NYISO Tariffs --> Market Administration and Control Area Services Tariff (MST) --> 30 MST Attachment O - Market Monitoring Plan --> 30.4 MST Att O Market Monitoring Unit
The Market Monitoring Unit’s goals are (1) to ensure that the markets administered by the ISO function efficiently and appropriately, and (2) to protect both consumers and participants in the markets administered by the ISO by identifying and reporting Market Violations, market design flaws and market power abuses to the Commission in accordance with Sections 30.4.5.3 and 30.4.5.4 below.
The Board shall retain a consulting or other professional services firm, or other similar entity, to advise it on the matters encompassed by Attachment O and to carry out the responsibilities that are assigned to the Market Monitoring Unit in Attachment O. The Market Monitoring Unit selected by the Board shall have experience and expertise appropriate to the analysis of competitive conditions in markets for electric capacity, energy and ancillary services, and financial instruments such as TCCs, and to such other responsibilities as are assigned to the Market Monitoring Unit under Attachment O, and must also have sufficient resources and personnel to be able to perform the Core Functions and other assigned functions.
The Market Monitoring Unit shall be accountable to the non-management members of the Board, and shall serve at the pleasure of the non-management members of the Board.
The Market Monitoring Unit, including all persons employed thereby, shall comply at all times with the ethics standards set forth below. The Market Monitoring Unit ethics standards set forth below shall apply in place of the standards set forth in the ISO’s OATT Attachment F Code of Conduct, and/or the more general policies and standards that apply to consultants retained by the ISO.
30.4.3.1The Market Monitoring Unit and its employees must have no material affiliation with any Market Party or Affiliate of any Market Party.
30.4.3.2The Market Monitoring Unit and its employees must not serve as an officer, employee, or partner of a Market Party.
30.4.3.3The Market Monitoring Unit and its employees must have no material financial interest in any Market Party or Affiliate of a Market Party. Ownership of mutual funds by Market Monitoring Units and their employees that contain investments in Market Parties or their Affiliates is permitted so long as: (a) the fund is publicly traded; (b) the fund’s prospectus does not indicate the objective or practice of concentrating its investment in Market Parties or their Affiliates; and (c) the Market Monitoring Unit/Market Monitoring Unit employee does not exercise or have the ability to exercise control over the financial interests held by the fund.
30.4.3.4The Market Monitoring Unit and its employees are prohibited from engaging in transactions in the markets administered by the ISO, other than in the performance of duties under the ISO’s Tariffs. This provision shall not, however, prevent the Market Monitoring Unit, or its employees, from purchasing electricity, power and Energy as retail customers for their own account and consumption.
30.4.3.5The Market Monitoring Unit and its employees must not be compensated, other than by the ISO, for any expert witness testimony or other commercial services, in connection with any legal or regulatory proceeding or commercial transaction relating to the ISO or to the markets that the ISO administers.
30.4.3.6The Market Monitoring Unit and its employees may not accept anything that is of more than de minimis value from a Market Party.
30.4.3.7The Market Monitoring Unit and its employees must advise the Board in the event they seek employment with a Market Party, and must disqualify themselves from participating in any matter that could have an effect on the financial interests of that Market Party until the outcome of the matter is determined.
30.4.3.8If the Market Monitoring Unit or any of its employees provide services to entities other than the ISO, the Market Monitoring Unit shall provide to the ISO’s Board, and shall regularly update, a list of such entities and services. When the Market Monitoring Unit issues an opinion, report or recommendation to, for or addressing the ISO or the markets it administers that relates to, or could reasonably be expected to affect, an entity (other than the ISO) to which the Market Monitoring Unit or its employees provide services, the Market Monitoring Unit shall inform the ISO’s Board of the opinion, report or recommendation it has issued, and that its opinion, report or recommendation relates to, or could reasonably be expected to affect, an entity to which the Market Monitoring Unit or its employees provide services.
The Market Monitoring Unit shall advise the Board, shall perform the Core Functions specified in Section 30.4.5 of Attachment O, and shall have such other duties and responsibilities as are specified in Attachment O. The Market Monitoring Unit may, at any time, bring any matter to the attention of the Board that the Market Monitoring Unit may deem necessary or appropriate for achieving the purposes, objectives and effective implementation of Attachment O.
The Market Monitoring Unit shall not participate in the administration of the ISO’s Tariffs, except for performing its duties under Attachment O. The Market Monitoring Unit shall not be responsible for performing purely administrative duties, such as enforcement of late fees or Market Party reporting obligations, that are not specified in Attachment O. The Market Monitoring Unit may (i) provide, or assist the ISO’s efforts to develop, the inputs required to conduct mitigation, and (ii) assist the ISO’s efforts to conduct “retrospective” mitigation (see Order 719 at PP. 369, 375) that does not change bids or offers (including physical bid or offer parameters) at or before the time such bids or offers (including physical bid or offer parameters) are considered in the ISO’s market solution.
The Market Monitoring Unit shall be responsible for performing the following Core Functions:
30.4.5.1Evaluate existing and proposed market rules, tariff provisions and market design elements and recommend proposed rule and tariff changes to the ISO, to the Commission’s Office of Energy Market Regulation staff, and to other interested entities, including the New York Public Service Commission, and participants in the ISO’s stakeholder governance process. Provided that:
30.4.5.1.1The Market Monitoring Unit is not responsible for systematic review of every tariff and market rule; its role is monitoring, not audit.
30.4.5.1.2The Market Monitoring Unit is not to effectuate its proposed market design itself.
30.4.5.1.3The Market Monitoring Unit’s role in recommending proposed rule and Tariff changes is advisory in nature, unless a Tariff provision specifically concerns actions to be undertaken by the Market Monitoring Unit itself.
30.4.5.1.4The Market Monitoring Unit must limit distribution of issues or concerns it identifies, and its recommendations to the ISO and to Commission staff in the event it believes broader dissemination could lead to exploitation. Limited distributions should include an explanation of why further dissemination should be avoided at that time.
30.4.5.2Review and report on the performance of the wholesale markets to the ISO, the Commission, and other interested entities such as the New York Public Service Commission and participants in its stakeholder governance process on at least a quarterly basis, and issue a more comprehensive annual state of the market report. The Market Monitoring Unit may issue additional reports as necessary.
30.4.5.2.1In order to perform the Core Functions, the Market Monitoring Unit shall perform daily monitoring of the markets that the ISO administers. The Market Monitoring Unit’s daily monitoring shall include monitoring of virtual bidding.
30.4.5.2.2The Market Monitoring Unit shall submit drafts of each of its reports to the ISO for review and comment sufficiently in advance of the report’s issuance to provide an effective opportunity for review and comment by the ISO. The Market Monitoring Unit may disregard any suggestions with which it disagrees. The ISO may not alter the reports prepared by the Market Monitoring Unit, nor dictate the Market Monitoring Unit’s conclusions.
30.4.5.3Identify and notify the Commission staff of instances in which a Market Party’s or the ISO’s behavior may require investigation, including, but not limited to, suspected Market Violations.
30.4.5.3.1Except as provided in Section 30.4.5.3.2 below, in compliance with § 35.28(g)(3)(iv) of the Commission’s regulations (or any successor provisions thereto) the Market Monitoring Unit shall submit a non-public referral to the Commission in all instances where it has obtained sufficient credible information to believe a Market Violation has occurred. Once the Market Monitoring Unit has obtained sufficient credible information to warrant referral to the Commission, the Market Monitoring Unit shall immediately refer the matter to the Commission and desist from further investigation of independent action related to the alleged Market Violation, except at the express direction of the Commission or Commission staff. The Market Monitoring Unit may continue to monitor for repeated instances of the reported activity by the same or other entities and shall respond to requests from the Commission for additional information in connection with the alleged Market Violation it has referred.
30.4.5.3.2The Market Monitoring Unit is not required to refer the actions (or failures to act) listed in this Section 30.4.5.3.2 to the Commission as Market Violations, because they have: (i) already been reported by the ISO as a Market Problem under Article 3.5.1 of the ISO Services Tariff; and/or (ii) because they pertain to actions or failures that: (a) are expressly set forth in the ISO’s Tariffs; (b) involve objectively identifiable behavior; and (c) trigger a sanction or other consequence that is expressly set forth in the ISO Tariffs and that is ultimately appealable to the Commission. The actions (or failures to act) that are exempt from mandatory referral to the Commission are:
30.4.5.3.2.1failure to meet a deadline, or to take any other action, required of Developers under Attachments S, X, or Z to the ISO OATT that subjects a Developer to a possible loss of queue position;
30.4.5.3.2.2failure to meet a Contract or Non-Contract CRIS MW Commitment pursuant to Sections 25.7.11.1.1 and 25.7.11.1.2 of Attachment S to the ISO OATT that results in a charge or other a sanction under Section 25.7.11.1.3 of Attachment S of the ISO OATT;
30.4.5.3.2.3failure to provide wind forecasting information that results in a sanction under Section 5.8.1 of the ISO Services Tariff;
30.4.5.3.2.4failure to provide Installed Capacity related information or operating data under Articles 5.12.1, 5.12.3, or 5.12.5 of the ISO Services Tariff that triggers sanctions under Article 5.12.12 of the ISO Services Tariff;
30.4.5.3.2.5failure to comply with the scheduling, bidding, and notification requirements under Articles 5.12.1 or 5.12.7 of the ISO Services Tariff that trigger sanctions under Article 5.12.12 of the ISO Services Tariff;
30.4.5.3.2.6other actions or failures to act that trigger sanctions under Article 5.12.12 of the ISO Services Tariff, including, but not limited to, failures by:
30.4.5.3.2.6.1Installed Capacity Suppliers of Unforced Capacity from External System Resources located in an External Control Area or from a Control Area System Resource that has agreed not to Curtail the Energy associated with Installed Capacity, or afford the same Curtailment priority that it affords its own Control Area Load to: (a) provide Installed Capacity related information required for certification as an Installed Capacity Resource as established in the ISO Procedures; and (b) comply with scheduling, bidding, or notification requirements for certification as an Installed Capacity Supplier established in the ISO Procedures.
30.4.5.3.2.6.2Transmission Owners to provide information required by Article 5.11.3 of the ISO Services Tariff;
30.4.5.3.2.7shortfalls by Installed Capacity Suppliers and External Installed Capacity Suppliers that trigger sanctions under Article 5.14.2 of the ISO Services Tariff;
30.4.5.3.2.8Voltage Support Service performance that results in the imposition of charges under Rate Schedule 2 to the ISO Services Tariff;
30.4.5.3.2.9Regulation Service performance that results in the imposition of penalties under Section 15.3.8 of Rate Schedule 3 to the ISO Services Tariff (in the event that such penalties are re-instituted by the ISO);
30.4.5.3.2.10performance that results in the imposition of Persistent Undergeneration charges under Rate Schedule 3-A to the ISO Services Tariff;
30.4.5.3.2.11Black Start performance that results in reduction or forfeitures of payments under Rate Schedule 5 to the ISO Services Tariff;
30.4.5.3.2.12conduct that results in a sanction under Section 23.4.3 of the Market Mitigation Measures, including, but not limited to: (i) where a Market Party, or its Affiliate, engages in physical withholding, including providing the ISO false information regarding the derating or outage of an electric facility; (ii) where a Market Party, or its Affiliate, fails to follow the ISOs dispatch instructions in real-time, resulting in a different output level than expected had the dispatch instruction been followed, where such conduct has caused a material increase in one or more prices or guarantee payments in an ISO administered market; (iii) where a Market Party makes unjustifiable changes to one or more operating parameters of a Generator that reduce its ability to provide Energy or Ancillary Services; and
(iv) a Load Serving Entity that has been subjected to a “Load Bid Measure” Penalty Level payment in accordance with Section .23.4.4 of the Market Mitigation Measures;
30.4.5.3.2.13conduct that results in the ISO’s use of the “Load Bid Measure” set forth in Section .23.4.4 of the Market Mitigation Measures;
30.4.5.3.2.14actions or failures to act by Installed Capacity Suppliers and Responsible Interface Parties that trigger sanctions under Section 23.4.5.4, 23.4.4.6, or 23.4.5.7 of the Market Mitigation Measures;
30.4.5.3.2.15any failure by the ISO to meet the deadlines for completing System Impact Studies, or any failure by a Transmission Owner to meet the deadlines for completing Facilities Studies, under Sections 3.7 and 4.5 of the ISO OATT that results in the filing of a notice and/or the imposition of sanctions under those provisions;
30.4.5.3.2.16failure of a Market Party to comply with the ISO’s creditworthiness requirements for customers, including, but not limited to, failure to:
(i) comply with a demand for additional credit support, (ii) cure a default in another independent system operator/regional transmission organization market; (iii) prepay for charges in accordance with the terms of a prepayment agreement; (iv) comply with the ISO’s creditworthiness reporting requirements; and (v) provide sufficient credit support to cover bid submissions.
To the extent the above list enumerates specific Tariff provisions, the exclusions specified above shall also apply to re-numbered and/or successor provisions thereto. The Market Monitoring Unit is not precluded from referring any of the activities listed above to the Commission.
30.4.5.4Identify and notify the Commission staff of perceived market design flaws that could be effectively remedied by rule or tariff changes.
30.4.5.4.1In compliance with § 35.28(g)(3)(v) of the Commission’s regulations (or any successor provisions thereto) the Market Monitoring Unit shall submit a referral to the Commission when the Market Monitoring Unit has reason to believe that a market design flaw exists, that the Market Monitoring Unit believes could effectively be remedied by rule or tariff changes.
30.4.5.4.1.1If the Market Monitoring Unit believes broader dissemination of the possible market design flaw, and its recommendation could lead to exploitation, the Market Monitoring Unit shall limit distribution of its referral to the ISO and to the Commission. The referral shall explain why further dissemination should be avoided.
30.4.5.4.1.2Following referral of a possible market design flaw, the Market Monitoring Unit shall continue to provide to the Commission additional information regarding the perceived market design flaw, its effects on the market, any additional or modified observations concerning the Market Monitoring Unit’s proposed market rule or tariff change, any recommendations made by the Market Monitoring Unit to the ISO, its stakeholders, Market Parties or state public service commissions regarding the perceived market design flaw, and any actions taken by the ISO regarding the perceived market design flaw.
Provisions addressing the Market Monitoring Unit, its responsibilities and its authority, have been centralized in Attachment O. However, provisions that address the Market Monitoring Unit can also be found in the Market Mitigation Measures that are set forth in Attachment H to the ISO Services Tariff, and elsewhere in the ISO’s Tariffs. In the event of any inconsistency between the provisions of Attachment O and any other provision of the ISO OATT, the ISO Services Tariff, or any of their attachments and schedules, with regard to the Market Monitoring Unit, its responsibilities and its authority, the provisions of Attachment O shall control.
30.4.6.2.1The ISO and its Market Monitoring Unit shall monitor the markets the ISO administers for conduct that the ISO or the Market Monitoring Unit determine constitutes an abuse of market power but that does not trigger the thresholds specified in the Market Mitigation Measures for the imposition of mitigation measures by the ISO. If the ISO identifies or is made aware of any such conduct, and in particular conduct exceeding the thresholds for presumptive market effects specified in Section 23.3.2.3 of the Market Mitigation Measures, it shall make a filing under § 205 of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824d (1999) (“§ 205”) with the Commission requesting authorization to apply appropriate mitigation measures. Any such filing shall identify the particular conduct the ISO believes warrants mitigation, shall propose a specific mitigation measure for the conduct, shall incorporate or address the recommendation of its Market Monitoring Unit, and shall set forth the ISO’s justification for imposing that mitigation measure. The Market Monitoring Unit’s reporting obligations are specified in Sections 30.4.5.3 and 30.4.5.4 of Attachment O. See Market Mitigation Measures Section 23.1.2.
30.4.6.2.2The ISO and the Market Monitoring Unit shall monitor the ISO Administered Markets for other categories of conduct, whether by a single firm or by multiple firms acting in concert, that have material effects on prices or guarantee payments in an ISO Administered Market. See Market Mitigation Measures Section 23.2.4.4.
30.4.6.2.3When it has the capability to do so, the ISO shall determine the effect on prices or guarantee payments of questioned conduct through the use of sensitivity analyses performed using the ISO’s SCUC, RTC and RTD computer models, and such other computer modeling or analytic methods as the ISO shall deem appropriate following consultation with its Market Monitoring Unit. See Market Mitigation Measures Section 23.3.2.2.1.
30.4.6.2.4Pending development of the capability to use automated market models, the ISO, following consultation with its Market Monitoring Unit, shall determine the effect on prices or guarantee payments of questioned conduct using the best available data and such models and methods as they shall deem appropriate. See Market Mitigation Measures Section 23.3.2.2.2.
30.4.6.2.5If through the application of an appropriate index or screen or other monitoring of market conditions, conduct is identified that (i) exceeds an applicable threshold, and (ii) has a material effect, as specified above, on one or more prices or guarantee payments in an ISO Administered Market, the ISO shall, as and to the extent specified in Attachment O or in Section 23.3.3.2 of the Market Mitigation Measures, contact the Market Party engaging in the identified conduct to request an explanation of the conduct. If a Market Party anticipates submitting bids in a market administered by the ISO that will exceed the thresholds specified in Section 23.3.1 of the Market Mitigation Measures for identifying conduct inconsistent with competition, the Market Party may contact the ISO to provide an explanation of any legitimate basis for any such changes in the Market Party’s bids. If a Market Party’s explanation of the reasons for its bidding indicates to the satisfaction of the ISO that the questioned conduct is consistent with competitive behavior, no further action will be taken. A preliminary determination by the ISO shall be provided to the Market Monitoring Unit for its review and the ISO shall consider the Market Monitoring Unit’s recommendations in reaching its decision. Upon request, the ISO shall also consult with a Market Party with respect to the information and analysis used to determine reference levels under Section 23.3.1.4 of the Market Mitigation Measures for that Market Party. If cost data or other information submitted by a Market Party indicates to the satisfaction of the ISO that the reference levels for that Market Party should be changed, revised reference levels shall be determined by the ISO, reviewed by the Market Monitoring Unit and, following the ISO’s consideration of the Market Monitoring Unit’s recommendation, communicated to the Market Party, and implemented by the ISO as soon as practicable. See Market Mitigation Measures Section 23.3.3.1.
30.4.6.2.6With regard to a Market Party’s request for consultation that satisfies the requirements of Sections 23.3.3.3.1.3 and 23.3.3.3.1.6 of the Market Mitigation Measures, and consistent with the duties assigned to the ISO in Section 23.3.3.3.1.6.1 of the Market Mitigation Measures, a preliminary determination by the ISO regarding the Market Party’s consultation request shall be provided to the Market Monitoring Unit for its review and the ISO shall consider the Market Monitoring Unit’s recommendations in reaching its decision. See Market Mitigation Measures Section 23.3.3.3.1.6.1 and 23.3.3.3.1.6.2.
30.4.6.2.7Reasonably in advance of the deadline for submitting offers in an External Reconfiguration Market and in accordance with the deadlines specified in ISO Procedures, the Responsible Market Party for External Sale UCAP may request the ISO to provide a projection of ICAP Spot Auction clearing prices for the New York City Locality over the Comparison Period for the External Reconfiguration Market. Prior to completing its projection of ICAP Spot Auction clearing prices for the New York City Locality over the Comparison Period for the External Reconfiguration Market, the ISO shall consult with the Market Monitoring Unit regarding such price projection. See Market Mitigation Measures Section 23.4.5.4.3.
30.4.6.2.8Prior to reaching its decision regarding whether the presumption of control of Unforced Capacity has been rebutted, the ISO shall provide its preliminary determination to the Market Monitoring Unit for review and comment. See Market Mitigation Measures Section 23.4.5.5.
30.4.6.2.9Any proposal or decision by a Market Participant to retire or otherwise remove an Installed Capacity Supplier from the In-City Unforced Capacity market, or to de-rate the amount of Installed Capacity available from such supplier, may be subject to audit and review by the ISO if the ISO determines that such action could reasonably be expected to affect Market-Clearing Prices in one or more ICAP Spot Market Auctions for the New York City Locality subsequent to such action. Such an audit or review shall assess whether the proposal or decision has a legitimate economic justification or is based on an effort to withhold Installed Capacity physically in order to affect prices. The ISO shall provide the preliminary results of its audit or review to the Market Monitoring Unit for its review and comment. See Market Mitigation Measures Section 23.4.5.6.
30.4.6.2.10When evaluating a request by a Developer or Interconnection Customer pursuant to Section 23.4.5.7 of the Market Mitigation Measures, the ISO shall seek comment from the Market Monitoring Unit on matters relating to the determination of price projections and cost calculations. See Market Mitigation Measures Section 23.4.5.7.
30.4.6.3.1The ICAP Demand Curve periodic review schedule and procedures shall provide an opportunity for the Market Monitoring Unit to review and comment on the draft request for proposals, the independent consultant’s report, and the ISO’s proposed ICAP Demand Curves. See ISO Services Tariff Section 5.14.1.2.5.
In order to respond to operational or reliability problems that arise in real-time, the ISO may procure Regulation Service at a quantity and/or price point different than those specified in Section 15.3.7 of Rate Schedule 3 to the ISO Services Tariff. The ISO shall post a notice of any such purchase as soon as reasonably possible and shall report on the reasons for such purchases at the next meeting of its Business Issues Committee. The ISO shall also immediately initiate an investigation to determine whether it is necessary to modify the quantity and price points specified above to avoid future operational or reliability problems. The ISO will consult with its Market Monitoring Unit when it conducts this investigation.
If the ISO determines that it is necessary to modify the quantity and/or price points specified above in order to avoid future operational or reliability problems it may temporarily modify them for a period of up to 90 days. If circumstances reasonably allow, the ISO will consult with its Market Monitoring Unit, the Business Issues Committee, the Commission, and the PSC before implementing any such modification. In all circumstances, the ISO will consult with those entities as soon as reasonably possible after implementing a temporary modification.
After the first year the Regulation Service Demand Curve is in place, the ISO shall perform periodic reviews, subject to the scope requirement specified in Section 15.3.7 of Rate Schedule 3 to the ISO Services Tariff, and the Market Monitoring Unit shall be given the opportunity to review and comment on the ISO’s periodic reviews of the Regulation Service Demand Curve. See Section 15.3.7 of Rate Schedule 3 to the ISO Services Tariff.
In order to respond to operational or reliability problems that arise in real-time, the ISO may procure any Operating Reserve product at a quantity and/or price point different than those specified in Section 15.4.7 of Rate Schedule 4 to the ISO Services Tariff. The ISO shall post a notice of any such purchase as soon as reasonably possible and shall report on the reasons for such purchases at the next meeting of its Business Issues Committee. The ISO shall also immediately initiate an investigation to determine whether it is necessary to modify the quantity and price points specified above to avoid future operational or reliability problems. The ISO will consult with its Market Monitoring Unit when it conducts this investigation.
If the ISO determines that it is necessary to modify the quantity and/or price points specified in Section 15.4.7 of Rate Schedule 4 to the ISO Services Tariff in order to avoid future operational or reliability problems it may temporarily modify them for a period of up to 90 days. If circumstances reasonably allow, the ISO will consult with its Market Monitoring Unit, the Business Issues Committee, the Commission, and the PSC before implementing any such modification. In all circumstances, the ISO will consult with those entities as soon as reasonably possible after implementing a temporary modification.
After the first year the Operating Reserves Demand Curves are in place, the ISO shall perform periodic reviews, subject to the scope requirement specified in Section 15.4.7 of Rate Schedule 4 to the ISO Services Tariff, and the Market Monitoring Unit shall be given the opportunity to review and comment on the ISO’s periodic reviews of the Operating Reserve Demand Curves. See Section 15.4.7 of Rate Schedule 4 to the ISO Services Tariff.
The ISO may periodically evaluate the Transmission Shortage Cost to determine whether it is necessary to modify the Transmission Shortage Cost to avoid future operational or reliability problems. The ISO will consult with its Market Monitoring Unit after it conducts this evaluation.
If the ISO determines that it is necessary to modify the Transmission Shortage Cost in order to avoid future operational or reliability problems the resolution of which would otherwise require recurring operator intervention outside normal market scheduling procedures, in order to avoid among other reliability issues, a violation of NERC Interconnection Reliability Operating Limits or System Operating Limits, it may temporarily modify it for a period of up to 90 days, provided however the ISO shall file such change with the Commission pursuant to § 205 of the Federal Power Act within 45 days of such modification. If circumstances reasonably allow, the ISO will consult with its Market Monitoring Unit, the Business Issues Committee, the Commission, and the PSC before implementing any such modification. In all circumstances, the ISO will consult with those entities as soon as reasonably possible after implementing a temporary modification and shall explain the reasons for the change. See Section 17.1.4 of Attachment B to the ISO Services Tariff.
The ISO and PJM and their Market Monitoring Units shall, to the extent compatible with their respective tariffs and with any other market monitoring procedures that they have filed with the Commission:
30.4.6.5.2.1Conduct such investigations as may be necessary to ensure that gaming, abuse of market power, or similar activities do not take place with regard to power transfers under the 600/400 MW contracts;
30.4.6.5.2.2Conduct investigations that go into the region of the other ISO jointly with the ISO, PJM and both Market Monitoring Units;
30.4.6.5.2.3Inform each other of any such investigations; and
30.4.6.5.2.4Share information related to such investigations, as necessary to conduct joint investigations, subject to the requirements of Section C of Appendix 4 to the Operating Protocol and Section 30.6.6 of Attachment O.
See Section A of Appendix 4 to Attachment M-1 to the ISO Services Tariff.
The ISO may periodically evaluate the Transmission Shortage Cost to determine whether it is necessary to modify the Transmission Shortage Cost to avoid future operational or reliability problems. The ISO will consult with its Market Monitoring Unit after it conducts this evaluation.
If the ISO determines that it is necessary to modify the Transmission Shortage Cost in order to avoid future operational or reliability problems the resolution of which would otherwise require recurring operator intervention outside normal market scheduling procedures, in order to avoid among other reliability issues, a violation of NERC Interconnection Reliability Operating Limits or System Operating Limits, it may temporarily modify it for a period of up to 90 days, provided however the ISO shall file such change with the Commission pursuant to §205 of the Federal Power Act within 45 days of such modification. If circumstances reasonably allow, the ISO will consult with its Market Monitoring Unit, the Business Issues Committee, the Commission, and the PSC before implementing any such modification. In all circumstances, the ISO will consult with those entities as soon as reasonably possible after implementing a temporary modification and shall explain the reasons for the change. See Section 16.1.4 of Attachment J to the ISO OATT.
30.4.6.8.2Following the Management Committee vote, the draft Reliability Needs Assessment (RNA), with working group, Operating Committee, and Management Committee input, will be forwarded to the ISO Board for review and action. Concurrently, the draft RNA will be provided to the Market Monitoring Unit for its review and consideration of whether market rules changes are necessary to address an identified failure, if any, in one of the ISO’s competitive markets. See Section 31.2.3.2 of Attachment Y to the ISO OATT.
30.4.6.8.3Following the Management Committee vote, the draft Comprehensive Reliability Plan (CRP), with working group, Operating Committee, and Management Committee input, will be forwarded to the ISO Board for review and action. Concurrently, the draft CRP will also be provided to the Market Monitoring Unit for its review and consideration of whether market rule changes are necessary to address an identified failure, if any, in one of the ISO’s competitive markets. See Section 31.2.6.2 of Attachment Y to the ISO OATT.
30.4.6.8.4Following the Management Committee vote, the draft Congestion Analysis and Resource Integration Study (CARIS), with Business Issues Committee and Management Committee input, will be forwarded to the ISO Board for review and action. Concurrently, the draft CARIS will be provided to the Market Monitoring Unit for its review and consideration. See Section 31.3.2.2 of Attachment Y to the ISO OATT.
30.4.6.9Market Monitoring Unit responsibilities set forth in other documents that have been formally filed with the Commission.
30.4.7.1The ISO shall ensure that the Market Monitoring Unit has sufficient access to ISO resources, personnel and market data to enable the Market Monitoring Unit to carry out its functions under Attachment O. Consistent with Section 30.6.1 of Attachment O, the Market Monitoring Unit shall have complete access to the ISO’s databases of market information.
30.4.7.2Any data created by the Market Monitoring Unit, including but not limited to reconfiguration of the ISO’s data, will be kept within the exclusive control of the Market Monitoring Unit. The Market Monitoring Unit may share the data it creates, subject to the limitations on distribution of and obligation to protect the confidentiality of Protected Information that are contained in Attachment O, the ISO Services Tariff, and the ISO’s Code of Conduct.
30.4.7.3Where data outside the ISO’s geographic footprint would be helpful to the Market Monitoring Unit in carrying out its duties, the Market Monitoring Unit should seek out that data (with assistance from the ISO, where appropriate).
Effective Date: 6/30/2010 - Docket #: ER10-1657-000 - Page 1