## 4.2 Day-Ahead Markets and Schedules

### 4.2.1 Day-Ahead Load Forecasts, Bids and Bilateral Schedules

#### 4.2.1.1 General Customer Forecasting and Bidding Requirements

Subject to the two earlier submission deadlines set forth below, by 5 a.m. on the day prior to the Dispatch Day: (i) All LSEs serving Load in the NYCA shall provide the ISO with Load forecasts for the Dispatch Day and the day after the Dispatch Day; and (ii) Customers and Transmission Customers submitting Bids in the Day-Ahead Market shall provide the ISO, consistent with ISO Procedures:

a. Bids to supply Energy, including Bids to supply Energy in Virtual Transactions;

b. Bids to supply Ancillary Services;

c. Requests for Bilateral Transaction schedules;

d. Bids to purchase Energy, including Bids to purchase Energy in Virtual Transactions and Bids to withdraw Energy by Withdrawal-Eligible Generators;

e. Demand Reduction Bids; and

f. For Behind-the-Meter Net Generation Resources, the forecasted Host Load for each hour of the Dispatch Day.

By 4:50 a.m. on the day prior to the Dispatch Day, all Customers or Transmission Customers shall submit Bids for External Transactions at the Proxy Generator Bus associated with the Cross-Sound Scheduled Line, the Neptune Scheduled Line, the Linden VFT Scheduled Line, or the HTP Scheduled Line.

By 4:45 a.m. on the day prior to the Dispatch Day, all Customers or Transmission Customers shall submit Bids that include revised fuel type or fuel price information to the ISO’s Market Information System.

In general, the information provided to the ISO shall include the following:

#### 4.2.1.2 Load Forecasts

The Load forecast shall indicate the predicted level of Load in MW by Point of Withdrawal for each hour.

#### 4.2.1.3 Bids by Suppliers Using the ISO-Committed Flexible, Self-Committed Flexible or ISO-Committed Fixed Bid Modes to Supply Energy and/or Ancillary Services

4.2.1.3.1 General Rules

Day-Ahead Bids by Suppliers using the ISO-Committed Flexible, Self-Committed Flexible or ISO-Committed Fixed bid modes shall identify the Capacity, in MW, available for commitment in the Day‑Ahead Market (for every hour of the Dispatch Day) and the price(s) at which the Supplier will voluntarily enter into dispatch commitments. If the Supplier elects to participate in the Day-Ahead Market, and is within a defined electrical boundary, electrically interconnected with, and routinely serves a Host Load (which Host Load does not consist solely of Station Power) at a single PTID, it can only participate in the Day-Ahead Market as a Behind-the-Meter Net Generation Resource. If the Supplier is a Behind-the-Meter Net Generation Resource, the ISO shall only consider price-MW pairs in excess of the forecasted Host Load for the Resource.

A Supplier’s Day-Ahead Bids for an Energy Storage Resource to withdraw Energy and to inject Energy shall be submitted as a single, continuous, bid curve representing the Capacity, in MW, available for commitment in the Day-Ahead Market for each hour of the Dispatch Day, and shall indicate whether the Resource’s Energy Level will be ISO- or Self-Managed. An Energy Storage Resource may not change its Energy Level Management election within the Day-Ahead Market evaluation period (*i.e.,* within a single day).

A Supplier’s Day-Ahead Market Self-Committed Flexible Bid for a DER Aggregation may include Energy withdrawals if the DER Aggregation includes at least one Withdrawal-Eligible Generator. A Supplier’s hourly Day-Ahead Bids for a DER Aggregation to withdraw Energy and to supply Energy shall be submitted as a single, continuous bid curve representing the Capacity, in MW, available for each hour of the Dispatch Day. When the Energy Bid for a DER Aggregation includes both Energy supply and Energy withdrawal by a Withdrawal-Eligible Generator that is a component of the Aggregation, each point of the DER Aggregation’s Bid curve shall reflect the net offer, such that any Energy withdrawals reduce the Energy the DER Aggregation is capable of supplying.

Co-located Storage Resources can each offer all of their available capability into the Day-Ahead Market. The ISO will account for the CSR Scheduling Limits in the scheduled if issues to CSR Generators.

If the Supplier using the ISO-Committed Flexible or Self-Committed Flexible bid mode is eligible to provide Regulation Service or Operating Reserves under Rate Schedules 3 and 4 respectively of this ISO Services Tariff, the Supplier’s Bid may specify the quantity of Regulation Capacity it is making available and shall specify an emergency response rate that determines the quantity of Operating Reserves that it is capable of providing. Offers to provide Regulation Service and Operating Reserves must comply with the rules set forth in Rate Schedules 3 and 4 of this ISO Services Tariff. If a Supplier that is eligible to provide Operating Reserves does not submit a Day-Ahead Availability Bid for Operating Reserves, its Day-Ahead Bid shall be rejected in its entirety. A Behind-the-Meter Net Generation Resource that is comprised of more than one generating unit, or an Aggregation containing at least one generating unit (unless all of the generating unit(s) use inverter-based energy storage technology) that is dispatched as a single aggregate unit at a single PTID is not qualified to provide Regulation Service or Spinning Reserves. Aggregations may only qualify to offer the Ancillary Services that all individual Resources in the Aggregation are qualified to provide. A Supplier may resubmit a complete Day-Ahead Bid, provided that the new Bid is timely. See Section 4.2.1.9 for bidding requirements for Demand Side Resources offering Energy in the Day-Ahead Market.

Suppliers other than Demand Side Resources entering a Bid into the Day-Ahead Market may also enter Day-Ahead Bids for each of the next nine (9) Dispatch Days. If not subsequently modified or withdrawn, these offers for subsequent Dispatch Days may be used by the ISO as offers from these Suppliers in the Day-Ahead Market for these subsequent Dispatch Days. For Suppliers that are providing Unforced Capacity in the ISO-administered ICAP Market for the month in which the Dispatch Day and the nine-day advance bidding period are encompassed, the ISO may enter the eighth day offer as the Bid for that Supplier’s ninth day, if there is, otherwise no ninth–day Bid.

4.2.1.3.2 Bid Parameters

Day-Ahead Bids by Suppliers using the ISO-Committed Flexible, Self-Committed Flexible or ISO-Committed Fixed bid modes may identifyvariable Energy price Bids, consisting of up to eleven monotonically increasing, constant cost incremental Energy steps, and other parameters described in ISO Procedures. Day-Ahead Bids from Demand Side Resources offering Operating Reserves or Regulation Service shall be ISO-Committed Flexible and shall have an Energy Bid price no lower than the Monthly Net Benefit Offer Floor. Day-Ahead Bids by Intermittent Power Resources that depend on wind or solar energy as their fuel shall be ISO-Committed Flexible and shall include a Minimum Generation Bid of zero megawatts and zero costs and a Start-Up Bid of zero cost.

Day-Ahead Bids by ISO-Committed Fixed and ISO-Committed Flexible Generators, other than Bids from Intermittent Power Resources that depend on wind or solar energy as their fuel, shall also include Minimum Generation Bids and hourly Start-Up Bids. Bids shall specify whether a Supplier is offering to be ISO-Committed Fixed, ISO-Committed Flexible, Self-Committed Fixed, or Self-Committed Flexible.

Co-located Storage Resources must each submit a CSR injection Scheduling Limit and a CSR withdrawal Scheduling Limit for each hour of the Day-Ahead Market to indicate the expected capability of the relevant facilities. An Energy Storage Resource that participates in a CSR shall not submit Day-Ahead Market Bids that would Self-Commit the Generator to inject or to withdraw a quantity of Energy that exceeds an applicable CSR Scheduling Limit.

4.2.1.3.3 Upper Operating Limits, Lower Operating Limits, and Response Rates

All Bids to supply Energy and Ancillary Services must specify a UOLN and a UOLE for each hour. A Resource’s UOLE may not be lower than its UOLN. Bids from Withdrawal-Eligible Generators, and Aggregations containing at least one Withdrawal-Eligible Generator, shall also specify the Generator’s Lower Operating Limit for each hour.

Bids from Suppliers for Generators and Aggregations supplying Energy and Ancillary Services must specify a normal response rate and may provide up to three normal response rates provided the minimum normal response rate may be no less than one percent (1%) of the Generator’s or Aggregation’s Operating Capacity per minute. All Bids from Suppliers for Generators and Aggregations supplying Energy and Ancillary Services must also specify an emergency response rate which shall be equal to or greater than the maximum normal response rate of the Generator or Aggregation.

Bids from Suppliers offering Operating Reserves or Regulation Service from Demand Side Resources must specify a normal response rate and an emergency response rate provided that the emergency response rate may not be lower than the normal response rate. For Demand Side Resources the minimum acceptable response rate is one percent (1%) of the quantity of Demand Reduction the Demand Side Resource produces per minute.

**4.2.1.3.4 Additional Parameters for Energy Storage Resources and Aggregations Comprised only of Energy Storage Resources**

In addition to the parameters that Suppliers submit for Energy Storage Resources because they are Generators, specific parameters may apply to some Bids for Energy Storage Resources. Consistent with the ISO Procedures, Bids from Suppliers for Energy Storage Resources supplying Energy and Ancillary Services may be required to specify the Beginning Energy Level and the Energy Storage Resource’s Roundtrip Efficiency, and must specify its Upper and Lower Storage Limits. The Energy Level for an Energy Storage Resource shall be managed by the Supplier unless the Supplier elects, in its Bids, to be ISO-Managed.

The Day-Ahead Schedule for Energy Storage Resources with ISO-Managed Energy Levels will reflect the Resource’s Energy Level constraints, including the Beginning Energy Level, the Upper and Lower Storage Limits, and the Resource’s Roundtrip Efficiency. An Energy Storage Resource that self-manages its Energy Level is obligated to submit Bids that are consistent with its Energy Level constraints, and the Day-Ahead optimization will not honor the above-identified Energy Level constraints.

The rules in this section 4.2.1.3.4 shall also apply to Aggregations comprised entirely of Energy Storage Resources.

#### 4.2.1.4 Offers to Supply Energy from Self-Committed Fixed Generators and Aggregations

Self-Committed Fixed Generators and Aggregations shall provide the ISO with a schedule of their expected Energy output and withdrawals (when applicable) for each hour. Self-Committed Fixed Generators and Aggregations are responsible for ensuring that any hourly changes in output are consistent with their response rates. Self-Committed Fixed Generators and Aggregations shall also submit UOLNs, UOLEs and variable Energy Bids for possible use by the ISO in the event that RTD-CAM initiates a maximum generation pickup, as described in Section 4.4.3 of this ISO Services Tariff.

A Supplier may submit a Day-Ahead Market Self-Committed Fixed Bid for a DER Aggregation to withdraw Energy if the DER Aggregation includes at least one Withdrawal-Eligible Generator. When a Self-Committed Fixed Bid for a DER Aggregation reflects both Energy supply and Energy withdrawals by a Withdrawal-Eligible Generator that is a component of the Aggregation, the DER Aggregation’s Bid shall reflect the net offer, such that any Energy withdrawals reduce the Energy the DER Aggregation is capable of supplying.

#### 4.2.1.5 Bids to Supply Energy in Virtual Transactions

Customers submitting Bids to supply Energy in Virtual Transactions shall identify the Energy, in MW, available in the Day-Ahead Market (for every hour of the Dispatch Day) and the price(s) at which the Customer will voluntarily make it available.

#### 4.2.1.6 Bids to Purchase Energy in Virtual Transactions

Customers submitting bids to purchase Energy in Virtual Transactions shall identify the Energy, in MW, to be purchased in the Day-Ahead Market (for every hour of the Dispatch Day) and the price(s) at which the Customer will voluntarily purchase it.

#### 4.2.1.7 Bilateral Transactions

Transmission Customers requesting Bilateral Transaction schedules shall identify hourly Transaction quantities (in MW) by Point of Injection and Point of Withdrawal, minimum run times associated with Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service, if any, and shall provide other information (as described in ISO Procedures). A Generator can be the Point of Injection for a Bilateral Transaction. A Withdrawal-Eligible Generator can be the Point of Injection or the Point of Withdrawal for a Bilateral Transaction, but it cannot be both the Point of Injection and the Point of Withdrawal for the same Bilateral Transaction. An Aggregation containing one or more Withdrawal-Eligible Generators can be the Point of Injection or the Point of Withdrawal for a Bilateral Transaction, but it cannot be both the Point of Injection and the Point of Withdrawal for the same Bilateral Transaction. An Aggregation containing one or more Demand Side Resources shall not be the Point of Injection or the Point of Withdrawal for a Bilateral Transaction.

#### 4.2.1.8 Bids to Purchase LBMP Energy in the Day‑Ahead Market

Each purchaser shall submit Bids indicating the hourly quantity of Energy, in MW, that it will purchase from the Day-Ahead Market for each hour of the following Dispatch Day. These Bids shall indicate the quantities to be purchased by Point of Withdrawal. The Bids may identify prices at which the purchaser will voluntarily enter into the Transaction.

#### 4.2.1.9 Day-Ahead Bids from Demand Reduction Providers and DSASP Providers to Supply Energy from Demand Reductions

Demand Reduction Providers and DSASP Providers offering Energy from Demand Side Resources shall submit Bids: (i) identifying the amount of Demand Reduction, in MWs in accordance with Section 4.1.4, that is available for commitment in the Day-Ahead Market (for every hour of the dispatch day) and (ii) identifying the prices at which the Demand Reduction Provider or DSASP Provider will voluntarily enter into dispatch commitments to reduce demand; provided, however, the price at which the Demand Reduction Provider or DSASP Provider will voluntarily enter into dispatch commitments to reduce demand shall be no lower than the Monthly Net Benefit Offer Floor, as determined in accordance with this section. The Bids will identify the minimum period of time that the Demand Reduction Provider or DSASP Provider is willing to reduce demand, however the minimum period may not be less than one hour. The Bid may separately identify the Demand Reduction Provider’s Curtailment Initiation Cost. Demand Reduction Bids from Demand Reduction Providers that are not accepted in the Day-Ahead Market shall expire at the close of the Day-Ahead Market.

The ISO shall perform the Net Benefits Test and post on its web site the Monthly Net Benefit Offer Floor for each month by the 15th of the preceding month in accordance with ISO Procedures. The Net Benefits Test shall establish the threshold price below which the dispatch of Energy from Demand Side Resources is not cost-effective. The Net Benefits Test shall consist of the following steps: (1) the ISO shall compile hourly supply curves for the Reference Month; (2) the ISO shall develop the average supply curve for the Study Month by updating the Reference Month supply curves for retirements and new entrants, and adjusting offers for changes in fuel prices; (3) the ISO shall apply an appropriate mathematical formula to smooth the average supply curve; and (4) the ISO shall evaluate the smoothed average supply curve to determine the Monthly Net Benefit Floor for the Study Month. The ISO shall apply the Monthly Net Benefit Offer Floor, as so calculated, to Bids submitted by Demand Response Providers for all hours in the Study Month.

The ISO shall promptly post corrections, where necessary, to the Monthly Net Benefit Offer Floor. Corrections shall only apply to errors in conducting the calculations described above and/or in posting the properly calculated Monthly Net Benefit Offer Floor. Corrections shall not include recalculations based on changes in gas prices as set forth above. The ISO shall not use any correction to the Monthly Net Benefit Offer Floor to determine revised Day-Ahead Market clearing prices for periods prior to the imposition of the correction.

### 4.2.2 ISO Responsibility to Establish a Statewide Load Forecast

By 8 a.m., or as soon thereafter as is reasonably possible, the ISO will develop and publish its statewide Load forecast on the OASIS. The ISO will use this forecast to perform the SCUC for the Dispatch Day.

### 4.2.3 Security Constrained Unit Commitment (“SCUC”)

Subject to ISO Procedures and Good Utility Practice, the ISO will develop a SCUC schedule over the Dispatch Day using a computer algorithm which simultaneously minimizes the total Bid Production Cost of: (i) supplying Energy or Demand Reductions to satisfy accepted purchasers’ Bids to buy Energy from the Day-Ahead Market; (ii) providing sufficient Ancillary Services to support Energy purchased from the Day-Ahead Market consistent with the Regulation Service Demand curve and Operating Reserve Demand Curves set forth in Rate Schedules 3 and 4 respectively of this ISO Services Tariff; (iii) committing sufficient Capacity to meet the ISO’s Load forecast and provide associated Ancillary Services; and (iv) meeting Bilateral Transaction schedules submitted Day-Ahead excluding schedules of Bilateral Transactions with Trading Hubs or Withdrawal-Eligible Generators as their POWs. The computer algorithm shall consider whether accepting Demand Reduction Bids will reduce the total Bid Production Cost.

The ISO shall compute all NYCA Interface Transfer Capabilities prior to scheduling Transmission Service Day-Ahead. The ISO shall run the SCUC utilizing the computed Transfer Capabilities, submitted Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service requests, Load forecasts, and submitted IncrementalEnergy Bids, Decremental Bids and Sink Price Cap Bids.

The schedule will include commitment of sufficient Generators and/or Demand Side Resources/Aggregations to provide for the safe and reliable operation of the NYS Power System. SCUC will treat Behind-the-Meter Net Generation Resources, Energy Storage Resources, and Aggregations as already being committed and available to be scheduled. Pursuant to ISOProcedures, the ISO may schedule any Resource to run above its UOLn up to the level of its UOLe. In cases in which the sum of all Bilateral Schedules, excluding Bilateral Schedules for Transactions with Trading Hubs or Withdrawal-Eligible Generators as their POWs, and all Day-Ahead Market purchases to serve Load within the NYCA in the Day-Ahead schedule is less than the ISO’s Day-Ahead forecast of Load, the ISO will commit Resources in addition to the Operating Reserves it normally maintains to enable it to respond to contingencies. The purpose of these additional resources is to ensure that sufficient Capacity is available to the ISO in real-time to enable it to meet its Load forecast (including associated Ancillary Services). In considering which additional Resources to schedule to meet the ISO’s Load forecast, the ISO will evaluate unscheduled Imports, and will not schedule those Transactions if its evaluation determines the cost of those Transactions would effectively exceed a Bid Price cap in the hours in which the Energy provided by those Transactions is required. In addition to all Reliability Rules, the ISO shall consider the following information when developing the SCUC schedule: (i) Load forecasts; (ii) Ancillary Service requirements as determined by the ISO given the Regulation Service Demand Curve andOperating Reserve Demand Curves referenced above; (iii) Bilateral Transaction schedules excluding Bilateral Schedules for Transactions with Trading Hubs or Withdrawal-Eligible Generators as their POWs; (iv) price Bids and operating Constraints submitted for Generators or for Demand Side Resources/Aggregations; (v) price Bids for Ancillary Services; (vi) Decremental Bids and Sink Price Cap Bids for External Transactions; and (vii) Bids to purchase or sell Energy from or to the Day‑Ahead Market. External Transactions with minimum run times greater than one hour will only be scheduled at the requested Bid for the full minimum run time. External Transactions with identical Bids and minimum run times greater than one hour will not be prorated. The SCUC schedule shall list the hourly injections and withdrawals for: (a) each Customer whose Bid the ISO accepts for the Dispatch Day; and (b) each Bilateral Transaction scheduled Day-Ahead excluding Bilateral Transactions with Trading Hubs or Withdrawal-Eligible Generators as their POWs.

In the development of its SCUC schedule, the ISO may commit and de*-*commit Generators and Demand Side Resources/Aggregations, based upon any flexible Bids, including Minimum Generation Bids, Start-Up Bids, Curtailment Initiation Cost Bids, Energy, and Incremental Energy Bids and Decremental Bids received by the ISO provided however that: (a) the ISO shall commit zero megawatts of Energy for Demand Side Resources committed to provide Operating Reserves and Regulation Service; and (b) for Behind-the-Meter Net Generation Resources, the ISO will consider for dispatch only those segments of the Resource’s Incremental Energy Bids above the forecasted Host Load and subject to the Injection Limit.

The ISO may disable the ISO-Managed Energy Level bid parameter that is ordinarily available to Energy Storage Resources if it determines that there is a significant risk that including the ISO-Managed Energy Level bid parameter in the SCUC evaluation could delay the completion and posting of the Day-Ahead Market beyond the 11:00 a.m. deadline specified in Section 4.2.5 of this Services Tariff. The ISO shall post a notice to its public website by 4:00 p.m. on the day before the Day-Ahead Market closes if it decides to disable the ISO-Managed Energy Level bid parameter. The ISO-Managed Energy Level bid parameter shall remain disabled until the ISO posts a notice that complies with the notice requirement specified above reinstating the bid parameter’s availability.

When the ISO-Managed Energy Level bid parameter is disabled, Bids that utilized the ISO-Managed Energy Level functionality that were submitted prior to the issuance of the ISO’s notice will be rejected. The ISO will inform affected Suppliers, so that the Suppliers will have the opportunity to resubmit their Day-Ahead Market Bids using Self-Managed Energy Levels prior to the deadlines specified in Section 4.2.1.1 of the Services Tariff. Bids that utilize ISO-Managed Energy Levels will continue to be rejected until the ISO reinstates the ISO-Managed Energy Level bid parameter, following notice.

The ISO may disable the ISO-Managed Energy Level bid parameter that is ordinarily available to Energy Storage Resources if it determines that there is a significant risk that including the ISO-Managed Energy Level bid parameter in the SCUC evaluation could delay the completion and posting of the Day-Ahead Market beyond the 11:00 a.m. deadline specified in Section 4.2.5 of this Services Tariff. The ISO shall post a notice to its public website by 4:00 p.m. on the day before the Day-Ahead Market closes if it decides to disable the ISO-Managed Energy Level bid parameter. The ISO-Managed Energy Level bid parameter shall remain disabled until the ISO posts a notice that complies with the notice requirement specified above reinstating the bid parameter’s availability.

When the ISO-Managed Energy Level bid parameter is disabled, Bids that utilized the ISO-Managed Energy Level functionality that were submitted prior to the issuance of the ISO’s notice will be rejected. The ISO will inform affected Suppliers, so that the Suppliers will have the opportunity to resubmit their Day-Ahead Market Bids using Self-Managed Energy Levels prior to the deadlines specified in Section 4.2.1.1 of the Services Tariff. Bids that utilize ISO-Managed Energy Levels will continue to be rejected until the ISO reinstates the ISO-Managed Energy Level bid parameter, following notice.

The ISO will select the least cost mix of Ancillary Services and Energy from Suppliers, Demand Side Resources, and Customers submitting Virtual Transactions bids. The ISO may

substitute higher quality Ancillary Services (*i.e.*, shorter response time) for lower quality Ancillary Services when doing so would result in an overall least bid cost solution. For example, 10-Minute Non-Synchronized Reserve may be substituted for 30-Minute Reserve if doing so would reduce the total bid cost of providing Energy and Ancillary Services.

#### 4.2.3.1 Reliability Forecast for the Dispatch Day

At the request of a Transmission Owner to meet the reliability of its local system, the ISO may incorporate into the ISO’s Security Constrained Unit Commitment constraints specified by the Transmission Owner.

A Transmission Owner may request commitment of certain Generators for a Dispatch Day if it determines that certain Generators are needed to meet the reliability of its local system. Such request shall be made before the Day-Ahead Market for that Dispatch Day has closed if the Transmission Owner knows of the need to commit certain Generators before the Day-Ahead Market close. The ISO may commit one or more Generator(s) in the Day-Ahead Market for a Dispatch Day if it determines that the Generator(s) are needed to meet NYCA reliability requirements.

A Transmission Owner may request commitment of additional Generators and/or Aggregations for a Dispatch Day following the close of the Day-Ahead Market to meet changed or local system conditions for the Dispatch Day that may cause the Day-Ahead schedules for the Dispatch Day to be inadequate to ensure the reliability of its local system. The ISO will use SRE to fulfill a Transmission Owner’s request for additional Resources.

All Generator and/or Aggregation commitments made in the Day-Ahead Market pursuant to this Section 4.2.3.1 shall be posted on the ISO website following the close of the Day-Ahead Market, in accordance with ISO procedures. In addition, the ISO shall post on its website a non-binding, advisory notification of a request, or any modifications thereto, made pursuant to this Section 4.2.3.1 in the Day-Ahead Market by a Transmission Owner to commit a Generator and/or Aggregation that is located within a Constrained Area, as defined in Attachment H of this Services Tariff. The advisory notification shall be provided upon receipt of the request and in accordance with ISO procedures. The postings described here may be included with the operator-initiated commitment report that the ISO posts in accordance with Section 4.1.3.4 of this Services Tariff.

After the Day-Ahead schedule is published, the ISO shall evaluate any events, including, but not limited to, the loss of significant Generators, Aggregations, or transmission facilities that may cause the Day-Ahead schedules to be inadequate to meet the Load or reliability requirements for the Dispatch Day.

In order to meet Load or reliability requirements in response to such changed conditions the ISO may: (i) commit additional Resources, beyond those committed Day-Ahead, using a SRE and considering (a) Bids submitted to the ISO that were not previously accepted but were designated by the bidder as continuing to be available; or (b) new Bids from all Suppliers, including neighboring systems; or (ii) take the following actions: (a) after providing notice, require all Resources to run above their UOLNs, up to the level of their UOLEs (pursuant to ISO Procedures) and/or raise the UOLNs of Capacity Limited Resources and Energy Limited Resources to their UOLE levels, or (b) cancel or reschedule transmission facility maintenance outages when possible. Actions taken by the ISO in performing supplemental commitments will not change any financial commitments that resulted from the Day-Ahead Market.

### 4.2.4 Reliability Forecast for the Six Days Following the Dispatch Day

In the SCUC program, system operation shall be optimized based on Bids over the Dispatch Day. However, to preserve system reliability, the ISO must ensure that there will be sufficient resources available to meet forecasted Load and reserve requirements over the seven (7)-day period that begins with the next Dispatch Day. The ISO will perform a Supplemental Resource Evaluation (“SRE”) for days two (2) through seven (7) of the commitment cycle. If it is determined that a long start-up time Generator (*i.e.*, a Generator that cannot be scheduled by SCUC to start up in time for the next Dispatch Day) is needed for reliability, the ISO shall accept a Bid from the Generator and the Generator will begin its start-up sequence. During each day of the start-up sequence, the ISO will perform an SRE to determine if long start-up time Generators will still be needed as previously forecasted. If at any time it is determined that the Generator will not be needed as previously forecasted, the ISO shall order the Generator to abort its start-up sequence.

The ISO will commit to long start-up time Generators to preserve reliability. However, the ISO will not commit resources with long start-up times to reduce the cost of meeting Loads that it expects to occur in days following the next Dispatch Day.

A Supplier that bids on behalf of a long start-up time Generator, including one that is committed and whose start is subsequently aborted by the ISO as described in this Section 4.2.4, may be eligible for a Bid Production Cost Guarantee pursuant to the provisions of Section 4.6.6 and Attachment C of this ISO Services Tariff. The costs of such a Bid Production Cost guarantee will be recovered by the ISO under Rate Schedule 1 of the ISO OATT.

The ISO shall perform the SRE as follows: (1) The ISO shall develop a forecast of daily system peak Load for days two (2) through seven (7) in this seven (7)-day period and add the appropriate reserve margin; (2) the ISO shall then forecast its available Generators for the day in question by summing the Operating Capacity for all Generators currently in operation that are available for the commitment cycle, the Operating Capacity of all other Generators capable of starting on subsequent days to be available on the day in question, and an estimate of the net Imports from External Bilateral Transactions; (3) if the forecasted peak Load plus reserves exceeds the ISO’s forecast of available Generators for the day in question, then the ISO shall commit additional Generators capable of starting prior to the day in question (*e.g.*, start-up period of two (2) days when looking at day three (3)) to assure system reliability; (4) in choosing among Generators with comparable start-up periods, the ISO shall schedule Generators to minimize Minimum Generation Bidand Start-Up Bid costs of meeting forecasted peak Load plus Ancillary Services consistent with the Reliability Rules; (5) in determining the appropriate reserve margin for days two (2) through seven (7), the ISO will supplement the normal reserve requirements to allow for forced outages of the short start-up period units (*e.g.*, gas turbines) assumed to be operating at maximum output in the unit commitment analysis for reliability.

Energy Bids are binding for day one (1) only for units in operation or with start‑up periods less than one (1) day. Minimum Generation Bids for Generators with start‑up periods greater than one (1) day will be binding only for units that are committed by the ISO and only for the first day in which those units could produce Energy given their start‑up periods. For example, Minimum Generation Bids for a Generator with a start‑up period of two (2) days would be binding only for day three (3) because, if that unit begins to start up at any time during day one (1), it would begin to produce Energy forty‑eight (48) hours later on day three (3). Similarly, the Minimum Generation Bids for a Generator with a start‑up period of three (3) days would be binding only for day four (4).

### 4.2.5 Post the Day‑Ahead Schedule

By 11 a.m. on the day prior to the Dispatch Day, the ISO shall close the Day-Ahead scheduling process and post on the Bid/Post System the Day-Ahead schedule for each entity that submits a Bid or Bilateral Transaction schedule. All schedules shall be considered proprietary, with the posting only visible to the appropriate scheduling Customer and Transmission Owners subject to the applicable Code of Conduct (See Attachment F to the ISO OATT). The ISO will post on the OASIS the statewide aggregate resources (Day-Ahead Energy schedules and total operating capability forecast), Day-Ahead scheduled Load, forecast Load for each Load Zone, and the Day-Ahead LBMP prices (including the Congestion Component and the Marginal Losses Component) for each Load Zone in each hour of the upcoming Dispatch Day. The ISO shall conduct the Day-Ahead Settlement based upon the Day-Ahead schedule determined in accordance with this section and Attachment B to this Services Tariff. The ISO will provide the Transmission Owner with the Load forecast (for seven (7) days) as well as the ISO security evaluation data to enable local area reliability to be assessed.

### 4.2.6 Day-Ahead LBMP Market Settlements

The ISO shall calculate the Day-Ahead LBMPs for each Load Zone and at each Generator bus and Demand Reduction Bus/Transmission Node as described in Attachment B. Each Supplier that bids a Generator or Aggregation into the ISO Day-Ahead Market and is scheduled in the SCUC to sell or purchase Energy in the Day-Ahead Market will be settled at the product of: (a) the Day-Ahead hourly LBMP at the applicable Generator bus or Transmission Node; and (b) the hourly Energy schedule. Each Supplier that bids an External Transaction into the Day-Ahead LBMP Market and is scheduled in the SCUC to sell Energy into the Day-Ahead LBMP Market will be settled at the product of (a) the Day-Ahead LBMP at the applicable Proxy Generator Bus and (b) the External Transaction schedule. For each Demand Reduction Provider that bids a Demand Reduction into the Day-Ahead Market and is scheduled in SCUC to provide Energy from the Demand Reduction, the LSE providing Energy service to the Demand Side Resource that accounts for the Demand Reduction shall be settled at the product of: (a) the Day-Ahead hourly LBMP at theapplicable Demand Reduction Bus; and (b) the hourly demand reduction scheduled Day-Ahead (in MW). In addition, each Demand Reduction Provider that bids a Demand Reduction into theDay-Ahead Market and is scheduled in the SCUC to provide Energy through Demand Reduction shall receive a Demand Reduction Incentive Payment from the ISO equal to the product of: (a) the Day-Ahead hourly LBMP at the Demand Reduction bus; and (b) the lesser of the verified actual hourly Demand Reduction or the scheduled hourly Demand Reduction (in MW). Each Customer that bids into the Day-Ahead Market, including each Customer that submits a Bid for aVirtual Transaction, and has a schedule accepted by the ISO to purchase Energy in the Day-Ahead Market will pay the product of: (a) the Day-Ahead hourly Zonal LBMP at each Point of Withdrawal; and (b) the scheduled Energy at each Point of Withdrawal. Each Supplier that bids an External Transaction into the Day-Ahead LBMP Market and is scheduled in the SCUC to buy Energy from the Day-Ahead LBMP Market will pay the product of (a) the Day-Ahead LBMP at the applicable Proxy Generator Bus and (b) the External Transaction schedule. Each Customer that submits a Virtual Transaction bid into the ISO Day-Ahead Market and has a schedule accepted by the ISO to sell Energy in a Load Zone in the Day-Ahead Market will receive a payment equal to the product of (a) the Day-Ahead hourly zonal LBMP for that Load Zone; and (b) the hourly scheduled Energy for the Customer in that Load Zone. Each Trading Hub Energy Owner who bids a Bilateral Transaction into the Day-Ahead Market with a Trading Hub as its POI and has its schedule accepted by the ISO will pay the product of: (a) the Day-Ahead hourly zonal LBMP for the Load Zone associated with that Trading Hub; and (b) the Bilateral Transaction scheduled MW. Each Trading Hub Energy Owner who bids a Bilateral Transaction into the Day-Ahead Market with a Trading Hub as its POW and has its schedule accepted by the ISO will be paid the product of: (a) the Day-Ahead hourly zonal LBMP for the Load Zone associated with that Trading Hub; and (b) the Bilateral Transaction scheduled MW.

The ISO shall publish the Day-Ahead Settlement Load Zone LBMPs for each hour in the Dispatch Day.