes of Section 23.4.5 of this Attachment H, **“Responsible Market Party”** shall mean the Market Party that is authorized, in accordance with ISO Procedures, to submit offers in an ICAP Spot Market Auction to sell Unforced Capacity from a specified Installed Capacity Supplier.

“Revised Project Cost Allocation” shall have the meaning specified in, as applicable, Section 25 or 40 (Attachment S or HH) of the ISO’s Open Access Transmission Tariff.

“Self Supply LSE” shall mean a Load Serving Entity in one or more Mitigated Capacity Zones that operates under a long-standing business model to meet more than fifty percent of its Load obligations through its own generation and that is (i) a municipally owned electric system that was created by an act of one or more local governments pursuant to the laws of the State of New York to own or control distribution facilities and/or provide electric service, (ii) a cooperatively owned electric system that was created by an act of one or more local governments pursuant to the laws of State of New York or otherwise created pursuant to the Rural Electric Cooperative Law of New York to own or control distribution facilities and/or provide electric service, (iii) a “Single Customer Entity,” or (iv) a “Vertically Integrated Utility.” A Self Supply LSE cannot be an entity that is a public authority or corporate municipal instrumentality created by the State of New York (including a subsidiary of such an authority or instrumentality) that owns or operates generation or transmission and that is authorized to produce, transmit or distribute electricity for the benefit of the public unless it meets the criteria provided in section (i), (ii), or (iii) of this definition. For purposes of this definition only: “Vertically Integrated Utility” means a utility that owns generation, includes such generation in a non-bypassable charge in its regulated rates, earns a regulated return on its investment in such generation, and that as of the date of its request for a Self Supply Exemption, has not divested more than seventy-five percent of its generation assets owned on May 20, 1996; and “Single Customer Entity” means an LSE that serves at retail only customers that are under common control with such LSE, where such control means

holding 51% or more of the voting securities or voting interests of the LSE and all its retail customers.

“Starting Capability Period” is the Summer Capability Period that will commence three years from the Cluster Study Phase I Start Date and shall be the start of the Mitigation Study Period for any Examined Facility in a Cluster Study, as well as any Additional SDU Studies and Expedited Deliverability Studies that are completed while the Cluster Study is ongoing. If no Cluster Study is ongoing when an Expedited Deliverability Study or Additional SDU Study arrives at the Decision Period, the Starting Capability Period used for the purposes of Section 23.4.5 of this Attachment H shall be the Starting Capability Period that applied to the most recently completed Cluster Study.

“Subsequent Decision Round” shall have the meaning specified in Section 40 (Attachment HH) of the ISO OATT. Subsequent Decision Round shall include the term Subsequent Decision Period as that term is defined in Section 25 of the ISO OATT (Attachment S).

For purposes of Section 23.4.5 of this Attachment H, **“Surplus Capacity”** shall mean the amount of Installed Capacity, in MW, available in a Mitigated Capacity Zone in excess of the Locational Minimum Installed Capacity Requirement for such Mitigated Capacity Zone.

“Total Evaluated CRIS MW” shall mean the Additional CRIS MW requested plus either (i) if the Installed Capacity Supplier previously received an exemption under Sections 23.4.5.7.2(b), 23.4.5.7.6(b), 23.4.5.7.7 or 23.4.5.7.8, all prior Additional CRIS MW since the facility was last exempted under Sections 23.4.5.7.2(b), 23.4.5.7.6(b), or 23.4.5.7.8, or (ii) for all other Installed Capacity Suppliers, all MW of Capacity for which an Examined Facility obtained CRIS pursuant to the provisions in ISO OATT Sections 25, 30, 32, or 40 (OATT Attachments S, X, Z, or HH).

For purposes of Section 23.4.5 of this Attachment H, **“UCAP Offer Reference Level”** shall mean a dollar value equal to the projected clearing price for each ICAP Spot Market Auction determined by the ISO on the basis of the applicable ICAP Demand Curve and the total quantity of Unforced Capacity from all Installed Capacity Suppliers in a Mitigated Capacity Zone for the period covered by the applicable ICAP Spot Market Auction.

For purposes of Section 23.4.5 of this Attachment H, **“Unit Net CONE”** shall mean localized levelized embedded costs of a specified Installed Capacity Supplier, including interconnection costs, and for an Installed Capacity Supplier located outside a Mitigated Capacity Zone including embedded costs of transmission service, in either case net of likely projected annual Energy and Ancillary Services revenues, and revenues associated with other energy products (such as energy services and renewable energy credits, as determined by the ISO, translated into a seasonally adjusted monthly UCAP value using an appropriate class outage rate. The Unit Net CONE of an Installed Capacity Supplier that has functions beyond the generation or transmission of power shall include only the embedded costs allocated to the production and transmission of power, and shall not net the revenues from functions other than the generation or transmission of power.

23.2.2 Conduct Subject to Mitigation

Mitigation Measures may be applied: (i) to the bidding, scheduling or operation of an “Electric Facility”; or (ii) as specified in Section 23.2.4.2.

23.2.3 Conditions for the Imposition of Mitigation Measures

23.2.3.1 To achieve the foregoing purpose and objectives, Mitigation Measures should only be imposed to remedy conduct that would substantially distort or impair the competitiveness of any of the ISO Administered Markets.

Accordingly, the ISO shall seek to impose Mitigation Measures only to remedy conduct that:

23.2.3.1.1 is significantly inconsistent with competitive conduct; and

23.2.3.1.2 would result in a material change in one or more prices in an ISO Administered Market or production cost guarantee payments (“guarantee payments”) to a Market Party.

23.2.3.2 In general, the ISO shall consider a Market Party's or its Affiliates’ conduct to be inconsistent with competitive conduct if the conduct would not be in the economic interest of the Market Party or its Affiliates in the absence of market power. The categories of conduct that are inconsistent with competitive conduct include, but may not be limited to, the three categories of conduct specified in Section 23.2.4 below.

23.2.4 Categories of Conduct that May Warrant Mitigation

23.2.4.1 The following categories of conduct, whether by a single firm or by multiple firms acting in concert, may cause a material effect on prices or guarantee payments in an ISO Administered Market if exercised from a position

of market power. Accordingly, the ISO shall monitor the ISO Administered Markets for the following categories of conduct, and shall impose appropriate Mitigation Measures if such conduct is detected and the other applicable conditions for the imposition of Mitigation Measures are met:

23.2.4.1.1 Physical withholding of an Electric Facility, that is, not offering to sell or schedule the output of or services provided by an Electric Facility capable of serving an ISO Administered Market. Such withholding may include, but not be limited to, (i) falsely declaring that an Electric Facility has been forced out of service or otherwise become unavailable, (ii) refusing to offer Bids or schedules for an Electric Facility when such conduct would not be in the economic interest of the Market Party or its Affiliates in the absence of market power (includes refusing to offer Bids or schedules to withdraw Energy for a Generator that must withdraw Energy in order to be able to later inject Energy); (iii); making an unjustifiable change to one or more operating parameters of an Electric Facility or an Aggregation that reduces a Resource's ability to provide Energy or Ancillary Services or (iv) operating a Generator or an Aggregation in real-time at a lower output level than the Generator or Aggregation would have been expected to provide had the Generator or Aggregation followed the ISO's dispatch instructions, in a manner that is not attributable to the Generator's or Aggregation's verifiable physical operating capabilities and that would not be in the economic interest of the Market Party or its Affiliates in the absence of market power.

For purposes of this Section and Section 23.4.3.2, the term “unjustifiable change” shall mean a change in an Electric Facility’s operating parameters that is: (a) not attributable to an Electric Facility’s verifiable physical operating capabilities, and (b) is not a rational competitive response to economic factors other than market power.

23.2.4.1.2 Economic withholding of an Electric Facility, that is, submitting Bids for an Electric Facility that are unjustifiably high so that (i) the Electric Facility is not or will not be dispatched or scheduled, or (ii) the Bids will set a market clearing price; or submitting Bids for a Withdrawal-Eligible Generator to withdraw Energy that are unjustifiably high, so that (i) the Electric Facility is or will be dispatched or scheduled to withdraw Energy, or (ii) the Bids will set a market clearing price.

23.2.4.1.3 Uneconomic production from an Electric Facility is increasing the output of an Electric Facility to levels that would not be in the economic interest of the Market Party or its Affiliates in the absence of market power. Uneconomic withdrawal by an Electric Facility is withdrawing Energy that would not be in the economic interest of the Market Party or its Affiliates in the absence of market power.

23.2.4.2 Mitigation Measures may also be imposed, subject to FERC’s approval, to mitigate the market effects of a rule, standard, procedure or design feature of an ISO Administered Market that allows a Market Party or its Affiliate to manipulate market prices or otherwise impair the efficient operation of that market, pending the revision of such rule, standard, procedure or design feature to preclude such manipulation of prices or impairment of efficiency.

23.2.4.3 Taking advantage of opportunities to sell at a higher price or buy at a lower price in a market other than an ISO Administered Market shall not be deemed a form of withholding or otherwise inconsistent with competitive conduct.

23.2.4.4 The ISO and the Market Monitoring Unit shall monitor the ISO Administered Markets for other categories of conduct, whether by a single firm or by multiple firms acting in concert, that have material effects on prices or guarantee payments in an ISO Administered Market. The ISO shall: (i) seek to amend the foregoing list as may be appropriate, in accordance with the procedures and requirements for amending the Plan, to include any such conduct that would substantially distort or impair the competitiveness of any of the ISO Administered Markets; and (ii) seek such other authorization to mitigate the effects of such conduct from the FERC as may be appropriate. The responsibilities of the Market Monitoring Unit that are addressed in this section of the Mitigation Measures are also addressed in Section 30.4.6.2.2 of Attachment O.

23.2.4.5 Merchant Transmission Facilities (“MTF”) — the ISO shall monitor Electric Facilities that are MTF subject to the ISO’s operational control for the following categories of conduct: (i) physical or economic withholding of the opportunity to schedule transmission service over the MTF, where such withholding may have a material effect on prices or guarantee payments in the ISO Administered Markets; and (ii) under-delivery of scheduled Energy in Real Time, where such under-delivery may have a material effect on prices or guarantee payments in the ISO Administered Markets. If the ISO identifies

conduct that violates either of the standards specified in this Section 23.2.4.5, and that the ISO determines is inconsistent with competitive behavior, it shall inform its Market Monitoring Unit of the behavior it identified for possible referral to FERC's Office of Enforcement.

**29 Attachment N – External Transactions at The Proxy Generator Buses Associated
With The Cross-Sound Scheduled Line, Neptune Scheduled Line, Linden VFT
Scheduled Line, and HTP Scheduled Line**

29.1 Supremacy of Attachment N

External Transactions at the Proxy Generator Buses associated with the Cross-Sound Scheduled Line, the Neptune Scheduled Line, the Linden VFT Scheduled Line, and the HTP Scheduled Line shall be Bid and scheduled pursuant to the provisions of the ISO Services Tariff and the ISO OATT, and in accordance with this Attachment N. In the event of a conflict between the provisions of this Attachment N and any other provision of the ISO OATT, the ISO Services Tariff, or any of their attachments and schedules, with regard to External Transactions at the Proxy Generator Buses associated with the Cross-Sound Scheduled Line, the Neptune Scheduled Line, the Linden VFT Scheduled Line, or the HTP Scheduled Line, the provisions of this Attachment N shall prevail.

External Transactions at the Proxy Generator Bus associated with the Champlain Hudson Power Express MTF shall be Bid and scheduled pursuant to the provisions of the ISO Services Tariff and OATT, and in accordance with OATT Attachment II (Section 41).

29.2 Transmission Reservations on the Cross-Sound Scheduled Line, the Neptune Scheduled Line, the Linden VFT Scheduled Line, and the HTP Scheduled Line

Customers scheduling External Transactions at the Proxy Generator Buses associated with the Cross-Sound Scheduled Line, the Neptune Scheduled Line, the Linden VFT Scheduled Line, or the HTP Scheduled Line must first hold an Advance Reservation on the appropriate Scheduled Line sufficient to support the proposed External Transaction. Advance Reservations must be obtained in accordance with (a) the Cross-Sound Scheduled Line release procedures that are set forth in Schedule 18 and the Schedule 18 Implementation Rule of the ISO New England Inc. Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, or any successors thereto, or (b) the Neptune release procedures that are established pursuant to Section 38 of the PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (“PJM”) Open Access Transmission Tariff and set forth in a separate service schedule under the PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff, or (c) the Linden VFT Scheduled Line release procedures that are established pursuant to Section 38 of the PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff and set forth in a separate service schedule under the PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff, or (d) the HTP Scheduled Line release procedures that are established pursuant to Section 38 of the PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff and set forth in a separate service schedule under the PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff.

Customers that have obtained Advance Reservations and wish to schedule External Transactions at the Proxy Generator Bus associated with the Cross-Sound Scheduled Line, the Neptune Scheduled Line, the Linden VFT Scheduled Line, or the HTP Scheduled Line must (a) schedule an External Transaction with the ISO by submitting appropriate bids for economic evaluation, and (b) correspondingly schedule a transaction over the Cross-Sound Scheduled Line, the Neptune Scheduled Line, the Linden VFT Scheduled Line, or the HTP Scheduled Line (as appropriate) in accordance with all applicable tariffs and market rules of the Control Area in which the Scheduled Line is located.

If a Customer scheduling External Transactions at the Proxy Generator Buses that are associated with the Cross-Sound Scheduled Line, the Neptune Scheduled Line, the Linden VFT Scheduled Line, or the HTP Scheduled Line inaccurately claims to hold an Advance Reservation or Advance Reservations that are adequate to support its Bid(s), or falsely implies that it has an Advance Reservation or Advance Reservations that are adequate to support its Bid(s) by scheduling such an External Transaction, the ISO may inform the Commission and take other appropriate action.

29.3 Additional Scheduling Rules for the Cross-Sound Scheduled Line, the Neptune Scheduled Line, the Linden VFT Scheduled Line, and the HTP Scheduled Line

29.3.1 Bid Submission and E-Tags for Day-Ahead Transactions

Customers seeking to Schedule Day-Ahead transactions at the Proxy Generator Bus associated with the Cross-Sound Scheduled Line, the Neptune Scheduled Line, the Linden VFT Scheduled Line, or the HTP Scheduled Line (a) shall comply with all applicable ISO Procedures, and (b) shall submit bids that reference valid NERC E-Tags for their transaction(s) no later than 10 minutes prior to the close of the DAM.

29.3.2 Bids and E-Tags for Real Time Transactions

Customers seeking to schedule Real-Time Market transactions at the Proxy Generator Bus associated with the Cross-Sound Scheduled Line, the Neptune Scheduled Line, the Linden VFT Scheduled Line, or the HTP Scheduled Line (a) shall comply with all applicable ISO Procedures, and (b) shall submit Bids that reference valid NERC E-Tags for their transaction(s) at least 85 minutes before the start of each dispatch hour.

29.3.3 E-Tags Shall Each Reference One Advance Reservation ID

NERC E-Tags for External Transactions at the Proxy Generator Bus associated with the Cross-Sound Scheduled Line, the Neptune Scheduled Line, the Linden VFT Scheduled Line, or the HTP Scheduled Line shall each reference no more than one (a) Cross-Sound Scheduled Line Advance Reservation ID or “assignment reference number” from the Cross-Sound Cable, LLC node of the ISO-NE OASIS, or (b) assignment reference number or other designation associated with the grant of scheduling rights over the Neptune Scheduled Line, the Linden VFT Scheduled Line, or the HTP Scheduled Line (as appropriate).