

## **20.2 Congestion Settlements Related to the Day-Ahead Market**

### **20.2.1 Overview of Congestion Settlements Related to the Day-Ahead Market; Calculation of Net Congestion Rents**

*Overview of DAM Related Congestion Settlements.* For each hour  $h$  of the Day-Ahead Market, the ISO shall settle all Congestion settlements related to the Day-Ahead Market. These Congestion settlements include, as applicable pursuant to the provisions of this Attachment N:

(i) Congestion Rent charges or payments for Energy Transactions in the Day-Ahead Market and Bilateral Transactions scheduled in the Day-Ahead Market; (ii) Congestion payments or charges to Primary Holders of TCCs; (iii) O/R-t-S Congestion Rent Shortfall Charges and U/D Congestion Rent Shortfall Charges; and (iv) O/R-t-S Congestion Rent Surplus Payments and U/D Congestion Rent Surplus Payments. Each of these settlements is represented by a variable in Formula N-1.

*Calculation of Net Congestion Rents for an Hour.* In each hour  $h$  of the Day-Ahead Market, the ISO shall calculate Net Congestion Rents pursuant to Formula N-1.

#### **Formula N-1**

$$NetCongestionRents_h = (CongestionRents_h - TCCPayments_h - O/R-t-S\&U/D\ CRSC\&CRSP_h)$$

Where,

$NetCongestionRents_h$  = The total Net Congestion Rents for hour  $h$  of the Day-Ahead Market

$h$  = An hour of the Day-Ahead Market

$CongestionRents_h$  = The sum of Congestion Rents for (i) Energy Transactions scheduled in hour  $h$  of the Day-Ahead Market, and (ii) Bilateral Transactions scheduled in hour  $h$  of the Day-Ahead Market, each as calculated pursuant to Section 20.2.2

$TCCPayments_h$  = The sum for all TCCs of all payments and charges made pursuant to Section 20.2.3 to Primary Holders of TCCs in hour  $h$

$O/R-t-S \& U/D$   
 $CRSC \& CRSP_h$  = The sum of all O/R-t-S Congestion Rent Shortfall Charges ( $O/R-t-S CRSC_{a,t,h}$ ), U/D Congestion Rent Shortfall Charges ( $U/D CRSC_{a,t,h}$ ), O/R-t-S Congestion Rent Surplus Payments ( $O/R-t-S CRSP_{a,t,h}$ ), and U/D Congestion Rent Surplus Payments ( $U/D CRSP_{a,t,h}$ ) for all Transmission Owners  $t$  (which sum is calculated for each Transmission Owner as  $NetDAMAllocations_{t,h}$  pursuant to Formula N-14), reduced by any zeroing out of such charges or payments pursuant to Section 20.2.4.5

The ISO shall allocate the Net Congestion Rents calculated in each hour to Transmission Owners pursuant to Section 20.2.5.

## 20.2.2 Congestion Rents Charged in the Day-Ahead Market

In each hour of the Day-Ahead Market, the ISO shall collect or pay Congestion Rents through Energy Transactions in the Day-Ahead Market and through Bilateral Transactions scheduled in the Day-Ahead Market.

*Day-Ahead Market Energy Transactions.* The ISO shall charge or pay Congestion Rents as part of the Congestion Component of the LBMP applicable to Energy injections and withdrawals scheduled in the Day-Ahead Market, as described in Attachment J of this Tariff. The total Congestion Rents for all Energy Transactions scheduled in the Day-Ahead Market in hour  $h$  are calculated pursuant to Formula N-2.

### Formula N-2

$$\sum_W MWh_{W,h} * CCPOW_{W,h} - \sum_I MWh_{I,h} * CCPOI_{I,h}$$

Where,

$MWh_{W,h}$  = Energy, in MWh, scheduled to be withdrawn in hour  $h$  pursuant to Day-Ahead Market schedule  $W$   
 $CCPOW_{W,h}$  = Congestion Component, in \$/MWh, at the Point of Withdrawal for Energy withdrawn in hour  $h$  pursuant to schedule  $W$   
 $MWh_{I,h}$  = Energy, in MWh, scheduled to be injected in hour  $h$  pursuant to Day-Ahead Market schedule  $I$

$CCPOI_{I,h}$  = Congestion Component, in \$/MWh, at the Point of Injection for Energy injected in hour  $h$  pursuant to schedule  $I$ .

*Bilateral Transactions.* The ISO shall charge or pay Congestion Rents as part of the Transmission Usage Charge applied to Bilateral Transaction  $B$  scheduled in the Day-Ahead Market, as described in Section 2.7.2.2 of this Tariff. Total Congestion Rents for all Bilateral Transactions scheduled in the Day-Ahead Market in hour  $h$  are calculated pursuant to Formula N-3.

### Formula N-3

$$\sum_B MWh_{B,h} * CCTUC_{B,h}$$

Where,

$MWh_{B,h}$  = Energy, in MWh, of Bilateral Transaction  $B$  scheduled in the Day-Ahead Market in hour  $h$

$CCTUC_{B,h}$  = Congestion Component of the TUC, in \$/MWh, for scheduled Bilateral Transaction  $B$ , in hour  $h$ , which is equal to  $CCPOW_{B,h} - CCPOI_{B,h}$ .

$CCPOW_{B,h}$  = Congestion Component, in \$/MWh, at the Point of Withdrawal for Energy withdrawn in hour  $h$  pursuant to Bilateral Transaction  $B$

$CCPOI_{B,h}$  = Congestion Component, in \$/MWh, at the Point of Injection for Energy injected in hour  $h$  pursuant to Bilateral Transaction  $B$ .

### 20.2.3 Congestion Payments Made To Primary Holders

For each hour  $h$  of the Day-Ahead Market, the ISO shall charge or pay Congestion payments to the Primary Holders, as follows:

### Formula N-4

$$\text{Congestion Payment } (\$/hr) = (CCPOW - CCPOI) * TCCMW$$

Where,

$CCPOW$  = Congestion Component (\$/MWh) at the Point of Withdrawal (POW)

$CCPOI$  = Congestion Component (\$/MWh) at the Point of Injection (POI)

$TCCMW$  = The number of TCCs in MW from POI to POW.

(See Attachment J for the calculation of the Congestion Component of the LBMP price at either the POI or the POW.)

The ISO shall pay Primary Holders for the Congestion payments from revenues collected from: (i) Congestion Rents, (ii) O/R-t-S Congestion Rent Shortfall Charges and U/D Congestion Rent Shortfall Charges, and (iii) Net Congestion Rents in accordance with Section 20.2.5.

~~The ISO shall assess a "Shortfall Reimbursement Surcharge" each month on monthly net positive Congestion payments to Primary Holders of TCCs sold in or after the Autumn 2004 Centralized TCC Auction. The Shortfall Reimbursement Surcharge shall be 0.5% of Congestion payments associated with TCCs that have a Point of Withdrawal outside of Load Zone J and 2.5% of Congestion payments associated with TCCs that have a Point of Withdrawal at, or inside of, Load Zone J.~~

~~The Shortfall Reimbursement Surcharge shall not be assessed on Congestion payments to Primary Holders of TCCs that produce net negative Congestion payments, i.e., that oblige the Primary Holder to make payments, in a given month, on Congestion payments to Primary Holders of Grandfathered TCCs, or on Congestion payments to Primary Holders of ETCNL TCCs or RCRR TCCs. The Shortfall Reimbursement Surcharge also shall not be assessed on Congestion payments to Primary Holders of TCCs sold before the Autumn 2004 Centralized TCC Auction, except to the extent that such TCCs are unbundled or reconfigured at the request of a Primary Holder, and sold, in or after that auction, in which case the Congestion payments associated with them shall be subject to the Shortfall Reimbursement Surcharge.~~

~~The ISO shall cease to impose the Shortfall Reimbursement Surcharge when it has collected sufficient funds to: (i) pay refunds for all of the "Historic Shortfall" plus interest pursuant to Article III of the July 13, 2004 Settlement Agreement that was approved by the~~

~~Commission in Docket Nos. EL04-110, EL04-113, EL04-115, and ER04-983; and~~

~~(ii) replenished the ISO Working Capital Fund pursuant to Article IV of that Settlement~~

~~Agreement.~~

#### **20.2.4 Charges and Payments to Transmission Owners for DAM Outages and Returns-to-Service**

The ISO shall charge O/R-t-S Congestion Rent Shortfall Charges and U/D Congestion Rent Shortfall Charges and pay O/R-t-S Congestion Rent Surplus Payments and U/D Congestion Rent Surplus Payments pursuant to this Section 20.2.4. To do so, the ISO shall calculate the DAM Constraint Residual for each binding constraint for each hour of the Day-Ahead Market and then determine the amount of each DAM Constraint Residual that is O/R-t-S DAM Constraint Residual and the amount that is U/D DAM Constraint Residual, as specified in Section 20.2.4.1. The ISO shall use the O/R-t-S DAM Constraint Residual to allocate O/R-t-S Congestion Rent Shortfall Charges and O/R-t-S Congestion Rent Surplus Payments to Transmission Owners pursuant to Sections 20.2.4.2 and 20.2.4.4, each of which shall be subject to being reduced to zero pursuant to Section 20.2.4.5. The ISO shall use the U/D DAM Constraint Residual to allocate U/D Congestion Rent Shortfall Charges and U/D Congestion Rent Surplus Payments to Transmission Owners pursuant to Sections 20.2.4.3 and 20.2.4.4, each of which shall be subject to being reduced to zero pursuant to Section 20.2.4.5.

##### **20.2.4.1 Measuring the Impact of DAM Outages and Returns-to-Service: Calculation of DAM Constraint Residuals and Division of DAM Constraint Residuals into O/R-t-S DAM Constraint Residuals and U/D DAM Constraint Residuals**

For each hour  $h$  of the Day-Ahead Market, the ISO shall identify all constraints that are binding in the Power Flow solution for the final schedules for hour  $h$  of the Day-Ahead Market.

For each binding constraint  $a$  identified for each hour  $h$ , the ISO shall calculate the DAM

Constraint Residual,  $DCR_{a,h}$ , using Formula N-5; *provided, however*, where  $DCR_{a,h}$  calculated using Formula N-5 is not greater than the DCR Allocation Threshold or less than the negative of the DCR Allocation Threshold, then  $DCR_{a,h}$  shall be set equal to zero.

**Formula N-5**

$$DCR_{a,h} = ShadowPrice_{a,h} * \left[ \begin{array}{l} (FLOW_{a,h,DAM} - FLOW_{a,h,TCCAuction}) \\ + (UprateDerate_{a,h} * SCUCSignChange_{a,h}) \\ + (UnsoldCapacity_{a,h,RA} * SCUCSignChange_{a,h}) \end{array} \right]$$

Where,

- $DCR_{a,h}$  = The DAM Constraint Residual, in dollars, for binding constraint  $a$  in hour  $h$  of the Day-Ahead Market
- $ShadowPrice_{a,h}$  = The Shadow Price, in dollars/MWh, of binding constraint  $a$  in hour  $h$  of the Day-Ahead Market, which Shadow Price is calculated in a manner so that if relaxation of constraint  $a$  would permit a reduction in the associated Bid Production Cost,  $ShadowPrice_{a,h}$  is negative
- $FLOW_{a,h,DAM}$  = The Energy flow, in MWh, on binding constraint  $a$  for hour  $h$  for a set of injections and withdrawals that corresponds<sup>1</sup> to the set of TCCs and Grandfathered Rights represented for the month that contains hour  $h$  in the solution to the most recent auction in which TCCs valid in hour  $h$  were sold (including those pre-existing TCCs and Grandfathered Rights represented as fixed injections and withdrawals in that auction), which Energy flow will be determined using Shift Factors produced in scheduling hour  $h$  of the Day-Ahead Market applied to these injections and withdrawals and the phase angle regulator schedules fixed for the month that contains hour  $h$  in the last auction held for TCCs valid for hour  $h$
- $FLOW_{a,h,TCC Auction}$  = The Energy flow, in MWh, on binding constraint  $a$  for hour  $h$  determined as described in the definition of  $FLOW_{a,h,DAM}$  above, except that the Shift Factors applied will be those produced in a simulated run of SCUC (run using the Transmission System model for the month that contains hour  $h$  used in the most recent auction in which TCCs valid in hour  $h$  were sold); *provided, however*, special rules (1) through (3) below shall instead be used to calculate  $FLOW_{a,h,TCC Auction}$  if they apply, and rule (4) below shall be used to calculate  $FLOW_{a,h,TCC Auction}$  if  $FLOW_{a,h,TCC Auction}$  cannot be calculated using any other rule set forth in this definition of  $FLOW_{a,h,TCC Auction}$  because a simulated run of SCUC does not produce

<sup>1</sup> A set of injections and withdrawals corresponds to a set of TCCs and Grandfathered Rights if the quantity of Energy injected at each location matches the number of TCCs and Grandfathered Rights specifying that location as a POI, and the quantity of Energy withdrawn at each location matches the number of TCCs and Grandfathered Rights specifying that location as a POW.

Shift Factors to calculate  $FLOW_{a,h,TCC \text{ Auction}}$ :

- (1) in the event that a maintenance contingency is binding in the Day-Ahead Market but was not applied for the month that contains hour  $h$  in the most recent auction in which TCCs valid in hour  $h$  were sold,  $FLOW_{a,h,TCC \text{ Auction}}$  shall be equal to the Energy flow in MWh on the monitored transmission facility of binding constraint  $a$  for the contingency resulting in the highest flows on constraint  $a$  for the month that contains hour  $h$  in the most recent auction in which TCCs valid in hour  $h$  were sold, which Energy flow shall be calculated using the set of injections and withdrawals that corresponds to the set of TCCs and Grandfathered Rights represented for the month that contains hour  $h$  in the solution to that auction (including those pre-existing TCCs and Grandfathered Rights represented as fixed injections and withdrawals in that auction) and using Shift Factors from a simulated run of SCUC as first set forth in this definition of  $FLOW_{a,h,TCC \text{ Auction}}$
- (2) in the event that the monitored transmission facility for constraint  $a$  was modeled as out-of-service for the month that contains hour  $h$  in the most recent auction in which TCCs valid in hour  $h$  were sold and that transmission facility returns to service for hour  $h$  of the Day-Ahead Market,  $FLOW_{a,h,TCC \text{ Auction}}$  shall be equal to:
  - (i) the rating limit, in MWh, for the monitored transmission facility of binding constraint  $a$  applicable in hour  $h$  of the Day-Ahead Market, multiplied by
  - (ii) negative  $SCUCSignChange_{a,h}$
- (3) in the event that the transmission facility that is the contingency element for constraint  $a$  was modeled as out-of-service for the month that contains hour  $h$  in the most recent auction in which TCCs valid in hour  $h$  were sold and that transmission facility returns to service for hour  $h$  of the Day-Ahead Market,

$FLOW_{a,h,TCC \text{ Auction}}$  shall be equal to the Energy flow, in MWh, on the monitored transmission facility of binding constraint  $a$  for the contingency resulting in the highest flows on the monitored transmission facility of constraint  $a$  for the month that contains hour  $h$  in the most recent auction in which TCCs valid in hour  $h$  were sold, which Energy flow shall be calculated using the set of injections and withdrawals that corresponds to the set of TCCs and Grandfathered Rights represented for the month that contains hour  $h$  in the solution to that auction (including those pre-existing TCCs and Grandfathered Rights represented as fixed injections and withdrawals in that auction) and using Shift Factors from a simulated run of SCUC as first set forth in this definition of  $FLOW_{a,h,TCC \text{ Auction}}$

- (4) in the event that a simulated run of SCUC does not produce Shift Factors to calculate  $FLOW_{a,h,TCC \text{ Auction}}$ ,  $FLOW_{a,h,TCC \text{ Auction}}$  shall be equal to:
  - (i) the Energy flow on constraint  $a$  as determined for the month that contains hour  $h$  in the most recent auction in which TCCs valid in hour  $h$  were sold, multiplied by
  - (ii)  $OPF/SCUCAdjust_a$

$UprateDerate_{a,h}$  = Zero, except that in the event of a Qualifying DAM Up-rating or Qualifying DAM Derating for constraint  $a$  in hour  $h$  that is included for the month that contains hour  $h$  in the Reconfiguration Auction Interface Uprate/Derate Table in effect for the last Reconfiguration Auction in which TCCs valid in hour  $h$  were sold (or if no Reconfiguration Auction was held for TCCs valid in hour  $h$ , then the Centralized TCC Auction Interface Uprate/Derate Table in effect for the last Centralized TCC Auction held for TCCs valid in hour  $h$ ),  $UprateDerate_{a,h}$  shall equal the interface uprating or derating impact reflected in such table. Notwithstanding the definition above,  $UprateDerate_{a,h}$  shall always equal zero in the event that the monitored transmission facility for binding constraint  $a$  in the Day-Ahead Market was modeled as out-of-service for the month that contains hour  $h$  in the most recent auction in which TCCs valid in hour  $h$  were sold and that transmission facility returns to service for hour  $h$ .



UnsoldCapacity<sub>a,h,RA</sub> = Zero, except that if ShadowPrice<sub>a,h</sub> \*  $\frac{(FLOW_{a,h,DAM} - FLOW_{a,h,TCCAuction})}{(FLOW_{a,h,DAM} - FLOW_{a,h,TCCAuction}) + (UprateDerate_{a,h} * SCUCSignChange_{a,h})}$  is less than zero, then UnsoldCapacity<sub>a,h,RA</sub> shall be equal to the lesser of (1) the amount of transmission Capacity for constraint *a* that was available for sale for the month that contains hour *h* in the most recent auction in which TCCs valid in hour *h* were sold but which transmission Capacity was not sold; or (2) the absolute value of  $(FLOW_{a,h,DAM} - FLOW_{a,h,TCCAuction}) + (UprateDerate_{a,h} * SCUCSignChange_{a,h})$ .

SCUCSignChange<sub>a,h</sub> = 1 if ShadowPrice<sub>a,h</sub> is greater than zero; otherwise, -1.

OPF/SCUCAdjust<sub>a</sub> = 1 if the directional orientation of constraint *a* used by the ISO in SCUC is the same as that used by the ISO in the Optimal Power Flow program used to select winning Bids for the month that contains hour *h* in the most recent auction in which TCCs auctions valid in hour *h* were sold; otherwise, -1.

Following calculation of the DAM Constraint Residual for each constraint *a* for each hour *h*, the ISO shall calculate the amount of each O/R-t-S DAM Constraint Residual and the amount of each U/D DAM Constraint Residual for each constraint *a* for each hour *h*. The amount of each O/R-t-S DAM Constraint Residual for hour *h* and for constraint *a* shall be determined by applying Formula N-6. The amount of each U/D DAM Constraint Residual for hour *h* and for constraint *a* shall be determined by applying Formula N-7.

#### Formula N-6

$$O/R-t-S DCR_{a,h} = DCR_{a,h} * \left[ \frac{(FLOW_{a,h,DAM} - FLOW_{a,h,TCCAuction})}{(FLOW_{a,h,DAM} - FLOW_{a,h,TCCAuction}) + (UprateDerate_{a,h} * SCUCSignChange_{a,h})} \right]$$

Where,

O/R-t-S DCR<sub>a,h</sub> = The amount of the O/R-t-S DAM Constraint Residual, in dollars, for hour *h* and for constraint *a*

and each of the other variables are as defined in Formula N-5.

#### Formula N-7

$$U/D DCR_{a,h} = DCR_{a,h} * \left[ \frac{(UprateDerate_{a,h} * SCUCSignChange_{a,h})}{(FLOW_{a,h,DAM} - FLOW_{a,h,TCCAuction}) + (UprateDerate_{a,h} * SCUCSignChange_{a,h})} \right]$$

Where,

$U/D DCR_{a,h}$  = The amount of the U/D DAM Constraint Residual for hour  $h$  for constraint  $a$  and each of the other variables are as defined in Formula N-5.

#### **20.2.4.2 Charges and Payments for the Direct Impact of DAM Outages and Returns-to-Service**

The ISO shall use O/R-t-S DAM Constraint Residuals to allocate O/R-t-S Congestion Rent Shortfall Charges and O/R-t-S Congestion Rent Surplus Payments, as the case may be, among Transmission Owners pursuant to this Section 20.2.4.2. Each O/R-t-S Congestion Rent Shortfall Charge and each O/R-t-S Congestion Rent Surplus Payment allocated to a Transmission Owner pursuant to this Section 20.2.4.2 is subject to being set equal to zero pursuant to Section 20.2.4.5.

##### **20.2.4.2.1 Identification of Outages and Returns-to-Service Qualifying for Charges and Payments**

For each hour of the Day-Ahead Market, the ISO shall identify each Qualifying DAM Outage and each Qualifying DAM Return-to-Service, as described below. The Transmission Owner responsible, as determined pursuant to Section 20.2.4.4, for a Qualifying DAM Outage or Qualifying DAM Return-to-Service shall be allocated an O/R-t-S Congestion Rent Shortfall Charge or an O/R-t-S Congestion Rent Surplus Payment pursuant to Sections 20.2.4.2.2 or 20.2.4.2.3.

##### **20.2.4.2.1.1 Definition of Qualifying DAM Outage**

A “**Qualifying DAM Outage**” shall be defined to mean either an Actual Qualifying DAM Outage or a Deemed Qualifying DAM Outage. For purposes of this Attachment N, “ $o$ ” shall refer to a single Qualifying DAM Outage.

An “**Actual Qualifying DAM Outage**” shall be defined as a transmission facility that, for a given hour  $h$  of the Day-Ahead Market, meets each of the following requirements:

- (i) the facility exists but is not modeled as in-service for the Day-Ahead Market for hour  $h$ ;
- (ii) the facility existed and was modeled as in-service for the month that contains hour  $h$  in the last auction held for TCCs valid for hour  $h$ ; and
- (iii) the facility was not Normally Out-of-Service Equipment for the month that contains hour  $h$  at the time of the last auction held for TCCs valid for hour  $h$ .

A “**Deemed Qualifying DAM Outage**” shall be defined as a transmission facility that, for a given hour  $h$  of the Day-Ahead Market, meets each of the following requirements:

- (i) the facility existed but was not modeled as in-service for the month that contains hour  $h$  in the last auction held for TCCs valid for hour  $h$ ;
- (ii) the facility existed but was not modeled as in-service in the Day-Ahead Market in hour  $h$  as a result of a DAM Status Change or external event described in Section 20.2.4.4.3 for which responsibility was assigned pursuant to Section 20.2.4.4 to a Transmission Owner (including the ISO when it is deemed a Transmission Owner pursuant to Section 20.2.4.4) other than the Transmission Owner assigned responsibility for the facility not being modeled as in-service for the month that contains hour  $h$  in the last auction held for TCCs valid for hour  $h$ ;
- (iii) the facility was not Normally Out-of-Service Equipment for the month that contains hour  $h$  at the time of the last auction held for TCCs valid for hour  $h$ .

A transmission facility shall not qualify as an Actual Qualifying DAM Outage if the facility is modeled as in-service for hour  $h$  of the Day-Ahead Market as a result of a Transmission Owner’s use of spare or alternative transmission equipment to bring the facility back in-service so long as the Transmission Owner has notified the ISO in advance of or

contemporaneously with the use of such spare or alternative equipment and the estimated duration of its use.

#### **20.2.4.2.1.2 Definition of Qualifying DAM Return-to-Service**

A “**Qualifying DAM Return-to-Service**” shall be defined to mean either an Actual Qualifying DAM Return-to-Service or a Deemed Qualifying DAM Return-to-Service. For purposes of this Attachment N, “*o*” shall refer to a single Qualifying DAM Return-to-Service.

An “**Actual Qualifying DAM Return-to-Service**” shall be defined as a transmission facility that, for a given hour *h* of the Day-Ahead Market, meets each of the following requirements:

- (i) the facility exists and is modeled as in-service in the Day-Ahead Market for hour *h*;
- (ii) the facility existed but was not modeled as in-service for the month that contains hour *h* in the last auction held for TCCs valid for hour *h*; and
- (iii) the facility was not Normally Out-of-Service Equipment for the month that contains hour *h* at the time of the last auction held for TCCs valid for hour *h*.

A “**Deemed Qualifying DAM Return-to-Service**” shall be defined as a transmission facility that, for a given hour *h* of the Day-Ahead Market, meets each of the following requirements:

- (i) the facility existed but was not modeled as in-service for the month that contains hour *h* in the last auction held for TCCs valid for hour *h*;
- (ii) the facility existed but was not modeled as in-service in the Day-Ahead Market for hour *h* as a result of a DAM Status Change or external event described in Section 20.2.4.4.3 for which responsibility is assigned pursuant to Section

20.2.4.4 to a Transmission Owner (including the ISO when it is deemed a Transmission Owner pursuant to Section 20.2.4.4) other than the Transmission Owner assigned responsibility for the facility not being modeled as in-service for the month that contains hour  $h$  in the last auction held for TCCs valid for hour  $h$ ; and

- (iii) the facility was not Normally Out-of-Service Equipment for the month that contains hour  $h$  at the time of the last auction held for TCCs valid for hour  $h$ .

#### **20.2.4.2.2 Allocation of an O/R-t-S DAM Constraint Residual When Only One Transmission Owner is Responsible for All of the Relevant Outages and Returns-to-Service**

This Section 20.2.4.2.2 describes the allocation of an O/R-t-S DAM Constraint Residual for a given hour and a given constraint when only one Transmission Owner is responsible, as determined pursuant to Section 20.2.4.4, for all of the Qualifying DAM Outages and all of the Qualifying DAM Returns-to-Service for that hour that contribute to that constraint.

If the same Transmission Owner is responsible, as determined pursuant to Section 20.2.4.4, for all of the Qualifying DAM Outages  $o$  and Qualifying DAM Returns-to-Service  $o$  for hour  $h$  that contribute to constraint  $a$ , then the ISO shall allocate the O/R-t-S DAM Constraint Residual for that hour and that constraint,  $\text{O/R-t-S DCR}_{a,h}$ , to that Transmission Owner in the form of either: (i) an O/R-t-S Congestion Rent Shortfall Charge in the amount of  $\text{O/R-t-S DCR}_{a,h}$  if  $\text{O/R-t-S DCR}_{a,h}$  is negative, or (ii) an O/R-t-S Congestion Rent Surplus Payment in the amount of  $\text{O/R-t-S DCR}_{a,h}$  if  $\text{O/R-t-S DCR}_{a,h}$  is positive.

#### **20.2.4.2.3 Allocation of an O/R-t-S DAM Constraint Residual When More Than One Transmission Owner is Responsible for the Relevant Outages and Returns-to-Service**

This Section 20.2.4.2.3 describes the allocation of an O/R-t-S DAM Constraint Residual

for a given hour and a given constraint when more than one Transmission Owner is responsible, as determined pursuant to Section 20.2.4.4, for the Qualifying DAM Outages and the Qualifying DAM Returns-to-Service for that hour that contribute to that constraint.

If more than one Transmission Owner is responsible, as determined pursuant to Section 20.2.4.4, for the Qualifying DAM Outages and the Qualifying DAM Returns-to-Service for hour  $h$  that contribute to constraint  $a$ , the ISO shall allocate the O/R-t-S DAM Constraint Residual for constraint  $a$  for hour  $h$ , O/R-t-S  $DCR_{a,h}$ , in the form of an O/R-t-S Congestion Rent Shortfall Charge or O/R-t-S Congestion Rent Surplus Payment to the Transmission Owners responsible for the Qualifying DAM Outages  $o$  and Qualifying DAM Returns-to-Service  $o$  for hour  $h$  by first determining the net total impact on the constraint for hour  $h$  of all Qualifying DAM Outages and Qualifying DAM Returns-to-Service for hour  $h$  with an impact on the Energy flow across that constraint of 1 MWh or more by applying Formula N-8, and then applying either Formula N-9 or Formula N-10, as specified herein, to assess O/R-t-S Congestion Rent Shortfall Charges and O/R-t-S Congestion Rent Surplus Payments.

### Formula N-8

$$O/R-t-S \text{ NetDAMImpact}_{a,h} = \left( \sum_{\text{for all } o \in O_h} \text{FlowImpact}_{a,h,o} * \text{ShadowPrice}_{a,h} \right) * OPF/SCUCAdjust_a$$

Where,

O/R-t-S NetDAMImpact<sub>a,h</sub> = The net impact, in dollars, on constraint  $a$  in hour  $h$  of all Qualifying DAM Outages and Qualifying DAM Returns-to-Service for hour  $h$  having an impact of more than 1 MWh on Energy flow across constraint  $a$ ; *provided, however*, O/R-t-S NetDAMImpact<sub>a,h</sub> shall be subject to recalculation as specified in the paragraph immediately following this Formula N-8

FlowImpact<sub>a,h,o</sub> = The Energy flow impact of a Qualifying DAM Outage  $o$  or Qualifying DAM Return-to-Service  $o$ , in MWh, on binding constraint  $a$  determined for hour  $h$ , which shall either:

- (a) if Qualifying DAM Outage  $o$  is a Deemed Qualifying DAM Outage, be equal to

the negative of  $\text{FlowImpact}_{a,h,o}$  calculated for the corresponding Deemed

Qualifying DAM Return-to-Service as described in part (b) of this definition of

$\text{FlowImpact}_{a,h,o}$ ; or

- (b) if Qualifying DAM Outage  $o$  or Qualifying DAM Return-to-Service  $o$  is an Actual Qualifying DAM Outage, an Actual Qualifying DAM Return-to-Service, or a Deemed Qualifying DAM Return-to-Service, be calculated pursuant to the following formula:

$$\text{FlowImpact}_{a,h,o} = \text{One-OffFlow}_{a,h,o} - \text{BaseCaseFlow}_{a,h}$$

Where,

$\text{BaseCaseFlow}_{a,h}$  = The Energy flow on binding constraint  $a$  resulting from a Power Flow or similar analysis using (1) the set of injections and withdrawals corresponding to the TCCs and Grandfathered Rights represented for the month that contains hour  $h$  in the solution to the most recent auction in which TCCs valid in hour  $h$  were sold (including those pre-existing TCCs and Grandfathered Rights represented as fixed injections and withdrawals in that auction); (2) the phase angle regulator schedules determined in the Optimal Power Flow solution for the month that contains hour  $h$  for the final round of the last auction held for TCCs valid in hour  $h$ ; and (3) the Transmission System model for the month that contains hour  $h$  in the last auction held for TCCs valid in hour  $h$ ;

$\text{One-OffFlow}_{a,h,o}$  = Either

- (1) if Qualifying DAM Outage  $o$  or Qualifying DAM Return-to-Service  $o$  is an Actual Qualifying DAM Outage or an Actual Qualifying DAM Return-to-Service, the Energy flow on binding constraint  $a$  resulting from a Power Flow or similar analysis using each element of the base case data set used in the calculation of  $\text{BaseCaseFlow}_{a,h}$  above (*provided, however*, if a transmission facility was modeled as free-flowing in hour  $h$  of the Day-Ahead Market because of the outage of any transmission facility, the ISO shall appropriately adjust the phase angle regulator schedules and related variables to model the transmission facility

as free flowing), but in each case with the Transmission System model modified so as to, as the case may be, either (i) model as out-of-service Actual Qualifying DAM Outage  $o$ , or (ii) model as in-service Actual Qualifying DAM Return-to-Service  $o$ ; or

- (2) if Qualifying DAM Return-to-Service  $o$  is a Deemed Qualifying DAM Return-to-Service, the Energy flow on binding constraint  $a$  resulting from a Power Flow or similar analysis using each element of the base case data set used in the calculation of  $\text{BaseCaseFlow}_{a,h}$  above (*provided, however*, if a transmission facility was modeled as free-flowing in hour  $h$  of the Day-Ahead Market because of the outage of any transmission facility, the ISO shall appropriately adjust the phase angle regulator schedules and related variables to model the transmission facility as free flowing), but with the Transmission System model modified so as to model as in-service the transmission facility that is Deemed Qualifying DAM Return-to-Service  $o$

*provided, however*, where the absolute value of  $\text{FlowImpact}_{a,h,o}$  calculated using the procedures set forth above is less than 1 MWh, then  $\text{FlowImpact}_{a,h,o}$  shall be set equal to zero;

*provided further*,  $\text{FlowImpact}_{a,h,o}$  shall be subject to being set equal to zero as specified in the paragraph immediately following this Formula N-8

$O_h$  = The set of all Qualifying DAM Outages  $o$  and Qualifying DAM Returns-to-Service  $o$  in hour  $h$

and the variables  $\text{ShadowPrice}_{a,h}$  and  $\text{OPF/SCUCAdjust}_a$  are defined as set forth in

Formula N-5.

After calculating  $\text{O/R-t-S NetDAMImpact}_{a,h}$  pursuant to Formula N-8, the ISO shall determine whether  $\text{O/R-t-S NetDAMImpact}_{a,h}$  for constraint  $a$  in hour  $h$  has a different sign than  $\text{O/R-t-S DCR}_{a,h}$  for constraint  $a$  in hour  $h$ . If the sign is different, the ISO shall (i) recalculate



O/R-t-S NetDAMImpact<sub>a,h</sub> pursuant to Formula N-8 after setting equal to zero each FlowImpact<sub>a,h,o</sub> for which FlowImpact<sub>a,h,o</sub> \* ShadowPrice<sub>a,h</sub> \* OPF/SCUCAdjust<sub>a</sub> has a different sign than O/R-t-S DCR<sub>a,h</sub>, and then (ii) use this recalculated O/R-t-S NetDAMImpact<sub>a,h</sub> and reset value of FlowImpact<sub>a,h,o</sub> to allocate O/R-t-S Congestion Rent Shortfall Charges and O/R-t-S Congestion Rent Surplus Payments pursuant to Formula N-9 or Formula N-10, as specified below.

If the absolute value of the net impact (O/R-t-S NetDAMImpact<sub>a,h</sub>) on constraint *a* of all Qualifying DAM Outages and Qualifying DAM Returns-to-Service for hour *h* as calculated using Formula N-8 (or recalculated pursuant to Formula N-8 using a reset value of FlowImpact<sub>a,h,o</sub> as described in the prior paragraph) is greater than the absolute value of the O/R-t-S DAM Constraint Residual (O/R-t-S DCR<sub>a,h</sub>), in dollars, for constraint *a* in hour *h*, then the ISO shall allocate the O/R-t-S DAM Constraint Residual in the form of an O/R-t-S Congestion Rent Shortfall Charge, O/R-t-S CRSC<sub>a,t,h</sub>, or O/R-t-S Congestion Rent Surplus Payment, O/R-t-S CRSP<sub>a,t,h</sub>, by using Formula N-9. If the absolute value of the net impact (O/R-t-S NetDAMImpact<sub>a,h</sub>) on constraint *a* of all Qualifying DAM Outages and Qualifying DAM Returns-to-Service for hour *h* as calculated using Formula N-8 (or recalculated pursuant to Formula N-8 using a reset value of FlowImpact<sub>a,h,o</sub> as described in the prior paragraph) is less than or equal to the absolute value of the O/R-t-S DAM Constraint Residual (O/R-t-S DCR<sub>a,h</sub>), in dollars, for constraint *a* in hour *h*, then the ISO shall allocate the O/R-t-S DAM Constraint Residual in the form of an O/R-t-S Congestion Rent Shortfall Charge or O/R-t-S Congestion Rent Surplus Payment by using Formula N-10.

#### Formula N-9

$$O/R-t-S Allocation_{a,t,h} = \left[ \frac{\sum_{\substack{o \in O_h \\ \text{and } q=t}} (FlowImpact_{a,h,o} * Responsibility_{h,q,o})}{\phantom{\sum_{\substack{o \in O_h \\ \text{and } q=t}}}} \right] * O/R-t-S DCR_{a,h}$$

$$\sum_{\text{for all } o \in O_h} FlowImpact_{a,h,o}$$

Where,

O/R-t-S Allocation<sub>a,t,h</sub> = Either an O/R-t-S Congestion Rent Shortfall Charge or an O/R-t-S Congestion Rent Surplus Payment, as specified in (a) and (b) below:

(a) If O/R-t-S Allocation<sub>a,t,h</sub> is negative, then O/R-t-S Allocation<sub>a,t,h</sub> shall be an O/R-t-S Congestion Rent Shortfall Charge, O/R-t-S CRSC<sub>a,t,h</sub>, charged to Transmission Owner *t* for binding constraint *a* in hour *h* of the Day-Ahead Market; or

(b) If O/R-t-S Allocation<sub>a,t,h</sub> is positive, then O/R-t-S Allocation<sub>a,t,h</sub> shall be an O/R-t-S Congestion Rent Surplus Payment, O/R-t-S CRSP<sub>a,t,h</sub>, paid to Transmission Owner *t* for binding constraint *a* in hour *h* of the Day-Ahead Market

Responsibility<sub>h,q,o</sub> = The amount, as a percentage, of responsibility borne by Transmission Owner *q* (which shall include the ISO when it is deemed a Transmission Owner for the purpose of applying Sections 20.2.4.4.2, 20.2.4.4.3, or 20.2.4.4.4) for Qualifying DAM Outage *o* or Qualifying DAM Return-to-Service *o* in hour *h*, as determined pursuant to Section 20.2.4.4

and the variable O/R-t-S DCR<sub>a,h</sub> is defined as set forth in Formula N-6 and the variables

FlowImpact<sub>a,h,o</sub> and O<sub>h</sub> are defined as set forth in Formula N-8.

#### Formula N-10

$$O/R-t-S Allocation_{a,t,h} = \left( \sum_{\substack{o \in O_h \\ \text{and } q=t}} FlowImpact_{a,h,o} * ShadowPrice_{a,h} * Responsibility_{h,q,o} \right) * OPF/SCUCAdjust_a$$

Where,

the variables ShadowPrice<sub>a,h</sub> and OPF/SCUCAdjust<sub>a</sub> are defined as set forth in Formula

N-5, the variables O/R-t-S Allocation<sub>a,t,h</sub> and Responsibility<sub>h,q,o</sub> are defined as set forth in

Formula N-9, and the variables FlowImpact<sub>a,h,o</sub> and O<sub>h</sub> are defined as set forth in Formula N-8.

### **20.2.4.3 Charges and Payments for the Secondary Impact of DAM Outages and Returns-to-Service**

The ISO shall use U/D DAM Constraint Residuals to allocate U/D Congestion Rent Shortfall Charges and U/D Congestion Rent Surplus Payments, as the case may be, among Transmission Owners pursuant to this Section 20.2.4.3. Each U/D Congestion Rent Shortfall Charge and each U/D Congestion Rent Surplus Payment allocated to a Transmission Owner pursuant to this Section 20.2.4.3 is subject to being set equal to zero pursuant to Section 20.2.4.5.

#### **20.2.4.3.1 Identification of Upratings and Deratings Qualifying for Charges and Payments**

For each hour of the Day-Ahead Market and for each constraint, the ISO shall identify each Qualifying DAM Derating and each Qualifying DAM Uprating, as described below. The Transmission Owner responsible, as determined pursuant to Section 20.2.4.4, for the Qualifying DAM Derating shall be allocated a U/D Congestion Rent Shortfall Charge and the Transmission Owner responsible, as determined pursuant to Section 20.2.4.4, for the Qualifying DAM Uprating shall be allocated a U/D Congestion Rent Surplus Payment pursuant to Section 20.2.4.3.2.

##### **20.2.4.3.1.1 Definition of Qualifying DAM Derating**

A “**Qualifying DAM Derating**” shall be defined to mean either an Actual Qualifying DAM Derating or a Deemed Qualifying DAM Derating. For purposes of this Attachment N, “*r*” shall refer to a single Qualifying DAM Derating.

An “**Actual Qualifying DAM Derating**” shall be defined as a change in the rating of a constraint that, for a given constraint *a* and hour *h* of the Day-Ahead Market, meets each of the following requirements:

- (i) the constraint has a lower rating in hour *h* than it would have if all transmission

facilities were modeled as in-service in hour  $h$ ;

- (ii) this lower rating is in whole or in part the result of an Actual Qualifying DAM Outage  $o$  or an Actual Qualifying DAM Return-to-Service  $o$  for hour  $h$ ;
- (iii) this lower rating resulting from Actual Qualifying DAM Outage  $o$  or Actual Qualifying DAM Return-to-Service  $o$  for hour  $h$  was not modeled for the month that contains hour  $h$  in the last auction held for TCCs valid for hour  $h$ ;
- (iv) this lower rating is included for the month that contains hour  $h$  in the Reconfiguration Auction Interface Uprate/Derate Table in effect for the last Reconfiguration Auction in which TCCs valid in hour  $h$  were sold (or if no Reconfiguration Auction was held for TCCs valid in hour  $h$ , then the Centralized TCC Auction Interface Uprate/Derate Table in effect for the last Centralized TCC Auction held for TCCs valid in hour  $h$ ); and
- (v) the constraint is binding in the Day-Ahead Market for hour  $h$ .

A “**Deemed Qualifying DAM Derating**” shall be defined as a change in the rating of a constraint that, for a given constraint  $a$  and hour  $h$  of the Day-Ahead Market, meets each of the following requirements:

- (i) the constraint has a lower rating in hour  $h$  than it would have if all transmission facilities were modeled as in-service in hour  $h$ ;
- (ii) this lower rating is in whole or in part the result of a Deemed Qualifying DAM Outage  $o$  or Deemed Qualifying DAM Return-to-Service  $o$  for hour  $h$ ;
- (iii) the lower rating resulting from Deemed Qualifying DAM Outage  $o$  or Deemed Qualifying DAM Return-to-Service  $o$  for hour  $h$  was modeled for the month that contains hour  $h$  in the last auction held for TCCs valid for hour  $h$ , but

responsibility for Qualifying DAM Outage  $o$  or Qualifying DAM Return-to-Service  $o$  resulting in the lower rating for hour  $h$  is assigned pursuant to Section 20.2.4.4 to a Transmission Owner (including the ISO when it is deemed a Transmission Owner pursuant to Section 20.2.4.4) other than the Transmission Owner responsible for the lower rating for the month that contains hour  $h$  in the last auction held for TCCs valid for hour  $h$ ;

- (iv) this lower rating is included for the month that contains hour  $h$  in the Reconfiguration Auction Interface Uprate/Derate Table in effect for the last Reconfiguration Auction in which TCCs valid in hour  $h$  were sold (or if no Reconfiguration Auction was held for TCCs valid in hour  $h$ , then the Centralized TCC Auction Interface Uprate/Derate Table in effect for the last Centralized TCC Auction held for TCCs valid in hour  $h$ ); and
- (v) the constraint is binding in the Day-Ahead Market for hour  $h$ .

#### **20.2.4.3.1.2 Definition of Qualifying DAM Uprating**

A “**Qualifying DAM Uprating**” shall be defined to mean either an Actual Qualifying DAM Uprating or a Deemed Qualifying DAM Uprating. For purposes of this Attachment N, “ $r$ ” shall refer to a single Qualifying DAM Uprating.

An “**Actual Qualifying DAM Uprating**” shall be defined as a change in the rating of a constraint that, for a given constraint  $a$  in hour  $h$  of the Day-Ahead Market, meets each of the following requirements:

- (i) the constraint has a higher rating for hour  $h$  than it would have absent an Actual Qualifying DAM Outage  $o$  or Actual Qualifying DAM Return-to-Service  $o$  for hour  $h$ ;

- (ii) this higher rating resulting from Actual Qualifying DAM Outage  $o$  or Actual Qualifying Return-to-Service  $o$  for hour  $h$  was not modeled for the month that contains hour  $h$  in the last auction held for TCCs valid for hour  $h$ ;
- (iii) this higher rating is included for the month that contains hour  $h$  in the Reconfiguration Auction Interface Uprate/Derate Table in effect for the last Reconfiguration Auction in which TCCs valid in hour  $h$  were sold (or if no Reconfiguration Auction was held for TCCs valid in hour  $h$ , then the Centralized TCC Auction Interface Uprate/Derate Table in effect for the last Centralized TCC Auction held for TCCs valid in hour  $h$ ); and
- (iv) the constraint is binding in the Day-Ahead Market for hour  $h$ .

A “**Deemed Qualifying DAM Uprating**” shall be defined as a change in the rating of a constraint that, for a given constraint  $a$  and hour  $h$  of the Day-Ahead Market, meets each of the following requirements:

- (i) the constraint has a lower rating in hour  $h$  than it would have if all transmission facilities were modeled as in-service in hour  $h$ ;
- (ii) this lower rating is in whole or in part the result of a Deemed Qualifying DAM Outage  $o$  or Deemed Qualifying DAM Return-to-Service  $o$  for hour  $h$ ;
- (iii) this lower rating resulting from Deemed Qualifying DAM Outage  $o$  or Deemed Qualifying DAM Return-to-Service  $o$  for hour  $h$  was modeled for the month that contains hour  $h$  in the last auction held for TCCs valid for hour  $h$ , but responsibility for Qualifying DAM Outage  $o$  or Qualifying DAM Return-to-Service  $o$  resulting in the lower rating for hour  $h$  is assigned pursuant to Section 20.2.4.4 to a Transmission Owner (including the ISO when it is deemed a

Transmission Owner for the purpose of applying Section 20.2.4.4) other than the

Transmission Owner responsible for the lower rating for the month that contains

hour  $h$  in the last auction held for TCCs valid for hour  $h$ ;

- (iv) this lower rating for hour  $h$  is included for the month that contains hour  $h$  in the Reconfiguration Auction Interface Uprate/Derate Table in effect for the last Reconfiguration Auction in which TCCs valid in hour  $h$  were sold (or if no Reconfiguration Auction was held for TCCs valid in hour  $h$ , then the Centralized TCC Auction Interface Uprate/Derate Table in effect for the last Centralized TCC Auction held for TCCs valid in hour  $h$ ); and
- (v) the constraint is binding in the Day-Ahead Market for hour  $h$ .

#### **20.2.4.3.2 Allocation of U/D DAM Constraint Residuals**

This Section 20.2.4.3.2 describes the allocation of U/D DAM Constraint Residuals to Qualifying DAM Deratings and Qualifying DAM Upratings.

When there are Qualifying DAM Deratings or Qualifying DAM Upratings for constraint  $a$  in hour  $h$ , the ISO shall allocate a U/D DAM Constraint Residual in the form of a U/D Congestion Rent Shortfall Charge, U/D CRSC<sub>a,t,h</sub>, or U/D Congestion Rent Surplus Payment, U/D CRSP<sub>a,t,h</sub>, by first determining the net total impact on the constraint for hour  $h$  of all Qualifying DAM Upratings  $u$  and Qualifying DAM Deratings  $d$  for constraint  $a$  in hour  $h$  pursuant to Formula N-11 and then applying either Formula N-12 or Formula N-13, as specified herein, to assess U/D Congestion Rent Shortfall Charges and U/D Congestion Rent Surplus Payments.

### Formula N-11

$$U/D \text{ NetDAMImpact}_{a,h} = \left( \sum_{\text{for all } r \in R_{a,h}} \text{RatingChange}_{a,h,r} * \text{ShadowPrice}_{a,h} \right) * \text{SCUCSignChange}_{a,h}$$

Where,

$U/D \text{ NetDAMImpact}_{a,h}$  = The net impact, in dollars, on constraint  $a$  of all Qualifying DAM Upratings and Qualifying DAM Deratings for constraint  $a$  in hour  $h$ ; *provided, however*,  $U/D \text{ NetDAMImpact}_{a,h}$  shall be subject to recalculation as specified in the paragraph immediately following this Formula N-11

$\text{RatingChange}_{a,h,r}$  = Either

- (a) If Qualifying DAM Derating  $r$  or Qualifying DAM Uprating  $r$  is a Deemed Qualifying DAM Derating or a Deemed Qualifying DAM Uprating,  $\text{RatingChange}_{a,h,r}$  shall be equal to the amount, in MWh, of the decrease or increase in the rating of binding constraint  $a$  in hour  $h$  resulting from a Deemed Qualifying DAM Return-to-Service or Deemed Qualifying DAM Outage for constraint  $a$  in hour  $h$ , as shown for the month that contains hour  $h$  in the Reconfiguration Auction Interface Uprate/Derate Table in effect for the last Reconfiguration Auction in which TCCs valid in hour  $h$  were sold (or if no Reconfiguration Auction was held for TCCs valid in hour  $h$ , then the Centralized TCC Auction Interface Uprate/Derate Table in effect for the last Centralized TCC Auction held for TCCs valid in hour  $h$ ); or
- (b) If Qualifying DAM Derating  $r$  or Qualifying DAM Uprating  $r$  is an Actual Qualifying DAM Derating or an Actual Qualifying DAM Uprating,  $\text{RatingChange}_{a,h,r}$  shall be equal to the amount, in MWh, of the decrease or increase in the rating of binding constraint  $a$  in hour  $h$  resulting from an Actual Qualifying DAM Return-to-Service or an Actual Qualifying DAM Outage for



constraint  $a$  in hour  $h$ , as shown for the month that contains hour  $h$  in the Reconfiguration Auction Interface Uprate/Derate Table in effect for the last Reconfiguration Auction in which TCCs valid in hour  $h$  were sold (or if no Reconfiguration Auction was held for TCCs valid in hour  $h$ , then the Centralized TCC Auction Interface Uprate/Derate Table in effect for the last Centralized TCC Auction held for TCCs valid in hour  $h$ ); *provided, however*,  $\text{RatingChange}_{a,h,r}$  shall be subject to being set equal to zero as specified in the paragraph immediately following this Formula N-11

$R_{a,h}$  = The set of all Qualifying DAM Deratings  $r$  or Qualifying DAM Upratings  $r$  for binding constraint  $a$  in hour  $h$

and the variables  $\text{SCUCSignChange}_{a,h}$  and  $\text{ShadowPrice}_{a,h}$  are defined as set forth in Formula N-5.

After calculating  $\text{U/D NetDAMImpact}_{a,h}$  pursuant to Formula N-11, the ISO shall determine whether  $\text{U/D NetDAMImpact}_{a,h}$  for constraint  $a$  in hour  $h$  has a different sign than  $\text{U/D DCR}_{a,h}$  for constraint  $a$  in hour  $h$ . If the sign is different, the ISO shall (i) recalculate  $\text{U/D NetDAMImpact}_{a,h}$  pursuant to Formula N-11 after setting equal to zero each  $\text{RatingChange}_{a,h,r}$  for which  $\text{RatingChange}_{a,h,r} * \text{ShadowPrice}_{a,h} * \text{SCUCSignChange}_{a,h}$  has a different sign than  $\text{U/D DCR}_{a,h}$ , and then (ii) use this recalculated  $\text{U/D NetDAMImpact}_{a,h}$  and reset value of  $\text{RatingChange}_{a,h,r}$  to allocate U/D Congestion Rent Shortfall Charges and U/D Congestion Rent Surplus Payments pursuant to Formula N-12 or Formula N-13, as specified below.

If the absolute value of the net impact ( $\text{U/D NetDAMImpact}_{a,h}$ ) on constraint  $a$  of all Qualifying DAM Deratings and Qualifying DAM Upratings for constraint  $a$  in hour  $h$  as calculated using Formula N-11 (or recalculated pursuant to Formula N-11 using a reset value of  $\text{RatingChange}_{a,h,r}$  as described in the prior paragraph) is greater than the absolute value of the

U/D DAM Constraint Residual (U/D DCR<sub>a,h</sub>) for constraint  $a$  in hour  $h$ , then the ISO shall allocate the U/D DAM Constraint Residual in the form of a U/D Congestion Rent Shortfall Charge, U/D CRSC<sub>a,t,h</sub>, or U/D Congestion Rent Surplus Payment, U/D CRSP<sub>a,t,h</sub>, by using Formula N-12. If the absolute value of the net impact (U/D NetDAMImpact<sub>a,h</sub>) on constraint  $a$  of all Qualifying DAM Deratings and Qualifying DAM Upratings for constraint  $a$  in hour  $h$  as calculated using Formula N-11 (or recalculated pursuant to Formula N-11 using a reset value of RatingChange<sub>a,h,r</sub> as described in the prior paragraph) is less than or equal to the absolute value of the U/D DAM Constraint Residual (U/D DCR<sub>a,h</sub>) for constraint  $a$  in hour  $h$ , then the ISO shall allocate the U/D DAM Constraint Residual in the form of a U/D Congestion Rent Shortfall Charge, U/D CRSC<sub>a,t,h</sub>, or U/D Congestion Rent Surplus Payment, U/D CRSP<sub>a,t,h</sub>, by using Formula N-13.

**Formula N-12**

$$U/D Allocation_{a,t,h} = \left( \frac{\sum_{\substack{r \in R_{a,h} \\ \text{and } q=t}} (RatingChange_{a,h,r} * Responsibility_{h,q,r})}{\sum_{\text{for all } r \in R_{a,h}} RatingChange_{a,h,r}} \right) * U/D DCR_{a,h}$$

Where,

U/D Allocation<sub>a,t,h</sub> = Either a U/D Congestion Rent Shortfall Charge or a U/D Congestion Rent Surplus Payment, as specified in (a) and (b) below:

(a) If U/D Allocation<sub>a,t,h</sub> is negative, then U/D Allocation<sub>a,t,h</sub> shall be a U/D Congestion Rent Shortfall Charge, U/D CRSC<sub>a,t,h</sub>, charged to Transmission Owner  $t$  for binding constraint  $a$  in hour  $h$  of the Day-Ahead Market; or

(b) If U/D Allocation<sub>a,t,h</sub> is positive, then U/D Allocation<sub>a,t,h</sub> shall be a U/D Congestion Rent Surplus Payment, U/D CRSP<sub>a,t,h</sub>, paid to Transmission Owner  $t$  for binding constraint  $a$  in hour  $h$  of the Day-Ahead Market

Responsibility<sub>h,q,r</sub> = The amount, as a percentage, of responsibility borne by Transmission Owner  $q$  (which shall include the ISO when it is deemed a Transmission Owner for the purpose of applying Sections 20.2.4.4.2, 20.2.4.4.3, or

20.2.4.4.4) for Qualifying DAM Derating  $r$  or Qualifying DAM  
 Upgrading  $r$  in hour  $h$ , as determined pursuant to Section 20.2.4.4

and the variable  $U/D\ DCR_{a,h}$  is defined as set forth in Formula N-7 and the variables

$RatingChange_{a,h,r}$  and  $R_{a,h}$  are defined as set forth in Formula N-11.

### Formula N-13

$$U/D\ Allocation_{a,t,h} = \left( \sum_{\substack{r \in R_{a,h} \\ \text{and } q=t}} RatingChange_{a,h,r} * ShadowPrice_{a,h} * Responsibility_{h,q,r} \right) * SCUCSignChange_{a,h}$$

Where,

the variables  $ShadowPrice_{a,h}$  and  $SCUCSignChange_{a,h}$  are defined as set forth in Formula N-5,

the variables  $U/D\ Allocation_{a,t,h}$  and  $Responsibility_{h,q,r}$  are defined as set forth in Formula N-12,

and the variables  $RatingChange_{a,h,r}$  and  $R_{a,h}$  are defined as set forth in Formula N-11.

## 20.2.4.4 Assigning Responsibility for Outages, Returns-to-Service, Deratings, and Upgradings

### 20.2.4.4.1 General Rule for Assigning Responsibility; Presumption of Causation

Unless the special rules set forth in Sections 20.2.4.4.2 through 20.2.4.4.4 apply, a Transmission Owner shall for purposes of this Section 20.2.4 be deemed responsible for a DAM Status Change to the extent that the Transmission Owner has caused the DAM Status Change by changing the in-service or out-of-service status of its transmission facility; *provided, however*, that where a DAM Status Change results from a change to the in-service or out-of-service status of a transmission facility owned by more than one Transmission Owner, responsibility for such DAM Status Change shall be assigned to each owning Transmission Owner based on the percentage of the transmission facility that is owned by the Transmission Owner (as determined in accordance with Section 20.2.4.6.1) during the hour for which the DAM Status Change occurred. For the sake of clarity, a Transmission Owner may, by changing the in-service or out-

of-service status of its transmission facility, cause a DAM Status Change of another transmission facility if the Transmission Owner's change in the in-service or out-of-service status of its transmission facility causes (directly or as a result of Good Utility Practice) a change in the in-service or out-of-service status of the other transmission facility.

The Transmission Owner that owns a transmission facility that qualifies as a DAM Status Change shall be deemed to have caused the DAM Status Change of that transmission facility unless (i) the Transmission Owner that owns the facility informs the ISO that another Transmission Owner caused the DAM Status Change or that responsibility is to be shared among Transmission Owners in accordance with Sections 20.2.4.4.2, 20.2.4.4.3, or 20.2.4.4.4, and no party disputes such claim; (ii) in case of a dispute over the assignment of responsibility, the ISO determines a Transmission Owner other than the owner of the transmission facility caused the DAM Status Change or that responsibility is to be shared among Transmission Owners in accordance with Sections 20.2.4.4.2, 20.2.4.4.3, or 20.2.4.4.4; or (iii) FERC orders otherwise.

**20.2.4.4.2 Shared Responsibility For Outages, Returns-to-Service, and Ratings Changes Directed by the ISO or Caused by Facility Status Changes Directed by the ISO**

A Transmission Owner shall not be responsible for any DAM Status Change that qualifies as an ISO-Directed DAM Status Change or Deemed ISO-Directed DAM Status Change. Instead, the ISO shall allocate any revenue impacts resulting from a DAM Status Change that qualifies as an ISO-Directed DAM Status Change or Deemed ISO-Directed DAM Status Change as part of Net Congestion Rents for hour  $h$ . To do so, the ISO shall be treated as a Transmission Owner when allocating DAM Constraint Residuals pursuant to Section 20.2.4.2 and Section 20.2.4.3, and any DAM Status Change that qualifies as an ISO-Directed DAM Status Change or Deemed ISO-Directed DAM Status Change shall be attributed to the ISO when

performing the calculations described in Section 20.2.4.2 and Section 20.2.4.3; *provided*, however, any O/R-t-S Congestion Rent Shortfall Charge, U/D Congestion Rent Shortfall Charge, O/R-t-S Congestion Rent Surplus Payment, or U/D Congestion Rent Surplus Payment allocable to the ISO pursuant to this Section 20.2.4.4.2 shall ultimately be allocated to the Transmission Owners as Net Congestion Rents pursuant to Section 20.2.5.

Responsibility for a Qualifying DAM Return-to-Service or Qualifying DAM Upgrading that is directed by the ISO but does not qualify as a Deemed ISO-Directed DAM Status Change shall be assigned to the Transmission Owner that was responsible for the Qualifying Auction Outage or Qualifying Auction Derating for the month that contains the relevant hour in the last Reconfiguration Auction held for TCCs valid for the relevant hour (or if no Reconfiguration Auction was held for TCCs valid in the relevant hour, the last 6-month Sub-Auction of a Centralized TCC Auction held for TCCs valid for the relevant hour).

#### **20.2.4.4.3 Shared Responsibility for External Events**

A Transmission Owner shall not be responsible for a DAM Status Change occurring inside the NYCA that is caused by a change in the in-service or out-of-service status or rating of a transmission facility located outside the NYCA. Instead, the ISO shall allocate any revenue impacts resulting from a DAM Status Change caused by such an event outside the NYCA as part of Net Congestion Rents for hour *h*. To do so, the ISO shall be treated as a Transmission Owner when allocating DAM Constraint Residuals pursuant to Section 20.2.4.2 and Section 20.2.4.3 and any DAM Status Change caused by such an event outside the NYCA shall be attributed to the ISO when performing the calculations described in Section 20.2.4.2 and Section 20.2.4.3; *provided*, however, any O/R-t-S Congestion Rent Shortfall Charge, U/D Congestion Rent Shortfall Charge, O/R-t-S Congestion Rent Surplus Payment, or U/D Congestion Rent Surplus

Payment allocable to the ISO pursuant to this Section 20.2.4.4.3 shall ultimately be allocated to the Transmission Owners as Net Congestion Rents pursuant to Section 20.2.5.

**~~20.2.4.4.4 Shared Responsibility For Returns-to-Service and Upratings During a Transitional Period~~**

~~Notwithstanding any other provision of this Attachment N, a Transmission Owner shall be deemed to be not responsible for a Qualifying DAM Return-to-Service, Qualifying DAM Derating, or Qualifying DAM Uprating for an hour of the Day Ahead Market if this Attachment N was not in effect at the time of the last Reconfiguration Auction held for TCCs valid for the hour. Instead, the ISO shall allocate any revenue impacts resulting from such a Qualifying DAM Return-to-Service, Qualifying DAM Derating, or Qualifying DAM Uprating as part of Net Congestion Rents for hour *h*. To do so, the ISO shall be treated as a Transmission Owner when allocating DAM Constraint Residuals pursuant to Section 20.2.4.2 and Section 20.2.4.3, and any such Qualifying DAM Return-to-Service, Qualifying DAM Derating, or Qualifying DAM Uprating during this transitional period shall be attributed to the ISO when performing the calculations described in Section 20.2.4.2 and Section 20.2.4.3; provided, however, any O/R-t-S Congestion Rent Shortfall Charge, U/D Congestion Rent Shortfall Charge, O/R-t-S Congestion Rent Surplus Payment, or U/D Congestion Rent Surplus Payment allocable to the ISO pursuant to this Section 20.2.4.4 shall ultimately be allocated to the Transmission Owners as Net Congestion Rents pursuant to Section 20.2.5.~~

**20.2.4.5 Exceptions: Setting Charges and Payments to Zero**

**20.2.4.5.1 Zeroing Out of Charges and Payments When Outages and Deratings Lead to Net Payments or Returns-to-Service and Upratings Lead to Net Charges**

The ISO shall use Formula N-14 to calculate the total O/R-t-S Congestion Rent Shortfall

Charges, U/D Congestion Rent Shortfall Charges, O/R-t-S Congestion Rent Surplus Payments, and U/D Congestion Rent Surplus Payments,  $NetDAMAllocations_{t,h}$ , for Transmission Owner  $t$  in hour  $h$ . Based on this calculation, the ISO shall set equal to zero all O/R-t-S  $CRSC_{a,t,h}$ , U/D  $CRSC_{a,t,h}$ , O/R-t-S  $CRSP_{a,t,h}$ , and U/D  $CRSP_{a,t,h}$  (each as defined in Formula N-14) for Transmission Owner  $t$  for all constraints for hour  $h$  if (i)  $NetDAMAllocations_{t,h}$  is positive and Transmission Owner  $t$  is not responsible (as determined pursuant to Section 20.2.4.4) for any Qualifying DAM Returns-to-Service or Qualifying DAM Upratings during hour  $h$ , or (ii)  $NetDAMAllocations_{t,h}$  is negative and Transmission Owner  $t$  is not responsible (as determined pursuant to Section 20.2.4.4) for any Qualifying DAM Outages or Qualifying DAM Deratings during hour  $h$ ; *provided, however*, the ISO shall not set equal to zero pursuant to this Section 20.2.4.5.1 any O/R-t-S  $CRSC_{a,t,h}$ , U/D  $CRSC_{a,t,h}$ , O/R-t-S  $CRSP_{a,t,h}$ , or U/D  $CRSP_{a,t,h}$  arising from an ISO-Directed DAM Status Change or Deemed ISO-Directed DAM Status Change described in Section 20.2.4.4.2, an external event described in Section 20.2.4.4.3, or an event occurring during a transitional period as described in Section 20.2.4.4.4.

#### Formula N-14

$$NetDAMAllocations_{t,h} = \sum_{for\ all\ a} (O/R-t-S\ CRSC_{a,t,h} + U/D\ CRSC_{a,t,h} + O/R-t-S\ CRSP_{a,t,h} + U/D\ CRSP_{a,t,h})$$

Where,

$NetDAMAllocations_{t,h}$	=	The total of the O/R-t-S Congestion Rent Shortfall Charges, U/D Congestion Rent Shortfall Charges, O/R-t-S Congestion Rent Surplus Payments, and U/D Congestion Rent Surplus Payments allocated to Transmission Owner $t$ in hour $h$
O/R-t-S $CRSC_{a,t,h}$	=	An O/R-t-S Congestion Rent Shortfall Charge allocated to Transmission Owner $t$ for binding constraint $a$ in hour $h$ of the Day-Ahead Market, calculated pursuant to Section 20.2.4.2
U/D $CRSC_{a,t,h}$	=	A U/D Congestion Rent Shortfall Charge allocated to Transmission Owner $t$ for binding constraint $a$ in hour $h$ of the Day-Ahead Market, calculated pursuant to Section 20.2.4.3
O/R-t-S $CRSP_{a,t,h}$	=	An O/R-t-S Congestion Rent Surplus Payment allocated to

Transmission Owner  $t$  for binding constraint  $a$  in hour  $h$  of the Day-Ahead Market, calculated pursuant to Section 20.2.4.2

$U/D\ CRSP_{a,t,h}$  = A U/D Congestion Rent Surplus Payment allocated to Transmission Owner  $t$  for binding constraint  $a$  in hour  $h$  of the Day-Ahead Market, calculated pursuant to Section 20.2.4.3.

#### **20.2.4.5.2 Zeroing Out of Charges and Payments Resulting from Formula Failure**

Notwithstanding any other provision of this Attachment N, the ISO shall set equal to zero any O/R-t-S Congestion Rent Shortfall Charge, U/D Congestion Rent Shortfall Charge, O/R-t-S Congestion Rent Surplus Payment, or U/D Congestion Rent Surplus Payment allocated to a Transmission Owner for an hour of the Day-Ahead Market if either:

- (i) data necessary to compute such a charge or payment, as specified in the formulas set forth in Section 20.2.4, is not known by the ISO and cannot be computed by the ISO (in interpreting this clause, equipment failure shall not preclude computation by the ISO unless necessary data is irretrievably lost); or
- (ii) both (a) the charge or payment is clearly and materially inconsistent with cost causation principles; and (b) this inconsistency is the result of factors not taken into account in the formulas used to calculate the charge or payment;

*provided, however*, if the amount of charges or payments set equal to zero as a result of the unknown data or inaccurate formula is greater than twenty five thousand dollars (\$25,000) in any given month or greater than one hundred thousand dollars (\$100,000) over multiple months, the ISO will inform the Transmission Owners of the identified problem and will work with the Transmission Owners to determine if an alternative allocation method is needed and whether it will apply to all months for which the intended formula does not work. Alternate methods would be subject to market participant review and subsequent filing with FERC, as appropriate.

For the sake of clarity, the ISO shall not pursuant to this Section 20.2.4.5.2 set equal to



zero any O/R-t-S Congestion Rent Shortfall Charge, U/D Congestion Rent Shortfall Charge, O/R-t-S Congestion Rent Surplus Payment, or U/D Congestion Rent Surplus Payment that fails to meet these conditions, even if another O/R-t-S Congestion Rent Shortfall Charge, U/D Congestion Rent Shortfall Charge, O/R-t-S Congestion Rent Surplus Payment, or U/D Congestion Rent Surplus Payment is set equal to zero pursuant to this Section 20.2.4.5.2 in the same hour of the Day-Ahead Market.

#### **20.2.4.6 Information Requirements**

##### **20.2.4.6.1 Information Regarding Facility Ownership**

A Transmission Owner shall be responsible for informing the ISO of any change in the ownership of a transmission facility. The ISO shall allocate responsibility for DAM Status Changes based on the transmission facility ownership information available to it at the time of initial settlement.

##### **20.2.4.6.2 Calculation of Settlements Without DCR Allocation Threshold**

One month each year, the ISO shall, for informational purposes only, calculate the DAM Constraint Residuals for each constraint for each hour without applying the DCR Allocation Threshold and shall calculate all O/R-t-S Congestion Rent Shortfall Charges, O/R-t-S Congestion Rent Surplus Payments, U/D Congestion Rent Shortfall Charges, and U/D Congestion Rent Surplus Payments. Before choosing the month for which it will perform these calculations, the ISO will consult with the Transmission Owners.

#### **20.2.5 Allocation of Net Congestion Rents to Transmission Owners**

The Net Congestion Rents for each hour of month  $m$  shall be summed over the month, so that positive and negative values net to a monthly total,  $NCR_m$ . The ISO shall allocate  $NCR_m$

each month to the Transmission Owners by allocating to each Transmission Owner  $t$  an amount equal to the product of (i)  $NCR_m$ , and (ii) the allocation factor for Transmission Owner  $t$  for month  $m$ , as calculated pursuant to Formula N-15.

### Formula N-15

$$AllocationFactor_{t,m} = \frac{(OriginalResidual_{t,m} + ETCNL_{t,m} + NARs_{t,m} + GFR\&GFTCC_{t,m} + HFPTCC_{t,m})}{\sum_{q \in T} (OriginalResidual_{q,m} + ETCNL_{q,m} + NARs_{q,m} + GFR\&GFTCC_{q,m} + HFPTCC_{q,m})}$$

Where,

Allocation Factor<sub>t,m</sub> = The allocation factor used by the ISO to allocate a share of the Net Congestion Rents to Transmission Owner  $t$  for month  $m$

Original Residual<sub>q,m</sub> = The sum of the one-month portion of the revenue imputed to the Direct Sale ~~or~~and the sale in any Centralized TCC Auction Sub-Auction of Original Residual TCCs held by Transmission Owner  $q$  that are valid in month  $m$ . The one-month portion of the revenue imputed to the Direct Sale of these Original Residual TCCs shall be the market-clearing price of the TCCs valid in month  $m$  in the last Reconfiguration Auction held for TCCs valid in month  $m$  (or one-sixth of the average market-clearing price in the rounds of the 6-month Sub-Auction of the last Centralized TCC Auction if no Reconfiguration Auction was held for TCCs valid in month  $m$ ). ~~For Centralized TCC Auctions conducted before May 1, 2010, the calculation of the average market-clearing price in rounds of the 6-month Sub-Auction shall incorporate only Stage 1 six month rounds.)~~ The one-month portion of the revenue imputed to the sale in any Centralized TCC Auction Sub-Auction of these Original Residual TCCs shall be calculated by dividing the revenue received from the sale of these Original Residual TCCs in the Centralized TCC Auction Sub-Auction by the duration in months of the TCCs sold in that Centralized TCC Auction Sub-Auction.

ETCNL<sub>q,m</sub> = The sum of the one-month portion of the revenue ~~the~~imputed to Transmission Owner  $q$  has received as payment for the Direct Sale of Transmission Owner  $q$ 's ETCNL or for its ETCNL released in the Centralized TCC Auction Sub-Auction held for TCCs valid for month  $m$ . ~~Each~~The one-month portion of the revenue imputed for ETCNL released in ~~such~~any Centralized TCC Auction shall be calculated by dividing the revenue received in a Centralized TCC Auction Sub-Auction from the sale of the ETCNL by the duration in months of the TCCs corresponding to the ETCNL sold in the

Centralized TCC Auction Sub-Auction.<sup>2</sup> The one-month portion of the revenue imputed to the Direct Sale of ETCNL shall be the ~~value~~market-clearing price of the TCCs valid in month  $m$  corresponding to that ETCNL in the last Reconfiguration Auction held for TCCs valid in month  $m$  (or one-sixth of the average market-clearing price of such TCCs in the rounds of the 6-month Sub-Auction of the last Centralized TCC Auction if no Reconfiguration Auction was held for TCCs valid in month  $m$ ). ~~For Centralized TCC Auctions conducted before May 1, 2010, the calculation of the average market clearing price in rounds of the 6-month Sub-Auction shall incorporate only Stage 1 six month rounds.~~

NAR<sub>s<sub>q,m</sub></sub>

= The one-month portion of the Net Auction Revenues ~~the~~ Transmission Owner  $q$  has received in Centralized TCC Auction Sub-Auctions and all Reconfiguration Auctions held for TCCs valid for month  $m$  (which shall not include any revenue from the sale of Original Residual TCCs). The one-month portion of the revenues shall be calculated by summing (i) the revenue Transmission Owner  $q$  received from the allocation of Net Auction Revenue pursuant to Section 20.3.7 in each Centralized TCC Auction Sub-Auction for TCCs valid in month  $m$ , divided in each case by the duration in months of the TCCs sold in the Centralized TCC Auction Sub-Auction ~~and the sum of the revenue Transmission Owner  $q$  received from the allocation of that portion of Net Auction Revenue pursuant to Section 20.3.7 related to month  $m$  for all Reconfiguration Auctions held for TCCs valid in month  $m$  from the allocation of Net Auction Revenue pursuant to Section 20.3.7, divided by the duration in months of the TCCs sold in the Centralized TCC Auction Sub-Auction or Reconfiguration Auction~~ (or, to the extent TCC auction revenues were allocated pursuant to a different methodology, the amount of such revenues allocated to Transmission Owner  $q$ ), minus (ii) the sum of NetAuctionAllocations<sub>t,n</sub> as calculated pursuant to Formula N-27 (as adjusted for any charges or payments that are zeroed out) for Transmission Owner  $q$  for all 6-month Sub-Auction rounds  $n$  of all Centralized TCC Auctions held for TCCs valid in month  $m$ , divided in each case by the duration in months of the TCCs sold in each Centralized TCC Auction Sub-Auction (or, to the extent that the revenue impact of transmission facility outages, returns-to-service, upratings, and deratings were settled pursuant to a different methodology, the net of such revenue impacts for Transmission Owner  $q$ ), minus (iii) the sum of the portion of NetAuctionAllocations<sub>t,n</sub> as calculated pursuant to Formula N-27 and as adjusted for any charges or payments that are zeroed out for

2 A TCC corresponds to ETCNL if it has the same POI and POW as the ETCNL.

	Transmission Owner $q$ for <u>month <math>m</math> for the all</u> Reconfiguration Auctions <del>#</del> held for <u>TCCs valid in</u> month $m$ (or, to the extent that the revenue impact of transmission facility outages, returns-to-service, upratings, and deratings were settled pursuant to a different methodology, the net of such revenue impacts for Transmission Owner $q$ ). <del>For Centralized TCC Auctions conducted before May 1, 2010, the calculation of (ii) shall incorporate only Stage 1 six month rounds.</del>
$GFR\&GFTCC_{q,m}$	= The one-month portion of the imputed value of Grandfathered TCCs and Grandfathered Rights <u>held by Transmission Owner <math>q</math></u> , valued at their market-clearing prices <u>for month <math>m</math></u> in the <u>last</u> Reconfiguration Auction for <u>TCCs valid in</u> month $m$ (or one-sixth of the average market clearing price for rounds in the 6-month Sub-Auction of the last Centralized TCC Auction if no Reconfiguration Auction was held for <u>TCCs valid in</u> month $m$ ), provided that <del>the</del> Transmission Owner $q$ is the selling party and the Existing Transmission Agreement related to each Grandfathered TCC and Grandfathered Right remains valid in month $m$ . <del>For Centralized TCC Auctions conducted before May 1, 2010, the calculation of the average market clearing price in rounds of the 6-month Sub-Auction shall incorporate only Stage 1 six month rounds.</del>
$HFPTCC_{q,m}$	= The one-month portion of the Historic Fixed Price TCC revenues that Transmission Owner $q$ has received for Historic Fixed Price TCCs valid for month $m$ , valued at the sum of the share of revenues received by Transmission Owner $q$ pursuant to Section 20.4 of this Attachment N for all Historic Fixed Price TCCs valid for month $m$ , divided by twelve; provided, however that the value shall be zero for all Historic Fixed Price TCCs that took effect on or before November 1, 2016.
$t$	= Transmission Owner $t$
$T$	= The set of all Transmission Owners $q$ .

For purposes of Formula N-15, variables subscripted by  $t$  shall be calculated for Transmission Owner  $t$  in the same manner as variables subscripted by  $q$  are calculated for Transmission Owner  $q$ .

Each Transmission Owner's share of Net Congestion Rents allocated pursuant to this Section 20.2.5 shall be incorporated into its TSC or NTAC, as the case may be.