

## 20.3 Settlement of TCC Auctions

### 20.3.1 Overview of TCC Auction Settlements; Calculation of Net Auction Revenue

*Overview of TCC Auction Settlements.* For each round  $n$  of a Centralized TCC Auction and for each Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ , the ISO shall settle all settlements for round  $n$  or for Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ . These settlements include, as applicable pursuant to the provisions of this Attachment N: (i) the market clearing price charged or paid to purchasers of TCCs; (ii) payments to Transmission Owners that released ETCNL; (iii) payments or charges to Primary Holders selling TCCs; (iv) payments to Transmission Owners that released Original Residual TCCs; (v) O/R-t-S Auction Revenue Shortfall Charges and U/D Auction Revenue Shortfall Charges; and (vi) O/R-t-S Auction Revenue Surplus Payments and U/D Auction Revenue Surplus Payments. Each of these settlements is represented by a variable in Formula N-16.

*Calculation of Net Auction Revenues for a Round or a Reconfiguration Auction.* In each Centralized TCC Auction round  $n$  and in each Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ , the ISO shall calculate Net Auction Revenue pursuant to Formula N-16.

#### Formula N-16

$$Net\ Auction\ Revenue_n = \begin{bmatrix} TCC\ Auction\ Revenue_n \\ -ETCNL_n \\ -Primary\ Holder\ TCCs\ Sold_n \\ -Original\ Residual\ TCCs_n \\ -O/R-t-S\&U/D\ ARSC\&ARSP_n \end{bmatrix}$$

Where,

- $n$  = A round of a Centralized TCC Auction (which may be either a round of a 6-month Sub-Auction, a round of a Sub-Auction in which TCCs with a duration greater than 6 months are sold,) or a Reconfiguration Auction, as the case may be
- Net Auction Revenue <sub>$n$</sub>  = Net Auction Revenue for the round  $n$  of a Centralized TCC Auction or for Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ , as the case may be

TCC Auction Revenue <sub>n</sub>	= The gross amount of revenue that the ISO collects from the award of TCCs to purchasers in round <i>n</i> or in Reconfiguration Auction <i>n</i> , which results from the charges and payments allocated pursuant to Section 20.3.2
ETCNL <sub>n</sub>	= Either (i) if round <i>n</i> is a round of a Centralized TCC Auction, the total of all payments that the ISO makes to Transmission Owners releasing ETCNL into the round pursuant to Section 20.3.3; or (ii) for Reconfiguration Auction <i>n</i> , 0
Primary Holder TCCs Sold <sub>n</sub>	= The net of the total payments and charges the ISO allocates to Primary Holders selling TCCs in round <i>n</i> or in Reconfiguration Auction <i>n</i> pursuant to Section 20.3.4
Original Residual TCCs <sub>n</sub>	= Either (i) if round <i>n</i> is a round of a Centralized TCC Auction, the total payments the ISO makes in round <i>n</i> pursuant to Section 20.3.5 to Transmission Owners that release into round <i>n</i> Original Residual TCCs; or (ii) for Reconfiguration Auction <i>n</i> , 0
O/R-t-S&U/D ARSC&ARSP <sub>n</sub>	= Either (i) if round <i>n</i> is a round of a Centralized TCC Auction in which 6-month TCCs are sold, the sum of the total O/R-t-S Auction Revenue Shortfall Charges, U/D Auction Revenue Shortfall Charges, O/R-t-S Auction Revenue Surplus Payments, and U/D Auction Revenue Surplus Payments (calculated as NetAuctionAllocations <sub>t,n</sub> pursuant to Formula N-27) for all Transmission Owners <i>t</i> , reduced by any zeroing out of such charges or payments pursuant to Section 20.3.6.5; (ii) if round <i>n</i> is a round of a Centralized TCC Auction Sub-Auction in which TCCs with durations longer than 6 months are sold, 0; or (iii) for Reconfiguration Auction <i>n</i> , the sum of the total O/R-t-S Auction Revenue Shortfall Charges (O/R-t-S ARSC <sub>a,t,n</sub> ), U/D Auction Revenue Shortfall Charges (U/D ARSC <sub>a,t,n</sub> ), O/R-t-S Auction Revenue Surplus Payments (O/R-t-S ARSP <sub>a,t,n</sub> ), and U/D Auction Revenue Surplus Payments (U/D ARSP <sub>a,t,n</sub> ) for all Transmission Owners <i>t</i> (which sum is calculated for each Transmission Owner as NetAuctionAllocations <sub>t,n</sub> pursuant to Formula N-27), reduced by any zeroing out of such charges or payments pursuant to Section 20.3.6.5

The ISO shall allocate the Net Auction Revenue calculated in each round of a Centralized TCC Auction Sub-Auction and in each Reconfiguration Auction to Transmission Owners pursuant to Section 20.3.7.

## 20.3.2 Charges for TCCs Purchased

All bidders awarded TCCs in round *n* of a Centralized TCC Auction or in

Reconfiguration Auction  $n$  shall pay or be paid the market clearing price in round  $n$  or in Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ , as determined pursuant to Attachment M of this Tariff, for the TCCs purchased.

### **20.3.3 Payments for ETCNL**

The ISO shall, in each round of a Centralized TCC Auction in which ETCNL is released, pay the market clearing price determined in that round for TCCs that correspond to that ETCNL to the Transmission Owner that releases the ETCNL.

If a Transmission Owner releases ETCNL for sale in a round of the Centralized TCC Auction, and the market-clearing price for those TCCs corresponding to that ETCNL in that round is negative, the value of those TCCs will not be included in the determination of payments to the Transmission Owners for ETCNL released into the Centralized TCC Auction. If the market-clearing price is negative for TCCs corresponding to any ETCNL, the value will be set to zero for purposes of allocating auction revenues from the sale of ETCNL. If the total value of the auction revenues available for payment to the Transmission Owners for ETCNL released into the Centralized TCC Auction is insufficient to fund payments at market-clearing prices, the total payments to each Transmission Owner for ETCNL will be reduced proportionately.

Notwithstanding any other provision in this Tariff, ETCNL that is offered in any Centralized TCC Auction and that is assigned a negative market clearing price or value shall not give rise to a payment obligation by the Transmission Owner that released it.

### **20.3.4 Payments to Primary Holders Selling TCCs; Distribution of Revenues from Sale of Certain Grandfathered TCCs (excluding ETCNL) in a Centralized TCC Auction**

The ISO shall distribute to or collect from each Primary Holder of a TCC selling that TCC in the Centralized TCC Auction or Reconfiguration Auction the market clearing price of

that TCC in the round of the Centralized TCC Auction or in the Reconfiguration Auction in which that TCC was sold.

In the event a Grandfathered TCC<sup>1</sup> is terminated by mutual agreement of the parties to the grandfathered ETA prior to the conditions specified within Attachments K and L, then the ISO shall distribute the revenues from the sale of the TCCs that correspond to the terminated Grandfathered TCCs in a round of a Centralized TCC Auction directly back to the Transmission Owner identified in Attachment L, until such time as the conditions specified within Attachments K and L are met. Upon such time that the conditions within Attachments K and L are met, the ISO shall allocate the revenues from the sale of the TCCs that correspond to terminated Grandfathered TCCs in the Centralized TCC Auction as Net Auction Revenues in accordance with Section 20.3.7 of this Attachment.

### **20.3.5 Allocation of Revenues from the Sale of Original Residual TCCs**

Revenues associated with Original Residual TCCs shall be distributed directly to each Primary Holder for the duration of the LBMP Transition Period. The Primary Holder of such an Original Residual TCC shall be paid the market clearing price of the Original Residual TCC in the round of the Sub-Auction in which that Original Residual TCC was sold.

If a Transmission Owner releases an Original Residual TCC for sale in a round of the Centralized TCC Auction, and the market-clearing price for those TCCs in that round is negative, the value of those TCCs will not be included in the determination of payments to the Transmission Owners for Original Residual TCCs released into the Centralized TCC Auction. If the market-clearing price is negative for any Original Residual TCC, the value will be set to zero for purposes of allocating auction revenues from the sale of Residual TCCs. If the total value of

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<sup>1</sup> These TCCs include TCCs, if any, associated with those rate schedules to which footnote 9 of Attachment L pertains, whether by mutual agreement or otherwise.

the auction revenues available for payment to the Transmission Owners for Original Residual TCCs released into the Centralized TCC Auction is insufficient to fund payments at market-clearing prices, the total payments to each Transmission Owner for Original Residual TCCs will be reduced proportionately. This proportionate reduction would include a reduction in payments reflecting a proportionate reduction in the auction value of Original Residual TCCs sold in a Direct Sale. Notwithstanding any other provision in this Tariff, Original Residual TCCs that are offered in any Centralized TCC Auction and that are assigned a negative market clearing price or value shall not give rise to a payment obligation by the Transmission Owner that released them.

#### **20.3.6 Charges and Payments to Transmission Owners for Auction Outages and Returns-to-Service**

The ISO shall charge O/R-t-S Auction Revenue Shortfall Charges and U/D Auction Revenue Shortfall Charges and pay O/R-t-S Auction Revenue Surplus Payments and U/D Auction Revenue Surplus Payments pursuant to this Section 20.3.6. To do so, the ISO shall calculate the Auction Constraint Residual for each constraint for each round  $n$  of a Centralized TCC Auction 6-month Sub-Auction or Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ , as the case may be, pursuant to Section 20.3.6.1 and then determine the amount of each Auction Constraint Residual that is O/R-t-S Auction Constraint Residual and the amount that is U/D Auction Constraint Residual, as specified in Section 20.3.6.1. The ISO shall use the O/R-t-S Auction Constraint Residual to allocate O/R-t-S Auction Revenue Shortfall Charges and O/R-t-S Auction Revenue Surplus Payments to Transmission Owners pursuant to Sections 20.3.6.2 and 20.3.6.4, each of which shall be subject to being reduced to zero pursuant to Section 20.3.6.5. The ISO shall use the U/D Auction Constraint Residual to allocate U/D Auction Revenue Shortfall Charges and U/D Auction Revenue Surplus Payments to Transmission Owners pursuant to Sections 20.3.6.3 and 20.3.6.4, each of which shall be subject to being reduced to zero pursuant to Section 20.3.6.5.

The ISO shall not calculate an Auction Constraint Residual, O/R-t-S Auction Constraint Residual, or U/D Auction Constraint Residual for any rounds of a Centralized TCC Auction except for rounds of the 6-month Sub-Auction.

**20.3.6.1 Measuring the Impact of Auction Outages and Returns-to-Service: Calculation of Auction Constraint Residuals and Division of Auction Constraint Residuals into O/R-t-S Auction Constraint Residuals and U/D Auction Constraint Residuals**

The ISO shall identify all constraints that are binding in the final Optimal Power Flow solution for round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction of a Centralized TCC Auction or for Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ , as the case may be. For each binding constraint  $a$  and for each round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction of a Centralized TCC Auction or Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ , the ISO shall calculate the Auction Constraint Residual,  $ACR_{a,n}$ , using Formula N-17; *provided, however*, the ISO shall recalculate  $ACR_{a,n}$  using Formula N-18 if (i)  $ACR_{a,n}$  is positive based on the calculation using Formula N-17, and (ii) constraint  $a$  was not binding in the Power Flow used to determine the Energy flow on constraint  $a$  in calculating the variable  $FLOW_{a,n,basecase}$  in Formula N-17.

**Formula N-17**

$$ACR_{a,n} = ShadowPrice_{a,n} * \left[ \frac{(FLOW_{a,n,actual} - FLOW_{a,n,basecase})}{+(ISORatingChange_{a,n} * OPFSignChange_{a,n})} \right] * \%Sold_n$$

Where,

- $ACR_{a,n}$  = The Auction Constraint Residual, in dollars, for binding constraint  $a$  in round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction or in Reconfiguration Auction  $n$
- $ShadowPrice_{a,n}$  = The Shadow Price, in dollars/MW- $p$ , of binding constraint  $a$  in round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction or in Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ , where  $p$  is a one-month period for Reconfiguration Auction  $n$  and  $p$  is a six-month period for round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction, which Shadow Price is calculated in a manner so that if relaxation of constraint  $a$  would permit an increase in the objective function used for round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction or Reconfiguration Auction  $n$  as described in Attachment M of this tariff, then

ShadowPrice<sub>a,n</sub> is positive

FLOW<sub>a,n,actual</sub> = The Energy flow, in MW- $p$ , on binding constraint  $a$  resulting from a Power Flow using, as the case may be:

- (a) For Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ , (i) the Transmission System model for Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ , (ii) the set of TCCs and Grandfathered Rights represented in the solution to Reconfiguration Auction  $n$  (including those pre-existing TCCs and Grandfathered Rights represented as fixed injections and withdrawals in that auction), and (iii) the phase angle regulator schedules determined in the Optimal Power Flow solution for Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ ; or
- (b) For round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction, (i) the Transmission System model for round  $n$ , (ii) the set of TCCs (scaled appropriately) and Grandfathered Rights represented in the solution to round  $n$  (including those pre-existing TCCs and Grandfathered Rights represented as fixed injections and withdrawals in that auction), and (iii) the phase angle regulator schedule produced in the Optimal Power Flow solution for round  $n$

FLOW<sub>a,n,basecase</sub>= The Energy flow, in MW- $p$ , on binding constraint  $a$  produced in, as the case may be:

- (a) For Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ , a Power Flow using the following base case data set: (i) the Transmission System model for Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ , (ii) the set of TCCs and Grandfathered Rights represented in the solution to the final round of the last 6-month Sub-Auction held for TCCs valid during the month corresponding to Reconfiguration Auction  $n$  (including those pre-existing TCCs and Grandfathered Rights represented as fixed injections and withdrawals in that auction), and (iii) the phase angle regulator schedules determined in the Optimal Power Flow solution for the final round of the last 6-month Sub-Auction held for

TCCs valid during the month corresponding to Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ ; or (b)

For round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction, a Power Flow run using the following base case data set: (i) the Transmission System model for the actual 6-month Sub-Auction, and (ii) the base case set of TCCs (including those pre-existing TCCs and Grandfathered Rights represented as fixed injections and withdrawals in the simulated auction) and the phase angle regulator schedule produced in a single simulated TCC auction administered for all rounds of the 6-month Sub-Auction using the Transmission System model for the actual 6-month Sub-Auction modified so as to model as in-service all transmission facilities that were out-of-service in the Transmission System model used for the Sub-Auction and model as fully rated all transmission facilities that were derated in the Transmission System model used for the Sub-Auction, the pre-existing TCCs and Grandfathered Rights represented as fixed injections and withdrawals in the Sub-Auction, and all bids to purchase and offers to sell made into all rounds of the Sub-Auction that includes round  $n$

$ISORatingChange_{a,n}$  = The total change in the rating of constraint  $a$  for round  $n$  or Reconfiguration Auction  $n$  resulting from ISO-Directed Auction Status Changes or Deemed ISO-Directed Auction Status Changes described in Section 20.3.6.4.2, external events described in Section 20.3.6.4.3, or reasons determined by the ISO to be unrelated to Qualifying Auction Outages or Qualifying Auction Returns-to-Service for round  $n$  or Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ , which shall be calculated as follows:

- (a) For Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ , zero, except that in the event of a change in the rating of constraint  $a$  resulting from ISO-Directed Auction Status Changes or Deemed ISO-Directed Auction Status Changes described in Section 20.3.6.4.2, external events described in Section 20.3.6.4.3, or reasons determined by the ISO to be unrelated to Qualifying Auction Outages or Qualifying Auction Returns-to-



Service for round  $n$  or Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ ,  $ISORatingChange_{a,n}$  shall be equal to the amount, in MW- $p$ , of the change in the rating limit of constraint  $a$  as shown in the Reconfiguration Auction Interface Uprate/Derate Table applicable for Reconfiguration Auction  $n$

- (b) For round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction, zero, except that in the event of a change in the rating of a transmission facility resulting from ISO-Directed Auction Status Changes or Deemed ISO-Directed Auction Status Changes described in Section 20.3.6.4.2, external events described in Section 20.3.6.4.3, or reasons determined by the ISO to be unrelated to Qualifying Auction Outages or Qualifying Auction Returns-to-Service for round  $n$  or Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ ,  $ISORatingChange_{a,n}$  shall be equal to the amount, in MW- $p$ , of the change in the rating limit of constraint  $a$  as shown in the Centralized TCC Auction Interface Uprate/Derate Table applicable for round  $n$

$OPFSignChange_{a,n} = 1$  if  $ShadowPrice_{a,n}$  is greater than zero; otherwise, -1

$\%Sold_n =$  Either (i) for round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction, the percentage of transmission Capacity sold in round  $n$ , divided by the percentage of transmission Capacity sold in all rounds of the Sub-Auction of which round  $n$  is a part; or (ii) for Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ , 1.

#### Formula N-18

$$ACR_{a,n} = ShadowPrice_{a,n} * \left[ \begin{array}{c} (FLOW_{a,n,actual} - FLOW_{a,n,basecase}) \\ + (ISORatingChange_{a,n} * OPFSignChange_{a,n}) \\ - (UnsoldCapacity_{a,n,PriorAuction} * OPFSignChange_{a,n}) \end{array} \right] * \%Sold_n$$

Where,

$UnsoldCapacity_{a,n,PriorAuction} =$  Either:

- (a) For Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ , the rating limit for binding constraint  $a$  applied in the model used in the last Centralized TCC Auction held for TCCs valid during

the month corresponding to Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ , minus the Energy flow, in MW- $p$ , on binding constraint  $a$  produced in the Optimal Power Flow in the last round of that Centralized TCC Auction; or

- (b) For round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction, the rating limit for binding constraint  $a$  applied in the model used in the simulated auction run to determine  $FLOW_{a,n,basecase}$  in Formula N-17, minus the Energy flow, in MW- $p$ , on binding constraint  $a$  produced in the Optimal Power Flow in the simulated auction run to determine  $FLOW_{a,n,basecase}$  in Formula N-17

and each of the other variables is as set forth in Formula N-17; *provided, however*, if  $ACR_{a,n}$  is less than zero when calculated using this Formula N-18,  $ACR_{a,n}$  shall be set equal to zero.

Following calculation of the Auction Constraint Residual for each constraint  $a$  for each round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction or each Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ , the ISO shall calculate the amount of each O/R-t-S Auction Constraint Residual and the amount of each U/D Auction Constraint Residual for each constraint  $a$  for each round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction or Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ , as the case may be. The amount of each O/R-t-S Auction Constraint Residual for round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction or Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ , as the case may be, for constraint  $a$  shall be determined by applying Formula N-19. The amount of each U/D Auction Constraint Residual for round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction or Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ , as the case may be, for constraint  $a$  shall be determined by applying Formula N-20.

### Formula N-19

$$O/R-t-S\ ACR_{a,n} = ACR_{a,n} * \left[ \frac{(FLOW_{a,n,actual} - FLOW_{a,n,basecase}) + (TotalRatingChange_{a,n} * OPFSignChange_{a,n})}{(FLOW_{a,n,actual} - FLOW_{a,n,basecase}) + (ISORatingChange_{a,n} * OPFSignChange_{a,n})} \right]$$

Where:

O/R-t-S  $ACR_{a,n}$  = The amount of the O/R-t-S Auction Constraint Residual for round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction or Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ , as the case may be, for

constraint  $a$

TotalRatingChange<sub>a,n</sub> = The total change in the rating of constraint  $a$ , which shall be calculated as follows:

- (a) For Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ , TotalRatingChange<sub>a,n</sub> shall be equal to (1) the rating limit, in MW- $p$ , of constraint  $a$  in the last Centralized TCC Auction held for TCCs valid during the month corresponding to Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ , minus (2) the rating limit, in MW- $p$ , of constraint  $a$  applicable in Reconfiguration Auction  $n$
- (b) For round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction, TotalRatingChange<sub>a,n</sub> shall be equal to (1) the rating limit, in MW- $p$ , of constraint  $a$  in a case where all transmission facilities are in-service and fully rated, minus (2) the rating limit, in MW- $p$ , of constraint  $a$  in round  $n$

and the variable ACR<sub>a,n</sub> is as calculated pursuant to Formula N-17 or, if required, pursuant to Formula N-18, and each of the other variables are as defined in Formula N-17.

#### Formula N-20

$$U/D\ ACR_{a,n} = ACR_{a,n} * \left[ \frac{-(TotalRatingChange_{a,n} - ISORatingChange_{a,n}) * OPFSignChange_{a,n}}{(FLOW_{a,n,actual} - FLOW_{a,n,basewcase}) + (ISORatingChange_{a,n} * OPFSignChange_{a,n})} \right]$$

Where,

U/D ACR<sub>a,n</sub> = The amount of the U/D Auction Constraint Residual for round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction or Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ , as the case may be, for constraint  $a$  and the variable ACR<sub>a,n</sub> is as calculated pursuant to Formula N-17 or, if required, pursuant to Formula N-18, the variable TotalRatingChange<sub>a,n</sub> is defined as set forth in Formula N-19 and each of the other variables are defined as set forth in Formula N-17.

#### 20.3.6.2 Charges and Payments for the Direct Impact of Auction Outages and Returns-to-Service

The ISO shall use O/R-t-S Auction Constraint Residuals to allocate O/R-t-S Auction

Revenue Shortfall Charges and O/R-t-S Auction Revenue Surplus Payments, as the case may be, among Transmission Owners pursuant to this Section 3.6.2. Each O/R-t-S Auction Revenue Shortfall Charge and each O/R-t-S Auction Revenue Surplus Payment allocated to a Transmission Owner pursuant to this Section 20.3.6.2 is subject to being set equal to zero pursuant to Section 20.3.6.5.

#### **20.3.6.2.1 Identification of Outages and Returns-to-Service Qualifying for Charges and Payments**

For each round of a 6-month Sub-Auction or Reconfiguration Auction, as the case may be, the ISO shall identify each Qualifying Auction Outage and each Qualifying Auction Return-to-Service, as described below. The Transmission Owner responsible, as determined pursuant to Section 20.3.6.4, for the Qualifying Auction Outage or Qualifying Auction Return-to-Service shall be allocated an O/R-t-S Auction Revenue Shortfall Charge or an O/R-t-S Auction Revenue Surplus Payment pursuant to Sections 20.3.6.2.2 or 20.3.6.2.3.

##### **20.3.6.2.1.1 Definition of Qualifying Auction Outage**

A “**Qualifying Auction Outage**” (which term shall apply to round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction or Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ , as the case may be) shall be defined to mean either an Actual Qualifying Auction Outage or a Deemed Qualifying Auction Outage. For purposes of this Attachment N, “ $o$ ” shall refer to a single Qualifying Auction Outage.

An “**Actual Qualifying Auction Outage**” (which term shall apply to round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction or Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ , as the case may be) shall be defined as a transmission facility that, for a given round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction or Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ , as the case may be:

- (a) For Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ , meets each of the following requirements:

- (i) the facility existed and was modeled as in-service in the last 6-month Sub-Auction held for TCCs valid during the month corresponding to Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ ; and
  - (ii) the facility exists but is not modeled as in-service for Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ ;
  - (iii) the facility was not Normally Out-of-Service Equipment at the time of the last 6-month Sub-Auction held for TCCs valid during the month corresponding to Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ ; or
- (b) For round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction, meets each of the following requirements:
- (i) the facility exists but is not modeled as in-service for round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction; and
  - (ii) the facility was not Normally Out-of-Service Equipment at the time of stage 1 round  $n$  of that 6-month Sub-Auction.

A “**Deemed Qualifying Auction Outage**” (which term shall apply only to a Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ ) shall be defined as a transmission facility that, for Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ , meets each of the following requirements:

- (i) the facility existed but was not modeled as in-service in the last 6-month Sub-Auction held for TCCs valid during the month corresponding to Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ ;
- (ii) the facility existed but was not modeled as in-service in Reconfiguration Auction  $n$  as a result of an Auction Status Change or external event described in Section 20.3.6.4.3 in Reconfiguration Auction  $n$  for which responsibility was assigned pursuant to Section 20.3.6.4 to a Transmission Owner (including the ISO when it is deemed a Transmission Owner pursuant to Section 20.3.6.4) other than the

Transmission Owner assigned responsibility for the facility not being modeled as in-service in the last 6-month Sub-Auction held for TCCs valid during the month corresponding to Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ ;

- (iii) the facility was not Normally Out-of-Service Equipment at the time of the last 6-month Sub-Auction held for TCCs valid during the month corresponding to Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ .

#### **20.3.6.2.1.2 Definition of Qualifying Auction Return-to-Service**

A “**Qualifying Auction Return-to-Service**” shall be defined to mean either an Actual Qualifying Auction Return-to-Service or a Deemed Qualifying Auction Return-to-Service. For purposes of this Attachment N, “ $o$ ” shall refer to a single Qualifying Auction Return-to-Service.

An “**Actual Qualifying Auction Return-to-Service**” shall be defined as a transmission facility that, for a given Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ , meets each of the following requirements:

- (i) the facility existed but was not modeled as in-service for the last 6-month Sub-Auction held for TCCs valid during the month corresponding to Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ ; and
- (ii) the facility exists and is modeled as in-service in Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ ;
- (iii) the facility was not Normally Out-of-Service Equipment at the time of the last 6-month Sub-Auction held for TCCs valid during the month corresponding to Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ .

Notwithstanding any other provision of this Attachment N, a transmission facility returning to service for round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction shall not be an Actual Qualifying Auction Return-to-Service for that round  $n$  and shall not qualify a Transmission Owner for an O/R-t-S Auction Revenue Shortfall Charge or O/R-t-S Auction Revenue Surplus Payment for

that round  $n$ .

A “**Deemed Qualifying Auction Return-to-Service**” shall be defined as a transmission facility that, for a given Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ , meets each of the following requirements:

- (i) the facility existed but was not modeled as in-service in the last 6-month Sub-Auction held for TCCs valid during the month corresponding to Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ ;
- (ii) the facility existed but was not modeled as in-service in Reconfiguration Auction  $n$  as a result of an Auction Status Change or external event described in Section 20.3.6.4.3 in Reconfiguration Auction  $n$  for which responsibility was assigned pursuant to Section 20.3.6.4 to a Transmission Owner (including the ISO when it is deemed a Transmission Owner pursuant to Section 20.3.6.4) other than the Transmission Owner assigned responsibility for the facility not being modeled as in-service for the last 6-month Sub-Auction held for TCCs valid during the month corresponding to Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ ; and
- (iii) the facility was not Normally Out-of-Service Equipment at the time of the last 6-month Sub-Auction held for TCCs valid during the month corresponding to Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ .

#### **20.3.6.2.2 Allocation of an O/R-t-S Auction Constraint Residual When Only One Transmission Owner is Responsible for All of the Relevant Outages and Returns-to-Service**

This Section 20.3.6.2.2 describes the allocation of an O/R-t-S Auction Constraint Residual for a given round of a 6-month Sub-Auction or Reconfiguration Auction, as the case may be, and a given constraint when only one Transmission Owner is responsible, as determined pursuant to Section 20.3.6.4, for all of the Qualifying Auction Outages and all of the Qualifying

Auction Returns-to-Service for that round of a 6-month Sub-Auction or Reconfiguration Auction that contribute to that constraint.

If the same Transmission Owner is responsible, as determined pursuant to Section 20.3.6.4, for all of the Qualifying Auction Outages  $o$  and Qualifying Auction Returns-to-Service  $o$  for round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction or Reconfiguration Auction  $n$  that contribute to constraint  $a$ , then the ISO shall allocate the O/R-t-S Auction Constraint Residual for that round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction or Reconfiguration Auction  $n$  and that constraint, O/R-t-S  $ACR_{a,n}$ , to that Transmission Owner in the form of either (i) an O/R-t-S Auction Revenue Shortfall Charge in the amount of O/R-t-S  $ACR_{a,n}$  if O/R-t-S  $ACR_{a,n}$  is negative, or (ii) an O/R-t-S Auction Revenue Surplus Payment in the amount of O/R-t-S  $ACR_{a,n}$  if O/R-t-S  $ACR_{a,n}$  is positive.

#### **20.3.6.2.3 Allocation of an O/R-t-S Auction Constraint Residual When More Than One Transmission Owner is Responsible for the Relevant Outages and Returns-to-Service**

This Section 20.3.6.2.3 describes the allocation of an O/R-t-S Auction Constraint Residual for a given round of a 6-month Sub-Auction or Reconfiguration Auction, as the case may be, and a given constraint when more than one Transmission Owner is responsible, as determined pursuant to Section 20.3.6.4, for the Qualifying Auction Outages and the Qualifying Auction Returns-to-Service for the round of a 6-month Sub-Auction or Reconfiguration Auction that contribute to the constraint.

If more than one Transmission Owner is responsible, as determined pursuant to Section 20.3.6.4, for the Qualifying Auction Outages and the Qualifying Auction Returns-to-Service for round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction or Reconfiguration Auction  $n$  that contribute to constraint  $a$ , the ISO shall allocate the O/R-t-S Auction Constraint Residual for constraint  $a$  for round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction or for Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ , O/R-t-S  $ACR_{a,n}$ , in the form of an O/R-



t-S Auction Revenue Shortfall Charge or O/R-t-S Auction Revenue Surplus Payment to the Transmission Owners responsible for the Qualifying Auction Outages  $o$  and Qualifying Auction Returns-to-Service  $o$  for round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction or Reconfiguration Auction  $n$  by first determining the net total impact on the constraint of all Qualifying Auction Outages and Qualifying Auction Returns-to Service for round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction or Reconfiguration Auction  $n$  with an impact on the Energy flow across that constraint of 1 MW- $p$  or more by applying Formula N-21, and then applying either Formula N-22 or Formula N-23, as specified herein, to assess O/R-t-S Auction Revenue Shortfall Charges and O/R-t-S Auction Revenue Surplus Payments.

#### Formula N-21

$$O/R-t-SNetAuctionImpact_{a,n} = \sum_{\text{for all } o \in O_n} FlowImpact_{a,n,o} * ShadowPrice_{a,n}$$

Where,

$O/R-t-SNetAuctionImpact_{a,n}$  = The net impact, in dollars, for round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction or Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ , as the case may be, on constraint  $a$  of all Qualifying Auction Outages and Qualifying Auction Returns-to-Service for round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction or Reconfiguration Auction  $n$  having an impact of more than 1 MW- $p$  on Energy flow across constraint  $a$ ; *provided, however*,  $O/R-t-SNetAuctionImpact_{a,n}$  shall be subject to recalculation as specified in the paragraph immediately following this Formula N-21

$FlowImpact_{a,n,o}$  = The Energy flow impact, in MW- $p$ , of a Qualifying Auction Outage  $o$  or Qualifying Auction Return-to-Service  $o$  on binding constraint  $a$  determined for Reconfiguration Auction  $n$  or round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction, which shall either:

- (a) if Qualifying Auction Outage  $o$  is a Deemed Qualifying Auction Outage, be equal to the negative of  $FlowImpact_{a,n,o}$  calculated for the corresponding Deemed Qualifying Auction Return-to-Service as described in part (b) of this definition of  $FlowImpact_{a,n,o}$ , or

- (b) if Qualifying Auction Outage  $o$  or Qualifying Auction Return-to-Service  $o$  is an Actual Qualifying Auction Outage, an Actual Qualifying Auction Return-to-Service, or a Deemed Qualifying Auction Return-to-Service, be calculated pursuant to the following formula:

$$FlowImpact_{a,n,o} = BaseCaseFlow_{a,n} - One-OffFlow_{a,n,o}$$

Where,

$BaseCaseFlow_{a,n}$  = Either, as the case may be:

- (i) for a Reconfiguration Auction, the Energy flow on constraint  $a$  resulting from a Power Flow using (1) the set of injections and withdrawals corresponding to the actual TCCs and Grandfathered Rights represented in the solution to the last 6-month Sub-Auction held for TCCs valid during the month corresponding to Reconfiguration Auction  $n$  (including those pre-existing TCCs and Grandfathered Rights represented as fixed injections and withdrawals in that auction); (2) the phase angle regulator schedule determined in the Optimal Power Flow solution for the final round of the last 6-month Sub-Auction held for TCCs valid during the month corresponding to Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ ; and (3) the Transmission System model for the last 6-month Sub-Auction held for TCCs valid during the month corresponding to Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ ; or
- (ii) for any round of a 6-month Sub-Auction, the Energy flow on constraint  $a$  resulting from a Power Flow run using the following base case data set: (1) the Transmission System model for the actual 6-month Sub-Auction, modified so as to model as in-service all transmission facilities that were out-of-service for the actual 6-month Sub-Auction, and (2) the set of injections and withdrawals corresponding to the base case set of TCCs (including those pre-existing TCCs

and Grandfathered Rights that are represented as fixed injections and withdrawals in the 6-month Sub-Auction) and the phase angle regulator schedule produced in the Optimal Power Flow used to calculate the Energy flow on constraint  $a$  for round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction, as described in the definition of  $FLOW_{a,n,basecase}$  in Formula N-17

One-OffFlow $_{a,n,o}$  = Either

- (i) if Qualifying Auction Outage  $o$  or Qualifying Auction Return-to-Service  $o$  is an Actual Qualifying Auction Outage or an Actual Qualifying Auction Return-to-Service, the Energy flow on constraint  $a$  resulting from a Power Flow using each element of the base case data set used in the calculation of  $BaseCaseFlow_{a,n}$  above (*provided, however*, if a transmission facility was modeled as free-flowing in round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction or in Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ , as the case may be, because of the outage of any transmission facility, the ISO shall appropriately adjust the phase angle regulator schedule and related variables to model the transmission facility as free flowing), but in each case with the Transmission System model modified so as to, as the case may be, either (i) model as out-of-service Actual Qualifying Auction Outage  $o$ , or (ii) model as in-service Actual Qualifying Auction Return-to-Service  $o$ ; or
- (ii) if Qualifying Auction Return-to-Service  $o$  is a Deemed Qualifying Auction Return-to-Service, the Energy flow on constraint  $a$  resulting from a Power Flow using each element of the base case data set used in the calculation of  $BaseCaseFlow_{a,n}$  above (*provided, however*, if a transmission facility was modeled as free-flowing in round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction or in

Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ , as the case may be, because of the outage of any transmission facility, the ISO shall appropriately adjust the phase angle regulator schedule and related variables to model the transmission facility as free flowing), but with the Transmission System model modified so as to model as in-service the facility that is Deemed Qualifying Auction Return-to-Service  $o$ ; *provided*, *however*, where the absolute value of  $\text{FlowImpact}_{a,n,o}$  calculated using the procedures set forth above is less than 1 MW- $p$ , then  $\text{FlowImpact}_{a,n,o}$  shall be set equal to zero *provided further*,  $\text{FlowImpact}_{a,n,o}$  shall be subject to being set equal to zero as specified in the paragraph immediately following this Formula N-21

$O_n$  = The set of all Qualifying Auction Outages  $o$  and Qualifying Auction Returns-to-Service  $o$  in round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction or Reconfiguration Auction  $n$

$p$  = A one-month period for Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ , or a six-month period for round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction

and the variable  $\text{ShadowPrice}_{a,n}$  is defined as set forth in Formula N-17.

After calculating O/R-t-S  $\text{NetAuctionImpact}_{a,n}$  pursuant to Formula N-21, the ISO shall determine whether O/R-t-S  $\text{NetAuctionImpact}_{a,n}$  for constraint  $a$  in round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction or Reconfiguration Auction  $n$  has a different sign than O/R-t-S  $\text{ACR}_{a,n}$  for constraint  $a$  in round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction or Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ . If the sign is different, the ISO shall (i) recalculate O/R-t-S  $\text{NetAuctionImpact}_{a,n}$  pursuant to Formula N-21 after setting equal to zero each  $\text{FlowImpact}_{a,n,o}$  for which  $\text{FlowImpact}_{a,n,o} * \text{ShadowPrice}_{a,n}$  has a different sign than O/R-t-S  $\text{ACR}_{a,n}$ , and then (ii) use this recalculated O/R-t-S  $\text{NetAuctionImpact}_{a,n}$  and reset value of  $\text{FlowImpact}_{a,n,o}$  to allocate O/R-t-S Auction Revenue Shortfall Charges and O/R-t-S Auction Revenue Surplus Payments pursuant to Formula N-22 or Formula N-23, as specified below.

If the absolute value of the net impact (O/R-t-S  $\text{NetAuctionImpact}_{a,n}$ ) on constraint  $a$  of

all Qualifying Auction Outages and Qualifying Auction Returns-to-Service for round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction or Reconfiguration Auction  $n$  as calculated using Formula N-21 (or recalculated pursuant to Formula N-21 using a reset value of  $FlowImpact_{a,n,o}$  as described in the prior paragraph) is greater than the absolute value of the O/R-t-S Auction Constraint Residual (O/R-t-S  $ACR_{a,n}$ ) for constraint  $a$  in round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction or Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ , as the case may be, then the ISO shall allocate the O/R-t-S Auction Constraint Residual in the form of an O/R-t-S Auction Revenue Shortfall Charge, O/R-t-S  $ARSC_{a,t,n}$ , or O/R-t-S Auction Revenue Surplus Payment, O/R-t-S  $ARSP_{a,t,n}$ , by using Formula N-22. If the absolute value of the net impact (O/R-t-S  $NetAuctionImpact_{a,n}$ ) on constraint  $a$  of all Qualifying Auction Outages and Qualifying Auction Returns-to-Service for round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction or Reconfiguration Auction  $n$  as calculated using Formula N-21 (or recalculated pursuant to Formula N-21 using a reset value of  $FlowImpact_{a,n,o}$  as described in the prior paragraph) is less than or equal to the absolute value of the O/R-t-S Auction Constraint Residual (O/R-t-S  $ACR_{a,n}$ ) for constraint  $a$  in round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction or Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ , as the case may be, then the ISO shall allocate the O/R-t-S Auction Constraint Residual in the form of an O/R-t-S Auction Revenue Shortfall Charge, O/R-t-S  $ARSC_{a,t,n}$ , or O/R-t-S Auction Revenue Surplus Payment, O/R-t-S  $ARSP_{a,t,n}$ , by using Formula N-23.

**Formula N-22**

$$O/R-t-S Allocation_{a,t,n} = \left[ \frac{\sum_{\substack{o \in O_n \\ \text{and } q=t}} (FlowImpact_{a,n,o} * Responsibility_{n,q,o})}{\sum_{\text{for all } o \in O_n} FlowImpact_{a,n,o}} \right] * O/R-t-S ACR_{a,n}$$

Where,

O/R-t-S Allocation<sub>a,t,n</sub> = Either an O/R-t-S Auction Revenue Shortfall Charge or an O/R-t-S Auction Revenue Surplus Payment, as specified in (a) and (b) below:

(a) If O/R-t-S Allocation<sub>a,t,n</sub> is negative, then O/R-t-S Allocation<sub>a,t,n</sub> shall be an O/R-t-S Auction Revenue Shortfall Charge, O/R-t-S ARSC<sub>a,t,n</sub>, charged to Transmission Owner *t* for binding constraint *a* in Reconfiguration Auction *n* or round *n* of a 6-month Sub-Auction; or

(b) If O/R-t-S Allocation<sub>a,t,n</sub> is positive, then O/R-t-S Allocation<sub>a,t,n</sub> shall be an O/R-t-S Auction Revenue Surplus Payment, O/R-t-S ARSP<sub>a,t,n</sub>, paid to Transmission Owner *t* for binding constraint *a* in Reconfiguration Auction *n* or round *n* of a 6-month Sub-Auction

Responsibility<sub>n,q,o</sub> = The amount, as a percentage, of responsibility borne by Transmission Owner *q* (which shall include the ISO when it is deemed a Transmission Owner for the purpose of applying Sections 20.3.6.4.2 or 20.3.6.4.3) for Qualifying Auction Outage *o* or Qualifying Auction Return-to-Service *o* in Reconfiguration Auction *n* or round *n* of a 6-month Sub-Auction, as determined pursuant to Section 20.3.6.4

and the variable O/R-t-S ACR<sub>a,n</sub> is defined as set forth in Formula N-19 and the variables

FlowImpact<sub>a,n,o</sub> and O<sub>n</sub> are defined as set forth in Formula N-21.

#### Formula N-23

$$O/R-t-S Allocation_{a,t,n} = \sum_{\substack{o \in O_n \\ \text{and } q=t}} FlowImpact_{a,n,o} * ShadowPrice_{a,n} * Responsibility_{n,q,o}$$

Where,

the variable ShadowPrice<sub>a,n</sub> is defined as set forth in Formula N-17, the variables O/R-t-S

Allocation<sub>a,t,n</sub> and Responsibility<sub>n,q,o</sub> are defined as set forth in Formula N-22, and the variables

FlowImpact<sub>a,n,o</sub> and O<sub>n</sub> are defined as set forth in Formula N-21.

#### 20.3.6.3 Charges and Payments for the Secondary Impact of Auction Outages and Returns-to-Service

The ISO shall use U/D Auction Constraint Residuals to allocate U/D Auction Revenue Shortfall Charges and U/D Auction Revenue Surplus Payments, as the case may be, among Transmission Owners pursuant to this Section 20.3.6.3. Each U/D Auction Revenue Shortfall Charge and each U/D Auction Revenue Surplus Payment allocated to a Transmission Owner

pursuant to this Section 20.3.6.3 is subject to being set equal to zero pursuant to Section 20.3.6.5.

#### **20.3.6.3.1 Identification of Upratings and Deratings Qualifying for Charges and Payments**

For each constraint for each round of a 6-month Sub-Auction or Reconfiguration Auction, the ISO shall identify each Qualifying Auction Derating and each Qualifying Auction Uprating, as described below. The Transmission Owner responsible, as determined pursuant to Section 20.3.6.4, for a Qualifying Auction Derating or Qualifying Auction Uprating shall be allocated a U/D Auction Revenue Shortfall Charge or a U/D Auction Revenue Surplus Payment, as the case may be, pursuant to Section 20.3.6.3.2.

##### **20.3.6.3.1.1 Definition of Qualifying Auction Derating**

A “**Qualifying Auction Derating**” (which term shall apply to round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction or Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ , as the case may be) shall be defined to mean an Actual Qualifying Auction Derating or a Deemed Qualifying Auction Derating. For purposes of this Attachment N, “ $r$ ” shall refer to a single Qualifying Auction Derating.

An “**Actual Qualifying Auction Derating**” (which term shall apply to round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction or Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ , as the case may be) shall be defined as a change in the rating of a constraint that, for a given constraint  $a$  and a given round  $n$  or Reconfiguration Auction  $n$  meets each of the following requirements:

For Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ :

- (i) the constraint has a lower rating in Reconfiguration Auction  $n$  than it would have if all transmission facilities were modeled as in-service in Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ ;
- (ii) this lower rating is in whole or in part the result of an Actual Qualifying Auction

Outage  $o$  or an Actual Qualifying Auction Return-to-Service  $o$  for  
Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ ;

- (iii) the lower rating resulting from Actual Qualifying Auction Outage  $o$  or Actual Qualifying Auction Return-to-Service  $o$  for Reconfiguration Auction  $n$  was not modeled in the last 6-month Sub-Auction held for TCCs valid during the month corresponding to Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ ;
- (iv) this lower rating is included in the Reconfiguration Auction Interface Uprate/Derate Table in effect for Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ ; and
- (v) the constraint was binding in Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ .

For round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction:

- (i) the constraint has a lower rating in round  $n$  of the 6-month Sub-Auction than that constraint would have in a case where all transmission facilities are in-service and fully rated;
- (ii) this lower rating is the result of an Actual Qualifying Auction Outage  $o$  or Actual Qualifying Auction Return-to-Service  $o$  for round  $n$  of the 6-month Sub-Auction;
- (iii) this lower rating is included in the Centralized TCC Auction Interface Uprate/Derate Table in effect for round  $n$  of the 6-month Sub-Auction; and
- (iv) the constraint is binding in round  $n$  of the 6-month Sub-Auction.

A “**Deemed Qualifying Auction Derating**” (which term shall apply to Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ ) shall be defined as a change in the rating of a constraint that, for a given constraint  $a$  and a given Reconfiguration Auction  $n$  meets each of the following requirements:

- (i) the constraint has a lower rating in Reconfiguration Auction  $n$  than it would have if all transmission facilities were modeled as in-service in Reconfiguration



Auction  $n$ ;

- (ii) this lower rating is in whole or in part the result of a Deemed Qualifying Auction Outage  $o$  or Deemed Qualifying Auction Return-to-Service  $o$  for Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ ;
- (iii) this lower rating resulting from Deemed Qualifying Auction Outage  $o$  or Deemed Qualifying Auction Return-to-Service  $o$  for Reconfiguration Auction  $n$  was modeled in the last 6-month Sub-Auction held for TCCs valid during the month corresponding to Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ , but responsibility for Qualifying Auction Outage  $o$  or Qualifying Auction Return-to-Service  $o$  resulting in the lower rating for Reconfiguration Auction  $n$  is assigned pursuant to Section 20.3.6.4 to a Transmission Owner (including the ISO when it is deemed a Transmission Owner pursuant to Section 20.3.6.4) other than the Transmission Owner responsible for the lower rating in the last 6-month Sub-Auction held for TCCs valid during the month corresponding to Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ ;
- (iv) this lower rating is included in the Reconfiguration Auction Interface Uprate/Derate Table in effect for Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ ; and
- (v) the constraint is binding in Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ .

#### **20.3.6.3.1.2 Definition of Qualifying Auction Uprating**

A “**Qualifying Auction Uprating**” shall be defined to mean either an Actual Qualifying Auction Uprating or a Deemed Qualifying Auction Uprating. For purposes of this Attachment N, “ $r$ ” shall refer to a single Qualifying Auction Uprating.

An “**Actual Qualifying Auction Uprating**” shall be defined as a change in the rating of a constraint that, for a given constraint  $a$  and Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ , as the case may be,

meets each of the following requirements:

- (i) the constraint has a higher rating for Reconfiguration Auction  $n$  than it would have absent an Actual Qualifying Auction Outage  $o$  or Actual Qualifying Auction Return-to-Service  $o$  for Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ ;
- (ii) this higher rating resulting from Actual Qualifying Auction Outage  $o$  or Actual Qualifying Auction Return-to-Service  $o$  for Reconfiguration Auction  $n$  was not modeled in the last 6-month Sub-Auction held for TCCs valid during the month corresponding to Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ ;
- (iii) this higher rating is included in the Reconfiguration Auction Interface Uprate/Derate Table in effect for Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ ; and
- (iv) the constraint is binding in Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ .

Notwithstanding any other provision of this Attachment N, a transmission facility uprating for a round of a 6-month Sub-Auction shall not be a Qualifying Auction Uprating and shall not qualify a Transmission Owner for a U/D Auction Revenue Shortfall Charge or U/D Auction Revenue Surplus Payment.

A “**Deemed Qualifying Auction Uprating**” shall be defined as a change in the rating of a constraint that, for a given constraint  $a$  and Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ , as the case may be, meets each of the following requirements:

- (i) the constraint has a lower rating in Reconfiguration Auction  $n$  than it would have if all transmission facilities were modeled as in-service in Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ ;
- (ii) this lower rating is in whole or in part the result of a Deemed Qualifying Auction Outage  $o$  or Deemed Qualifying Auction Return-to-Service  $o$  for Reconfiguration

Auction  $n$ ;

- (iii) this lower rating resulting from Deemed Qualifying Auction Outage  $o$  or Deemed Qualifying Auction Return-to-Service  $o$  for Reconfiguration Auction  $n$  was modeled in the last 6-month Sub-Auction held for TCCs valid during the month corresponding to Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ , but responsibility for Qualifying Auction Outage  $o$  or Qualifying Auction Return-to-Service  $o$  resulting in the lower rating for Reconfiguration Auction  $n$  is assigned pursuant to Section 20.3.6.4 to a Transmission Owner (including the ISO when it is deemed a Transmission Owner pursuant to Section 20.3.6.4) other than the Transmission Owner responsible for the lower rating in the last auction held for TCCs valid for hour  $h$ ;
- (iv) this lower rating in Reconfiguration Auction  $n$  is included in the Reconfiguration Auction Interface Uprate/Derate Table in effect for Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ ; and
- (v) the constraint is binding in Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ .

#### **20.3.6.3.2 Allocation of U/D Auction Constraint Residuals**

This Section 20.3.6.3.2 describes the allocation of U/D Auction Constraint Residuals to Qualifying Auction Deratings and Qualifying Auction Upratings.

When there are Qualifying Auction Deratings or Qualifying Auction Upratings in Reconfiguration Auction  $n$  or round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction for constraint  $a$ , the ISO shall allocate a U/D Auction Constraint Residual in the form of a U/D Auction Revenue Shortfall Charge,  $U/D\ ARSC_{a,t,n}$ , or U/D Auction Revenue Surplus Payment,  $U/D\ ARSP_{a,t,n}$ , by first determining the net total impact on the constraint for the round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction or

Reconfiguration Auction  $n$  of all Qualifying Auction Deratings  $r$  and Qualifying Auction Upratings  $r$  for constraint  $a$  in Reconfiguration Auction  $n$  or round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction pursuant to Formula N-24 and then applying either Formula N-25 or Formula N-26, as specified herein, to assess U/D Auction Revenue Shortfall Charges and U/D Auction Revenue Surplus Payments.

### Formula N-24

$$U/D \text{ NetAuctionImpact}_{a,n} = \left( \sum_{r \in R_{a,n}} \text{RatingChange}_{a,n,r} * \text{ShadowPrice}_{a,n} \right) * \text{OPFSignChange}_{a,n}$$

Where,

$U/D \text{ NetAuctionImpact}_{a,n}$  = The net impact, in dollars, on constraint  $a$  in Reconfiguration Auction  $n$  or round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction of all Qualifying Auction Deratings or Qualifying Auction Upratings for constraint  $a$  in Reconfiguration Auction  $n$  or round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction; *provided, however*,  $U/D \text{ NetAuctionImpact}_{a,n}$  shall be subject to recalculation as specified in the paragraph immediately following this Formula N-24

$\text{RatingChange}_{a,n,r}$  = Either:

- (a) If Qualifying Auction Derating  $r$  or Qualifying Auction Uprating  $r$  is a Deemed Qualifying Auction Derating or a Deemed Qualifying Auction Uprating,  $\text{RatingChange}_{a,n,r}$  shall be equal to the amount, in MW- $p$ , of the decrease or increase in the rating of binding constraint  $a$  in Reconfiguration Auction  $n$  or round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction resulting from a Deemed Qualifying Auction Outage or Deemed Qualifying Auction Return-to-Service for constraint  $a$  in Reconfiguration Auction  $n$  or round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction, which in the case of Reconfiguration Auction  $n$  shall be as shown in the Reconfiguration Auction Interface Uprate/Derate Table in effect for Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ ,

and which in the case of round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction shall be as shown in the Centralized TCC Auction Interface Uprate/Derate Table in effect for round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction; or

- (b) If Qualifying Auction Derating  $r$  or Qualifying Auction Uprating  $r$  is an Actual Qualifying Auction Derating or an Actual Qualifying Auction Uprating,  $\text{RatingChange}_{a,n,r}$  shall be equal to the amount, in MW- $p$ , of the decrease or increase in the rating of binding constraint  $a$  in Reconfiguration Auction  $n$  or round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction resulting from an Actual Qualifying Auction Outage or Actual Qualifying Auction Return-to-Service for constraint  $a$  in Reconfiguration Auction  $n$  or round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction, which in the case of Reconfiguration Auction  $n$  shall be as shown in the Reconfiguration Auction Interface Uprate/Derate Table in effect for Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ , and which in the case of round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction shall be as shown in the Centralized TCC Auction Interface Uprate/Derate Table in effect for round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction;

*provided, however*,  $\text{RatingChange}_{a,n,r}$  shall be subject to being set equal to zero as specified in the paragraph immediately following this Formula N-24

$R_{a,n}$  = The set of all Qualifying Auction Deratings  $r$  or Qualifying Auction Upratings  $r$  for binding constraint  $a$  in Reconfiguration Auction  $n$  or round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction

and the variables  $\text{ShadowPrice}_{a,n}$  and  $\text{OPFSignChange}_{a,n}$  are defined as set forth in

Formula N-17.

After calculating  $\text{U/D NetAuctionImpact}_{a,n}$  pursuant to Formula N-24, the ISO shall determine whether  $\text{U/D NetAuctionImpact}_{a,n}$  for constraint  $a$  in round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction or Reconfiguration Auction  $n$  has a different sign than  $\text{U/D ACR}_{a,n}$  for constraint  $a$  in

round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction or Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ . If the sign is different, the ISO shall (i) recalculate  $U/D \text{ NetAuctionImpact}_{a,n}$  pursuant to Formula N-24 after setting equal to zero each  $\text{RatingChange}_{a,n,r}$  for which  $\text{RatingChange}_{a,n,r} * \text{ShadowPrice}_{a,n} * \text{OPFSignChange}_{a,n}$  has a different sign than  $U/D \text{ ACR}_{a,n}$ , and then (ii) use this recalculated  $U/D \text{ NetAuctionImpact}_{a,n}$  and reset value of  $\text{RatingChange}_{a,n,r}$  to allocate  $U/D$  Auction Revenue Shortfall Charges and  $U/D$  Auction Revenue Surplus Payments pursuant to Formula N-25 or Formula N-26, as specified below.

If the absolute value of the net impact ( $U/D \text{ NetAuctionImpact}_{a,n}$ ) on constraint  $a$  for Reconfiguration Auction  $n$  or round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction of all Qualifying Auction Deratings or Qualifying Auction Upratings for constraint  $a$  in Reconfiguration Auction  $n$  or round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction as calculated using Formula N-24 (or recalculated pursuant to Formula N-24 using a reset value of  $\text{RatingChange}_{a,n,r}$  as described in the prior paragraph) is greater than the absolute value of the  $U/D$  Auction Constraint Residual ( $U/D \text{ ACR}_{a,n}$ ) for constraint  $a$  in Reconfiguration Auction  $n$  or round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction, as the case may be, then the ISO shall allocate the  $U/D$  Auction Constraint Residual in the form of a  $U/D$  Auction Revenue Shortfall Charge,  $U/D \text{ ARSC}_{a,t,n}$ , or  $U/D$  Auction Revenue Surplus Payment,  $U/D \text{ ARSP}_{a,t,n}$ , by using Formula N-25. If the absolute value of the net impact ( $U/D \text{ NetAuctionImpact}_{a,n}$ ) on constraint  $a$  for Reconfiguration Auction  $n$  or round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction of all Qualifying Auction Deratings or Qualifying Auction Upratings for constraint  $a$  in Reconfiguration Auction  $n$  or round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction as calculated using Formula N-24 (or recalculated pursuant to Formula N-24 using a reset value of  $\text{RatingChange}_{a,n,r}$  as described in the prior paragraph) is less than or equal to the absolute value of the  $U/D$  Auction Constraint Residual ( $U/D \text{ ACR}_{a,n}$ ) for constraint  $a$  in Reconfiguration Auction  $n$  or round  $n$  of a

6-month Sub-Auction, as the case may be, then the ISO shall allocate the U/D Auction

Constraint Residual in the form of a U/D Auction Revenue Shortfall Charge, U/D ARSC<sub>a,t,n</sub>, or

U/D Auction Revenue Surplus Payment, U/D ARSP<sub>a,t,n</sub>, by using Formula N-26.

$$\text{U/D Allocation}_{a,t,n} = \left( \frac{\sum_{\substack{r \in R_{a,n} \\ \text{and } q=t}} (\text{RatingChange}_{a,n,r} * \text{Responsibility}_{n,q,r})}{\sum_{\text{for all } r \in R_{a,n}} \text{RatingChange}_{a,n,r}} \right) * \text{U/D ACR}_{a,n}$$

**Formula N-25**

Where,

U/D Allocation<sub>a,t,n</sub> = Either a U/D Auction Revenue Shortfall Charge or a U/D Auction Revenue Surplus Payment, as specified in (a) and (b) below:

(a) If U/D Allocation<sub>a,t,n</sub> is negative, then U/D Allocation<sub>a,t,n</sub> shall be a U/D Auction Revenue Shortfall Charge, U/D ARSC<sub>a,t,n</sub>, charged to Transmission Owner *t* for binding constraint *a* in Reconfiguration Auction *n* or round *n* of a 6-month Sub-Auction; or

(b) If U/D Allocation<sub>a,t,n</sub> is positive, then U/D Allocation<sub>a,t,n</sub> shall be a U/D Auction Revenue Surplus Payment, U/D ARSP<sub>a,t,n</sub>, paid to Transmission Owner *t* for binding constraint *a* in Reconfiguration Auction *n* or round *n* of a 6-month Sub-Auction

Responsibility<sub>n,q,r</sub> = The amount, as a percentage, of responsibility borne by Transmission Owner *q* (which shall include the ISO when it is deemed a Transmission Owner for the purpose of applying Sections 20.3.6.4.2 or 20.3.6.4.3) for Qualifying Auction Derating *r* or Qualifying Auction Up-rating *r* in Reconfiguration Auction *n* or round *n* of a 6-month Sub-Auction, as determined pursuant to Section 20.3.6.4

and the variable U/D ACR<sub>a,n</sub> is defined as set forth in Formula N-20 and the variables

RatingChange<sub>a,n,r</sub> and R<sub>a,n</sub> are defined as set forth in Formula N-24.

### Formula N-26

$$\text{U/D Allocation}_{a,t,n} = \sum_{\substack{r \in R_{a,n} \\ \text{and } q=t}} \text{RatingChange}_{a,n,r} * \text{ShadowPrice}_{a,n} * \text{Responsibility}_{n,q,r}$$

Where,

the variables  $U/D Allocation_{a,t,n}$  and  $Responsibility_{n,q,r}$  are defined as set forth in Formula N-25, the variable  $ShadowPrice_{a,n}$  is defined as set forth in Formula N-17, and the variables  $RatingChange_{a,n,r}$  and  $R_{a,n}$  are defined as set forth in Formula N-24.

#### **20.3.6.4 Assigning Responsibility for Outages, Returns-to-Service, Deratings, and Upratings**

##### **20.3.6.4.1 General Rule for Assigning Responsibility; Presumption of Causation**

Unless the special rules set forth in Sections 20.3.6.4.2 or 20.3.6.4.3 apply, a Transmission Owner shall for purposes of this Section 20.3.6 be deemed responsible for an Auction Status Change to the extent that the Transmission Owner has caused the Auction Status Change by changing the in-service or out-of-service status of its transmission facility; *provided, however*, that where an Auction Status Change results from a change to the in-service or out-of-service status of a transmission facility owned by more than one Transmission Owner, responsibility for such Auction Status Change shall be assigned to each owning Transmission Owner based on the percentage of the transmission facility that is owned by the Transmission Owner (as determined in accordance with Section 20.3.6.6.3) during the hour for which the DAM Status Change occurred. For the sake of clarity, a Transmission Owner may, by changing the in-service or out-of-service status of its transmission facility, cause an Auction Status Change of another transmission facility if the Transmission Owner's change in the in-service or out-of-service status of its transmission facility causes (directly or as a result of Good Utility Practice) a change in the in-service or out-of-service status of the other transmission facility.

The Transmission Owner that owns a transmission facility that qualifies as an Auction Status Change shall be deemed to have caused the Auction Status Change of that transmission facility unless (i) the Transmission Owner that owns the facility informs the ISO that another



Transmission Owner caused the Auction Status Change or that responsibility is to be shared among Transmission Owners in accordance with Sections 20.3.6.4.2 or 20.3.6.4.3, and no party disputes such claim; (ii) in case of a dispute over the assignment of responsibility, the ISO determines a Transmission Owner other than the owner of the transmission facility caused the Auction Status Change or that responsibility is to be shared among Transmission Owners in accordance with Section 20.3.6.4.2 or Section 20.3.6.4.3; or (iii) FERC orders otherwise.

**20.3.6.4.2 Shared Responsibility For Outages, Returns-to-Service, and Ratings Changes Directed by the ISO or Caused by Facility Status Changes Directed by the ISO**

A Transmission Owner shall not be responsible for any Auction Status Change that qualifies as an ISO-Directed Auction Status Change or Deemed ISO-Directed Auction Status Change. Instead, the ISO shall allocate any revenue impacts resulting from an Auction Status Change that qualifies as an ISO-Directed Auction Status Change or Deemed ISO-Directed Auction Status Change as part of Net Auction Revenues for round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction or Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ . To do so, the ISO shall be treated as a Transmission Owner when allocating Auction Constraint Residuals pursuant to Section 20.3.6.2 and Section 20.3.6.3, and any Auction Status Change that qualifies as an ISO-Directed Auction Status Change or Deemed ISO-Directed Auction Status Change shall be attributed to the ISO when performing the calculations described in Section 20.3.6.2 and Section 20.3.6.3; *provided, however*, any O/R-t-S Auction Revenue Shortfall Charge, U/D Auction Revenue Shortfall Charge, O/R-t-S Auction Revenue Surplus Payment, or U/D Auction Revenue Surplus Payment allocable to the ISO pursuant to this Section 20.3.6.4.2 shall ultimately be allocated to the Transmission Owners as Net Auction Revenues pursuant to Section 20.3.7.

Responsibility for a Qualifying Auction Return-to-Service or Qualifying Auction

Upgrading that is directed by the ISO but does not qualify as a Deemed ISO-Directed Auction Status Change shall be assigned to the Transmission Owner that was responsible for the Qualifying Auction Outage or Qualifying Auction Derating in the last 6-month Sub-Auction held for TCCs valid during the month corresponding to the relevant Reconfiguration Auction.

The ISO shall not direct that a transmission facility be modeled as in-service or out-of-service for purposes of a Reconfiguration Auction without the unanimous consent of the Transmission Owner(s), if any, that will be allocated a resulting O/R-t-S Auction Revenue Shortfall Charge, U/D Auction Revenue Shortfall Charge, O/R-t-S Auction Revenue Surplus Payment, or U/D Auction Revenue Surplus Payment in accordance with this Section 20.3.6.4.2.

#### **20.3.6.4.3 Shared Responsibility for External Events**

A Transmission Owner shall not be responsible for an Auction Status Change occurring inside the NYCA that is caused by a change in the in-service or out-of-service status or rating of a transmission facility located outside the NYCA. Instead, the ISO shall allocate any revenue impacts resulting from an Auction Status Change caused by such an event outside the NYCA as part of Net Auction Revenues for round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction or Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ . To do so, the ISO shall be treated as a Transmission Owner when allocating Auction Constraint Residuals pursuant to Section 20.3.6.2 and Section 20.3.6.3 and any Auction Status Change caused by such an event outside the NYCA shall be attributed to the ISO; *provided, however*, any O/R-t-S Auction Revenue Shortfall Charge, U/D Auction Revenue Shortfall Charge, O/R-t-S Auction Revenue Surplus Payment, or U/D Auction Revenue Surplus Payment allocable to the ISO pursuant to this Section 20.3.6.4.3 shall ultimately be allocated to the Transmission Owners as Net Auction Revenues pursuant to Section 20.3.7.

### **20.3.6.5 Exceptions: Setting Charges and Payments to Zero**

#### **20.3.6.5.1 Zeroing Out of Charges and Payments When Outages and Deratings Lead to Net Payments or Returns-to-Service and Upratings Lead to Net Charges**

The ISO shall use Formula N-27 to calculate the total O/R-t-S Auction Revenue Shortfall Charges, U/D Auction Revenue Shortfall Charges, O/R-t-S Auction Revenue Surplus Payments, and U/D Auction Revenue Surplus Payments,  $NetAuctionAllocations_{t,n}$ , for Transmission Owner  $t$  in round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction or in Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ , as the case may be. Based on this calculation, the ISO shall set equal to zero all O/R-t-S  $ARSC_{a,t,n}$ , U/D  $ARSC_{a,t,n}$ , O/R-t-S  $ARSP_{a,t,n}$ , and U/D  $ARSP_{a,t,n}$  (each as defined in Formula N-27) for Transmission Owner  $t$  for all constraints for round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction or Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ , as the case may be, if (i)  $NetAuctionAllocations_{t,n}$  is positive and Transmission Owner  $t$  is not responsible (as determined pursuant to Section 20.3.6.4) for any Qualifying Auction Returns-to-Service or Qualifying Auction Upratings in round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction or in Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ , as the case may be, or (ii)  $NetAuctionAllocations_{t,n}$  is negative and Transmission Owner  $t$  is not responsible (as determined pursuant to Section 20.3.6.4) for any Qualifying Auction Outages or Qualifying Auction Deratings in round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction or in Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ , as the case may be; *provided, however*, the ISO shall not set equal to zero pursuant to this Section 20.3.6.5.1 any O/R-t-S  $ARSC_{a,t,n}$ , U/D  $ARSC_{a,t,n}$ , O/R-t-S  $ARSP_{a,t,n}$ , or U/D  $ARSP_{a,t,n}$  arising from an ISO-Directed Auction Status Change or Deemed ISO-Directed Auction Status Change described in Section 20.3.6.4.2 or external events described in Section 20.3.6.4.3.

#### **Formula N-27**

$$NetAuctionAllocations_{t,n} = \sum_{\text{for all } a} (O/R-t-S ARSC_{a,t,n} + U/D ARSC_{a,t,n} + O/R-t-S ARSP_{a,t,n} + U/D ARSP_{a,t,n})$$

Where,

$\text{NetAuctionAllocations}_{t,n}$  = The total of the O/R-t-S Auction Revenue Shortfall Charges, U/D Auction Revenue Shortfall Charges, O/R-t-S Auction Revenue Surplus Payments, and U/D Auction Revenue Surplus Payments allocated to Transmission Owner  $t$  in round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction or in Reconfiguration Auction  $n$

$\text{O/R-t-S ARSC}_{a,t,n}$  = An O/R-t-S Auction Revenue Shortfall Charge allocated to Transmission Owner  $t$  for binding constraint  $a$  in round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction or in Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ , calculated pursuant to Section 20.3.6.2

$\text{U/D ARSC}_{a,t,n}$  = A U/D Auction Revenue Shortfall Charge allocated to Transmission Owner  $t$  for binding constraint  $a$  in round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction or in Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ , calculated pursuant to Section 20.3.6.3

$\text{O/R-t-S ARSP}_{a,t,n}$  = An O/R-t-S Auction Revenue Surplus Payment allocated to Transmission Owner  $t$  for binding constraint  $a$  in round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction or in Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ , calculated pursuant to Section 20.3.6.2

$\text{U/D ARSP}_{a,t,n}$  = A U/D Auction Revenue Surplus Payment allocated to Transmission Owner  $t$  for binding constraint  $a$  in round  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction or in Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ , calculated pursuant to Section 20.3.6.3.

#### **20.3.6.5.2 Zeroing Out of Charges and Payments Resulting from Formula Failure**

Notwithstanding any other provision of this Attachment N, the ISO shall set equal to zero any O/R-t-S Auction Revenue Shortfall Charge, U/D Auction Revenue Shortfall Charge, O/R-t-S Auction Revenue Surplus Payment, or U/D Auction Revenue Surplus Payment allocated to a Transmission Owner for a Reconfiguration Auction or a round of a Centralized TCC Auction if either:

- (i) data necessary to compute such a charge or payment, as specified in the formulas set forth in Section 20.3.6, is not known by the ISO and cannot be computed by the ISO (in interpreting this clause, equipment failure shall not preclude computation by the ISO unless necessary data is irretrievably lost); or
- (ii) both (a) the charge or payment is clearly and materially inconsistent with cost causation principles; and (b) this inconsistency is the result of factors not taken into account in the formulas used to calculate the charge or payment;

*provided, however*, if the amount of charges or payments set equal to zero as a result of the unknown data or inaccurate formula is greater than twenty five thousand dollars (\$25,000) in any given month or greater than one hundred thousand dollars (\$100,000) over multiple months, the ISO will inform the Transmission Owners of the identified problem and will work with the Transmission Owners to determine if an alternative allocation method is needed and whether it will apply to all months for which the intended formula does not work. Alternate methods would be subject to market participant review and subsequent filing with FERC, as appropriate.

For the sake of clarity, the ISO shall not pursuant to this Section 20.3.6.5.2 set equal to zero any O/R-t-S Auction Revenue Shortfall Charge, U/D Auction Revenue Shortfall Charge, O/R-t-S Auction Revenue Surplus Payment, or U/D Auction Revenue Surplus Payment that fails to meet these conditions, even if another O/R-t-S Auction Revenue Shortfall Charge, U/D Auction Revenue Shortfall Charge, O/R-t-S Auction Revenue Surplus Payment, or U/D Auction Revenue Surplus Payment is set equal to zero pursuant to this Section 20.3.6.5.2 in the same round of a Centralized TCC Auction or the same Reconfiguration Auction, as the case may be.

### **20.3.6.6 Information Requirements**

#### **20.3.6.6.1 Posting of Uprate/Derate Tables**

Prior to each Reconfiguration Auction, the ISO shall post on its website the Reconfiguration Auction Interface Uprate/Derate Table, which table shall specify the expected impact (at the time of the Reconfiguration Auction based on all information available to the ISO) of all transmission facility outages and returns-to-service on interface transfer limits for the period for which TCCs are to be sold in the Reconfiguration Auction.

Prior to each Centralized TCC Auction, the ISO shall post on its website the Centralized TCC Auction Interface Uprate/Derate Table, which table shall specify the expected impact (at

the time of the Centralized TCC Auction based on all information available to the ISO) of all transmission facility outages and returns-to-service on interface transfer limits for the period for which TCCs are to be sold in each Sub-Auction of the Centralized TCC Auction.

#### **20.3.6.6.2 Posting of List of Normally Out-of-Service Equipment**

The ISO shall maintain on its website a list of Normally Out-of-Service Equipment and update such list prior to each Reconfiguration Auction and each Centralized TCC Auction.

#### **20.3.6.6.3 Information Regarding Facility Ownership**

A Transmission Owner shall be responsible for informing the ISO of any change in the ownership of a transmission facility. The ISO shall allocate responsibility for Auction Status Changes based on the transmission facility ownership information available to it at the time of initial settlement.

### **20.3.7 Allocation of Net Auction Revenue to Transmission Owners**

In Centralized TCC Auction round  $n$  or in Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ , as the case may be, the ISO shall use the Facility Flow-Based Methodology to allocate Net Auction Revenue to each Transmission Owner  $t$  in an amount equal to the product of (i) the Facility Flow-Based Methodology coefficient,  $FFB_{t,n}$ , and (ii) the Net Auction Revenue for the round or for the Reconfiguration Auction; *provided, however*, where the Net Auction Revenue is negative for a Reconfiguration Auction, the ISO shall allocate Net Auction Revenue to each Transmission Owner  $t$  in an amount equal to the product of (i) the negative Net Auction Revenue coefficient,  $NNAR_{t,n}$ , and (ii) the negative Net Auction Revenue for the Reconfiguration Auction.

*Calculation of Facility Flow-Based Methodology Coefficient.* The Facility Flow-Based Methodology coefficient for Transmission Owner  $t$  for Centralized TCC Auction round  $n$  or

Reconfiguration Auction  $n$  is calculated pursuant to Formula N-28.

### Formula N-28

$$FFB_{t,n} = \frac{\sum_{l \in L_{t,n}} |(FLOW_{l,n} - FLOW_{l,IC}) * (Price_{y,l} - Price_{x,l}) * Share_{n,t,l}|}{\sum_{l \in L_n} |(FLOW_{l,n} - FLOW_{l,IC}) * (Price_{y,l} - Price_{x,l})|}$$

Where,

$FFB_{t,n}$  = The Facility Flow-Based Methodology coefficient for Transmission Owner  $t$  for Centralized TCC Auction round  $n$  or Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ , as the case may be

$L_n$  = The set of all transmission facilities modeled in the Transmission System model for round  $n$  or for Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ , as the case may be

$L_{t,n}$  = The set of all transmission facilities owned by Transmission Owner  $t$  that are modeled in the Transmission System model applied in round  $n$  or in Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ , as the case may be

$l$  = A transmission facility from bus  $x$  to bus  $y$

$FLOW_{l,n}$  = The Energy flow, in MW- $p$ , on transmission facility  $l$  from the set of TCCs and Grandfathered Rights represented in the solution to round  $n$  or to Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ , as the case may be (including those pre-existing TCCs and Grandfathered Rights represented as fixed injections and withdrawals in that auction).

$FLOW_{l,IC}$  = The Energy flow, in MW- $p$ , on transmission facility  $l$  from (i) the set of pre-existing TCCs and Grandfathered Rights represented as fixed injections and withdrawals in administering the TCC auction held for round  $n$  or Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ , as the case may be, (ii) ETCNL not sold in prior Centralized TCC Auctions or through a Direct Sale, and (iii) Original Residual TCCs not sold in prior Centralized TCC Auctions or through a Direct Sale

$Price_{y,l}$  = The market clearing price at bus  $y$  on transmission facility  $l$  in the Optimal Power Flow solution to round  $n$  or Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ , as the case may be

$Price_{x,l}$  = The market clearing price at bus  $x$  on transmission facility  $l$  in the Optimal Power Flow solution to round  $n$  or Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ , as the case may be

$Share_{n,t,l}$  = The percentage of transmission facility  $l$  owned by Transmission Owner  $t$  on the effective date of the TCCs sold in round  $n$  or in Reconfiguration Auction  $n$

$p$  = A one-month period for Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ , or the effective period of

TCCs sold in round  $n$  for round  $n$ .

*Calculation of Negative Net Auction Revenue Coefficient.* The negative Net Auction Revenue coefficient for Transmission Owner  $t$  for Reconfiguration Auction  $n$  is calculated pursuant to Formula N-29.

**Formula N-29**

$$NNAR_{t,n} = \frac{(\text{Original Residual}_{t,n} + ETCNL_{t,n} + NARS_{t,n} + GFR\&GFTCC_{t,n})}{\sum_{q \in T} (\text{Original Residual}_{q,n} + ETCNL_{q,n} + NARS_{q,n} + GFR\&GFTCC_{q,n})}$$

$$NNAR_{t,n} = \frac{(\text{Original Residual}_{t,n} + ETCNL_{t,n} + NARS_{t,n} + GFR\&GFTCC_{t,n} + HFPTCC_{t,n})}{\sum_{q \in T} (\text{Original Residual}_{q,n} + ETCNL_{q,n} + NARS_{q,n} + GFR\&GFTCC_{q,n} + HFPTCC_{q,n})}$$

Where,

- $NNAR_{t,n}$  = The negative Net Auction Revenue coefficient for Transmission Owner  $t$  for Reconfiguration Auction  $n$
- Original Residual $_{q,n}$  = The one-month portion of the revenue imputed to the Direct Sale or the sale in any Centralized TCC Auction Sub-Auction of Original Residual TCCs that are valid during the month corresponding to Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ . The one-month portion of the revenue imputed to the Direct Sale of these Original Residual TCCs shall be one-sixth of the average market clearing price in the rounds of the 6-month Sub-Auction of the last Centralized TCC Auction held for TCCs valid during the month corresponding to Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ . For Centralized TCC Auctions conducted before May 1, 2010, the calculation of the average market clearing price in rounds of the 6-month Sub-Auction shall incorporate only Stage 1 six month rounds. The one-month portion of the revenue imputed to the sale in any Centralized TCC Auction Sub-Auction of these Original Residual TCCs shall be calculated by dividing the revenue received from the sale of these Original Residual TCCs in the Centralized TCC Auction Sub-Auction by the duration in months of the TCCs sold in that Centralized TCC Auction Sub-Auction
- ETCNL $_{q,n}$  = The sum of the one-month portion of the revenues the Transmission Owner has received as payment for the Direct Sale of ETCNL or for its ETCNL released in the Centralized TCC Auction Sub-Auction held for TCCs valid for the month corresponding to Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ . Each one-month portion of the revenue for ETCNL released in such Centralized TCC Auction shall be calculated by dividing the revenue received in a Centralized TCC Auction Sub-



Auction from the sale of the ETCNL by the duration in months of the TCCs corresponding to the ETCNL sold in the Centralized TCC Auction Sub-Auction.<sup>2</sup> The one-month portion of the revenue imputed to the Direct Sale of ETCNL shall be one-sixth of the average market clearing price of the TCCs corresponding to that ETCNL in the rounds of the 6-month Sub-Auction of the last Centralized TCC Auction held for TCCs valid during the month corresponding to Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ . For Centralized TCC Auctions conducted before May 1, 2010, the calculation of the average market clearing price in rounds of the 6-month Sub-Auction shall incorporate only Stage 1 six month rounds.

$NAR_{s,q,n}$  = The one-month portion of the Net Auction Revenues the Transmission Owner has received in Centralized TCC Auction Sub-Auction and Reconfiguration Auctions held for TCCs valid for the month corresponding to Reconfiguration Auction  $n$  (which shall not include any revenue from the sale of Original Residual TCCs). The one-month portion of the revenues shall be calculated by summing (i) the revenue Transmission Owner  $q$  received in each Centralized TCC Auction Sub-Auction from the allocation of Net Auction Revenue pursuant to Section 20.3.7, divided by the duration in months of the TCCs sold in the Centralized TCC Auction Sub-Auction (or, to the extent TCC auction revenues were allocated pursuant to a different methodology, the amount of such revenues allocated to Transmission Owner  $q$ ), minus (ii) the sum of  $NetAuctionAllocations_{t,n}$  as calculated pursuant to Formula N-27 (as adjusted for any charges or payments that are zeroed out) for Transmission Owner  $q$  for all rounds  $n$  of a 6-month Sub-Auction for all Centralized TCC Auctions held for TCCs valid in the month corresponding to Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ , divided in each case by the duration in months of the TCCs sold in each Centralized TCC Auction Sub-Auction (or, to the extent that the revenue impact of transmission facility outages, returns-to-service, upratings, and deratings were settled pursuant to a different methodology, the net of such revenue impacts for Transmission Owner  $q$ ), minus (iii)  $NetAuctionAllocations_{t,n}$  as calculated pursuant to Formula N-27 and as adjusted for any charges or payments that are zeroed out for Transmission Owner  $q$  for Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ . For Centralized TCC Auctions conducted before May 1, 2010, the calculation of (ii) shall incorporate only Stage 1 six month rounds.

$GFR\&GFTCC_{q,n}$  = The one-month portion of the imputed value of Grandfathered TCCs and Grandfathered Rights, valued at one-sixth of the market clearing price in the last Centralized TCC Auction held for TCCs valid during the month corresponding to Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ , provided that the Transmission Owner is the selling party and the Existing Transmission Agreement related to each Grandfathered TCC and Grandfathered Right remains valid in the month corresponding to Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ . For Centralized TCC Auctions conducted before May 1, 2010, the calculation of the average market clearing price in rounds of the 6-month Sub-Auction shall incorporate Stage 1 six month rounds.

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<sup>4</sup> A TCC corresponds to ETCNL if it has the same POI and POW as the ETCNL.

HFPTCC<sub>q,n</sub> ≡ The one-month portion of the Historic Fixed Price TCC revenues that Transmission Owner  $q$  has received for Historic Fixed Price TCCs valid during a given month covered by Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ , valued at the sum of the share of revenues received by Transmission Owner  $q$  pursuant to Section 20.4 of this Attachment N for all Historic Fixed Price TCCs valid in the relevant month covered by Reconfiguration Auction  $n$ , divided by twelve; provided, however that the value shall be zero for all Historic Fixed Price TCCs that took effect on or before November 1, 2016.

$t$  = Transmission Owner  $t$

$T$  = The set of all Transmission Owners  $q$ .

Each Transmission Owner's share of Net Auction Revenues allocated pursuant to this Section 20.3.7 shall be incorporated into its TSC or NTAC, as the case may be.