

Attachment I

2.3 Definitions - C

Capability Period: Six-month periods which are established as follows: (i) from May 1 through October 31 of each year (“Summer Capability Period”); and (ii) from November 1 of each year through April 30 of the following year (“Winter Capability Period”).

Capability Period Auction: An auction conducted no later than thirty (30) days prior to the start of each Capability Period in which Unforced Capacity may be purchased and sold in a six-month strip.

Capability Period SCR Load Zone Peak Hours: The top forty (40) coincident peak hours that, prior to the Summer 2014 Capability Period include hour beginning thirteen through hour beginning eighteen and beginning with the Summer 2014 Capability Period include hour beginning eleven through hour beginning nineteen. The Capability Period SCR Load Zone Peak Hours shall be determined by the NYISO from the Prior Equivalent Capability Period and shall be used by RIPs to report ACL values for the purpose of SCR enrollment. For a SCR enrolled with a Provisional ACL that requires verification data to be reported at the end of the Capability Period in which the SCR was enrolled, the Capability Period SCR Load Zone Peak Hours shall be determined from the Capability Period in which the SCR was enrolled. Such hours shall not include (i) hours in which Special Case Resources located in the specific Load Zone were called by the ISO to respond to a reliability event or test and (ii) hours for which the Emergency Demand Response Program resources were deployed by the ISO in each specific Load Zone. In addition, beginning with the Summer 2014 Capability Period, the NYISO shall not include, in descending rank order of NYCA Load up to a maximum of eight hours per Capability Period, a) the hour before the start time of a reliability event or performance test, in which SCRs located in the specific Load Zone were called by the ISO to respond to a reliability event or performance test, or b) the hour immediately following the end time of such reliability event or performance test.

Capability Year: A Summer Capability Period, followed by a Winter Capability Period (*i.e.*, May 1 through April 30).

Capacity: The capability to generate or transmit electrical power, or the ability to control demand at the direction of the ISO, measured in megawatts (“MW”).

Capacity Limited Resource: A Resource that is constrained in its ability to supply Energy above its Normal Upper Operating Limit by operational or plant configuration characteristics. Capacity Limited Resources must register their Capacity limiting characteristics with, and justify them to, the ISO consistent with ISO Procedures. Capacity Limited Resources may submit a schedule indicating that their Normal Upper Operating Limit is a function depending on one or more variables, such as temperature or pondage levels, in which case the Normal Upper Operating Limit applicable at any time shall be determined by reference to that schedule.

Capacity Reservation Cap: As defined in the ISO OATT.

CARL Data: Control Area Resource and Load (“CARL”) data submitted by Control Area System Resources to the ISO.

Centralized Transmission Congestion Contracts (“TCC”) Auction (“Auction”): As defined in the ISO OATT.

Co-located Storage Resources (“CSR”): A wind or solar Intermittent Power Resource and an Energy Storage Resource that: (a) are both located behind a single Point of Injection (as defined in Section 1.16 of the OATT); (b) participate in the ISO Administered Markets as two distinct Generators; and (c) share a set of CSR Scheduling Limits. Resources that serve a Host Load may not participate in the ISO-Administered Markets as components of a CSR.

Code of Conduct: The rules, procedures and restrictions concerning the conduct of the ISO directors and employees, contained in Attachment F to the ISO Open Access Transmission Tariff.

Commenced Repair: A determination by the ISO that a Market Participant with a Generator i) has decided to pursue the repair of its Generator, and based on the ISO’s technical/engineering evaluation ii) has a Repair Plan for the Generator that is consistent with a Credible Repair Plan, and iii) has made appropriate progress in pursuing the repair of its Generator when measured against the milestones of a Credible Repair Plan.

Commission (“FERC”): The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, or any successor agency.

Compensable Overgeneration: A quantity of Energy injected over a given RTD interval in which a Supplier has offered Energy that exceeds the Real-Time Scheduled Energy Injection established by the ISO for that Supplier and for which the Supplier may be paid pursuant to this Section and ISO Procedures.

For Suppliers not covered by other provisions of this Section and Intermittent Power Resources depending on wind or solar energy as their fuel for which the ISO has imposed a Wind and Solar Output Limit in the given RTD interval, Compensable Overgeneration shall initially equal three percent (3%) of the Supplier’s Normal Upper Operating Limit which may be modified by the ISO if necessary to maintain good Control Performance.

For a Generator: (i) which is operating in Start-Up or Shutdown Periods, or Testing Periods; or (ii) which is a Limited Control Run of River Hydro Resource that has offered its Energy to the ISO in a given interval not using the ISO-committed Flexible or Self-Committed Flexible bid mode; or (iii) which is an Intermittent Power Resource that depends on landfill gas for its fuel and has offered its Energy to the ISO in a given interval not using the ISO-committed Flexible or Self-Committed Flexible bid mode; or (iv) which is an Intermittent Power Resource that depends on wind or solar energy for its fuel, Compensable Overgeneration shall mean all Energy actually injected by the Generator that exceeds the Real-Time Scheduled Energy Injection established by the ISO for that Generator; provided however, this definition of Compensable Overgeneration shall not apply to an Intermittent Power Resource depending on wind or solar energy as its fuel for any interval for which the ISO has imposed a Wind and Solar Output Limit. For a Generator operating in intervals when it has been designated as operating Out of Merit at the request of a Transmission Owner or the ISO, Compensable Overgeneration shall mean all Energy actually injected by the Generator that exceeds the Real-Time

Scheduled Energy Injection up to the Energy level directed by the Transmission Owner or the ISO.

For a Generator comprised of a group of generating units at a single location, which grouped generating units are separately committed and dispatched by the ISO, and for which Energy injections are measured at a single location, Compensable Overgeneration shall mean that quantity of Energy injected by the Generator, during the period when one of its grouped generating units is operating in a Start-Up or Shutdown Period, that exceeds the Real-Time Scheduled Energy Injection established by the ISO for that period, for that Generator, and for which the Generator may be paid pursuant to ISO Procedures.

Completed Application: An Application that satisfies all of the information and other requirements for service under the ISO Services Tariff.

Confidential Information: Information and/or data that has been designated by a Customer to be proprietary and confidential, provided that such designation is consistent with the ISO Procedures, the ISO Services Tariff, and the ISO Code of Conduct.

Congestion: A characteristic of the transmission system produced by a constraint on the optimum economic operation of the power system, such that the marginal price of Energy to serve the next increment of Load, exclusive of losses, at different locations on the transmission system is unequal.

Congestion Component: The component of the LBMP measured at a location or the Transmission Usage Charge between two locations that is attributable to the cost of transmission Congestion as is more completely defined in Attachment B of the Services Tariff.

Congestion Rent: As defined in the ISO OATT.

Congestion Rent Shortfall: As defined in the ISO OATT.

Constraint: An upper or lower limit placed on a variable or set of variables that are used by the ISO in its SCUC, RTC, or RTD programs to control and/or facilitate the operation of the NYS Transmission System.

Contingency: An actual or potential unexpected failure or outage of a system component, such as a Generator, transmission line, circuit breaker, switch or other electrical element. A Contingency also may include multiple components, which are related by situations leading to simultaneous component outages.

Control Area: An electric system or combination of electric power systems to which a common Automatic Generation Control scheme is applied in order to: (1) match, at all times, the power output of the Generators within the electric power system(s) and Capacity and Energy purchased from entities outside the electric power system(s), with the Load within the electric power system(s); (2) maintain scheduled interchange with other Control Areas, within the limits of Good Utility Practice; (3) maintain the frequency of the electric power system(s) within

reasonable limits in accordance with Good Utility Practice; and (4) provide sufficient Capacity to maintain Operating Reserves in accordance with Good Utility Practice.

Control Area System Resource: A set of Resources owned or controlled by an entity within a Control Area that also is the operator of such Control Area. Entities supplying Unforced Capacity using Control Area System Resources will not designate particular Resources as the suppliers of Unforced Capacity.

Control Performance: A standard for measuring the degree to which a Control Area is providing Regulation Service in conformance with NERC requirements.

Controllable Transmission: Any Transmission facility over which power-flow can be directly controlled by power-flow control devices without having to re-dispatch generation.

Credible Repair Plan: A Repair Plan that meets the requirements described in Section 5.18.1.4 of this Services Tariff and in ISO Procedures.

Credit Assessment: An assessment of a Customer's creditworthiness, conducted by the ISO in accordance with Section 26.5.3 of Attachment K to this Services Tariff.

Cross-Sound Scheduled Line: A transmission facility that interconnects the NYCA to the New England Control Area at Shoreham, New York and terminates near New Haven, Connecticut.

CSR Scheduling Limits: The CSR injection Scheduling Limit sets the maximum, combined Regulation Capacity, Operating Reserve and Energy injection schedules for, and the maximum net injection by a CSR's Generators. The CSR withdrawal Scheduling Limit sets the maximum, combined Regulation Capacity and Energy withdrawal schedules for, and the maximum net withdrawal by a CSR's Generators.

The Market Participant that is responsible for submitting Bids for a set of CSR Generators shall submit a CSR injection Scheduling Limit and a CSR withdrawal Scheduling Limit with the hourly Day-Ahead and Real-Time Market Bids it submits for each of the CSR Generators. The CSR Scheduling Limit values that the Market Participant submits must reflect the physical capability to inject or withdraw Energy at the Point of Injection/Point of Withdrawal.

To address the real-time variability of Energy deliveries from wind and solar Intermittent Power Resources that participate as Co-located Storage Resources, when the participating Energy Storage Resource has a non-zero Regulation and/or Operating Reserves schedule or is dispatched to inject Energy, and the sum of the participating Energy Storage Resource's and the participating wind or solar Intermittent Power Resource's Energy, Regulation Service and Operating Reserves Schedules is greater than or equal to a specified percentage of the CSR injection Scheduling Limit, then the ISO will issue a Wind and Solar Output Limit to the Intermittent Power Resource to not exceed its Base Point Signal. The specified percentage that is ordinarily used will be posted on the ISO's website.

CTS Enabled Interface: An External Interface at which the ISO has authorized the use of Coordinated Transaction Scheduling ("CTS") market rules and which includes a CTS Enabled

Proxy Generator Bus for New York and a CTS Enabled Proxy Generator Bus for the neighboring Control Area.

CTS Enabled Proxy Generator Bus: A Proxy Generator Bus at which the ISO either requires or permits the use of CTS Interface Bids for Import and Export Transactions in the Real-Time Market and requires the use of Decremental Bids for Wheels Through in the Real-Time Market. A CTS Enabled Proxy Generator Bus at which the ISO permits CTS Interface Bids will also permit Decremental and Sink Price Cap Bids.

CTS Interface Bid: A Real-Time Bid provided by an entity engaged in an External Transaction at a CTS Enabled Interface. CTS Interface Bids shall include a MW amount, a direction indicating whether the proposed Transaction is to Import Energy to, or Export Energy from, the New York Control Area, and a Bid Price.

CTS Sink: Representation of the location(s) within a Control Area where energy associated with a CTS Interface Bid is withdrawn. The NYCA CTS Sinks are Proxy Generator Buses.

CTS Sink Price: The price at a CTS Sink.

CTS Source: Representation of the location(s) within a Control Area where energy associated with a CTS Interface Bid is injected. The NYCA CTS Sources are Proxy Generator Buses.

CTS Source Price: The price at a CTS Source.

Curtailement or Curtail: A reduction in Transmission Service in response to a transmission Capacity shortage as a result of system reliability conditions.

Curtailement Customer Aggregator: A Curtailement Services Provider that produces real-time verified reductions in NYCA load of at least 100 kW through contracts with retail end-users. The procedure for qualifying as a Curtailement Customer Aggregator is set forth in ISO procedures.

Curtailement Initiation Cost: The fixed payment, separate from a variable Demand Reduction Bid, required by a qualified Demand Reduction Provider in order to cover the cost of reducing demand.

Curtailement Services Provider: A qualified entity that can produce real-time, verified reductions in NYCA Load of at least 100 kW in a single Load Zone, pursuant to the Emergency Demand Response Program and related ISO procedures. The procedure for qualifying as a Curtailement Services Provider is set forth in Section 3 below and in ISO Procedures.

Curtailement Services Provider Capacity: Capacity from a Demand Side Resource nominated by a Curtailement Services Provider for participation in the Emergency Demand Response Program.

Customer: An entity which has complied with the requirements contained in the ISO Services Tariff, including having signed a Service Agreement, and is qualified to utilize the Market Services and the Control Area Services provided by the ISO under the ISO Services Tariff;

provided, however, that a party taking services under the Tariff pursuant to an unsigned Service Agreement filed with the Commission by the ISO shall be deemed a Customer.

2.23 Definitions - W

West of Central-East (“West” or “Western”): An electrical area comprised of Load Zones A, B, C, D, and E, as identified in the ISO Procedures.

Wheels Through: Transmission Service, originating in another Control Area, that is wheeled through the NYCA to another Control Area.

Wheels Through Credit Requirement: A component of the External Transaction Component of the Operating Requirement, calculated in accordance with Section 26.4.2 of Attachment K to this Services Tariff.

Wholesale Market: The sum of purchases and sales of Energy and Capacity for resale along with Ancillary Services needed to maintain reliability and power quality at the transmission level coordinated together through the ISO and Power Exchanges. A party who purchases Energy, Capacity or Ancillary Services in the Wholesale Market to serve its own Load is considered to be a participant in the Wholesale Market.

Wholesale Transmission Services Charges (“WTSC”): Those charges calculated pursuant to Attachment H of the OATT, incurred or declared overdue by a Transmission Owner pursuant to Section 26.4.2 of Attachment K, after the effective date of these revisions; provided, however, that these provisions will not apply to pre-petition bankruptcy debts for a company that is currently in bankruptcy.

Wind and Solar Energy Forecast: The ISO’s forecast of Energy that is expected to be supplied over a specified interval of time by an Intermittent Power Resource that depends on wind or solar energy as its fuel and which is used in ISO’s Energy market commitment and dispatch.

Wind and Solar Output Limit: A Base Point Signal calculated for an Intermittent Power Resource depending on wind or solar energy as its fuel and which, when sent to the Intermittent Power Resource, shall include a separate flag directing the Intermittent Power Resource not to exceed its Base Point Signal. All Intermittent Power Resources depending on wind or solar energy as their fuel, other than those that depend on wind for their fuel and were in commercial operation as of January 1, 2002 with name plate capacity of 12 MWs or fewer, shall be eligible to receive a Wind and Solar Output Limit.

Withdrawal-Eligible Generator: A Generator that is eligible to withdraw energy from the grid at a price for the purposes of recharging or refilling for later injection back into the grid.

WTSC Component: A component of the Operating Requirement, calculated in accordance with Section 26.4.2, of Attachment K to this Services Tariff.

4.2 Day-Ahead Markets and Schedules

4.2.1 Day-Ahead Load Forecasts, Bids and Bilateral Schedules

4.2.1.1 General Customer Forecasting and Bidding Requirements

Subject to the two earlier submission deadlines set forth below, by 5 a.m. on the day prior to the Dispatch Day: (i) All LSEs serving Load in the NYCA shall provide the ISO with Load forecasts for the Dispatch Day and the day after the Dispatch Day; and (ii) Customers and Transmission Customers submitting Bids in the Day-Ahead Market shall provide the ISO, consistent with ISO Procedures:

- a. Bids to supply Energy, including Bids to supply Energy in Virtual Transactions;
- b. Bids to supply Ancillary Services;
- c. Requests for Bilateral Transaction schedules;
- d. Bids to purchase Energy, including Bids to purchase Energy in Virtual Transactions and Bids to withdraw Energy by Withdrawal-Eligible Generators;
- e. Demand Reduction Bids; and
- f. For Behind-the-Meter Net Generation Resources, the forecasted Host Load for each hour of the Dispatch Day.

By 4:50 a.m. on the day prior to the Dispatch Day, all Customers or Transmission Customers shall submit Bids for External Transactions at the Proxy Generator Bus associated with the Cross-Sound Scheduled Line, the Neptune Scheduled Line, the Linden VFT Scheduled Line, or the HTP Scheduled Line.

By 4:45 a.m. on the day prior to the Dispatch Day, all Customers or Transmission Customers shall submit Bids that include revised fuel type or fuel price information to the ISO's Market Information System.

In general, the information provided to the ISO shall include the following:

4.2.1.2 Load Forecasts

The Load forecast shall indicate the predicted level of Load in MW by Point of Withdrawal for each hour.

4.2.1.3 Bids by Suppliers Using the ISO-Committed Flexible, Self-Committed Flexible or ISO-Committed Fixed Bid Modes to Supply Energy and/or Ancillary Services

4.2.1.3.1 General Rules

Day-Ahead Bids by Suppliers using the ISO-Committed Flexible, Self-Committed Flexible or ISO-Committed Fixed bid modes shall identify the Capacity, in MW, available for commitment in the Day-Ahead Market (for every hour of the Dispatch Day) and the price(s) at which the Supplier will voluntarily enter into dispatch commitments. If the Supplier elects to participate in the Day-Ahead Market, and is within a defined electrical boundary, electrically interconnected with, and routinely serves a Host Load (which Host Load does not consist solely of Station Power) at a single PTID, it can only participate in the Day-Ahead Market as a Behind-the-Meter Net Generation Resource. If the Supplier is a Behind-the-Meter Net Generation Resource, the ISO shall only consider price-MW pairs in excess of the forecasted Host Load for the Resource.

A Supplier's Day-Ahead Bids for an Energy Storage Resource to withdraw Energy and to inject Energy shall be submitted as a single, continuous, bid curve representing the Capacity, in MW, available for commitment in the Day-Ahead Market for each hour of the Dispatch Day, and shall indicate whether the Resource's Energy Level will be ISO- or Self-Managed. An Energy Storage Resource may not change its Energy Level Management election within the Day-Ahead Market evaluation period (*i.e.*, within a single day).

If the Supplier using the ISO-Committed Flexible or Self-Committed Flexible bid mode is eligible to provide Regulation Service or Operating Reserves under Rate Schedules 3 and 4 respectively of this ISO Services Tariff, the Supplier's Bid may specify the quantity of Regulation Capacity it is making available and shall specify an emergency response rate that determines the quantity of Operating Reserves that it is capable of providing. Offers to provide Regulation Service and Operating Reserves must comply with the rules set forth in Rate Schedules 3 and 4 of this ISO Services Tariff. If a Supplier that is eligible to provide Operating Reserves does not submit a Day-Ahead Availability Bid for Operating Reserves, its Day-Ahead Bid shall be rejected in its entirety. A Behind-the-Meter Net Generation Resource that is comprised of more than one generating unit that is dispatched as a single aggregate unit at a single PTID is not qualified to provide Regulation Service or Spinning Reserves. A Supplier may resubmit a complete Day-Ahead Bid, provided that the new Bid is timely. See Section 4.2.1.9 for bidding requirements for Demand Side Resources offering Energy in the Day-Ahead Market.

Suppliers other than Demand Side Resources entering a Bid into the Day-Ahead Market may also enter Day-Ahead Bids for each of the next nine (9) Dispatch Days. If not subsequently modified or withdrawn, these offers for subsequent Dispatch Days may be used by the ISO as offers from these Suppliers in the Day-Ahead Market for these subsequent Dispatch Days. For Suppliers that are providing Unforced Capacity in the ISO-administered ICAP Market for the month in which the Dispatch Day and the nine-day advance bidding period are encompassed, the ISO may enter the eighth day offer as the Bid for that Supplier's ninth day, if there is, otherwise no ninth-day Bid.

4.2.1.3.2 Bid Parameters

Day-Ahead Bids by Suppliers using the ISO-Committed Flexible, Self-Committed Flexible or ISO-Committed Fixed bid modes may identify-variable Energy price Bids, consisting of up to eleven monotonically increasing, constant cost incremental Energy steps, and other parameters described in ISO Procedures. Day-Ahead Bids from Demand Side Resources offering Operating Reserves or Regulation Service shall be ISO-Committed Flexible and shall have an Energy Bid price no lower than the Monthly Net Benefit Offer Floor. Day-Ahead Bids by Intermittent Power Resources that depend on wind or solar energy as their fuel shall be ISO-Committed Flexible and shall include a Minimum Generation Bid of zero megawatts and zero costs and a Start-Up Bid of zero cost.

Day-Ahead Bids by ISO-Committed Fixed and ISO-Committed Flexible Generators, other than Bids from Intermittent Power Resources that depend on wind or solar energy as their fuel, shall also include Minimum Generation Bids and hourly Start-Up Bids. Bids shall specify whether a Supplier is offering to be ISO-Committed Fixed, ISO-Committed Flexible, Self-Committed Fixed, or Self-Committed Flexible.

4.2.1.3.3 Upper Operating Limits, Lower Operating Limits, and Response Rates

All Bids to supply Energy and Ancillary Services must specify a UOL_N and a UOL_E for each hour. A Resource's UOL_E may not be lower than its UOL_N . Bids from Withdrawal-Eligible Generators shall also specify the Generator's Lower Operating Limit for each hour.

Bids from Suppliers for Generators supplying Energy and Ancillary Services must specify a normal response rate and may provide up to three normal response rates provided the minimum normal response rate may be no less than one percent (1%) of the Generator's Operating Capacity per minute. All Bids from Suppliers for Generators supplying Energy and

Ancillary Services must also specify an emergency response rate which shall be equal to or greater than the maximum normal response rate of the Generator.

Bids from Suppliers offering Operating Reserves or Regulation Service from Demand Side Resources must specify a normal response rate and an emergency response rate provided that the emergency response rate may not be lower than the normal response rate. For Demand Side Resources the minimum acceptable response rate is one percent (1%) of the quantity of Demand Reduction the Demand Side Resource produces per minute.

4.2.1.3.4 Additional Parameters for Energy Storage Resources

In addition to the parameters that Suppliers submit for Energy Storage Resources because they are Generators, specific parameters may apply to some Bids for Energy Storage Resources. Consistent with the ISO Procedures, Bids from Suppliers for Energy Storage Resources supplying Energy and Ancillary Services may be required to specify the Beginning Energy Level and the Energy Storage Resource's Roundtrip Efficiency, and must specify its Upper and Lower Storage Limits. The Energy Level for an Energy Storage Resource shall be managed by the Supplier unless the Supplier elects, in its Bids, to be ISO-Managed.

The Day-Ahead Schedule for Energy Storage Resources with ISO-Managed Energy Levels will reflect the Resource's Energy Level constraints, including the Beginning Energy Level, the Upper and Lower Storage Limits, and the Resource's Roundtrip Efficiency. An Energy Storage Resource that self-manages its Energy Level is obligated to submit Bids that are consistent with its Energy Level constraints, and the Day-Ahead optimization will not honor the above-identified Energy Level constraints.

4.2.1.4 Offers to Supply Energy from Self-Committed Fixed Generators

Self-Committed Fixed Generators shall provide the ISO with a schedule of their expected Energy output and withdrawals (when applicable) for each hour. Self-Committed Fixed Generators are responsible for ensuring that any hourly changes in output are consistent with their response rates. Self-Committed Fixed Generators shall also submit UOL_{NS}, UOL_{ES} and variable Energy Bids for possible use by the ISO in the event that RTD-CAM initiates a maximum generation pickup, as described in Section 4.4.3 of this ISO Services Tariff.

4.2.1.5 Bids to Supply Energy in Virtual Transactions

Customers submitting Bids to supply Energy in Virtual Transactions shall identify the Energy, in MW, available in the Day-Ahead Market (for every hour of the Dispatch Day) and the price(s) at which the Customer will voluntarily make it available.

4.2.1.6 Bids to Purchase Energy in Virtual Transactions

Customers submitting bids to purchase Energy in Virtual Transactions shall identify the Energy, in MW, to be purchased in the Day-Ahead Market (for every hour of the Dispatch Day) and the price(s) at which the Customer will voluntarily purchase it.

4.2.1.7 Bilateral Transactions

Transmission Customers requesting Bilateral Transaction schedules shall identify hourly Transaction quantities (in MW) by Point of Injection and Point of Withdrawal, minimum run times associated with Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service, if any, and shall provide other information (as described in ISO Procedures).

4.2.1.8 Bids to Purchase LBMP Energy in the Day-Ahead Market

Each purchaser shall submit Bids indicating the hourly quantity of Energy, in MW, that it will purchase from the Day-Ahead Market for each hour of the following Dispatch Day. These Bids shall indicate the quantities to be purchased by Point of Withdrawal. The Bids may identify prices at which the purchaser will voluntarily enter into the Transaction.

4.2.1.9 Day-Ahead Bids from Demand Reduction Providers and DSASP Providers to Supply Energy from Demand Reductions

Demand Reduction Providers and DSASP Providers offering Energy from Demand Side Resources shall submit Bids: (i) identifying the amount of Demand Reduction, in MWs in accordance with Section 4.1.4, that is available for commitment in the Day-Ahead Market (for every hour of the dispatch day) and (ii) identifying the prices at which the Demand Reduction Provider or DSASP Provider will voluntarily enter into dispatch commitments to reduce demand; provided, however, the price at which the Demand Reduction Provider or DSASP Provider will voluntarily enter into dispatch commitments to reduce demand shall be no lower than the Monthly Net Benefit Offer Floor, as determined in accordance with this section. The Bids will identify the minimum period of time that the Demand Reduction Provider or DSASP Provider is willing to reduce demand, however the minimum period may not be less than one hour. The Bid may separately identify the Demand Reduction Provider's Curtailment Initiation Cost. Demand Reduction Bids from Demand Reduction Providers that are not accepted in the Day-Ahead Market shall expire at the close of the Day-Ahead Market.

The ISO shall perform the Net Benefits Test and post on its web site the Monthly Net Benefit Offer Floor for each month by the 15th of the preceding month in accordance with ISO Procedures. The Net Benefits Test shall establish the threshold price below which the dispatch of Energy from Demand Side Resources is not cost-effective. The Net Benefits Test shall

consist of the following steps: (1) the ISO shall compile hourly supply curves for the Reference Month; (2) the ISO shall develop the average supply curve for the Study Month by updating the Reference Month supply curves for retirements and new entrants, and adjusting offers for changes in fuel prices; (3) the ISO shall apply an appropriate mathematical formula to smooth the average supply curve; and (4) the ISO shall evaluate the smoothed average supply curve to determine the Monthly Net Benefit Floor for the Study Month. The ISO shall apply the Monthly Net Benefit Offer Floor, as so calculated, to Bids submitted by Demand Response Providers for all hours in the Study Month.

The ISO shall promptly post corrections, where necessary, to the Monthly Net Benefit Offer Floor. Corrections shall only apply to errors in conducting the calculations described above and/or in posting the properly calculated Monthly Net Benefit Offer Floor. Corrections shall not include recalculations based on changes in gas prices as set forth above. The ISO shall not use any correction to the Monthly Net Benefit Offer Floor to determine revised Day-Ahead Market clearing prices for periods prior to the imposition of the correction.

4.2.2 ISO Responsibility to Establish a Statewide Load Forecast

By 8 a.m., or as soon thereafter as is reasonably possible, the ISO will develop and publish its statewide Load forecast on the OASIS. The ISO will use this forecast to perform the SCUC for the Dispatch Day.

4.2.3 Security Constrained Unit Commitment (“SCUC”)

Subject to ISO Procedures and Good Utility Practice, the ISO will develop a SCUC schedule over the Dispatch Day using a computer algorithm which simultaneously minimizes the total Bid Production Cost of: (i) supplying power or Demand Reductions to satisfy accepted purchasers’ Bids to buy Energy from the Day-Ahead Market; (ii) providing sufficient Ancillary

Services to support Energy purchased from the Day-Ahead Market consistent with the Regulation Service Demand curve and Operating Reserve Demand Curves set forth in Rate Schedules 3 and 4 respectively of this ISO Services Tariff; (iii) committing sufficient Capacity to meet the ISO's Load forecast and provide associated Ancillary Services; and (iv) meeting Bilateral Transaction schedules submitted Day-Ahead excluding schedules of Bilateral Transactions with Trading Hubs as their POWs. The computer algorithm shall consider whether accepting Demand Reduction Bids will reduce the total Bid Production Cost.

The ISO shall compute all NYCA Interface Transfer Capabilities prior to scheduling Transmission Service Day-Ahead. The ISO shall run the SCUC utilizing the computed Transfer Capabilities, submitted Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service requests, Load forecasts, and submitted Incremental Energy Bids, Decremental Bids and Sink Price Cap Bids.

The schedule will include commitment of sufficient Generators and/or Demand Side Resources to provide for the safe and reliable operation of the NYS Power System. SCUC will treat a Behind-the-Meter Net Generation Resources and Energy Storage Resources as already being committed and available to be scheduled. Pursuant to ISO Procedures, the ISO may schedule any Resource to run above its UOL_N up to the level of its UOL_E . In cases in which the sum of all Bilateral Schedules, excluding Bilateral Schedules for Transactions with Trading Hubs as their POWs, and all Day-Ahead Market purchases to serve Load within the NYCA in the Day-Ahead schedule is less than the ISO's Day-Ahead forecast of Load, the ISO will commit Resources in addition to the Operating Reserves it normally maintains to enable it to respond to contingencies. The purpose of these additional resources is to ensure that sufficient Capacity is available to the ISO in real-time to enable it to meet its Load forecast (including associated Ancillary Services). In considering which additional Resources to schedule to meet the ISO's

Load forecast, the ISO will evaluate unscheduled Imports, and will not schedule those Transactions if its evaluation determines the cost of those Transactions would effectively exceed a Bid Price cap in the hours in which the Energy provided by those Transactions is required. In addition to all Reliability Rules, the ISO shall consider the following information when developing the SCUC schedule: (i) Load forecasts; (ii) Ancillary Service requirements as determined by the ISO given the Regulation Service Demand Curve and Operating Reserve Demand Curves referenced above; (iii) Bilateral Transaction schedules excluding Bilateral Schedules for Transactions with Trading Hubs as their POWs; (iv) price Bids and operating Constraints submitted for Generators or for Demand Side Resources; (v) price Bids for Ancillary Services; (vi) Decremental Bids and Sink Price Cap Bids for External Transactions; and (vii) Bids to purchase or sell Energy from or to the Day-Ahead Market. External Transactions with minimum run times greater than one hour will only be scheduled at the requested Bid for the full minimum run time. External Transactions with identical Bids and minimum run times greater than one hour will not be prorated. The SCUC schedule shall list the hourly injections and withdrawals for: (a) each Customer whose Bid the ISO accepts for the Dispatch Day; and (b) each Bilateral Transaction scheduled Day-Ahead excluding Bilateral Transactions with Trading Hubs as their POWs.

In the development of its SCUC schedule, the ISO may commit and de-commit Generators and Demand Side Resources, based upon any flexible Bids, including Minimum Generation Bids, Start-Up Bids, Curtailment Initiation Cost Bids, Energy, and Incremental Energy Bids and Decremental Bids received by the ISO provided however that: (a) the ISO shall commit zero megawatts of Energy for Demand Side Resources committed to provide Operating Reserves and Regulation Service; and (b) for Behind-the-Meter Net Generation Resources, the

ISO will consider for dispatch only those segments of the Resource's Incremental Energy Bids above the forecasted Host Load and subject to the Injection Limit.

The ISO may disable the ISO-Managed Energy Level bid parameter that is ordinarily available to Energy Storage Resources if it determines that there is a significant risk that including the ISO-Managed Energy Level bid parameter in the SCUC evaluation could delay the completion and posting of the Day-Ahead Market beyond the 11:00 a.m. deadline specified in Section 4.2.5 of this Services Tariff. The ISO shall post a notice to its public website by 4:00 p.m. on the day before the Day-Ahead Market closes if it decides to disable the ISO-Managed Energy Level bid parameter. The ISO-Managed Energy Level bid parameter shall remain disabled until the ISO posts a notice that complies with the notice requirement specified above reinstating the bid parameter's availability.

When the ISO-Managed Energy Level bid parameter is disabled, Bids that utilized the ISO-Managed Energy Level functionality that were submitted prior to the issuance of the ISO's notice will be rejected. The ISO will inform affected Suppliers, so that the Suppliers will have the opportunity to resubmit their Day-Ahead Market Bids using Self-Managed Energy Levels prior to the deadlines specified in Section 4.2.1.1 of the Services Tariff. Bids that utilize ISO-Managed Energy Levels will continue to be rejected until the ISO reinstates the ISO-Managed Energy Level bid parameter, following notice.

The ISO will select the least cost mix of Ancillary Services and Energy from Suppliers, Demand Side Resources, and Customers submitting Virtual Transactions bids. The ISO may substitute higher quality Ancillary Services (*i.e.*, shorter response time) for lower quality Ancillary Services when doing so would result in an overall least bid cost solution. For example, 10-Minute Non-Synchronized Reserve may be substituted for 30-Minute Reserve if doing so

would reduce the total bid cost of providing Energy and Ancillary Services.

4.2.3.1 Reliability Forecast for the Dispatch Day

At the request of a Transmission Owner to meet the reliability of its local system, the ISO may incorporate into the ISO's Security Constrained Unit Commitment constraints specified by the Transmission Owner.

A Transmission Owner may request commitment of certain Generators for a Dispatch Day if it determines that certain Generators are needed to meet the reliability of its local system. Such request shall be made before the Day-Ahead Market for that Dispatch Day has closed if the Transmission Owner knows of the need to commit certain Generators before the Day-Ahead Market close. The ISO may commit one or more Generator(s) in the Day-Ahead Market for a Dispatch Day if it determines that the Generator(s) are needed to meet NYCA reliability requirements.

A Transmission Owner may request commitment of additional Generators for a Dispatch Day following the close of the Day-Ahead Market to meet changed or local system conditions for the Dispatch Day that may cause the Day-Ahead schedules for the Dispatch Day to be inadequate to ensure the reliability of its local system. The ISO will use SRE to fulfill a Transmission Owner's request for additional units.

All Generator commitments made in the Day-Ahead Market pursuant to this Section 4.2.3.1 shall be posted on the ISO website following the close of the Day-Ahead Market, in accordance with ISO procedures. In addition, the ISO shall post on its website a non-binding, advisory notification of a request, or any modifications thereto, made pursuant to this Section 4.2.3.1 in the Day-Ahead Market by a Transmission Owner to commit a Generator that is located within a Constrained Area, as defined in Attachment H of this Services Tariff. The advisory

notification shall be provided upon receipt of the request and in accordance with ISO procedures. The postings described here may be included with the operator-initiated commitment report that the ISO posts in accordance with Section 4.1.3.4 of this Services Tariff.

After the Day-Ahead schedule is published, the ISO shall evaluate any events, including, but not limited to, the loss of significant Generators or transmission facilities that may cause the Day-Ahead schedules to be inadequate to meet the Load or reliability requirements for the Dispatch Day.

In order to meet Load or reliability requirements in response to such changed conditions the ISO may: (i) commit additional Resources, beyond those committed Day-Ahead, using a SRE and considering (a) Bids submitted to the ISO that were not previously accepted but were designated by the bidder as continuing to be available; or (b) new Bids from all Suppliers, including neighboring systems; or (ii) take the following actions: (a) after providing notice, require all Resources to run above their UOL_{NS}, up to the level of their UOL_{ES} (pursuant to ISO Procedures) and/or raise the UOL_{NS} of Capacity Limited Resources and Energy Limited Resources to their UOL_E levels, or (b) cancel or reschedule transmission facility maintenance outages when possible. Actions taken by the ISO in performing supplemental commitments will not change any financial commitments that resulted from the Day-Ahead Market.

4.2.4 Reliability Forecast for the Six Days Following the Dispatch Day

In the SCUC program, system operation shall be optimized based on Bids over the Dispatch Day. However, to preserve system reliability, the ISO must ensure that there will be sufficient resources available to meet forecasted Load and reserve requirements over the seven (7)-day period that begins with the next Dispatch Day. The ISO will perform a Supplemental Resource Evaluation (“SRE”) for days two (2) through seven (7) of the commitment cycle. If it

is determined that a long start-up time Generator (*i.e.*, a Generator that cannot be scheduled by SCUC to start up in time for the next Dispatch Day) is needed for reliability, the ISO shall accept a Bid from the Generator and the Generator will begin its start-up sequence. During each day of the start-up sequence, the ISO will perform an SRE to determine if long start-up time Generators will still be needed as previously forecasted. If at any time it is determined that the Generator will not be needed as previously forecasted, the ISO shall order the Generator to abort its start-up sequence.

The ISO will commit to long start-up time Generators to preserve reliability. However, the ISO will not commit resources with long start-up times to reduce the cost of meeting Loads that it expects to occur in days following the next Dispatch Day.

A Supplier that bids on behalf of a long start-up time Generator, including one that is committed and whose start is subsequently aborted by the ISO as described in this Section 4.2.4, may be eligible for a Bid Production Cost Guarantee pursuant to the provisions of Section 4.6.6 and Attachment C of this ISO Services Tariff. The costs of such a Bid Production Cost guarantee will be recovered by the ISO under Rate Schedule 1 of the ISO OATT.

The ISO shall perform the SRE as follows: (1) The ISO shall develop a forecast of daily system peak Load for days two (2) through seven (7) in this seven (7)-day period and add the appropriate reserve margin; (2) the ISO shall then forecast its available Generators for the day in question by summing the Operating Capacity for all Generators currently in operation that are available for the commitment cycle, the Operating Capacity of all other Generators capable of starting on subsequent days to be available on the day in question, and an estimate of the net Imports from External Bilateral Transactions; (3) if the forecasted peak Load plus reserves exceeds the ISO's forecast of available Generators for the day in question, then the ISO shall

commit additional Generators capable of starting prior to the day in question (*e.g.*, start-up period of two (2) days when looking at day three (3)) to assure system reliability; (4) in choosing among Generators with comparable start-up periods, the ISO shall schedule Generators to minimize Minimum Generation Bid and Start-Up Bid costs of meeting forecasted peak Load plus Ancillary Services consistent with the Reliability Rules; (5) in determining the appropriate reserve margin for days two (2) through seven (7), the ISO will supplement the normal reserve requirements to allow for forced outages of the short start-up period units (*e.g.*, gas turbines) assumed to be operating at maximum output in the unit commitment analysis for reliability.

Energy Bids are binding for day one (1) only for units in operation or with start-up periods less than one (1) day. Minimum Generation Bids for Generators with start-up periods greater than one (1) day will be binding only for units that are committed by the ISO and only for the first day in which those units could produce Energy given their start-up periods. For example, Minimum Generation Bids for a Generator with a start-up period of two (2) days would be binding only for day three (3) because, if that unit begins to start up at any time during day one (1), it would begin to produce Energy forty-eight (48) hours later on day three (3). Similarly, the Minimum Generation Bids for a Generator with a start-up period of three (3) days would be binding only for day four (4).

4.2.5 Post the Day-Ahead Schedule

By 11 a.m. on the day prior to the Dispatch Day, the ISO shall close the Day-Ahead scheduling process and post on the Bid/Post System the Day-Ahead schedule for each entity that submits a Bid or Bilateral Transaction schedule. All schedules shall be considered proprietary, with the posting only visible to the appropriate scheduling Customer and Transmission Owners subject to the applicable Code of Conduct (See Attachment F to the ISO OATT). The ISO will

post on the OASIS the statewide aggregate resources (Day-Ahead Energy schedules and total operating capability forecast), Day-Ahead scheduled Load, forecast Load for each Load Zone, and the Day-Ahead LBMP prices (including the Congestion Component and the Marginal Losses Component) for each Load Zone in each hour of the upcoming Dispatch Day. The ISO shall conduct the Day-Ahead Settlement based upon the Day-Ahead schedule determined in accordance with this section and Attachment B to this Services Tariff. The ISO will provide the Transmission Owner with the Load forecast (for seven (7) days) as well as the ISO security evaluation data to enable local area reliability to be assessed.

4.2.6 Day-Ahead LBMP Market Settlements

The ISO shall calculate the Day-Ahead LBMPs for each Load Zone and at each Generator bus and Demand Reduction Bus as described in Attachment B. Each Supplier that bids a Generator into the ISO Day-Ahead Market and is scheduled in the SCUC to sell or purchase Energy in the Day-Ahead Market will be settled at the product of: (a) the Day-Ahead hourly LBMP at the applicable Generator bus; and (b) the hourly Energy schedule. Each Supplier that bids an External Transaction into the Day-Ahead LBMP Market and is scheduled in the SCUC to sell Energy into the Day-Ahead LBMP Market will be settled at the product of (a) the Day-Ahead LBMP at the applicable Proxy Generator Bus and (b) the External Transaction schedule. For each Demand Reduction Provider that bids a Demand Reduction into the Day-Ahead Market and is scheduled in SCUC to provide Energy from the Demand Reduction, the LSE providing Energy service to the Demand Side Resource that accounts for the Demand Reduction shall be settled at the product of: (a) the Day-Ahead hourly LBMP at the applicable Demand Reduction Bus; and (b) the hourly demand reduction scheduled Day-Ahead (in MW). In addition, each Demand Reduction Provider that bids a Demand Reduction into the Day-Ahead

Market and is scheduled in the SCUC to provide Energy through Demand Reduction shall receive a Demand Reduction Incentive Payment from the ISO equal to the product of: (a) the Day-Ahead hourly LBMP at the Demand Reduction bus; and (b) the lesser of the verified actual hourly Demand Reduction or the scheduled hourly Demand Reduction (in MW). Each Customer that bids into the Day-Ahead Market, including each Customer that submits a Bid for a Virtual Transaction, and has a schedule accepted by the ISO to purchase Energy in the Day-Ahead Market will pay the product of: (a) the Day-Ahead hourly Zonal LBMP at each Point of Withdrawal; and (b) the scheduled Energy at each Point of Withdrawal. Each Supplier that bids an External Transaction into the Day-Ahead LBMP Market and is scheduled in the SCUC to buy Energy from the Day-Ahead LBMP Market will pay the product of (a) the Day-Ahead LBMP at the applicable Proxy Generator Bus and (b) the External Transaction schedule. Each Customer that submits a Virtual Transaction bid into the ISO Day-Ahead Market and has a schedule accepted by the ISO to sell Energy in a Load Zone in the Day-Ahead Market will receive a payment equal to the product of (a) the Day-Ahead hourly zonal LBMP for that Load Zone; and (b) the hourly scheduled Energy for the Customer in that Load Zone. Each Trading Hub Energy Owner who bids a Bilateral Transaction into the Day-Ahead Market with a Trading Hub as its POI and has its schedule accepted by the ISO will pay the product of: (a) the Day-Ahead hourly zonal LBMP for the Load Zone associated with that Trading Hub; and (b) the Bilateral Transaction scheduled MW. Each Trading Hub Energy Owner who bids a Bilateral Transaction into the Day-Ahead Market with a Trading Hub as its POW and has its schedule accepted by the ISO will be paid the product of: (a) the Day-Ahead hourly zonal LBMP for the Load Zone associated with that Trading Hub; and (b) the Bilateral Transaction scheduled MW.

The ISO shall publish the Day-Ahead Settlement Load Zone LBMPs for each hour in the Dispatch Day.

4.4 Real-Time Markets and Schedules

4.4.1 Real-Time Commitment (“RTC”)

4.4.1.1 Overview

RTC will make binding unit commitment and de-commitment decisions for the periods beginning fifteen minutes (in the case of Resources that can respond in ten minutes) and thirty minutes (in the case of Resources that can respond in thirty minutes) after the scheduled posting time of each RTC run, will provide advisory commitment information for the remainder of the two and a half hour optimization period, and will produce binding schedules for External Transactions to begin at the start of each quarter hour. RTC will treat Behind-the-Meter Net Generation Resources and Energy Storage Resources as already being committed and available to be scheduled. RTC will co-optimize to solve simultaneously for all Load, Operating Reserves and Regulation Service and to minimize the total as-bid production costs over its optimization timeframe. RTC will consider SCUC’s Resource commitment for the day, load forecasts that RTC itself will produce each quarter hour, binding transmission constraints, and all Real-Time Bids and Bid parameters submitted pursuant to Section 4.4.1.2 below.

4.4.1.2 Bids and Other Requests

After the Day-Ahead schedule is published and before the close of the Real-Time Scheduling Window for each hour, Customers may submit Real-Time Bids into the Real-Time Market for real-time evaluation by providing all information required to permit real-time evaluation pursuant to ISO Procedures. If the Supplier elects to participate in the Real-Time Market, and is within a defined electrical boundary, electrically interconnected with, and routinely serves a Host Load (which Host Load does not exclusively consist of Station Power) at a single PTID, it can only participate in the Real-Time Market as a Behind-the-Meter Net

Generation Resource. If a Behind-the-Meter Net Generation Resource submits Bids into the Real-Time Market for real-time evaluation, such Bids shall provide the forecasted Host Load for each hour for which Bids are submitted.

An Energy Storage Resource shall indicate in its Real-Time Bids whether its Energy Level will be ISO- or Self-Managed. An Energy Storage Resource that elects to Self-Manage its Energy Level shall be responsible for managing its Energy Level through its Bids. An Energy Storage Resource, including an Energy Storage Resource that received a Day-Ahead Schedule, may change its Energy Level Management election for each operating hour in the Real-Time Market day.

4.4.1.2.1 Real-Time Bids to Supply or Withdraw Energy and Supply Ancillary Services, other than External Transactions

Intermittent Power Resources that depend on wind or solar energy as their fuel submitting new or revised offers to supply Energy shall bid as ISO-Committed Flexible and shall submit a Minimum Generation Bid of zero MW and zero cost and a Start-Up Bid at zero cost.

Eligible Customers may submit new or revised Bids to supply or withdraw Energy, and to supply Operating Reserves and/or Regulation Service. Customers that submit such Bids may specify different Bid parameters in real-time than they did Day-Ahead.

Incremental Energy Bids, for portions of the Capacity of Resources that were scheduled in the Day-Ahead Market, and/or Start-Up Bids may be submitted by Suppliers bidding Resources using ISO-Committed Fixed, ISO-Committed Flexible, and Self-Committed Flexible bid modes that exceed the Incremental Energy Bids or Start-Up Bids submitted in the Day-Ahead Market or the mitigated Day-Ahead Incremental Energy Bids or Start-Up Bids where appropriate, if not otherwise prohibited pursuant to other provisions of the tariff.

The ISO will use a Fast-Start Resource's single point Start-Up Bid if one is submitted (or the mitigated Bid, where appropriate). If a Fast-Start Resource does not submit a single point Start-Up Bid in real-time, the ISO will use the point on the Fast-Start Resource's multi-point Start-Up Bid curve (or its mitigated multi-point Start-Up Bid curve, where appropriate) that corresponds to the shortest specified down time.

Minimum Generation Bids or Regulation Service Bids for any hour in which Resources received a Day-Ahead Energy schedule or a Regulation Service schedule, as appropriate, may not exceed the Minimum Generation Bids or Regulation Service Bids, as appropriate, submitted for those Resources in the Day-Ahead Market. Provided however, a Fast-Start Resource that receives a Day-Ahead schedule may submit Minimum Generation Bids using ISO-Committed Fixed, ISO-Committed Flexible, and Self-Committed Flexible bid modes that exceed the dollar component of the Bids submitted in the Day-Ahead Market, or the dollar component of the mitigated Day-Ahead Bids where appropriate, if not otherwise prohibited pursuant to other provisions of the tariff.

Additionally, Real-Time Minimum Run Qualified Gas Turbine Customers shall not increase their previously submitted Real-Time Incremental Energy Bids, Minimum Generation Bids, or Start-Up Bids within 135 minutes of the dispatch hour. Bids to supply Energy or Ancillary Services shall be subject to the rules set forth in Section 4.2.1 of this ISO Services Tariff. For Behind-the-Meter Net Generation Resources, the ISO will consider only those segments of the Resource's Incremental Energy Bids above the forecasted Host Load and subject to the Injection Limit.

Suppliers bidding on behalf of Generators that did not receive a Day-Ahead schedule for a given hour may offer their Generators, for those hours, using the ISO-Committed Flexible,

Self-Committed Flexible, Self-Committed Fixed bid mode or, with ISO approval, the ISO-Committed Fixed bid modes in real-time. For Behind-the-Meter Net Generation Resources, the ISO will consider only those segments of the Resource's Incremental Energy Bids above the forecasted Host Load and subject to the Injection Limit. Suppliers bidding on behalf of Demand Side Resources that did not receive a Day-Ahead schedule to provide Operating Reserves or Regulation Service for a given hour may offer to provide Operating Reserves or Regulation Service using the ISO-Committed Flexible bid mode for that hour in the Real-Time Market provided, however, that the Demand Side Resource shall have an Energy price Bid no lower than the Monthly Net Benefit Offer Floor. A Supplier bidding on behalf of a Generator that received a Day-Ahead schedule for a given hour may not change the bidding mode for that Generator for the Real-Time Market for that hour provided, however, that Generators that were scheduled Day-Ahead in Self-Committed Fixed mode may switch, with ISO approval, to ISO-Committed Fixed bidding mode in real-time. Generators that were scheduled Day-Ahead in ISO-Committed Fixed mode will be scheduled as Self-Committed Fixed in the Real-Time Market unless, with ISO approval, they change their bidding mode to ISO-Committed Fixed.

A Generator with a real time physical operating problem that makes it impossible for it to operate in the bidding mode in which it was scheduled Day-Ahead should notify the ISO. Additionally, if the Host Load of a Behind-the-Meter Net Generation Resource is greater in real-time than was forecasted Day-Ahead such that it cannot meet its Day-Ahead schedule, it must notify the ISO.

Generators and Demand Side Resources may not submit separate Operating Reserves Availability Bids in real-time and will instead automatically be assigned a real-time Operating

Reserves Availability Bid of zero for the amount of Operating Reserves they are capable of providing in light of their response rate (as determined under Rate Schedule 4).

4.4.1.2.2 Real-Time Bids Associated with Internal and External Bilateral Transactions

Customers may use Real-Time Bids to seek to modify Bilateral Transactions that were previously scheduled Day-Ahead or propose new Bilateral Transactions, including External Transactions, for economic evaluation by RTC, provided however, that Bilateral Transactions with Trading Hubs as their POWs that were previously scheduled Day-Ahead may not be modified. Bids associated with Internal Bilateral Transactions shall be subject to the rules set forth above in Section 4.2.1.7.

Except as provided in this section, External Transaction Bids may not vary over the course of an hour. Each such Bid must offer to import, export or wheel the same amount of Energy at the same price at each point in time within that hour. At Variably Scheduled Proxy Generator Buses the ISO shall permit the submission of Bids to import or export Energy that vary the amount of Energy, and vary the price, for each quarter hour evaluation period.

The ISO may vary External Transaction Schedules at Proxy Generator Buses that are authorized to schedule transactions on an intra-hour basis if the party submitting the Bid for such a Transaction elects to permit variable scheduling. The ISO may also vary External Transaction Schedules at CTS Enabled Proxy Generator Buses. External Transaction Bids submitted to import Energy from, or export Energy to Proxy Generator Buses that are authorized to schedule transactions on either an intra-hour or hourly basis shall indicate whether the ISO may vary schedules associated with those Bids within each hour. Transmission Customers scheduling External Bilateral Transactions shall also be subject to the provisions of Section 16, Attachment J of the ISO OATT.

4.4.1.2.3 Self-Commitment Requests

Self-Committed Flexible Resources must provide the ISO with schedules of their expected minimum operating points in quarter hour increments. Self-Committed Fixed Resources must provide their expected actual operating points in quarter hour increments or, with ISO approval, bid as an ISO-Committed Fixed Generator.

4.4.1.2.4 ISO-Committed Fixed

The ability to use the ISO-Committed Fixed bidding mode in the Real-Time Market shall be subject to ISO approval pursuant to procedures, which shall be published by the ISO. Generators that have exclusively used the Self-Committed Fixed or ISO-Committed Fixed bid modes in the Day-Ahead Market or that do not have the communications systems, operational control mechanisms or hardware to be able to respond to five-minute dispatch basepoints are eligible to bid using the ISO-Committed Fixed bid mode in the Real-Time Market. Real-Time Bids by Generators using the ISO-Committed Fixed bid mode in the Real-Time Market shall provide variable Energy price Bids, consisting of up to eleven monotonically increasing, constant cost incremental Energy steps, Minimum Generation Bids, hourly Start-Up Bids and other information pursuant to ISO Procedures.

RTC shall schedule ISO-Committed Fixed Generators.

4.4.1.3 External Transaction Scheduling

RTC15 will schedule External Transactions on an hourly basis as part of its development of a co-optimized least-bid cost Real-Time Commitment. For External Transactions that are scheduled on a 15 minute basis, the amount of Energy scheduled to be imported, exported or wheeled in association with that External Transaction may change on the quarter hour. All RTC runs will schedule intra-hour External Transactions on a 15 minute basis at Variably Scheduled

Proxy Generator Buses. RTC will alert the ISO when it appears that scheduled External Transactions need to be reduced for reliability reasons but will not automatically Curtail them. Curtailment decisions will be made by the ISO, guided by the information that RTC provides, pursuant to the rules established by Attachment B of this ISO Services Tariff and the ISO Procedures. External Bilateral Transaction schedules are also governed by the provisions of Section 16, Attachment J of the OATT.

4.4.1.4 Posting Commitment/De-Commitment and External Transaction Scheduling Decisions

Except as specifically noted in Section 4.4.2, 4.4.3 and 4.4.4 of this ISO Services Tariff, RTC will make all Resource commitment and de-commitment decisions. RTC will make all economic commitment/de-commitment decisions based upon available offers assuming Suppliers internal to the NYCA have a minimum run time of at least 15 minutes, but not longer than one hour; provided however, Real-Time Minimum Run Qualified Gas Turbines shall be assumed to have a two-hour minimum run time. For Behind-the-Meter Net Generation Resources, RTC will consider only those segments of the Resource's Incremental Energy Bids above the forecasted Host Load and subject to the Injection Limit.

RTC will produce advisory commitment information and advisory real-time prices. RTC will make decisions and post information in a series of fifteen-minute "runs" which are described below.

RTC₁₅ will begin at the start of the first hour of the RTC co-optimization period and will post its commitment, de-commitment, and External Transaction scheduling decisions no later than fifteen minutes after the start of that hour. During the RTC₁₅ run, RTC will:

- (i) Commit Resources with 10-minute start-up times that should be synchronized by the time that the results of the next RTC run are posted so that they will be synchronized and running at their scheduled dispatch levels by that time;
- (ii) Commit Resources with 30-minute start-up times that should be synchronized by the time that the results of the RTC run following the next RTC run are posted so that they will be synchronized and running at their scheduled dispatch levels by that time;
- (iii) De-commit Resources that should be disconnected from the network by the time that the results of the next RTC run are posted so that they will be disconnected by that time;
- (iv) Issue advisory commitment and de-commitment guidance for periods more than thirty minutes in the future and advisory dispatch information;
- (v) Schedule economic hourly External Transactions for the next hour;
- (vi) Schedule economic 15 minute External Transactions, for the quarter hour for which the results of the next RTC run are posted, at Variably Scheduled Proxy Generator Buses other than a CTS Enabled Proxy Generator Bus;
- (vii) Schedule economic 15 minute External Transactions, for the quarter hour for which the results of the next RTC run are posted, at a CTS Enabled Proxy Generator Bus; and
- (viii) Schedule ISO-Committed Fixed Resources.

All subsequent RTC runs in the hour, *i.e.*, RTC₃₀, RTC₄₅, and RTC₀₀ will begin executing at fifteen minutes before their designated posting times (for example, RTC₃₀ will begin in the fifteenth minute of the hour), and will take the following steps:

- (i) Commit Resources with 10-minute start-up times that should be synchronized by the time that the results of the next RTC run are posted so that they will be synchronized and running at that time;
- (ii) Commit Resources with 30-minute start-up times that should be synchronized by the time that the results of the RTC run following the next RTC run are posted so that they will be synchronized and running at that time;
- (iii) De-commit Resources that should be disconnected from the network by the time that the results of the next RTC run are posted so that they will be disconnected at that time;
- (iv) Issue advisory commitment, de-commitment, and dispatching guidance for the period from thirty minutes in the future until the end of the RTC co-optimization period;
- (v) Either reaffirm that the External Transactions scheduled by previous RTC runs should continue to flow in the next hour, or inform the ISO that External Transactions may need to be reduced;
- (vi) Schedule economic 15 minute External Transactions, for the quarter hour for which the results of the next RTC run are posted, at Variably Scheduled Proxy Generator Buses other than a CTS Enabled Proxy Generator Bus;
- (vii) Schedule economic 15 minute External Transactions, for the quarter hour for which the results of the next RTC run are posted, at a CTS Enabled Proxy Generator Bus; and
- (viii) Schedule ISO-Committed Fixed Resources.

4.4.1.5 External Transaction Settlements

Settlements for External Transactions in the LBMP Market are described in Sections 4.2.6 and 4.5 of this ISO Services Tariff. Settlements for External Bilateral Transactions are also described in Section 16, Attachment J and Rate Schedules 7 and 8 of the OATT.

The calculation of Real-Time LBMPs at Proxy Generator Buses and CTS Enabled Interfaces is described in Section 17, Attachment B to this ISO Services Tariff.

4.4.2 Real-Time Dispatch

4.4.2.1 Overview

The Real-Time Dispatch will make dispatching decisions, send Base Point Signals to Internal Generators and Demand Side Resources, produce schedules for intra-hour External Transactions at Dynamically Scheduled Proxy Generator Buses, calculate Real-Time Market clearing prices for Energy, Operating Reserves, and Real-Time Market Prices for Regulation Service, and establish real-time schedules for those products on a five-minute basis, starting at the beginning of each hour. The Real-Time Dispatch will not make commitment decisions and will not consider start-up costs in any of its dispatching or pricing decisions, except as specifically provided in Section 4.4.2.4 below. Real-Time Dispatch will review each Energy Storage Resource's Beginning Energy Level in each interval. Real-Time Dispatch will attempt to prevent dispatching a Self-Managed Energy Storage Resource in a manner that would be infeasible based on its Beginning Energy Level. Instead, Real-Time dispatch will consider an Energy Storage Resource's Beginning Energy Level in developing a schedule for the binding interval. An Energy Storage Resource's Beginning Energy Level will be used to ensure that Operating Reserves scheduled from the Resource can be sustained for one hour if the Operating Reserves are converted to Energy. Each Real-Time Dispatch run will co-optimize to solve

simultaneously for Load, Operating Reserves, and Regulation Service and to minimize the total cost of production over its bid optimization horizon (which may be fifty, fifty-five, or sixty minutes long depending on where the run falls in the hour.) In addition to producing a binding schedule for the next five minutes, each Real-Time Dispatch run will produce advisory schedules for the remaining four time steps of its bid-optimization horizon (which may be five, ten, or fifteen minutes long depending on where the run falls in the hour). An advisory schedule may become binding in the absence of a subsequent Real-Time Dispatch run. RTD will use the most recent system information and the same set of Bids and constraints that are considered by RTC.

4.4.2.2 External Transaction Scheduling

All RTD runs will schedule External Transactions on a 5 minute basis at Dynamically Scheduled Proxy Generator Buses. For External Transactions that are scheduled on a 5 minute basis, the amount of Energy scheduled to be imported, exported or wheeled in association with that External Transaction may change every 5 minutes. External Bilateral Transaction Schedules are also governed by the provisions of Attachment J of the OATT.

4.4.2.3 Calculating Real-Time Market LBMPs and Advisory Prices

RTD shall calculate *ex ante* Real-Time LBMPs at each Generator bus, and for each Load Zone in each RTD cycle, in accordance with the procedures set forth in Attachment B to this ISO Services Tariff. RTD will also calculate and post advisory Real-Time LBMPs for the next four quarter hours in accordance with the procedures set forth in Attachment B.

4.4.2.4 Real-Time Pricing Rules for Scheduling Ten Minute Resources

RTD may commit and dispatch, for pricing purposes, Resources capable of starting and meeting Minimum Generation Levels within ten minutes (“eligible Resources”) when necessary

to meet load. Eligible Resources committed and dispatched by RTD for pricing purposes may be physically started through normal ISO operating processes. In the RTD cycle in which RTD commits and dispatches an eligible Resource, RTD will consider the Resource's start-up and incremental energy costs and will assume the Resource has a zero downward response rate for purposes of calculating *ex ante* Real-Time LBMPs pursuant to Section 17, Attachment B to this ISO Services Tariff.

4.4.2.5 Converting to Demand Reduction, Special Case Resource Capacity scheduled as Operating Reserves, Regulation or Energy in the Real-Time Market

The ISO shall convert to Demand Reductions, in hours in which the ISO requests that Responsible Interface Parties notify their Special Case Resources to reduce their demand pursuant to ISO Procedures, any Operating Reserves, Regulation Service or Energy scheduled in the Day-Ahead Market from Demand Side Resources that are also providing Special Case Resource Capacity. The ISO shall settle the Demand Reduction provided by that portion of the Special Case Resource Capacity that was scheduled Day-Ahead as Operating Reserves, Regulation Service or Energy as being provided by a Supplier of Operating Reserves, Regulation Service or Energy as appropriate. The ISO shall settle any remaining Demand Reductions provided beyond Capacity that was scheduled Day-Ahead as Ancillary Services or Energy as being provided by a Special Case Resource, provided such Demand Reduction is otherwise payable as a reduction by a Special Case Resource.

Operating Reserves or Regulation Service scheduled Day-Ahead and converted to Energy in real time pursuant to this Section 4.4.2.4, will be eligible for a Day-Ahead Margin Assurance Payment, pursuant to Attachment J of this ISO Services Tariff.

Special Case Resource Capacity that has been scheduled in the Day-Ahead Market to provide Operating Reserves, Regulation Service or Energy and that has been instructed as a Special Case Resource to reduce demand shall be considered, for the purpose of determining a Scarcity Reserve Requirement pursuant to Rate Schedule 4 of this ISO Services Tariff, to be a Special Case Resource.

The ISO shall not accept offers of Operating Reserves or Regulation Service in the Real-Time Market from Demand Side Resources that are also providing Special Case Resource Capacity for any hour in which the ISO has requested Special Case Resources to reduce demand.

4.4.2.6 Converting to Demand Reduction Curtailment Services Provider Capacity scheduled as Operating Reserves, Regulation or Energy in the Real-Time Market

The ISO shall convert to Demand Reductions, in hours in which the ISO requests Demand Reductions from the Emergency Demand Response Program pursuant to ISO Procedures, any Operating Reserves, Regulation Service or Energy scheduled in the Day-Ahead Market by Demand Side Resources that are also providing Curtailment Services Provider Capacity. The ISO shall settle the Demand Reduction provided by that portion of the Curtailment Services Provider Capacity that was scheduled Day-Ahead as Operating Reserves, Regulation Service or Energy as being provided by a Supplier of Operating Reserves, Regulation Service or Energy as appropriate. The ISO shall settle Demand Reductions provided beyond Capacity that was scheduled Day-Ahead as ancillary services or Energy as being provided by a Curtailment Services Provider.

Operating Reserves or Regulation Service scheduled Day-Ahead and converted to Energy in real time pursuant to this Section 4.4.2.5, will be eligible for a Day-Ahead Margin Assurance Payment, pursuant to Attachment J of this ISO Services Tariff.

Curtailed Services Provider Capacity that has been scheduled in the Day-Ahead Market as Operating Reserves, Regulation Service or Energy and that has been instructed to reduce demand shall be considered, for the purpose of determining a Scarcity Reserve Requirement pursuant to Rate Schedule 4 of this ISO Services Tariff, to be a Emergency Demand Response Program Resource.

The ISO shall not accept offers of Operating Reserves and Regulation Service in the Real-Time Market from Demand Side Resources that are also providing Curtailed Services Provider Capacity for any hour in which the ISO has requested participants in the Emergency Demand Response Program pursuant to ISO Procedures to reduce demand.

4.4.2.7 Post the Real-Time Schedule

Subsequent to the close of the Real-Time Scheduling Window, the ISO shall post the real-time schedule for each entity that submits a Bid or Bilateral Transaction schedule. All schedules shall be considered proprietary, with the posting only visible to the appropriate scheduling Customer, Transmission Customer and Transmission Owners subject to the applicable Code of Conduct (See Attachment F to the ISO OATT). The ISO will post on the OASIS the real-time Load for each Load Zone, and the Real-Time LBMP prices (including the Congestion Component and the Marginal Losses Component) for each Load Zone for each hour of the Dispatch Day. The ISO shall conduct the real-time settlement based upon the real-time schedule determined in accordance with this Section.

4.4.3 Real-Time Dispatch - Corrective Action Mode

When the ISO needs to respond to system conditions that were not anticipated by RTC or the regular Real-Time Dispatch, *e.g.*, the unexpected loss of a major Generator or Transmission line, it will activate the specialized RTD-CAM program. RTD-CAM runs will be nominally

either five or ten minutes long, as is described below. Unlike the Real-Time Dispatch, RTD-CAM will have the ability to commit certain Resources, and schedule intra-hour External Transactions at Dynamically Scheduled Proxy Generator Buses. When RTD-CAM is activated, the ISO will have discretion to implement various measures to restore normal operating conditions. These RTD-CAM measures are described below.

The ISO shall have discretion to determine which specific RTD-CAM mode should be activated in particular situations. In addition, RTD-CAM may require Resources to run above their UOL_{NS} , up to the level of their UOL_{ES} as is described in the ISO Procedures. Self-Committed Fixed Resources will not be expected to move in response to RTD-CAM Base Point Signals except when a maximum generation pickup is activated.

Except as expressly noted in this section, RTD-CAM will dispatch the system in the same manner as the normal Real-Time Dispatch.

4.4.3.1 RTD-CAM Modes

4.4.3.1.1 Reserve Pickup

The ISO will enter this RTD-CAM mode when necessary to re-establish schedules when large area control errors occur. When in this mode, RTD-CAM will send 10-minute Base Point Signals and produce schedules for the next ten minutes. RTD-CAM may also commit, or if necessary de-commit, Resources capable of starting or stopping within 10-minutes. The ISO will continue to optimize for Energy and Operating Reserves, will recognize locational Operating Reserve requirements and Scarcity Reserve Requirements, but will set all Regulation Service schedules to zero. If Resources are committed or de-committed in this RTD-CAM mode the schedules for them will be passed to RTC and the Real-Time Dispatch for their next execution.

Resources that are eligible to provide Operating Reserves and that are available to the ISO for dispatch in real-time are required to be able to meet the energy sustainability requirements set forth in applicable NERC, NPCC and/or NYSRC reliability requirements. When the ISO enters a reserve pickup RTD-CAM mode it will determine sustainable Energy schedules for Energy Storage Resources that are eligible to provide Operating Reserves and that are available to the ISO for dispatch based on their telemetered state of charge.

The ISO will have discretion to classify a reserve pickup as a “large event” or a “small event.” In a small event the ISO will have discretion to reduce Base Point Signals in order to reduce transmission line loadings. The ISO will not ordinarily have this discretion in large events, except that it may determine Energy schedules that satisfy Operating Reserve energy sustainability requirements for Energy Storage Resources. The distinction also has significance with respect to a Supplier’s eligibility to receive Bid Production Cost guarantee payment in accordance with Section 4.6.6 and Attachment C of this ISO Services Tariff.

4.4.3.1.2 Maximum Generation Pickup

The ISO will enter this RTD-CAM mode when an Emergency makes it necessary to maximize Energy production in one or more location(s), i.e., Long Island, New York City, Southeastern New York, East of Central East and/or NYCA-wide. RTD-CAM will produce schedules directing all Generators located in a targeted location to increase production at their emergency response rate up to their UOL_E level and to stay at that level until instructed otherwise. Security constraints will be obeyed to the extent possible. The ISO will continue to optimize for Energy and Operating Reserves, will recognize locational Operating Reserve requirements and Scarcity Reserve Requirements, but will set all Regulation Service schedules to zero.

4.4.3.1.3 Base Points ASAP -- No Commitments

The ISO will enter this RTD-CAM mode when changed circumstances make it necessary to issue an updated set of Base Point Signals. Examples of changed circumstances that could necessitate taking this step include correcting line, contingency, or transfer overloads and/or voltage problems caused by unexpected system events. When operating in this mode, RTD-CAM will produce schedules and Base Point Signals for the next five minutes but will only redispatch Generators that are capable of responding within five minutes. RTD-CAM will not commit or de-commit Resources in this mode.

4.4.3.1.4 Base Points ASAP -- Commit As Needed

This operating mode is identical to Base Points ASAP – No Commitments, except that it also allows the ISO to commit Generators that are capable of starting within 10 minutes when doing so is necessary to respond to changed system conditions.

4.4.3.1.5 Re-Sequencing Mode

When the ISO is ready to de-activate RTD-CAM, it will often need to transition back to normal Real-Time Dispatch operation. In this mode, RTD-CAM will calculate normal five-minute Base Point Signals and establish five minute schedules. Unlike the normal RTD-Dispatch, however, RTD-CAM will only look ahead 10-minutes. RTD-CAM re-sequencing will terminate as soon as the normal Real-Time Dispatch software is reactivated and is ready to produce Base Point signals for its entire optimization period.

4.4.3.2 Calculating Real-Time LBMPs

When RTD-CAM is activated, RTD shall calculate *ex ante* Real-Time LBMPs at each Generator bus, and for each Load Zone in accordance with the procedures set forth in Section 17, Attachment B of this ISO Services Tariff.

4.4.4 Identifying the Pricing and Scheduling Rules That Apply to External Transactions

LBMPs will be determined and External Transactions will be scheduled at external Proxy Generator Buses consistent with the table below.

Proxy Generator Bus	PTID	Scheduled Line	Designated Scheduled Line	Non-Competitive	CTS Enabled Proxy Generator Bus		Scheduling Frequencies		
					Requires CTS Bids	Permits CTS Bids	Hourly Scheduled	Variably Scheduled	Dynamically Scheduled (Not Presently Available)
Hydro Quebec									
HQ_GEN_IMPORT	323601			✓			✓	✓	
HQ_LOAD_EXPORT	355639			✓			✓	✓	
HQ_GEN_CEDARS_PROXY	323590	Dennison Scheduled Line		✓			✓		
HQ_LOAD_CEDARS_PROXY	355586	Dennison Scheduled Line		✓			✓		
HQ_GEN_WHEEL	23651			✓			✓		
HQ_LOAD_WHEEL	55856			✓			✓		
PJM									
PJM_GEN_KEYSTONE	24065					✓	✓* (See Notes)	✓	
PJM_LOAD_KEYSTONE	55857					✓	✓* (See Notes)	✓	
PJM_GEN_NEPTUNE_PROXY	323594	Neptune Scheduled Line	✓			✓	✓* (See Notes)	✓	
PJM_LOAD_NEPTUNE_PROXY	355615	Neptune Scheduled Line	✓			✓	✓* (See Notes)	✓	
PJM_GEN_VFT_PROXY	323633	Linden VFT Scheduled Line	✓			✓	✓* (See Notes)	✓	
PJM_LOAD_VFT_PROXY	355723	Linden VFT Scheduled Line	✓			✓	✓* (See Notes)	✓	
PJM_HTP_GEN	323702	HTP Scheduled Line	✓			✓	✓* (See Notes)	✓	

Proxy Generator Bus	PTID	Scheduled Line	Designated Scheduled Line	Non-Competitive	CTS Enabled Proxy Generator Bus		Scheduling Frequencies		
					Requires CTS Bids	Permits CTS Bids	Hourly Scheduled	Variably Scheduled	Dynamically Scheduled (Not Presently Available)
HUDSONTP_345KV_HTP_LOAD	355839	HTP Scheduled Line	✓			✓	✓*	✓	
ISO New England									
N.E._GEN_SANDY_POND	24062				✓		✓**	✓	
NE_LOAD_SANDY_PD	55858				✓		✓**	✓	
NPX_GEN_CSC	323557	Cross Sound Scheduled Line	✓				✓		
NPX_LOAD_CSC	355535	Cross Sound Scheduled Line	✓				✓		
NPX_GEN_1385_PROXY	323591	Northport Norwalk Scheduled Line					✓		
NPX_LOAD_1385_PROXY	355589	Northport Norwalk Scheduled Line					✓		
Ontario									
OH_GEN_PROXY	24063						✓		
OH_LOAD_PROXY	55859						✓		

Notes:

* At specifically identified Proxy Generator Buses (“* See Notes”), only Wheels Through (the NYCA) are scheduled on an hourly basis.

** At specifically identified Proxy Generator Buses (“** See Notes”), only wheels through the NYCA or a neighboring Control Area are scheduled on an hourly basis.

Pricing rules for Proxy Generator Buses are set forth in Section 17 of the Services Tariff.

The ISO may offer a more frequent scheduling option at a Proxy Generator Bus identified on the table. The ISO shall inform its Market Participants of the availability of such an option by providing notice at least two weeks in advance of the implementation of any such change. At the same time, the ISO shall update the above table to reflect the change in scheduling options by submitting a compliance filing in FERC Docket No. ER11-2547. Unless FERC acts on the ISO's compliance filing, the ISO shall effectuate the change in scheduling capability on the date it proposed in its compliance filing. The addition of new Proxy Generator Buses to the table, or changing the pricing rules that apply at a Proxy Generator Bus, may not be accomplished by submitting a compliance filing in Docket No. ER11-2547. The ISO may revert to establishing hourly Import and Export schedules using all available External Transaction Bids at a Proxy Generator Bus that is identified as a Dynamically or Variably Scheduled Proxy Generator Bus when the ISO or a neighboring Balancing Authority is not able to implement schedules as expected, or when necessary to ensure or preserve system reliability. When it reverts to hourly Import and Export schedules at a Dynamically or Variably Scheduled Proxy Generator Bus, the ISO shall apply the pricing rules for a corresponding Proxy Generator Bus that is not Dynamically Scheduled or Variably Scheduled. The ISO may cease evaluating CTS Interface Bids at CTS Enabled Proxy Generator Buses when the ISO or a neighboring Balancing Authority is not able to implement schedules as expected, or when necessary to ensure or preserve system reliability.

15.3A Rate Schedule “3-A” -Charges Applicable to Suppliers That Are Not Providing Regulation Service

15.3A.1 Persistent Undergeneration Charges

A Supplier, other than a Supplier exempted in Section 15.3A.2 of this Rate Schedule, that is not providing Regulation Service, and persistently operates at a level below its Energy schedule shall pay a persistent undergeneration charge to the ISO, unless its operation is within a tolerance described below, provided, however, no persistent undergeneration charges shall apply to a Fixed Block Unit that has reached a percentage of its Normal Upper Operating Limit, which percentage shall be set pursuant to ISO Procedures and shall be initially set at seventy percent (70%). Persistent undergeneration charges per interval shall be calculated as follows:

$$\text{Persistent undergeneration charge} = \text{Energy Difference} \times \text{Max} (\text{MPRC}_{\text{DAM}}, \text{MPRC}_{\text{RT}}) \times \text{Length of Interval in seconds}/3600 \text{ seconds}$$

Where:

Energy Difference in (MW) is determined by subtracting the actual Energy provided by the Supplier from its RTD Base Point Signal for the dispatch interval. The Energy Difference shall be set at zero for any Energy Difference that is otherwise negative or that falls within a tolerance, set pursuant to ISO Procedures, and which shall contain a steady-state and a dynamic component. The steady-state component shall initially be 3% of the Supplier’s Normal Upper Operating Limit or Emergency Upper Operating Limit, as applicable, and the dynamic component shall be a time constant that shall initially be set at fifteen minutes;

MPRC_{DAM} is the Regulation Capacity Market Price in the Day-Ahead Market; and

MPRC_{RT} is the Regulation Capacity Market Price in the Real-Time Market.

15.3A.1.1 Overgeneration Charges

An Intermittent Power Resource that depends on wind or solar energy as its fuel, for which the ISO has imposed a Wind and Solar Output Limit that operates at a level above its schedule shall pay an overgeneration charge to the ISO, unless its operation is within a tolerance described below.

Overgeneration charges per interval shall be calculated as follows:

$$\text{Overgeneration charge} = \text{Energy Difference} \times \text{Max} (\text{MPRC}_{\text{DAM}}, \text{MPRC}_{\text{RT}}) \times \text{Length of Interval} \\ \text{in seconds}/3600 \text{ seconds}$$

Where:

Energy Difference in (MW) is determined by subtracting the RTD Base Point Signal for the dispatch interval from the actual Energy provided by the Intermittent Power Resource for the same interval. The Energy Difference shall be set at zero for any Energy Difference that is otherwise negative or that falls within a tolerance, set pursuant to ISO Procedures, which shall initially be set at 3% of the Supplier's Normal Upper Operating Limit or Emergency Upper Operating Limit, as applicable;

MPRC_{DAM} is the Regulation Capacity Market Price in the Day-Ahead Market; and

MPRC_{RT} is the Regulation Capacity Market Price in the Real-Time Market

15.3A.1.2 Persistent Over-Withdrawal Charges

An Energy Storage Resource that is withdrawing Energy, not providing Regulation Services, and persistently withdraws at a level exceeding its withdrawal schedule shall pay a persistent over-withdrawal charge to the ISO, unless its operation is within the applicable tolerance described below. Persistent over-withdrawal charges per interval shall be calculated as follows:

$$\text{Persistent Over-Withdrawal Charge} = \text{Energy Difference} \times \text{Max} (\text{MPRC}_{\text{DAM}}, \text{MPRC}_{\text{RT}}) \times \\ \text{Length of Interval in seconds}/3600 \text{ seconds}$$

Where:

Energy Difference in (MW) is determined by subtracting the Resource's actual energy operating level from its RTD Base Point Signal. The Energy Difference shall be set at zero for any Energy Difference that is otherwise negative or that falls within a tolerance, set pursuant to ISO Procedures, and which shall contain a steady-state and a dynamic component. The steady-state component shall initially be an absolute value of 3% of the Resource's Maximum Withdrawal Limit, as applicable, and the dynamic component shall be a time constant that shall initially be set at fifteen minutes;

MPRC_{DAM} is the Regulation Capacity Market Price in the Day-Ahead Market; and

MPRC_{RT} is the Regulation Capacity Market Price in the Real-Time Market.

15.3A.2 Exemptions

The following types of Generator shall not be subject to persistent undergeneration charges:

15.3A.2.1 Generators, except for the Generator of a Behind-the-Meter Net

Generation Resource, providing Energy under contracts (including PURPA contracts), executed and effective on or before November 18, 1999, in which the power purchaser does not control the operation of the supply source but would be responsible for payment of the persistent undergeneration or performance charge;

15.3A.2.2 Existing topping turbine Generators and extraction turbine Generators

producing electric Energy resulting from the supply of steam to the district steam system in operation on or before November 18, 1999 and/or Generators utilized in

replacing or repowering existing steam supplies from such units (in accordance with good engineering and economic design) that cannot follow schedules, up to a maximum total of 533 MW of such units;

- 15.3A.2.3 Limited Control Run of River Hydro Resources;
- 15.3A.2.4 Intermittent Power Resources that depend on landfill gas as their fuel;
- 15.3A.2.5 Intermittent Power Resources that depend on wind or solar energy as their fuel;
- 15.3A.2.6 Capacity Limited Resources and Energy Limited Resources to the extent that their real-time Energy injections are equal to or greater than their bid-in upper operating limits but are less than their Real-Time Scheduled Energy Injections;
- 15.3A.2.7 Generators operating in their Start-Up Period or their Shutdown Period and, for Generators comprised of a group of generating units at a single location, which grouped generating units are separately committed and dispatched by the ISO, and for which Energy injections are measured at a single location, each of the grouped generating units when one of the grouped generating units is operating in its Start-Up or Shutdown Period; and
- 15.3A.2.8 Generators operating during a Testing Period.
- 15.3A.2.9 Withdrawing Energy Storage Resources are instead subject to persistent over-withdrawal charges.

For Generators and Resources described in Sections 15.3A.2.1, 15.3A.2.2, 15.3A.2.3, and 15.3A.2.4 above, this exemption shall not apply in an hour if the Generator or Resource has bid in that hour as ISO-Committed Flexible or Self-Committed Flexible.

17.1 LBMP Calculation

The Locational Based Marginal Prices (“LBMPs” or “prices”) for Suppliers and Loads in the Real-Time Market will be based on the system marginal costs produced by the Real-Time Dispatch (“RTD”) program and during intervals when certain conditions exist at Proxy Generator Buses, the Real-Time Commitment (“RTC”) program. LBMPs for Suppliers and Loads in the Day-Ahead Market will be based on the system marginal costs produced by the Security Constrained Unit Commitment (“SCUC”). LBMPs calculated by SCUC and RTD will incorporate the incremental dispatch costs of Dispatchable Resources that would be scheduled to meet an increment of Load. For pricing purposes, the incremental dispatch costs of Fast-Start Resources that Bid ISO-Committed Flexible shall be adjusted to include start-up costs and minimum generation costs based on the Start-Up Bids and Minimum Generation Bids or mitigated Start-Up Bids and Minimum Generation Bids of each such Resource, as described in Section 17.1.1.2 below.

To the extent that tradeoffs exist between scheduling providers to produce Energy or reduce demand, and scheduling them to provide Regulation Service or Operating Reserves, LBMPs shall reflect the effect of meeting an increment of Load, given those tradeoffs, at each location on the Bid Production Cost associated with those services. As such, those LBMPs may incorporate: (i) Bids for Regulation Service or Operating Reserves; or (ii) shortage costs associated with the inability to meet a Regulation Service or Operating Reserves requirement under the Regulation Service Demand Curve set forth in Rate Schedule 3 of this ISO Services Tariff and Operating Reserve Demand Curves and Scarcity Reserve Demand Curve set forth in Rate Schedule 4 of this ISO Services Tariff. For the purposes of calculating LBMPs under this

Services Tariff Section 17, Energy withdrawals by Withdrawal-Eligible Generators are treated as negative generation, and can set price.

Additionally, for the purpose of calculating Real-Time LBMPs when RTD is committing and dispatching Resources meeting Minimum Generation Levels and capable of starting in ten minutes pursuant to Section 4.4.2.4 of this ISO Services Tariff, RTD shall include in the incremental dispatch cost of each such Resource a start-up cost based on the Start-Up Bid of each such Resource and shall assume for each such Resource a zero downward response rate.

17.1.1 LBMP Bus Calculation Method

System marginal costs will be utilized in an *ex ante* computation to produce Day-Ahead and Real-Time LBMP bus prices using the following equations.

The LBMP at bus i can be written as:

$$\gamma_i = \lambda^R + \gamma_i^L + \gamma_i^C$$

Where:

γ_i	=	LBMP at bus i in \$/MWh
λ^R	=	the system marginal price at the Reference Bus
γ_i^L	=	Marginal Losses Component of the LBMP at bus i which is the marginal cost of losses at bus i relative to the Reference Bus
γ_i^C	=	Congestion Component of the LBMP at bus i which is the marginal cost of Congestion at bus i relative to the Reference Bus

The Marginal Losses Component of the LBMP at any bus i is calculated using the equation:

$$\gamma_i^L = (DF_i - 1)\lambda^R$$

Where:

DF_i = delivery factor for bus i to the system Reference Bus and:

$$DF_i = \left(1 - \frac{\partial L}{\partial P_i}\right)$$

Where:

- L = NYCA losses; and
 P_i = injection at bus i

The Congestion Component of the LBMP at bus i is calculated using the equation:

$$\gamma_i^c = - \left(\sum_{k \in K}^n GF_{ik} \mu_k \right)$$

Where:

- K = the set of Constraints;
 GF_{ik} = Shift Factor for bus i on Constraint k in the pre- or post-Contingency case which limits flows across that Constraint (the Shift Factor measures the incremental change in flow on Constraint k , expressed in per unit, for an increment of injection at bus i and a corresponding withdrawal at the Reference Bus); and
 μ_k = the Shadow Price of Constraint k expressed in \$/MWh, provided however, this Shadow Price shall not exceed the Transmission Shortage Cost.

Substituting the equations for γ_i^L and γ_i^c into the first equation yields:

$$\gamma_i = \lambda^R + (DF_i - 1)\lambda^R - \sum_{k \in K} GF_{ik} \mu_k$$

LBMPs will be calculated for the Day-Ahead and the Real-Time Markets. In the Day-Ahead Market, the three components of the LBMP at each location will be calculated from the SCUC results and posted for each of the twenty four (24) hours of the next day. The Real-Time LBMPs will be calculated and posted for each execution of RTD.

17.1.1.1 Determining Shift Factors and Incremental System Losses

For the purposes of pricing and scheduling, Shift Factors, GF_{ik} , and loss delivery factors, DF_i , will reflect expected power flows, including expected unscheduled power flows. When determining prices and schedules, SCUC, RTC and RTD shall include both the expected power flows resulting from NYISO interchange schedules (*see* Section 17.1.1.1.2), and expected unscheduled power flows (*see* Section 17.1.1.1.1). All NYCA Resource, NYCA Load and Proxy Generator Bus Shift Factors and loss delivery factors will incorporate internal and coordinated external transmission facility outages, power flows due to schedules, and expected unscheduled power flows.

17.1.1.1.1 Determining Expected Unscheduled Power Flows

In the Day-Ahead Market, expected unscheduled power flows will ordinarily be determined based on historical, rolling 30-day on-peak and off-peak averages. To ensure expected unscheduled power flows accurately reflect anticipated conditions, the frequency and/or period used to determine the historical average may be modified by the NYISO to address market rule, system topology, operational, or other changes that would be expected to significantly impact unscheduled power flows. The NYISO will publicly post the Day-Ahead on-peak and off-peak unscheduled power flows on its web site.

In the Real-Time Market, expected unscheduled power flows will ordinarily be determined based on current power flows, modified to reflect expected changes over the real-time scheduling horizon.

17.1.1.1.2 Determining Expected Power Flows Resulting from NYISO Interchange Schedules

In the Day-Ahead Market, for purposes of scheduling and pricing, SCUC will establish expected power flows for the ABC interface, JK interface and Branchburg-Ramapo interconnection based on the following:

- a. Consolidated Edison Company of New York's Day-Ahead Market hourly election under OATT Attachment CC, Schedule C;
- b. The percentage of PJM-NYISO scheduled interchange that is expected to flow over the Branchburg-Ramapo interconnection. The expected flow may also be adjusted by a MW offset to reflect expected operational conditions;
- c. The percentage of PJM-NYISO scheduled interchange (if any) that is expected to flow over the ABC interface; and
- d. The percentage of PJM-NYISO scheduled interchange (if any) that is expected to flow over the JK interface.

The terms "ABC interface" and "JK interface" have the meaning ascribed to them in Schedule C to Attachment CC to the OATT.

The NYISO shall post the percentage values it is currently using to establish Day-Ahead and real-time expected Branchburg-Ramapo interconnection, ABC interface and JK interface flows for purposes of scheduling and pricing on its web site. If the NYISO determines it is necessary to change the posted Branchburg-Ramapo, ABC or JK percentage values, it will provide notice to its Market Participants as far in advance of the change as is practicable under the circumstances.

In the Day-Ahead Market, scheduled interchange that is not expected to flow over the ABC interface, JK interface or Branchburg-Ramapo interconnection (or on Scheduled Lines)

will be expected to flow over the NYISO's other interconnections. Expected flows over the NYISO's other interconnections will be determined consistent with the expected impacts of scheduled interchange and consistent with shift factors and delivery factors calculated in accordance with Section 17.1.1.1, above.

For pricing purposes, flows in the Real-Time Market will be established for the ABC interface, JK interface, and Branchburg-Ramapo interconnection based on the current flow, modified to reflect the expected incremental impacts of changes to interchange schedules over the forward scheduling horizon in a manner that is consistent with the method used to establish Day-Ahead power flows over these facilities. Expected flows over the NYISO's other interconnections will be determined based on the current flow, modified to reflect the expected incremental impacts of changes to interchange schedules over the forward scheduling horizon, and shall be consistent with shift factors and delivery factors calculated in accordance with Section 17.1.1.1, above.

17.1.1.1.3 Scheduled Lines and Chateaugay Interconnection with Hydro Quebec

For purposes of scheduling and pricing, the NYISO expects that power flows will ordinarily match the interchange schedule at Scheduled Lines, and at the NYCA's Chateaugay interconnection with Hydro Quebec, in both the Day-Ahead and Real-Time Markets.

17.1.1.2 Incremental Dispatch Costs for Pricing Fast-Start Resources

For the purpose of calculating LBMPs for the Day-Ahead and Real-Time Markets, the incremental dispatch costs of Fast-Start Resources that Bid ISO-Committed Flexible shall be adjusted to include start-up costs and minimum generation costs based on the Start-Up Bids and Minimum Generation Bids or mitigated Start-Up Bids and Minimum Generation Bids of each such Resource ("Adjusted Dispatch Costs"). For start-up costs, the ISO will use a Fast-Start

Resource's single point Start-Up Bid if one is submitted (or the mitigated Bid, where appropriate). If a Fast-Start Resource does not submit a single point Start-Up Bid in the Real-Time Market, the ISO will use the point on the Fast-Start Resource's multi-point Start-Up Bid curve (or its mitigated multi-point Start-Up Bid curve, where appropriate) that corresponds to the shortest specified down time.

The ISO will use the following procedure to determine a Fast-Start Resource's Adjusted Dispatch Costs for each pricing interval in the Day-Ahead and Real-Time Markets. The ISO will determine the "cost-minimizing output level" that minimizes the average as-Bid operating cost ("minimum average cost") for that Fast-Start Resource in each hour of the Day-Ahead Market and in each RTD interval of the Real-Time Market. The average as-Bid operating cost for a Fast-Start Resource at a given operating level shall include the Fast-Start Resource's minimum generation costs and incremental energy costs to provide Energy at that operating level, based on the Resource's Bids, or mitigated Bids as appropriate. The average as-Bid operating cost may also include some or all of the Fast-Start Resource's start-up costs based on the Resource's Bids, or mitigated Bids as appropriate, in a given hour, to be determined as follows: (1) for the Day-Ahead Market, a Fast-Start Resource's average as-Bid operating cost to operate in a given hour will include start-up costs for the hour the Resource is scheduled to start; or (2) for the Real-Time Market, a Fast-Start Resource's average as-Bid operating cost to operate in a given RTD interval will include the start-up costs for approximately the first fifteen minutes, among consecutive operating intervals, after the Resource is scheduled to start, *i.e.*, for each RTD interval that starts within the first fifteen minutes after the Resource is scheduled to start, the average as-Bid operating cost to operate in that interval will include start-up costs.

For all output levels less than or equal to the cost-minimizing output level, the ISO will set the Adjusted Dispatch Cost equal to the minimum average cost. For all output levels greater than the cost-minimizing output level, the ISO will set the Adjusted Dispatch Cost equal to the price on the Resource's Bid curve. The ISO will calculate Adjusted Dispatch Costs for each output level between the Fast-Start Resource's minimum operating level and its UOL_N or UOL_E (whichever is applicable).

For the purpose of calculating LBMPs for the Day-Ahead and Real-Time Markets, all Fast-Start Resources that Bid ISO-Committed Flexible are treated as flexible and able to be dispatched anywhere between zero (0) MW and their UOL_N or UOL_E (whichever is applicable).

Additional rules for Fixed Block Units are set forth below in Section 17.1.2.1.2.

17.1.2 Real-Time LBMP Calculation Procedures

For each RTD interval, the ISO shall use the procedures described below in Sections 17.1.2.1-17.1.2.1.4 to calculate Real-Time LBMPs at each Load Zone and Generator bus. The LBMP bus and zonal calculation procedures are described in Sections 17.1.1 and 17.1.5 of this Attachment B, respectively. Procedures governing the calculation of LBMPs at Proxy Generator Buses are set forth below in Section 17.1.6 of this Attachment B.

17.1.2.1 General Procedures

17.1.2.1.1 Overview

The ISO shall calculate Real-Time Market LBMPs using the three passes of each RTD run, except as noted below in Section 17.1.2.1.3. A new RTD run will initialize every five minutes and each run will produce prices and schedules for five points in time (the optimization period). Only the prices and schedules determined for the first time point of the optimization

period will be binding. Prices and schedules for the other four time points of the optimization period are advisory.

Each RTD run shall, depending on when it occurs during the hour, have a bid optimization horizon of fifty, fifty-five, or sixty minutes beyond the first, or binding, point in time that it addresses. The posting time and the first time point in each RTD run, which establishes binding prices and schedules, will be five minutes apart. The remaining points in time in each optimization period can be either five, ten, or fifteen minutes apart depending on when the run begins within the hour. The points in time in each RTD optimization period are arranged so that they parallel as closely as possible RTC's fifteen minute evaluations.

For example, the RTD run that posts its results at the beginning of an hour ("RTD₀") will initialize at the fifty-fifth minute of the previous hour and produce schedules and prices over a fifty-five minute optimization period. RTD₀ will produce binding prices and schedules for the RTD interval beginning when it posts its results (i.e., at the beginning of the hour) and ending at the first time point in its optimization period (i.e., five minutes after the hour). It will produce advisory prices and schedules for its second time point, which is ten minutes after the first time point in its optimization period, and advisory prices and schedules for its third, fourth and fifth time points, each of which would be fifteen minutes apart. The RTD run that posts its results at five minutes after the beginning of the hour ("RTD₅") will initialize at the beginning of the hour and produce prices over a fifty minute optimization period. RTD₅ will produce binding prices and schedules for the RTD interval beginning when it posts its results (i.e., at five minutes after the hour) and ending at the first time point in its optimization period (i.e., ten minutes after the hour.) It will produce advisory prices and schedules for its second time point (which is five minutes after the first time point), and advisory prices and schedules for its third, fourth and fifth

time points, each of which would be fifteen minutes apart. The RTD run that posts its results at ten minutes after the beginning of the hour (“RTD₁₀”) will initialize at five minutes after the beginning of the hour and produce prices over a sixty minute optimization period. RTD₁₀ will produce binding prices and schedules for the interval beginning when it posts its results (i.e., at ten minutes after the hour) and ending at the first time point in its optimization period (i.e., fifteen minutes after the hour.) It will produce advisory prices and schedules for its second, third, fourth and fifth time points, each of which would be fifteen minutes after the preceding time point.

17.1.2.1.2 Description of the Real-Time Dispatch Process

17.1.2.1.2.1 The First Pass

The first RTD pass consists of a least bid cost, multi-period co-optimized dispatch for Energy, Regulation Service and Operating Reserves that treats all Fixed Block Units that are committed by RTC, or are otherwise instructed to be online or remain online by the ISO as if they were blocked on at their UOL_N or UOL_E, whichever is applicable. Fixed Block Units meeting Minimum Generation Levels and capable of being started in ten minutes that have not been committed by RTC are treated as flexible (i.e. able to be dispatched anywhere between zero (0) MW and their UOL_N or UOL_E, whichever is applicable). The first pass establishes “physical base points” (i.e., real-time Energy schedules) and real-time schedules for Regulation Service and Operating Reserves for the first time point of the optimization period. Physical base points and schedules established for the first time point shall be binding and shall remain in effect until the results of the next run are posted. Physical base points and schedules established for all subsequent time points shall be advisory. The first pass also produces information that is used to calculate the RTD Base Point Signals that the ISO sends to Suppliers.

When establishing physical base points, the ISO shall assume that each Generator will move toward the physical base point established during the first pass of the prior RTD run at its specified response rate.

17.1.2.1.2.1.1 Upper and Lower Dispatch Limits for Dispatchable Resources Other Than Intermittent Power Resources That Depend on Wind or Solar Energy as Their Fuel

When setting physical base points for a Dispatchable Resource at the first time point, the ISO shall ensure that they do not fall outside of the bounds established by the Dispatchable Resource's lower and upper dispatch limits. A Dispatchable Resource's dispatch limits shall be determined based on whether it was feasible for it to reach the physical base point calculated by the last RTD run given its: (A) metered output level at the time that the RTD run was initialized; (B) response rate; (C) minimum generation level; and (D) UOL_N or UOL_E , whichever is applicable. If it was feasible for the Dispatchable Resource to reach that base point, then its upper and lower dispatch limits shall reflect the highest and lowest output levels it could achieve over the next RTD interval, given its UOL_N or UOL_E , as applicable, and starting from its previous base point. If it was not feasible for the Dispatchable Resource to reach that base point, then its upper and lower dispatch limits shall reflect the highest and lowest output levels it could achieve over the next RTD interval, given its UOL_N or UOL_E , as applicable, but instead starting from the feasible output level closest to its previous base point.

When setting physical base points for a Dispatchable Resource at later time points, the ISO shall ensure that they do not fall outside of the bounds established by the Resource's lower and upper dispatch limits for that time point. A Resource's dispatch limits at later time points shall be based on its: (A) dispatch limits from the first time point; (B) response rate; (C) minimum generation; and (D) UOL_N or UOL_E , whichever is applicable.

The upper dispatch limit for a Dispatchable Resource at later time points shall be determined by increasing the upper dispatch limit from the first time point at the Resource's response rate, up to its UOL_N or UOL_E , whichever is applicable. The lower dispatch limit for a Dispatchable Resource at later time points shall be determined by decreasing the lower dispatch limit from the first time point at the Resource's response rate, down to its minimum generation level or to a Demand Side Resource's Demand Reduction level.

The RTD Base Point Signals sent to Dispatchable Resources shall be the same as the physical base points determined above.

17.1.2.1.2.1.2 Upper and Lower Dispatch Limits for Intermittent Power Resources That Depend on Wind or Solar Energy as Their Fuel

For all time points of the optimization period, the Lower Dispatch Limit shall be the higher of (a) an Intermittent Power Resource's metered output level at the time that the RTD run was initialized reduced by its response rate, or (b) zero. The Upper Dispatch Limit shall be the Wind and Solar Energy Forecast for that Resource. For Intermittent Power Resources depending on wind as their fuel in commercial operation as of January 1, 2002 with a name plate capacity of 12 MWs or fewer, the Upper and Lower Dispatch Limits shall be the output level specified by the Wind and Solar Energy Forecast.

17.1.2.1.2.1.3. Setting Physical Basepoints for Fixed Generators

When setting physical base points for Self-Committed Fixed Generators in any time point, the ISO shall consider the feasibility of the Resource reaching the output levels that it specified in its self-commitment request for each time point in the RTD run given: (A) its metered output at the time that the run was initialized; and (B) its response rate.

When setting physical base points for ISO-Committed Fixed Generators in any time point, the ISO shall consider the feasibility of the Resource reaching the output levels scheduled for it by RTC for each time point in the RTD run given: (A) its metered output at the time that the run was initialized; and (B) its response rate.

The RTD Base Point Signals sent to Self-Committed Fixed Generators shall follow the quarter hour operating schedules that those Generators submitted in their real-time self-commitment requests.

The RTD Base Point Signals sent to ISO-Committed Fixed Generators shall follow the quarter hour operating schedules established for those Generators by RTC, regardless of their actual performance. To the extent possible, the ISO shall honor the response rates specified by such Generators when establishing RTD Base Point Signals. If a Self-Committed Fixed Generator's operating schedule is not feasible based on its real-time self-commitment requests then its RTD Base Point Signals shall be determined using a response rate consistent with the operating schedule changes.

17.1.2.1.2.2 The Second Pass

The second RTD pass consists of a least bid cost, multi-period, co-optimized dispatch for Energy, Regulation Service, and Operating Reserves that treats: (i) all Fast-Start Resources that are committed by RTC; (ii) all Fixed Block Units meeting Minimum Generation Levels and capable of starting in ten minutes that have not been committed by RTC; and (iii) all Fixed Block Units otherwise instructed to be online or remain online by the ISO, as flexible (i.e., able to be dispatched anywhere between zero (0) MW and their UOL_N or UOL_E , whichever is applicable), regardless of their minimum run-time status. The second pass calculates real-time Energy prices and real-time Shadow Prices for Regulation Service and Operating Reserves that the ISO shall

use for settlement purposes pursuant to Section 4, Rate Schedule 15.3, and Rate Schedule 15.4 of this ISO Services Tariff respectively. The ISO will not use schedules for Energy, Regulation Service and Operating Reserves established in the second pass to dispatch Resources.

The upper and lower dispatch limits used for ISO-Committed Fixed and Self-Committed Fixed Resources shall be the same as the physical base points calculated in the first pass.

17.1.2.1.2.2.1 Upper and Lower Dispatch Limits for Dispatchable Resources Other Than Intermittent Power Resources That Depend on Wind or Solar Energy as Their Fuel

The upper dispatch limit for the first time point of the second pass for a Dispatchable Resource shall be the higher of: (A) its upper dispatch limit from the first pass; or (B) its “pricing base point” from the first time point of the prior RTD interval adjusted up within its Dispatchable range for any possible ramping since that pricing base point was issued less the higher of: (i) the physical base point established during the first pass of the RTD immediately prior to the previous RTD minus the Resource’s metered output level at the time that the current RTD run was initialized, or (ii) zero.

The lower dispatch limit for the first time point of the second pass for a Dispatchable Resource shall be the lower of: (A) its lower dispatch limit from the first pass; or (B) its “pricing base point” from the first time point of the prior RTD interval adjusted down within its Dispatchable range to account for any possible ramping since that pricing base point was issued plus the higher of: (i) the Resource’s metered output level at the time that the current RTD run was initialized minus the physical base point established during the first pass of the RTD immediately prior to the previous RTD; or (ii) zero.

The upper dispatch limit for the later time points of the second pass for a Dispatchable Resource shall be determined by increasing its upper dispatch limit from the first time point at

the Resource's response rate, up to its UOL_N or UOL_E , whichever is applicable. The lower dispatch limit for the later time points of the second pass for a Dispatchable non-Fast-Start Resource shall be determined by decreasing its lower dispatch limit from the first time point at the Resource's response rate, down to its minimum generation level. The lower dispatch limit for the later time points of the second pass for a Fast Start Resource shall be determined by decreasing its lower dispatch limit from the first time point at the Resource's response rate, down to zero.

17.1.2.1.2.2.2 Upper and Lower Dispatch Limits for Intermittent Power Resources That Depend on Wind or Solar Energy as Their Fuel

For the first time point and later time points for Intermittent Power Resources that depend on wind or solar energy as their fuel, the Lower Dispatch Limit shall be zero and the Upper Dispatch Limit shall be the Wind and Solar Energy Forecast for that Resource. For Intermittent Power Resources depending on wind as their fuel in commercial operation as of January 1, 2002 with a name plate capacity of 12 MWs or fewer, the Upper and Lower Dispatch Limits shall be the output level specified by the Wind and Solar Energy Forecast.

17.1.2.1.2.3 The Third Pass

The third RTD pass is reserved for future use.

17.1.2.1.3 Variations in RTD-CAM

When the ISO activates RTD-CAM, the following variations to the rules specified above in Sections 17.1.2.1.1 and 17.1.2.1.2 shall apply.

First, if the ISO enters reserve pickup mode: (i) the ISO will produce prices and schedules for a single ten minute interval (not for a multi-point co-optimization period); (ii) the ISO shall set Regulation Service schedules to zero as described in Rate Schedule 15.3 of this ISO

Services Tariff; (iii) the ISO will have discretion to make additional Generator commitments before executing the three RTD passes; and (iv) the ISO will have discretion to allow the RTD Base Point Signal of each Dispatchable Generator to be set to the higher of the Generator's physical base point or its actual generation level.

Second, if the ISO enters maximum generation pickup mode: (i) the ISO will produce prices and schedules for a single five minute interval (not for a multi-point co-optimization period); (ii) the ISO shall set Regulation Service schedules to zero as described in Rate Schedule 15.3 of this ISO Services Tariff; (iii) the ISO will have discretion to make additional Generator commitments in the affected area before executing the three RTD passes; and (iv) the ISO will have discretion to either move the RTD Base Point Signal of each Generator within the affected area towards its UOL_E at its emergency response rate or set it at a level equal to its physical base point.

Third, if the ISO enters basepoints ASAP – no commitments mode it will produce prices and schedules for a single five minute interval (not for a multi-point co-optimization period).

Fourth, if the ISO enters basepoints ASAP – commit as needed mode: (i) the ISO will produce price and schedules for a single five minute interval (not for a multi-point co-optimization period); and (ii) the ISO may make additional commitments of Generators that are capable of starting within ten minutes before executing the three RTD passes.

Fifth, and finally, if the ISO enters re-sequencing mode it will solve for a ten-minute optimization period consisting of two five-minute time points.

17.1.2.1.4 The Real-Time Commitment (“RTC”) Process and Automated Mitigation

Attachment H of this Services Tariff shall establish automated market power mitigation measures that may affect the calculation of Real-Time LBMPs. To the extent that these

measures are implemented they shall be incorporated into the RTC software through the establishment of a second, parallel, commitment evaluation that will assess the impact of the mitigation measures. The first evaluation, referred to as the “RTC evaluation,” will determine the schedules and prices that would result using an original set of offers and Bids before any additional mitigation measures, the necessity for which will be considered in the RTC evaluation, are applied. The second evaluation, referred to as the “RT-AMP” evaluation, will determine the schedules and prices that would result from using the original set of offers and bids as modified by any necessary mitigation measures. Both evaluations will follow the rules governing RTC’s operation that are set forth in Section 4 of and this Attachment B to this ISO Services Tariff.

In situations where Attachment H specifies that real-time automated mitigation measures be utilized, the ISO will perform the two parallel RTC evaluations in a manner that enables it to implement mitigation measures one RTC run (i.e., fifteen minutes) in the future. For example, RTC₁₅ and RT-AMP₁₅ will perform Resource commitment evaluations simultaneously. RT-AMP₁₅ will then apply the mitigation “impact” test, account for reference bid levels as appropriate and determine which Resources are actually to be mitigated. This information will then be conveyed to RTC₃₀ which will make Resource commitments consistent with the application of the mitigation measures (and will thus indirectly be incorporated into future RTD runs).

17.1.3 Day-Ahead LBMP Calculation Procedures

LBMPs in the Day-Ahead Market are calculated using five passes. The first two passes are commitment and dispatch passes; the last three are dispatch only passes.

Pass 1 consists of a least cost commitment and dispatch to meet Bid Load and reliable operation of the NYS Power System that includes Day-Ahead Reliability Units.

It consists of several steps. Step 1A is a complete Security Constrained Unit Commitment (“SCUC”) to meet Bid Load. At the end of this step, committed Fast-Start Resources, Imports, Exports, Virtual Supply, Virtual Load, Demand Side Resources and non-Fast-Start Resources are dispatched to meet Bid Load. Fast-Start Resources are treated as dispatchable between zero MW and their UOL_N or UOL_E , whichever is applicable. For mitigation purposes, LBMPs are calculated from this dispatch. Following Step 1A, SCUC tests for automated mitigation procedure (“AMP”) activation.

If AMP is activated, Step 1B tests to determine if the AMP will be triggered by mitigating offer prices subject to mitigation that exceed the conduct threshold to their respective reference prices. These mitigated offer prices together with all originally submitted offer prices not subject to automatic mitigation are then used to commit generation and dispatch energy to meet Bid Load. This step is another iteration of the SCUC process. At the end of Step 1B, committed Fast-Start Resources, Imports, Exports, Virtual Supply, Virtual Load, Demand Side Resources, and non-Fast-Start Resources are again dispatched to meet Bid Load using the same mitigated or unmitigated Bids used to determine the commitment to meet Bid Load. Fast-Start Resources are treated as dispatchable between zero MW and their UOL_N or UOL_E , whichever is applicable. For mitigation purposes, LBMPs are again calculated from this dispatch. The LBMPs determined at the end of Step 1B are compared to the LBMPs determined at the end of Step 1A to determine the hours and zones in which the impact test is met.

In Step 1C, generation offer prices subject to mitigation that exceed the conduct threshold are mitigated for those hours and zones in which the impact test was met in Step 1B. The

mitigated offer prices, together with the original unmitigated offer price of units whose offer prices were not subject to mitigation, or did not trigger the conduct or impact thresholds, are used to commit generation and dispatch energy to meet Bid Load. This step is also a complete iteration of the SCUC process. At the end of Step 1C, committed Fast-Start Resources, Imports, Exports, virtual supply, virtual load, Demand Side Resources, and non- Fast-Start Resources are again dispatched to meet Bid Load. Fast-Start Resources are treated as dispatchable between zero MW and their UOL_N or UOL_E , whichever is applicable. For mitigation purposes, LBMPs are again calculated from this dispatch.

All Demand Side Resources and non-Fixed Block Units committed in the final step of Pass 1 (which could be either step 1A, 1B, or 1C depending on activation of the AMP) are blocked on at least to minimum generation level in Passes 4 through 6. All Energy Storage Resources dispatched in the final step of Pass 1 (which could be either Step 1A, 1B, or 1C depending on activation of the AMP) are blocked on at the dispatch that was determined in Pass 1 in Passes 2 through 4. The resources required to meet local system reliability are determined in Pass 1.

Pass 2 consists of a least cost commitment and dispatch of Fast-Start Resources, Imports, Exports, Demand Side Resources and non- Fast-Start Resources to meet forecast Load requirements in excess of Bid Load, considering the Wind and Solar Energy Forecast, that minimizes the cost of incremental Minimum Generation and Start Up Bids, given revenues for Minimum Generation Energy based on LBMPs calculated in Pass 1, and assumes all Fast-Start Resources are dispatchable between zero MW and their UOL_N or UOL_E , whichever is applicable. Incremental Import Capacity needed to meet forecast Load requirements is determined in Pass 2. Fixed Block Units committed in this pass are not included in the least cost

dispatches of Passes 5 or 6. Demand Side Resources and non-Fixed Block Units committed in this step are blocked on at least to minimum generation level in Passes 4 through 6. Intermittent Power Resources that depend on wind or solar energy as their fuel committed in this pass as a result of the consideration of the Wind and Solar Energy Forecast are not blocked in Passes 5 or 6.

Pass 3 is reserved for future use.

Pass 4 consists of a least cost dispatch to forecast Load. It is not used to set schedules or prices. It is used for operational purposes and provides a dispatch of Fast-Start Resources, Imports, Exports, Demand Side Resources and non- Fast-Start Resources committed in Passes 1 or 2. Incremental Import Capacity committed in Pass 2 is re-evaluated and may be reduced if no longer required.

Pass 5 consists of a least cost dispatch of Fast-Start Resources, Imports, Exports, Virtual Supply, Virtual Load, Demand Side Resources and non- Fast-Start Resources committed to meet Bid Load, based where appropriate on offer prices as mitigated in Pass 1. Fast-Start Resources are treated as dispatchable between zero MW and their UOL_N or UOL_E , whichever is applicable. LBMPs used to settle the Day-Ahead Market are calculated from this dispatch. The Shadow Prices used to compute Day-Ahead Market clearing prices for Regulation Service and for Operating Reserves in Rate Schedules 3 and 4 of this ISO Services Tariff are also calculated from this dispatch. Final schedules for all Imports, Exports, Virtual Supply, Virtual Load, Demand Side Resources and non-Fixed Block Units in the Day-Ahead Market are calculated from this dispatch.

Pass 6 consists of a least cost dispatch of all Day-Ahead committed Resources, Imports, Exports, Virtual Supply, Virtual Load, based where appropriate on offer prices as mitigated in

Pass 1, with the schedules of all Fixed Block Units committed in the final step of Pass 1 blocked on at maximum Capacity. Final schedules for Fixed Block Units in the Day-Ahead Market are calculated from this dispatch.

17.1.4 Determination of Transmission Shortage Cost

The applicable Transmission Shortage Cost depends on whether a particular transmission Constraint is associated with a transmission facility or Interface that includes a non-zero constraint reliability margin value. The ISO shall establish constraint reliability margin values for transmission facilities and Interfaces. Non-zero constraint reliability margin values established by the ISO are normally equal to 20 MW. The ISO shall post to its website a list of transmission facilities and Interfaces assigned a constraint reliability margin value other than 20 MW.

For transmission facilities and Interfaces with a non-zero constraint reliability margin value, SCUC, RTC and RTD shall include consideration of a two step demand curve consisting of up to an additional 5 MW of available resource capacity at a cost of \$350/MWh and up to an additional 15 MW of available resource capacity at a cost of \$1,175/MWh when evaluating transmission Constraints associated with such facilities and Interfaces. In no event, however, shall the Shadow Price for such transmission Constraints exceed \$4,000/MWh.

For transmission facilities and Interfaces with a constraint reliability margin value of zero, the Shadow Price for transmission Constraints associated with such facilities and Interfaces shall not exceed \$4,000/MWh. SCUC, RTC and RTD shall not include consideration of the available resource capacity provided by the two step demand curve described above for such transmission Constraints.

In evaluating all transmission Constraints, the ISO will determine whether sufficient available resource capacity exists to solve each transmission Constraint at its applicable limit. If sufficient available resource capacity does not exist to solve the transmission Constraint at its otherwise applicable limit, the ISO shall increase the applicable limit for such transmission Constraint to an amount achievable by the available resource capacity plus 0.2 MW. For transmission facilities and Interfaces with a non-zero constraint reliability margin value, the ISO shall account for the 20 MW of available resource capacity from the two step demand curve described above in determining: (i) whether sufficient available resource capacity exists to solve transmission Constraints associated with such facilities and Interfaces at their otherwise applicable limit; and (ii) the extent of any limit adjustment required to solve such transmission Constraints.

The ISO may periodically evaluate the Transmission Shortage Cost to determine whether it is necessary to modify the Transmission Shortage Cost to avoid future operational or reliability problems. The ISO will consult with its Market Monitoring Unit after it conducts this evaluation. If the ISO determines that it is necessary to modify the Transmission Shortage Costs in order to avoid future operational or reliability problems the resolution of which would otherwise require recurring operator intervention outside normal market scheduling procedures, in order to avoid among other reliability issues, a violation of NERC Interconnection Reliability Operating Limits or System Operating Limits, it may temporarily modify it for a period of up to ninety days, provided however the NYISO shall file such change with the Commission pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act within 45 days of such modification. If circumstances reasonably allow, the ISO will consult with its Market Monitoring Unit, the Business Issues Committee, the Commission, and the PSC before implementing any such modification. In all

circumstances, the ISO will: (i) consult with those entities as soon as reasonably possible after implementing a temporary modification and shall explain the reasons for the change; and (ii) notify Market Participants of any temporary modification.

The responsibilities of the ISO and the Market Monitoring Unit in evaluating and modifying the Transmission Shortage Cost, as necessary are addressed in Attachment O, Section 30.4.6.8.1 of this Market Services Tariff (“Market Monitoring Plan”).

17.1.5 Zonal LBMP Calculation Method

The computation described in Section 17.1.1 of this Attachment B is at the bus level. An eleven (11) zone model will be used for the LBMP billing related to Loads, except for Energy withdrawals by Eligible Generators for later injection onto the grid. The LBMP for a zone will be a Load weighted average of the Load bus LBMPs in the Load Zone. The Load weights which will sum to unity will be calculated from the load bus MW distribution. Each component of the LBMP for a zone will be calculated as a Load weighted average of the Load bus LBMP components in the zone. The LBMP for a zone j can be written as:

$$\gamma_j^Z = \lambda^R + \gamma_j^{L,Z} + \gamma_j^{C,Z}$$

where:

$\gamma_j^Z =$	LBMP for zone j ,
$\gamma_j^{L,Z} = \sum_{i=1}^n W_i \gamma_i^L$	is the Marginal Losses Component of the LBMP for zone j ;
$\gamma_j^{C,Z} = \sum W_i \gamma_i^L$	is the Congestion Component of the LBMP for zone j ;
$n =$	number of Load buses in zone j for which LBMPs are calculated; and
$W_i =$	Load weighting factor for bus i .

The NYISO also calculates and posts zonal LBMP for four (4) external zones for informational purposes only. Settlements for External Transactions are determined using the Proxy Generator Bus LBMP. Each external zonal LBMP is equal to the LBMP of the Proxy Generator Bus associated with that external zone. The table below identifies which Proxy Generator Bus LBMP is used to determine each of the posted external zonal LBMPs.

External Zone	External Zone PTID	Proxy Generator Bus	Proxy Generator Bus PTID
HQ	61844	HQ_GEN_WHEEL	23651
NPX	61845	N.E._GEN_SANDY_POND	24062
OH	61846	O.H._GEN_PROXY	24063
PJM	61847	PJM_GEN_KEYSTONE	24065

Consistent with the ISO Services Tariff, LBMPs at Proxy Generator Buses are determined using calculated bus prices as described in this Section 17.1.

17.1.6 Real Time LBMP Calculation Methods for Proxy Generator Buses, Non-Competitive Proxy Generator Buses and Proxy Generator Buses Associated with Designated Scheduled Lines

17.1.6.1 Definitions

Interface ATC Constraint: An Interface ATC Constraint exists when proposed economic transactions over an Interface between the NYCA and the Control Area with which one or more Proxy Generator Bus(es) are associated would exceed the transfer capability for the Interface or for an associated Proxy Generator Bus.

Interface Ramp Constraint: An Interface Ramp Constraint exists when proposed interchange schedule changes pertaining to an Interface between the NYCA and the Control Area with which one or more Proxy Generator Bus(es) are associated would exceed any Ramp Capacity limit imposed by the ISO for the Interface or for an associated Proxy Generator Bus.

NYCA Ramp Constraint: A NYCA Ramp Constraint exists when proposed interchange schedule changes pertaining to the NYCA as a whole would exceed any Ramp Capacity limits in place for the NYCA as a whole.

Proxy Generator Bus Constraint: Any of an Interface ATC Constraint, an Interface Ramp Constraint, or a NYCA Ramp Constraint (individually and collectively).

External Interface Congestion: The product of: (i) the portion of the Congestion Component of the LBMP at a Proxy Generator Bus that is associated with a Proxy Generator Bus Constraint and (ii) a factor, between zero and 1, calculated pursuant to ISO Procedures.

Proxy Generator Bus Border LBMP: The LBMP at a Proxy Generator Bus minus External Interface Congestion at that Proxy Generator Bus.

Unconstrained RTD LBMP: The LBMP as calculated by RTD less any congestion associated with a Proxy Generator Bus Constraint.

17.1.6.2 General Rules

Transmission Customers and Customers with External Generators and Loads can bid into the LBMP Market or participate in Bilateral Transactions. Those with External Generators may arrange LBMP Market sales and/or Bilateral Transactions with Internal or External Loads and External Loads may arrange LBMP Market purchases and/or Bilateral Transactions with Internal Generators.

The Generator and Load locations for which LBMPs will be calculated will initially be limited to a pre-defined set of Proxy Generator Buses. LBMPs will be calculated for each Proxy Generator Bus within this limited set. When an Interface with multiple Proxy Generator Buses is constrained, the ISO will apply the constraint to all of the Proxy Generator Buses located at that Interface. Except as set forth in Sections 17.1.6.3 and 17.1.6.4, the NYISO will calculate the three components of LBMP for Transactions at a Proxy Generator Bus as provided in the tables below.

When determining the External Interface Congestion, if any, to apply to determine the LBMP for RTD intervals that bridge two RTC intervals, the NYISO shall use the External Interface Congestion associated with the second (later) RTC interval.

17.1.6.2.1 Pricing rules for Dynamically Scheduled Proxy Generator Buses

The pricing rules for Dynamically Scheduled Proxy Generator Buses are to be determined.

17.1.6.2.2 Pricing rules for Variably Scheduled Proxy Generator Buses

The pricing rules for Variably Scheduled Proxy Generator Buses are provided in the following table.

Rule No.	Proxy Generator Bus Constraint affecting External Schedules at location a	Direction of Proxy Generator Bus Constraint	Real-Time Pricing Rule (for location a)
1	Unconstrained in RTC_{15} , Rolling RTC and RTD	N/A	Real-Time $LBMP_a = RTD LBMP_a$
2	The Rolling RTC used to schedule External Transactions in a given 15-minute interval is subject to a Proxy Generator Bus Constraint	Into NYCA or out of NYCA (Import or Export)	Real-Time $LBMP_a = RTD LBMP_a + \text{Rolling RTC External Interface Congestion}_a$

17.1.6.2.3 Pricing rules for Proxy Generator Buses that are not Dynamically Scheduled or Variably Scheduled

The pricing rules for Proxy Generator Buses that are not Dynamically Scheduled or Variably Scheduled Proxy Generator Buses are provided in the following table.

Rule No.	Proxy Generator Bus Constraint affecting External Schedules at location a	Direction of Proxy Generator Bus Constraint	Real-Time Pricing Rule (for location a)
1	Unconstrained in RTC_{15} , Rolling RTC and RTD	N/A	Real-Time $LBMP_a = RTD LBMP_a$
3	RTC_{15} is subject to a Proxy Generator Bus Constraint	Into NYCA or out of NYCA (Import or Export)	Real-Time $LBMP_a = RTD LBMP_a + RTC_{15} \text{ External Interface Congestion}_a$

17.1.6.3 Rules for Non-Competitive Proxy Generator Buses and Associated Interfaces

Real-Time LBMPs for an Interface that is associated with one or more Non-Competitive Proxy Generator Buses or for a Non-Competitive Proxy Generator Bus shall be determined as

provided in the tables below. Non-Competitive Proxy Generator Buses are identified in Section 4.4.4 of the Services Tariff.

17.1.6.3.1 Pricing rules for Non-Competitive, Dynamically Scheduled Proxy Generator Buses

The pricing rules for Non-Competitive, Dynamically Scheduled Proxy Generator Buses are to be determined.

17.1.6.3.2 Pricing rules for Non-Competitive, Variably Scheduled Proxy Generator Buses

The pricing rules for Non-Competitive, Variably Scheduled Proxy Generator Buses are provided in the following table.

Rule No.	Proxy Generator Bus Constraint affecting External Schedules at location a	Direction of Proxy Generator Bus Constraint	Real-Time Pricing Rule (for location a)
1	Unconstrained in RTC ₁₅ , Rolling RTC and RTD	N/A	Real-Time $LBMP_a = RTD LBMP_a$
4	The Rolling RTC used to schedule External Transactions in a given 15-minute interval is subject to an Interface ATC or Interface RampConstraint	Into NYCA (Import)	If Rolling RTC Proxy Generator Bus $LBMP_a > 0$, then Real-Time $LBMP_a = RTD LBMP_a + \text{Rolling RTC External Interface Congestion}_a$ Otherwise, Real-Time $LBMP_a = \text{Minimum of (i) RTD } LBMP_a \text{ and (ii) zero}$
5	The Rolling RTC used to schedule External Transactions in a given 15-minute interval is subject to an Interface ATC or Interface Ramp Constraint	Out of NYCA (Export)	If Rolling RTC Proxy Generator Bus $LBMP_a < 0$, then Real-Time $LBMP_a = RTD LBMP_a + \text{Rolling RTC External Interface Congestion}_a$ Otherwise, Real-Time $LBMP_a = RTD LBMP_a$

17.1.6.3.3 Pricing rules for Non-Competitive Proxy Generator Buses that are not Dynamically Scheduled or Variably Scheduled Proxy Generator Buses

The pricing rules for Non-Competitive Proxy Generator Buses that are not Dynamically Scheduled or Variably Scheduled Proxy Generator Buses are provided in the following table.

Rule No.	Proxy Generator Bus Constraint affecting External Schedules at location <i>a</i>	Direction of Proxy Generator Bus Constraint	Real-Time Pricing Rule (for location <i>a</i>)
1	Unconstrained in RTC ₁₅ , Rolling RTC and RTD	N/A	Real-Time LBMP _{<i>a</i>} = RTD LBMP _{<i>a</i>}
6	RTC ₁₅ is subject to an Interface ATC or Interface Ramp Constraint	Into NYCA (Import)	If RTC ₁₅ Proxy Generator Bus LBMP _{<i>a</i>} > 0, then Real-Time LBMP _{<i>a</i>} = RTD LBMP _{<i>a</i>} + RTC ₁₅ External Interface Congestion _{<i>a</i>} Otherwise, Real-Time LBMP _{<i>a</i>} = Minimum of (i) RTD LBMP _{<i>a</i>} and (ii) zero
7	RTC ₁₅ is subject to an Interface ATC or Interface Ramp Constraint	Out of NYCA (Export)	If RTC ₁₅ Proxy Generator Bus LBMP _{<i>a</i>} < 0, then Real-Time LBMP _{<i>a</i>} = RTD LBMP _{<i>a</i>} + RTC ₁₅ External Interface Congestion _{<i>a</i>} Otherwise, Real-Time LBMP _{<i>a</i>} = RTD LBMP _{<i>a</i>}

17.1.6.4 Special Pricing Rules for Proxy Generator Buses Associated with Designated Scheduled Lines

Real-Time LBMPs for the Proxy Generator Buses associated with designated Scheduled Lines shall be determined as provided in the tables below. The Proxy Generator Buses that are associated with designated Scheduled Lines are identified in Section 4.4.4 of the Services Tariff.

17.1.6.4.1 Pricing rules for Dynamically Scheduled Proxy Generator Buses that are associated with Designated Scheduled Lines

The pricing rules for Dynamically Scheduled Proxy Generator Buses that are associated with designated Scheduled Lines are to be determined.

17.1.6.4.2 Pricing rules for Variably Scheduled Proxy Generator Buses that are associated with Designated Scheduled Lines

The pricing rules for Variably Scheduled Proxy Generator Buses that are associated with designated Scheduled Lines are provided in the following table.

Rule No.	Proxy Generator Bus Constraint affecting External Schedules at location <i>a</i>	Direction of Proxy Generator Bus Constraint	Real-Time Pricing Rule (for location <i>a</i>)
1	Unconstrained in RTC ₁₅ , Rolling RTC and RTD	N/A	Real-Time LBMP _{<i>a</i>} = RTD LBMP _{<i>a</i>}
4	The Rolling RTC used to schedule External Transactions in a given 15-minute interval is subject to an Interface ATC Constraint	Into NYCA (Import)	If Rolling RTC Proxy Generator Bus LBMP _{<i>a</i>} > 0, then Real-Time LBMP _{<i>a</i>} = RTD LBMP _{<i>a</i>} + Rolling RTC External Interface Congestion _{<i>a</i>} Otherwise, Real-Time LBMP _{<i>a</i>} = Minimum of (i) RTD LBMP _{<i>a</i>} and (ii) zero
5	The Rolling RTC used to schedule External Transactions in a given 15-minute interval is subject to an Interface ATC Constraint	Out of NYCA (Export)	If Rolling RTC Proxy Generator Bus LBMP _{<i>a</i>} < 0, then Real-Time LBMP _{<i>a</i>} = RTD LBMP _{<i>a</i>} + Rolling RTC External Interface Congestion _{<i>a</i>} Otherwise, Real-Time LBMP _{<i>a</i>} = RTD LBMP _{<i>a</i>})

17.1.6.4.3 Pricing rules for Proxy Generator Buses that are associated with Designated Scheduled Lines that are not Dynamically Scheduled or Variably Scheduled Proxy Generator Buses

The pricing rules for Proxy Generator Buses that are associated with designated Scheduled Lines that are not Dynamically Scheduled or Variably Scheduled Proxy Generator Buses, are provided in the following table.

Rule No.	Proxy Generator Bus Constraint affecting External Schedules at location <i>a</i>	Direction of Proxy Generator Bus Constraint	Real-Time Pricing Rule (for location <i>a</i>)
1	Unconstrained in RTC ₁₅ , Rolling RTC and RTD	N/A	Real-Time LBMP _{<i>a</i>} = RTD LBMP _{<i>a</i>}
6	RTC ₁₅ is subject to an Interface ATC Constraint	Into NYCA (Import)	If RTC ₁₅ Proxy Generator Bus LBMP _{<i>a</i>} > 0, then Real-Time LBMP _{<i>a</i>} = RTD LBMP _{<i>a</i>} + RTC ₁₅ External Interface Congestion _{<i>a</i>} Otherwise, Real-Time LBMP _{<i>a</i>} = Minimum of (i) RTD LBMP _{<i>a</i>} and (ii) zero

Rule No.	Proxy Generator Bus Constraint affecting External Schedules at location <i>a</i>	Direction of Proxy Generator Bus Constraint	Real-Time Pricing Rule (for location <i>a</i>)
7	RTC ₁₅ is subject to an Interface ATC Constraint	Out of NYCA (Export)	If RTC ₁₅ Proxy Generator Bus LBMP _a < 0, then Real-Time LBMP _a = RTD LBMP _a + RTC ₁₅ External Interface Congestion _a Otherwise, Real-Time LBMP _a = RTD LBMP _a

17.1.6.5 Method of Calculating Marginal Loss and Congestion Components of Real-Time LBMP at Non-Competitive Proxy Generator Buses and Proxy Generator Buses that are Subject to the Special Pricing Rule for Designated Scheduled Lines

Under the conditions specified below, the Marginal Losses Component and the Congestion Component of the Real-Time LBMP, calculated pursuant to the preceding paragraphs in Sections 17.1.6.3 and 17.1.6.4, shall be constructed as follows:

When the Real-Time LBMP is set to zero and that zero price was not the result of using the RTD, RTC or SCUC-determined LBMP;

$$\text{Marginal Losses Component of the Real-Time LBMP} = \text{Losses}_{RTD \text{ PROXY GENERATOR BUS}}$$

and

$$\text{Congestion Component of the Real-Time LBMP} = -(\text{Energy}_{RTD \text{ REF BUS}} + \text{Losses}_{RTD \text{ PROXY GENERATOR BUS}})$$

where:

$\text{Energy}_{RTD \text{ REF BUS}}$ = The marginal Bid cost of providing Energy at the reference Bus, as calculated by RTD for that 5-minute interval; and

$\text{Losses}_{RTD \text{ PROXY GENERATOR BUS}}$ = The Marginal Losses Component of the LBMP as calculated by RTD for that 5-minute interval at the Non-Competitive Proxy Generator Bus or Proxy Generator Bus associated with a designated Scheduled Line.

**25 Attachment J – Determination of Day-Ahead Margin Assurance Payments and
Import Curtailment Guarantee Payments**

25.1 Introduction

If a Supplier that is eligible pursuant to Section 25.2 of this Attachment J buys out of a Day-Ahead Energy, Regulation Service or Operating Reserve schedule in a manner that reduces its Day-Ahead Margin it shall receive a Day-Ahead Margin Assurance Payment, except as noted in Sections 25.2, 25.3, 25.4, and 25.5 of this Attachment J. The purpose of such payments is to protect Suppliers' Day-Ahead Margins associated with real-time reductions after accounting for: (i) any real-time profits associated with offsetting increases in real-time Energy, Regulation Service, or Operating Reserve schedules; and (ii) any Supplier-requested real-time de-rate granted by the ISO.

In addition, a Supplier may be eligible to receive an Import Curtailment Guarantee Payment if its Import is curtailed at the request of the ISO as determined pursuant to Section 25.6 of this Attachment J.

25.2 Eligibility for Receiving Day-Ahead Margin Assurance Payments

25.2.1 General Eligibility Requirements for Suppliers to Receive Day-Ahead Margin Assurance Payments

Subject to Section 25.2.2 of this Attachment J, the following categories of Resources bid by Suppliers shall be eligible to receive Day-Ahead Margin Assurance Payments: (i) all Self-Committed Flexible and ISO-Committed Flexible Generators, other than Energy Storage Resources, that are either online and dispatched by RTD or available for commitment by RTC; (ii) Demand Side Resources committed to provide Operating Reserves or Regulation Service; (iii) any Resource, including an Energy Storage Resource, that is scheduled out of economic merit order by the ISO in response to an ISO or Transmission Owner system security need or to permit the ISO to procure additional Operating Reserves; (iv) any Resource, including Energy Storage Resources, internal to the NYCA that is derated or decommitted by the ISO in response to an ISO or Transmission Owner system security need or to permit the ISO to procure additional Operating Reserves; and (v) Energy Limited Resources with an ISO-approved real-time reduction in scheduled output from its Day-Ahead schedule.

25.2.2 Exceptions

Notwithstanding Section 25.2.1 of this Attachment J, no Day-Ahead Margin Assurance Payment shall be paid to:

- 25.2.2.1 a Resource, otherwise eligible for a Day-Ahead Margin Assurance Payment, in hours in which the NYISO has increased the Resource's real-time minimum operating level above the Resource's Day-Ahead Market Energy schedule either: (i) at the Resource's request including through an adjustment to the Resource's self-commitment schedule; or (ii) in order to reconcile the ISO's dispatch with the Resource's actual output or to address reliability concerns that

arise because the Resource is not following Base Point Signals; or (iii) an Intermittent Power Resource that depends on wind or solar energy as its fuel.

25.2.2.2 a Resource, otherwise eligible for Day-Ahead Margin Assurance Payments, in hours in which the NYISO has increased the Resource's real-time minimum operating level at the Resource's request, including through an adjustment to the Resource's self-commitment schedule, above the MW level determined by subtracting the Resource's Day-Ahead Market Regulation Service schedule from its Day-Ahead Market Energy schedule.

25.2.2.3 a Resource, otherwise eligible for Day-Ahead Margin Assurance Payments, in hours in which the Resource reduces the MW quantity specified in its real-time Regulation Capacity Bid below its Day-Ahead Market Regulation Service schedule.

25.2.2.4 a Generator, otherwise eligible for Day-Ahead Margin Assurance Payments, for (i) any hour in which the Incremental Energy Bids submitted in the Real-Time Market for that Generator exceed the Incremental Energy Bids submitted in the Day-Ahead Market, or the mitigated Day-Ahead Incremental Energy Bids where appropriate, for the portion of that Generator's Capacity that was scheduled in the Day-Ahead Market; and (ii) the two hours immediately preceding and the two hours immediately following the hour(s) in which the Incremental Energy Bids submitted in the Real-Time Market for that Generator exceed the Incremental Energy Bids submitted in the Day-Ahead Market, or the mitigated Day-Ahead Incremental Energy Bids where appropriate, for the portion of that Generator's Capacity that was scheduled in the Day-Ahead Market.

25.2.2.5 A Generator that is available for commitment by RTC and otherwise eligible for Day-Ahead Margin Assurance Payments, for (i) any hour in which the Start-Up Bids submitted in the Real-Time Market for that Generator exceed the Start-Up Bids submitted in the Day-Ahead Market, or the mitigated Day-Ahead Start-Up Bids where appropriate, and that Generator was scheduled for Energy in that hour in the Day-Ahead Market; and (ii) the two hours immediately preceding and the two hours immediately following the hour(s) in which the Start-Up Bids submitted in the Real-Time Market for that Generator exceed the Start-Up Bids submitted in the Day-Ahead Market, or the mitigated Day-Ahead Start-Up Bids where appropriate, and that Generator was scheduled for Energy or Regulation Service in that hour in the Day-Ahead Market.

25.2.2.6 A Generator that is available for commitment by RTC and otherwise eligible for Day-Ahead Margin Assurance Payments, for (i) any hour in which the dollar component of the Minimum Generation Bids submitted in the Real-Time Market for that Generator exceed the dollar component of the Minimum Generation Bids submitted in the Day-Ahead Market, or the dollar component of the mitigated Day-Ahead Minimum Generation Bids where appropriate, and that Generator was scheduled for Energy in that hour in the Day-Ahead Market; and (ii) the two hours immediately preceding and the two hours immediately following the hour(s) in which the dollar component of the Minimum Generation Bids submitted in the Real-Time Market for that Generator exceed the dollar component of the Minimum Generation Bids submitted in the Day-Ahead Market, or the dollar component of the mitigated Day-Ahead Minimum Generation Bids

where appropriate, and that Generator was scheduled for Energy in that hour in the Day-Ahead Market.

25.3 Calculation of Day-Ahead Margin Assurance Payments

25.3.1 Formula for Day-Ahead Margin Assurance Payments for Generators, Except for Limited Energy Storage Resources

Subject to Sections 25.4 and 25.5 of this Attachment J, Day-Ahead Margin Assurance Payments for Generators, except for Limited Energy Storage Resources, shall be determined by applying the following equations to each individual Generator using the terms as defined in Section 25.3.4:

$$DMAP_{hu} = \max\left(0, \sum_{i \in h} CDMAP_{iu}\right)$$

where:

$$CDMAP_{iu} = CDMAPen_{iu} + \sum_P CDMAPres_{iup} + CDMAPreg_{iu}$$

25.3.1.1 Energy Contribution for Day-Ahead Margin Assurance Payments

If the Generator's (i) Day-Ahead schedule is to inject Energy (*i.e.*, greater than zero MW) and its real-time Energy schedule is lower than its Day-Ahead Energy schedule; or (ii) Day-Ahead schedule is to withdraw Energy (*i.e.*, less than zero MW) and its real-time Energy schedule is greater than its Day-Ahead Energy schedule, then:

$$CDMAPen_{iu} = \left((DASen_{hu} - LL_{iu}) * RTPen_{iu} - \int_{LL_{iu}}^{DASen_{hu}} DABen_{hu} \right) * \frac{Seconds_i}{3600}$$

If the Generator's (i) Day-Ahead Energy schedule is to inject Energy (*i.e.*, greater than zero MW) and its real-time Energy schedule is greater than or equal to its Day-Ahead Energy schedule; or (ii) Day-Ahead Energy schedule is to withdraw Energy (*i.e.*, less than zero MW),

and its real-time Energy schedule is less than or equal to its Day-Ahead Energy schedule; or

(iii) Day-Ahead Energy schedule is for zero MW, then:

$$CDMAPen_{iu} = \min \left[\left((DASen_{hu} - UL_{iu}) * RTPen_{iu} + \int_{DASen_{hu}}^{UL_{iu}} RTBen_{iu} \right) * \frac{Seconds_i}{3600}, 0 \right]$$

25.3.1.2 Operating Reserve Contribution for Day-Ahead Margin Assurance Payments

If the Generator's real-time schedule for a given Operating Reserve product, p, is lower than its Day-Ahead Operating Reserve schedule for that product then:

$$CDMAPres_{iup} = [(DASres_{hup} - RTSres_{iup}) * (RTPres_{iup} - DABres_{hup})] * \frac{Seconds_i}{3600}$$

If the Generator's real-time schedule for a given Operating Reserve product, p, is greater than or equal to its Day-Ahead Operating Reserve schedule for that product then:

$$CDMAPres_{iup} = [(DASres_{hup} - RTSres_{iup}) * (RTPres_{iup})] * \frac{Seconds_i}{3600}$$

25.3.1.3 Regulation Service Contribution for Day-Ahead Margin Assurance Payments

If the Generator's real-time Regulation Service schedule is less than its Day-Ahead Regulation Service schedule then:

$$CDMAPreg_{iu} = [(DASreg_{hu} - RTSreg_{iu}) * (RTPreg_{iu} - DABreg_{hu})] * \frac{Seconds_i}{3600} + [(-1 * RTMreg_{iu}) * \max(0, RTPreg_{iu} - RTBreg_{iu})]$$

If the Generator's real-time Regulation Schedule is greater than or equal to the Day-Ahead Regulation Service schedule then:

$$CDMAPreg_{iu} = [(DASreg_{hu} - RTSreg_{iu}) * \max((RTPreg_{iu} - RTBreg_{iu}), 0)] * \frac{Seconds_i}{3600} + [(-1 * RTMreg_{iu}) * \max(0, RTPreg_{iu} - RTBreg_{iu})]$$

25.3.2 Formula for Day-Ahead Margin Assurance Payments for Demand Side Resources

25.3.2.1 Formula for Day-Ahead Margin Assurance Payment for Demand Side Resources

Subject to Section 25.5 of this Attachment J, Day-Ahead Margin Assurance Payments for Demand Side resources scheduled to provide Operating Reserves or Regulation Service shall be determined by applying the following equations to each individual Demand Side Resource using the terms as defined in Section 25.3.4, except for RPI_{iu}, which is defined in Section 25.3.2.2:

$$DMAP_{hu} = \max\left(0, \sum_{i \in h} CDMAP_{iu}\right)$$

where:

$$CDMAP_{iu} = \sum_p CDMAPres_{iup} + CDMAPreg_{iu}$$

If the Demand Side Resource's real-time schedule for a given Operating Reserve product, p, is lower than its Day-Ahead Operating Reserve schedule for that product then:

$$CDMAPres_{iup} = [(DASres_{hup} - RTSres_{iup}) * (RTPres_{iup} - DABres_{hup})] * RPI_{iu} * \frac{Seconds_i}{3600}$$

If the Demand Side Resource's real-time schedule for a given Operating Reserve product, p, is greater than or equal to its Day-Ahead Operating Reserve schedule for that product then:

$$CDMAPres_{iup} = [(DASres_{hup} - RTSres_{iup}) * (RTSPres_{iup})] * RPI_{iu} * \frac{Seconds_i}{3600}$$

If the Demand Side Resource's real-time Regulation Service schedule is less than its Day-Ahead Regulation Service schedule then:

$$CDMAPreg_{iu} = [(DASreg_{hu} - RTSreg_{iu}) * (RTPreg_{iu} - DABreg_{hu})] * \frac{Seconds_i}{3600} + [(-1 * RTMreg_{iu}) * \max(0, RTPreg_{iu} - RTBreg_{iu})]$$

If the Demand Side Resource's real-time Regulation Schedule is greater than or equal to the Day-Ahead Regulation Service schedule then:

$$CDMAPreg_{iu} = [(DASreg_{hu} - RTSreg_{iu}) * \max((RTPreg_{iu} - RTBreg_{iu}), 0)] * \frac{Seconds_i}{3600} + [(-1 * RTMreg_{iu}) * \max(0, RTPreg_{iu} - RTBreg_{iu})]$$

25.3.2.2 Reserve Performance Index for Demand Side Resource Suppliers of Operating Reserves

The ISO shall produce a Reserve Performance Index for purposes of calculating a Day Ahead Margin Assurance Payment for a Demand Side Resource providing Operating Reserves. The Reserve Performance Index shall take account of the actual Demand Reduction achieved by the Supplier of Operating Reserves following the ISO's instruction to convert Operating Reserves to Demand Reduction.

The Reserve Performance Index shall be a factor with a value between 0.0 and 1.0 inclusive. For each interval in which the ISO has not instructed the Demand Side Resource to convert its Operating Reserves to Demand Reduction, the Reserve Performance Index shall have a value of one. For each interval in which the ISO has instructed the Demand Side Resource to convert its Operating Reserves to Demand Reduction the Reserve Performance Index shall be calculated pursuant to the following formula, provided however when UAGi is zero or less, the Reserve Performance Index shall be set to zero:

$$RPI_{iu} = \min[(UAG_i / ADG_i + .1), 1]$$

Where:

RPI_{iu} = Reserve Performance Index in interval i for Demand Side Resource u ;

UAG_i = average actual Demand Reduction for interval i , represented as a positive generation value; and

ADG_i = average scheduled Demand Reduction for interval i , represented as a positive generation base point.

25.3.3 Formula for Day-Ahead Margin Assurance Payments for Limited Energy Storage Resources

Day-Ahead Margin Assurance Payments for Limited Energy Storage Resources scheduled to provide Regulation Service shall be determined by applying the following equations to each Resource using the terms as defined in Section 25.3.4; *provided, however*, that a Day-Ahead Margin Assurance Payment is payable only for intervals in which the NYISO has reduced the real-time Regulation Service offer (in MWs) of a Limited Energy Storage Resource and the NYISO is not pursuing LESR Energy Management for such Resource for such interval, pursuant to ISO Procedures:

If the LESR's real-time Regulation Service schedule is less than its Day-Ahead Regulation Service schedule and the real-time Regulation Capacity Market Price is greater than the Day-Ahead Regulation Capacity Bid price then:

$$CDMAPreg_{iu} = [(DASreg_{hu} - RTSreg_{iu}) * (RTPreg_{iu} - DABreg_{hu})] * K_p * \frac{Seconds_i}{3600} + [(-1 * RTMreg_{iu}) * \max(0, RTPreg_{iu} - RTBreg_{iu})]$$

If the LESR's real-time Regulation Service schedule is less than its Day-Ahead Regulation Service schedule and the real-time Regulation Capacity Market price is less than or equal to the Day-Ahead Regulation Capacity Bid price then:

$$CDMAPreg_{iu} = [(DASreg_{hu} - RTSreg_{iu}) * (RTPreg_{iu} - DABreg_{hu})] * \frac{Seconds_i}{3600} + [(-1 * RTMreg_{iu}) * \max(0, RTPreg_{iu} - RTBreg_{iu})]$$

If the LESR's real-time Regulation Service schedule is greater than or equal to the Day-Ahead Regulation Service schedule then:

$$CDMAPreg_{iu} = [(DASreg_{hu} - RTSreg_{iu}) * \max((RTPreg_{iu} - RTBreg_{iu}), 0)] * \frac{Seconds_i}{3600} + [(-1 * RTMreg_{iu}) * \max(0, RTPreg_{iu} - RTBreg_{iu})]$$

25.3.4 Terms Used in this Attachment J

The terms used in the formulas in this Attachment J shall be defined as follows:

h is the hour that includes interval *i*;

- DMAP_{hu}* = the Day-Ahead Margin Assurance Payment attributable in any hour *h* to any Supplier *u*;
- CDMAP_{iu}* = the contribution of RTD interval *i* to the Day-Ahead Margin Assurance Payment for Supplier *u*;
- CDMAPen_{iu}* = the Energy contribution of RTD interval *i* to the Day-Ahead Margin Assurance Payment for Supplier *u*;
- CDMAPreg_{iu}* = the Regulation Service contribution of RTD interval *i* to the Day-Ahead Margin Assurance Payment for Supplier *u*;
- CDMAPres_{iup}* = the Operating Reserve contribution of RTD interval *i* to the Day-Ahead Margin Assurance Payment for Supplier *u* determined separately for each Operating Reserve product *p*;
- DASen_{hu}* = Day-Ahead Energy schedule for Supplier *u* in hour *h*;
- DASreg_{hu}* = Day-Ahead schedule for Regulation Service for Supplier *u* in hour *h*;
- DASres_{hup}* = Day-Ahead schedule for Operating Reserve product *p*, for Supplier *u* in hour *h*;
- DABen_{hu}* = Day-Ahead Energy Bid cost for Supplier *u* in hour *h*, including the Minimum Generation Bid and Incremental Energy Bids;

- $DABreg_{hu}$ = Day-Ahead Regulation Capacity Bid price for Supplier u in hour h ;
- $DABres_{hup}$ = Day-Ahead Availability Bid for Operating Reserve product p for Supplier u in hour h ;
- $RTSen_{iu}$ = real-time Energy scheduled for Supplier u in interval i , and calculated as the arithmetic average of the 6-second AGC Base Point Signals sent to Supplier u during the course of interval i ;
- $RTSreg_{iu}$ = real-time schedule for Regulation Service for Supplier u in interval i .
- $RTSres_{iup}$ = real-time schedule for Operating Reserve product p for Supplier u in interval i .
- $RTBreg_{iu}$ = real-time Regulation Capacity Bid price for Supplier u in interval i .
- $RTBen_{iu}$ = real-time Energy Bid cost for Supplier u in interval i , including the Minimum Generation Bid and Incremental Energy Bids.
- $RTBregm_{iu}$ = real-time Regulation Movement Bid price for Supplier u in interval i .
- $RTMreg_{iu}$ = real-time Regulation Movement MWs for Supplier u in interval i ;
- AE_{iu} = either, (1) when $RTSen_{iu}$ is greater than zero MW, average actual Energy injections or withdrawals by Supplier u in interval i but not more than $RTSen_{iu}$ plus Compensable Overgeneration; or (2) when $RTSen_{iu}$ is less than or equal to zero MW, average actual Energy injections or withdrawal by Supplier u in interval i ;
- $RTPen_{iu}$ = real-time price of Energy at the location of Supplier u in interval i ;
- $RTPreg_{iu}$ = real-time price of Regulation Capacity at the location of Supplier u in interval i ;
- $RTPres_{iup}$ = real-time price of Operating Reserve product p at the location of Supplier u in interval i ;
- $RTPregm_{iu}$ = real-time Regulation Movement Market Price at the location of Supplier u in interval i ;
- LL_{iu} = When the Day-Ahead Energy schedule is to inject, given that $RTSen_{iu} < DASen_{hu}$, either:
- (a) if $RTSen_{iu} < EOP_{iu}$, then $LL_{iu} = \max(\min(\max(RTSen_{iu}, \min(AE_{iu}, EOP_{iu})), DASen_{hu}), 0)$; or
- (b) if $RTSen_{iu} \geq EOP_{iu}$, then $LL_{iu} = \max(\min(RTSen_{iu}, \max(AE_{iu}, EOP_{iu}), DASen_{hu}), 0)$
- When the Day-Ahead Energy schedule is to withdraw, given that $RTSen_{iu} > DASen_{hu}$:
- $$LL_{iu} = \min(\max(DASen_{hu}, AE_{iu}, EOP_{iu}), RTSen_{iu}, 0)$$
- UL_{iu} = When the Day-Ahead Energy schedule is to inject, or the Day-Ahead Energy schedule is zero MW and the real-time Energy schedule is to inject, given that $RTSen_{iu} \geq DASen_{hu}$, either:
- (a) if $RTSen_{iu} \geq EOP_{iu} \geq DASen_{hu}$, then $UL_{iu} = \min(RTSen_{iu}, \max(AE_{iu}, EOP_{iu}))$; or
- (b) otherwise, then $UL_{iu} = \max(RTSen_{iu}, \min(AE_{iu}, EOP_{iu}))$

When the Day-Ahead Energy schedule is to withdraw, or the Day-Ahead Energy schedule is zero MW and the real-time Energy schedule is to withdraw, given that $RTSen_{iu} \leq DASen_{hu}$:

$$UL_{iu} = \min (RTSen_{iu}, \max (AE_{iu}, EOP_{iu}))$$

EOP_{iu} = the Economic Operating Point of Supplier u in interval i calculated without regard to ramp rates;

$Seconds_i$ = number of seconds in interval i

KPI_{pi} = the factor derived from the Regulation Service Performance index for Resource u for interval i as defined in Rate Schedule 3 of this Services Tariff.

25.4 Exception for Generators Lagging Behind RTD Base Point Signals

If an otherwise eligible Generator's average Actual Energy Injection in an RTD interval (*i.e.*, its Actual Energy Injections averaged over the RTD interval) is less than or equal to its penalty limit for under-generation value for that interval, as computed below, it shall not be eligible for Day-Ahead Margin Assurance Payments for that interval.

The penalty limit for under-generation value is the tolerance described in Section 15.3A.1 of Rate Schedule 3-A of this ISO Services Tariff, which is used in the calculation of the persistent under-generation charge applicable to Generators that are not providing Regulation Service.

25.5 Rules Applicable to Supplier Derates

Suppliers that request and are granted a derate of their real-time Operating Capacity, but that are otherwise eligible to receive Day-Ahead Margin Assurance Payments may receive a payment up to a Capacity level consistent with their revised Emergency Upper Operating Limit or Normal Upper Operating Limit, whichever is applicable. The foregoing rule shall also apply to a Generator otherwise eligible for a Day-Ahead Margin Assurance Payment in hours in which the ISO has derated the Generator's Operating Capacity in order to reconcile the ISO's dispatch with the Generator's actual output, or to address reliability concerns that arise because the Generator is not following Base Point Signals. If a Supplier's derated real-time Operating Capacity is lower than the sum of its Day-Ahead Energy, Regulation Services, and Operating Reserve schedules then when the ISO conducts the calculations described in Section 25.3 above, the $DASen$, $DASeg$ and $DASres_p$ variables will be reduced by $REDen$, $REDreg$ and $REDres_p$ respectively. $REDen$, $REDreg$ and $REDres_p$ shall be calculated using the formulas below:

$$REDtot_{iu} = \max\left(DASen_{hu} + DASreg_{hu} + \sum_p DASres_{hup} - RTUOL_{iu}, 0\right)$$

$$POTREDen_{iu} = \max(DASen_{hu} - RTSen_{iu}, 0)$$

$$POTREDreg_{iu} = \max(DASreg_{hu} - RTSreg_{iu}, 0)$$

$$POTREDres_{iup} = \max(DASres_{hup} - RTSres_{iup}, 0)$$

$$REDen_{iu} = \left(POTREDen_{iu} / \left(POTREDen_{iu} + POTREDreg_{iu} + \sum_p POTREDres_{iup} \right) \right) * REDtot_{iu}$$

$$REDreg_{iu} = \left(POTREDreg_{iu} / \left(POTREDen_{iu} + POTREDreg_{iu} + \sum_p POTREDres_{iup} \right) \right) * REDtot_{iu}$$

$$REDres_{iup} = \left(POTREDres_{iup} / \left(POTREDen_{iu} + POTREDreg_{iu} + \sum_p POTREDres_{iup} \right) \right) * REDtot_{iu}$$

where:

- $RTUOL_{iu}$ = The real-time Emergency Upper Operating Limit or Normal Upper Operating Limit whichever is applicable of Supplier u in interval i
- $REDtot_{iu}$ = The total amount in MW that Day-Ahead schedules need to be reduced to account for the derate of Supplier u in interval i
- $REDen_{iu}$ = The amount in MW that the Day-Ahead Energy schedule is reduced for the purposes of calculating the Day-Ahead Margin Assurance Payment for Supplier u in interval i
- $REDreg_{iu}$ = The amount in MW that Supplier u 's Day-Ahead Regulation Service schedule is reduced for the purposes of calculating the Day-Ahead Margin Assurance Payment in interval i
- $REDres_{iup}$ = The amount in MW that Supplier u 's Day-Ahead Operating Reserve schedule for Operating Reserves product p is reduced for the purposes of calculating the Day-Ahead Margin Assurance Payment in interval i
- $POTREDen_{iu}$ = The potential amount in MW that Supplier u 's Day-Ahead Energy schedule could be reduced for the purposes of calculating the Day-Ahead Margin Assurance Payment for Supplier u in interval i
- $POTREDreg_{iu}$ = The potential amount in MW that Supplier u 's Day-Ahead Regulation Service schedule could be reduced for the purposes of calculating the Day-Ahead Margin Assurance Payment for Supplier u in interval i
- $POTREDres_{iup}$ = The potential amount in MW that Supplier u 's Day-Ahead Operating Reserve Schedule for Operating Reserve product p could be reduced for the purposes of calculating the Day-Ahead Margin Assurance Payment for Supplier u in interval i

All other variables are as defined above.

25.6 Import Curtailment Guarantee Payments

25.6.1 Eligibility for an Import Curtailment Guarantee Payment for an Import Curtailed by the ISO

In the event that the Energy injections for an Import scheduled by RTC or RTD at a Proxy Generator Bus, other than a CTS Enabled Proxy Generator Bus, are Curtailed at the request of the ISO, and (i) the real-time Energy Profile MW is equal to or greater than the Day-Ahead Energy Schedule for that interval, and (ii) the real-time Decremental Bid is less than or equal to the default real-time Decremental Bid amount as established by ISO procedures, then the Supplier or Transmission Customer that is subjected to the Curtailment, in addition to the charge for Energy Imbalance, shall be eligible for an Import Curtailment Guarantee Payment as determined in Section 25.6.2 of this Attachment J. Suppliers scheduling Imports at CTS Enabled Proxy Generator Buses shall not be eligible for Import Curtailment Guarantee payments for those Transactions.

25.6.2 Formula for an Import Curtailment Guarantee Payment for a Supplier Whose Import Was Curtailed by the ISO

A Supplier eligible under Section 25.6.1 of this Attachment J shall receive an Import Curtailment Guarantee Payment for its curtailed Energy injections that is equal to the daily sum of the hourly payments which, for each hour of Import t, is calculated as the greater of the interval payments determined for the hour or zero as seen in the formula below.

Import Curtailment Guarantee Payment to Supplier u in association with Import t =

$$\sum_{h=1}^N \max \left(\sum_{i=1}^H (RTLBM P_{ti} - \max(DADecBid_{ti}, 0)) * (DAen_{ti} - RTDen_{ti}) * \frac{S_i}{3600}, 0 \right)$$

Where

N = the number of hours in the Dispatch Day

- H = the number of intervals in hour h
- i = the relevant interval in hour h ;
- S_i = number of seconds in interval i ;
- $RTLBM P_{t,i}$ = the real-time LBMP, in \$/MWh, for interval i at the Proxy Generator Bus which is the source of the Import t .
- $DA Dec Bid_{t,i}$ = the Day Ahead Decremental Bid price associated with the Day-Ahead energy schedule, in \$/MWh, for Import t in hour h containing interval i ;
- $DA en_{t,i}$ = the Day Ahead scheduled Energy injections, in MWh, for Import t in hour h containing interval i as determined by Security Constrained Unit Commitment (SCUC); and
- $RT Den_{t,i}$ = the scheduled Energy injections, in MWh, for Import t in interval i as determined by Real-Time Dispatch (RTD).