## 38.11 Entry into RMR Agreements

38.11.1 The ISO may enter into an RMR Agreement for service from one or more of the Generators that the ISO selected in accordance with Section 38.10 that can individually, or in conjunction with other Viable and Sufficient Generator Deactivation Solutions, satisfy the identified Reliability Need. If multiple Generators are capable of satisfying in whole or in part the identified Reliability Need, the ISO may execute an RMR Agreement with the Generator, or more than one Generator that the ISO selected pursuant to Section 38.10, provided that the RMR Service Offer accepts the Availability and Performance Rate, does not exceed the RMR Avoidable Costs determined by the ISO, and that the amount of Capital Expenditures in any given year included in the RMR Service Offer does not exceed 10,000,000 U.S. Dollars if a non-nuclear Generator, and 25,000,000 U.S. Dollars if a nuclear Generator. If the RMR Service Offer satisfies the stated requirements, but the amount of Capital Expenditures in any given year included in the RMR Service Offer exceeds the applicable limit in the preceding sentence, then the ISO may accept the RMR Service Offer conditioned upon the Commission approving the Capital Expenditure amount. If the RMR Service Offer exceeds the RMR Avoidable Costs determined by the ISO, and if there are no modifications, or only modifications which the ISO has determined are reasonable, to the *Form of Reliability Must Run Agreement* set forth in Appendix C of this Attachment FF, then the ISO will identify the Generator, and the ISO and the Generator Owner will submit filings to the Commission in accordance with Section 38.11.5. If a Generator’s RMR Service Offer is lower than the other RMR Service Offers but the Generator’s proposed revisions to the *Form of Reliability Must Run Agreement* are not acceptable to the ISO, then the ISO may proceed to enter into an RMR Agreement, in accordance with this section, with one or more Generator(s) that submitted the next best offer or offers pursuant to Section 38.10.3.

38.11.2 The ISO will tender to the Generator Owner(s) of the selected Generator(s) the *Form of Reliability Must Run Agreement* set forth in Appendix C of this Attachment FF. The term of the RMR Agreement will be determined by the ISO based on: (i) the in-service date of the conceptual permanent solution to the identified Reliability Need submitted by the Responsible Transmission Owner(s) pursuant to Section 38.4.2.1, and (ii) any modifications to the scope and timing of the Generator Deactivation Reliability Need resulting from circumstances including information provided by the NYPSC (or other agency or authority with jurisdiction over the implementation or siting of non-generation Generator Deactivation Solutions), information provided by the Responsible Transmission Owner, the ISO’s identification of market-based solutions, and RMR Agreements entered into between the ISO and other Generators. If the Generator Deactivation Reliability Need is identified pursuant to a Generator Deactivation Assessment, the effective date of the RMR Agreement shall be no earlier than the completion of the 365-day notice period, except as provided in Section 38.3.3 of this Attachment FF.

### 38.11.3 Filing of Executed RMR Agreement

The ISO will submit an RMR Agreement, including a proposed Availability and Performance Rate, to the Commission pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act if the ISO and Generator Owner agree on the terms and conditions of the RMR Agreement, Generator Owner accepts the Availability and Performance Rate calculated by the ISO for its Generator, and the ISO and Generator Owner execute the RMR Agreement. The ISO’s filing shall specifically identify and explain any changes to the *Form of Reliability Must Run Agreement* terms and conditions that ISO and Generator Owner have mutually agreed to.

### 38.11.4 Filing of Unexecuted RMR Agreement by ISO and Capital Expenditures in Excess of Annual Limit by Generator Owner

The ISO will submit an RMR Agreement, including a proposed Availability and Performance Rate, to the Commission pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act if the ISO and Generator Owner agree on the terms and conditions of the RMR Agreement and Generator Owner accepts the Availability and Performance Rate calculated by the ISO for its Generator. The ISO’s filing shall specifically identify and explain any changes to the *Form of Reliability Must Run Agreement* terms and conditions that ISO and Generator Owner have mutually agreed to. Generator Owner shall submit a filing pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act in addition to the ISO’s filing of the RMR Agreement that proposes the inclusion of the costs of certain Capital Expenditures in the Availability and Performance Rate that exceed the U.S. Dollar limits specified in Section 38.11.1, which filing shall be consistent with the terms and conditions of service proposed in the RMR Agreement that the ISO submits, and shall track the format of the RMR Agreement that the ISO submits.

### 38.11.5 Filing of Unexecuted RMR Agreement and Generator Owner Developed Rate

If the ISO and Generator Owner agree on the terms and conditions of the RMR Agreement, but Generator Owner rejects the Availability and Performance Rate calculated by the ISO for its Generator and proposes an Owner Developed Rate, the ISO will submit an unexecuted RMR Agreement to the Commission pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act that sets forth the agreed upon terms and conditions of the RMR Agreement. The ISO’s filing shall specifically identify and explain any changes to the *Form of Reliability Must Run Agreement* terms and conditions that ISO and Generator Owner have mutually agreed to. Generator Owner shall submit a separate filing to the Commission pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act that proposes an “Owner Developed Rate,” which filing shall be consistent with the terms and conditions of service proposed in the RMR Agreement the ISO submitted and shall track the format of the RMR Agreement the ISO submitted.

38.11.6 As part of its submission of an executed RMR Agreement pursuant to 38.11.3 or an unexecuted RMR Agreement pursuant to Sections 38.11.4 or 38.11.5, the ISO will include: (i) a description of the methodology and results of the reliability studies that identified a Generator Deactivation Reliability Need requiring a Generator Deactivation Solution, which description will specify identified violations of Reliability Criteria and local criteria and describe the impacted criteria, and (ii) a description of the alternative solutions evaluated by the ISO and why the term of the RMR Agreement is appropriate in light of these alternative solutions.

## 38.12 Developer’s Responsibility Following Selection of Its Transmission Solution

### 38.12.1 Responsible Transmission Owner’s Obligation to Develop and Construct a Generator Deactivation Solution

The Responsible Transmission Owner must develop and construct its proposed Generator Deactivation Solution if it is selected by the ISO pursuant to Section 38.10. The Responsible Transmission Owner shall be entitled to the full recovery of all reasonably incurred costs, including a reasonable return on investment and any applicable incentives, related to the development, construction, operation, and maintenance of the selected transmission Generator Deactivation Solution, as set forth in Section 38.23.

### 38.12.2 Developer’s Responsibility to Obtain Necessary Approvals and Authorizations

38.12.2.1 Upon the selection of a Developer’s transmission Generator Deactivation Solution pursuant to Section 38.10, the ISO will inform the Developer that it should submit the selected Generator Deactivation Solution to the appropriate governmental agency(ies) and/or authority(ies) to begin the necessary approval process to the site, construct, and operate the project, if such approvals are required. In response to the ISO’s request, the Developer shall make such a submission to the appropriate governmental agency(ies) and/or authority(ies) to the extent such authorization has not already been requested or obtained.

38.12.2.2 If the appropriate federal, state or local agency(ies) either rejects a necessary authorization, or approves and later withdraws its authorization of the selected transmission Generator Deactivation Solution, the Developer may recover all of the necessary and reasonable costs it incurred and commitments made up to the final federal, state or local regulatory decision, including reasonable and necessary expenses incurred to implement an orderly termination of the project, to the extent permitted by the Commission in accordance with its regulations on abandoned plant recovery. The ISO shall allocate these costs among Load Serving Entities in accordance with Section 38.22 the ISO OATT, except as otherwise determined by the Commission. The ISO shall recover such costs in accordance with Section 38.23.

### 38.12.3 Development Agreement

As soon as reasonably practicable following the ISO’s selection of a transmission Generator Deactivation Solution, the ISO shall tender to the Developer that proposed the selected transmission Generator Deactivation Solution a draft Development Agreement, with draft appendices completed by the ISO to the extent practicable, for review and completion by the Developer. The draft Development Agreement shall be in the form of the ISO’s Commission-approved Development Agreement for its reliability planning process, which is in Appendix C in Section 31.7 of Attachment Y of the ISO OATT, as amended by the ISO to reflect the Generator Deactivation Process.

The ISO and the Developer shall finalize the Development Agreement and appendices as soon as reasonably practicable after the ISO’s tendering of the draft Development Agreement. For purposes of finalizing the Development Agreement, the ISO and Developer shall develop the description and dates for the milestones necessary to develop and construct the selected project by the required in-service date identified in the Generator Deactivation Assessment, including the milestones for obtaining all necessary authorizations. Any milestone that requires action by a Connecting Transmission Owner or Affected System Operator identified pursuant to Attachment P of the ISO OATT to complete must be included as an Advisory Milestone, as that term is defined in the Development Agreement.

If the ISO or the Developer determines that negotiations are at an impasse, the ISO may file the Development Agreement in unexecuted form with the Commission on its own, or following the Developer’s request in writing that the agreement be filed unexecuted. If the Development Agreement is executed by both parties, the ISO shall file the agreement with the Commission for its acceptance within ten (10) Business Days after the execution of the Development Agreement by both parties. If the Developer requests that the Development Agreement be filed unexecuted, the ISO shall file the agreement at the Commission within ten (10) Business Days of receipt of the request from the Developer. The ISO will draft, to the extent practicable, the portions of the Development Agreement and appendices that are in dispute and will provide an explanation to the Commission of any matters as to which the parties disagree. The Developer will provide in a separate filing any comments that it has on the unexecuted agreement, including any alternative positions it may have with respect to the disputed provisions. Upon the ISO’s and the Developer’s execution of the Development Agreement or the ISO’s filing of an unexecuted Development Agreement with the Commission, the ISO and the Developer shall perform their respective obligations in accordance with the terms of the Development Agreement that are not in dispute, subject to modification by the Commission. The Connecting Transmission Owner(s) and Affected System Operator(s) that are identified in Attachment P of the ISO OATT in connection with the selected transmission Generator Deactivation Solution shall act in good faith in timely performing their obligations that are required for the Developer to satisfy its obligations under the Development Agreement.

**38.12.4 Process for Addressing Inability of Developer to Complete Selected Transmission Generator Deactivation Solution**

38.12.4.1 The ISO may take the action set forth in this Section 38.12.4 if: (i) the ISO has selected a regulated transmission Generator Deactivation Solution, and (ii) one of the following events occur: (A) the Developer that proposed the transmission solution does not execute the Development Agreement or does not request that it be filed unexecuted with the Commission as described in Section 38.12.3, or (B) an effective Development Agreement is terminated under the terms of the agreement prior to the completion of the term of the agreement.

38.12.4.2 If the Development Agreement has been filed with and accepted by the Commission, the ISO shall, upon terminating the Development Agreement under the terms of the agreement, file a notice of termination with the Commission.

38.12.4.3 If the ISO determines that it must identify a solution to the Generator Deactivation Reliability Need prior to the next planning cycle of the biennial reliability planning process, the ISO may take one or more of the following actions to address a Generator Deactivation Reliability Need based on the particular circumstances: (i) address the Generator Deactivation Reliability Need as an immediate reliability need pursuant to Section 38.3.3, (ii) direct the Developer to continue with the development of its Generator Deactivation Solution for completion beyond the in-service date required to address the Generator Deactivation Reliability Need, or (iii) request that the Responsible Transmission Owner complete the selected Generator Deactivation Solution if it is an alternative transmission Generator Deactivation Solution.

38.12.4.4 If the Responsible Transmission Owner agrees to complete the selected alternative transmission Generator Deactivation Solution, the Responsible Transmission Owner and the Developer that proposed the selected solution shall work cooperatively with each other to implement the transition, including negotiating in good faith with each other to transfer the project; *provided, however*, that the transfer is subject to: (i) any required approvals by the appropriate governmental agency(ies) and/or authority(ies), (ii) any requirements or restrictions on the transfer of Developer’s rights-of-way under law, conveyance, or contract, and (iii), if the Developer is a New York public authority, any requirements or restrictions on the transfer under the New York Public Authorities Law; *provided, further*, that the Responsible Transmission Owner and the Developer will address any disputes regarding the transfer of the project in accordance with the dispute resolution provisions in Article 11 of the ISO Services Tariff.

## 38.13 Interim Service Providers

38.13.1 At the time the ISO issues its Generator Deactivation Assessment, the ISO shall inform an Initiating Generator that requested a deactivation date prior to the conclusion of the 365 day notice period in its Generator Deactivation Notice whether the Generator will be permitted to deactivate on its requested deactivation date, or will need to remain in service for the 365 day notice period.

38.13.2 If the NYISO does not authorize an Initiating Generator to deactivate by the later of: (a) day 181 of the 365 day notice period, or (b) the date on which the Initiating Generator indicated it wanted to deactivate in its Generator Deactivation Notice, then for the remainder of the 365 day notice period, the Initiating Generator shall be an Interim Service Provider, subject to the following rules and exceptions.

#### 38.13.2.1 Interim Service Providers shall be compensated in accordance with Rate Schedule 8 to the ISO Services Tariff.

38.13.2.1.1 The ISO shall use the costs, revenues, and other information submitted in accordance with Sections 38.3, 38.4, 38.5, 38.7, 38.8 and Appendix B of this Attachment FF that it verifies and/or validates, as applicable to calculate an Interim Service Provider’s rate. If the ISO cannot verify and/or validate, as applicable, a cost or revenue submitted by a Market Party, the ISO shall substitute an estimated value.

38.13.2.2 Generators are not eligible to be Interim Service Providers while they are in an ICAP Ineligible Forced Outage.

38.13.2.3 The ISO may allow a Generator that it determined is needed to remain in service as an Interim Service Provider to deactivate prior to the conclusion of the 365 day notice period if the NYISO provides at least 60 days prior notice that the Generator may deactivate. After the conclusion of this notice period, the Generator will be permitted to deactivate and will no longer be an Interim Service Provider.

38.13.2.4 The ISO may allow a Generator that it determined is needed to remain in service as an Interim Service Provider to deactivate prior to the conclusion of the 365 day notice period if the Generator experiences a Forced Outage of ten days or greater duration, and the ISO provides at least 30 days prior notice that the Generator may deactivate. After the conclusion of this notice period, the Generator will be permitted to deactivate and will not be an Interim Service Provider.

38.13.2.5 Interim Service Providers must comply with the RMR Generator Energy and Ancillary Service Market Participation Rules that are set forth in Section 23.6 of the ISO Services Tariff.

38.13.2.6 Interim Service Providers that have Capacity Resource Interconnection Rights, pursuant to the applicable provisions of Attachment X, Attachment S and Attachment Z to the ISO OATT, must take all required actions to qualify as an Installed Capacity Supplier pursuant to Section 5.12 of the ISO Services Tariff. Interim Service Providers must also comply with the rules that are set forth in Sections 5.14.1.1 and 15.8.6 of the ISO Services Tariff.

38.13.2.7 A Generator that was an Interim Service Provider that has deactivated and that wants to return to participating in any of the ISO Administered Markets while it is eligible to receive market-based rates must give the ISO at least 60 days advance notice of its desire to return to the ISO Administered Markets in order to permit the ISO to determine a repayment obligation (if any) in accordance with Services Tariff Rate Schedule 8, and an associated credit requirement in accordance with Sections 26.4 and 26.5 of the ISO Services Tariff.

38.13.2.8 A Generator that is an Interim Service Provider that wants to continue participating in the ISO Administered Markets while it is eligible to receive market-based rates (after it is no longer an Interim Service Provider and when it is not operating pursuant to an RMR Agreement) must give the ISO at least 30 days advance notice of its desire to continue participating in the ISO Administered Markets in order to permit the ISO to determine and impose a repayment obligation (if any) in accordance with Services Tariff Rate Schedule 8, and an associated credit requirement in accordance with Sections 26.4 and 26.5 of the ISO Services Tariff.

## 38.14 Initiating Generator’s Failure to Timely Deactivate

38.14.1 A Market Participant’s Generator that satisfies the requirements to be Retired or enter into a Mothball Outage may be Retired or enter into a Mothball Outage, as applicable, within 365 days of: (i) the conclusion of the 365-day notice period, or (ii) the date specified in the Generator Deactivation Notice for the Generator to be Retired or enter into a Mothball Outage if the Market Participant provided greater than 365 days prior notice. If the Generator is not Retired or does not enter into a Mothball Outage within this time period, the Market Participant must submit a new Generator Deactivation Notice and satisfy anew the requirements of Sections 38.3.1 before the Generator may be Retired or enter into a Mothball Outage.

38.14.2 If (i) a Market Participant rescinds its Generator Deactivation Notice, or (ii) a Market Participant’s Generator has not Retired or entered into a Mothball Outage within the timeframes described in Section 38.14.1 and is not operating under an RMR Agreement, the Market Participant must reimburse the ISO and the Responsible Transmission Owner(s) the actual costs that each incurred in performing their responsibilities under this Section 38 in response to the Market Participant’s submission of a Generator Deactivation Notice, including any costs associated with using contractors. In the event that a Market Participant rescinds its Generator Deactivation Notice before the ISO posts the results of the Generator Deactivation Assessment conducted under Section 38.3.4, the ISO will not thereafter post the results of said assessment.

38.14.3 If the Initiating Generator was an Interim Service Provider and (i) it rescinds its Generator Deactivation Notice, or (ii) it has not Retired or entered into a Mothball Outage within the timeframes described in Section 38.14.1 and is not operating under an RMR Agreement, then the Initiating Generator may also be subject to a repayment obligation pursuant to Section 15.8.7 of Rate Schedule 8 to the ISO Services Tariff.

## 38.15 Halting of Regulated Transmission Generator Deactivation Solution

38.15.1 The ISO may determine to halt a regulated transmission Generator Deactivation Solution that the ISO has selected pursuant to Section 38.10 to address a Generator Deactivation Reliability Need if: (a) a Market Participant rescinds the Generator Deactivation Notice that resulted in the Generator Deactivation Reliability Need, (b) the Market Participant’s Generator has not Retired or entered into a Mothball Outage within the timeframes described in Section 38.14.1 and is not operating under an RMR Agreement, or (c) the Generator Deactivation Reliability Need has been otherwise addressed or eliminated (*e.g.,* a market-based solution that satisfies the Generator Deactivation Reliability Need has commenced operation). In making its determination whether to halt a transmission Generator Deactivation Solution under this Section 38.15.1, the ISO will consider, among other things: (i) whether the Developer has executed a Development Agreement or requested that it be filed unexecuted with the Commission; (ii) the status of the Developer’s progress against the milestones in the Development Agreement (*e.g.,* completion of engineering design, procurement of major equipment and materials, execution of key contracts, completion of project financing, obtaining Site Control, commencing physical construction, including excavation and pouring for foundations or the installation or erection of improvements); (iii) the status of Developer’s obtaining required permits or authorizations; (iv) whether the Generator Deactivation Solution is an interim or permanent project; and (v) the operational and performance benefits of the Generator Deactivation Solution. If the ISO determines to halt a regulated transmission Generator Deactivation Solution, it will notify the Developer of the project and post the notice on its website. If a selected regulated transmission Generator Deactivation Solution is halted by the ISO, all of the costs incurred and commitments made by the Developer up to that point, including reasonable and necessary expenses incurred to implement an orderly termination of the project, will be recoverable by the Developer in accordance with Section 38.23 and the cost recovery mechanism in Rate Schedule 16 of the ISO OATT.

38.15.2 Notwithstanding Section 38.15.1, the ISO shall not halt a regulated transmission Generator Deactivation Solution once the Developer: (i) has received its Article VII certification or other applicable siting permits or authorizations under New York State law or (ii) if permitting or regulatory approval is not required, has commenced physical construction of the Generator Deactivation Solution, including excavation and pouring for foundations or the installation or erection of improvements.

## 38.16 RMR Generator Additional Costs

### 38.16.1 Proposed Additional Costs

During the performance of an RMR Agreement, the Generator Owner of one or more RMR Generators shall promptly notify the ISO of an event that (a) could not reasonably have been foreseen at the time the rate in the RMR Agreement was executed, and that (b) it reasonably expects may require it to incur costs that in the aggregate exceed the lesser of (x) $250,000, and (y) five (5) percent of the annual RMR Avoidable Costs excluding the cost of Capital Expenditures, that (i) it can reasonably demonstrate was not among the costs (A) submitted to the ISO prior to the execution of an RMR Agreement with an Availability and Performance Rate, or (B) within the categories of costs submitted to the Commission in a petition for an Owner Developed Rate, and (ii) are necessary to incur in order for the RMR Generator to be able to continue to perform its obligations under the RMR Agreement after the event (a “Notice of Event of Proposed Additional Cost”).

If the NYISO informs an Initiating Generator that submitted a Generator Deactivation Notice that the Generator will need to remain in service for the 365 day notice period, the Generator Owner of the Initiating Generator shall promptly notify the ISO of an event (a) that occurred after the Generator Deactivation Notice was submitted, but prior to the conclusion of the 365 day notice period, and (b) that could not reasonably have been foreseen at the time the Generator Deactivation Notice was submitted; where (i) Generator Owner reasonably expects it will be required to incur unanticipated costs that, in the aggregate, will exceed $100,000 to operate for the remainder of the 365 day notice period, and (ii) incurring the costs is necessary for the Generator to be able to perform or continue to perform as an Interim Service Provider after the event (also a “Notice of Event of Proposed Additional Cost”).

Following its submission of the required Notice of Event of Proposed Additional Cost, the Generator Owner shall promptly notify the ISO of, and provide updates addressing the following: (i) the reason(s) why the expense was or must be incurred, (ii) viable alternatives to incurring the expense, (iii) actions examined or taken to avoid the need to incur the expense, and to minimize the expense, (iv) the potential impact on the RMR Generator’s ability to perform its obligations under an RMR Agreement if the expense is not incurred, (v) the estimated and actual costs of the proposed expense, (vi) the plan specifying the schedule and timing of any planned action or expenditure, (vii) an explanation and supporting documentation of how that plan compares with the Generator Owner’s past similar actions and protocols, (viii) whether each cost is associated solely with the RMR Generator or are for services or functions shared with other units or businesses; and if a shared cost, the Generator Owner shall identify the other entities with which the cost is shared, the entity that allocates the cost to it, and accounting protocols and methodology used to allocate the units and businesses across which the cost is allocated.

38.16.1.1 If the cost of returning an RMR Generator to service does not exceed the lesser of (x) $250,000, and (y) five (5) percent of the annual RMR Avoidable Costs excluding the cost of Capital Expenditures, then the Generator Owner shall promptly return the RMR Generator to service without additional recompense.

38.16.1.2 If the cost of returning an Interim Service Provider to service is not expected to exceed $100,000, then the Generator Owner shall promptly return the Generator to service without additional recompense.

#### 38.16.1.3 ISO Identification of Proposed Additional Costs

If the ISO determines that the Notice of Event of Proposed Additional Cost was timely provided and each of the requirements in Subsections (a) and (b) of Section 38.16.1 have been met, and the information required by Subsections (i) through (viii) has been provided, it shall be a “Proposed Additional Cost.”

### 38.16.2 Proposed Additional Cost Eligibility for Recovery

38.16.2.1 The ISO shall review, verify, and/or validate the information provided by the Generator Owner for a Proposed Additional Cost. The ISO may require the Generator Owner to re-submit or to submit additional information to support statements and costs that the ISO determines are not adequately supported or otherwise verifiable. A “Substantiated Additional Cost” shall mean a Proposed Additional Cost that the ISO has either verified is the actual cost, or verified and validated the estimated cost information received from the Generator Owner, provided that (a) the Generator Owner demonstrates it took measures to minimize the expense, or if the ISO determines that the Generator Owner did not demonstrate it took such steps, such amount estimated by the ISO that would be the expense had the RMR Generator or Interim Service Provider taken measures to reduce it, and (b) it is or was necessary for the Generator Owner to incur these costs for the RMR Generator to perform its obligations under the RMR Agreement or for the Interim Service Provider to operate during the 365 day notice period; provided the ISO has not issued a notice of shut-down (or similar notice) to Generator Owner for the RMR Generator pursuant to the RMR Agreement or to Generator Owner of the Interim Service Provider pursuant to Section 38.13.2.3 or 38.13.2.4 of this Attachment FF. If the cost information provided by the Generator Owner cannot be verified and validated by the ISO, the ISO shall substitute the amount it reasonably determines. The ISO shall also identify if the Substantiated Additional Costs, or a component thereof, is a Capital Expenditure by using the applicable criteria set forth in Section 38.8.1.3. The ISO shall notify the Generator Owner of its determination regarding whether Proposed Additional Costs are Substantiated Additional Costs.

38.16.2.2 The ISO shall seek comment from the Market Monitoring Unit on its review of Proposed Additional Costs and determinations of Substantiated Additional Costs. The responsibilities of the Market Monitoring Unit that are addressed in this Section are also addressed in Section 38.18.1 of this Attachment FF and in Section 30.4.6.8.6 of Attachment O of the ISO Services Tariff.

### 38.16.3 ISO’s Authority to Recover and Pay Substantiated Additional Costs that Are Capital Expenditures to RMR Generators with Availability and Performance Rates

This Section shall apply only to RMR Agreements with an Availability and Performance Rate. If a Substantiated Additional Cost is determined by the ISO to be a Capital Expenditure and it does not exceed 10,000,000 U.S. Dollars if a non-nuclear Generator, or 25,000,000 U.S. Dollars if a nuclear Generator, on the basis of the total expenditure needed to address the event that resulted in the Notice of Event of Proposed Additional Cost, then the ISO may recover the Substantiated Additional Cost that is a Capital Expenditure pursuant to OATT Rate Schedule 14 and pay that amount to Generator Owner in accordance with (a) the rules in Section 38.17 that address the ISO’s payment of Capital Expenditures, and (b) Rate Schedule 8 to the Services Tariff. The ISO shall submit an informational filing to the Commission identifying any Capital Expenditures it is paying pursuant to the authority granted in this section.

### 38.16.4 ISO’s Authority to Recover and Pay Substantiated Additional Costs that are Capital Expenditures to Interim Service Providers

This Section shall apply only to Interim Service Providers. If a Substantiated Additional Cost is determined by the ISO to be a Capital Expenditure and it does not exceed 1,000,000 U.S. Dollars, on the basis of the total expenditure needed to address the event that resulted in the Notice of Event of Proposed Additional Cost, then the ISO may recover the Substantiated Additional Cost that is a Capital Expenditure pursuant to OATT Rate Schedule 14 and pay that amount to Generator Owner in accordance with (a) the rules in Section 38.17 that address the ISO’s payment of Capital Expenditures, and (b) Rate Schedule 8 to the Services Tariff. The ISO shall submit an informational filing to the Commission identifying any Capital Expenditures it is paying pursuant to the authority granted in this section.

### 38.16.5 Owner May Request Commission Approval for Recovery of Additional Costs.

If the Owner makes such a filing, it shall also submit the ISO’s determinations pursuant to Sections 38.16.1.2 and 38.16.2.1 with its filing, or promptly after receipt of either determination. The ISO shall only be obligated to pay the Owner under this section if (a) the Commission determines that the cost filed for the RMR Generator or Interim Service Provider is eligible for recovery as a Proposed or Substantiated Additional Cost, and (b) the Commission approves the specific amount and authorizes its recovery. If the Proposed or Substantiated Additional Cost that the Commission authorizes payment of is for a Capital Expenditure, the ISO will pay in accordance with (a) the rules in Section 38.17 that address the ISO’s payment of Capital Expenditures, and (b) Rate Schedule 8 to the Services Tariff. If the Proposed or Substantiated Additional Cost that the Commission authorizes payment of is an Avoidable Cost that is not a Capital Expenditure then payment directed by a Commission order shall be made in accordance with Rate Schedule 8 to the ISO Services Tariff.

## 38.17 Payment of Capital Expenditures to RMR Generators and Interim Service Providers

38.17.1 Capital Expenditures that are specifically identified (including an estimated cost and estimated in-service date) in a Commission-accepted Availability and Performance Rate or in a Commission-accepted Owner Developed Rate are eligible for recovery in accordance with the rules set forth in Section 38.17, Section 23.6.5 of the ISO Services Tariff, Rate Schedule 8 of the ISO Services Tariff, Schedule 14 of the ISO OATT, and any relevant Commission order.

38.17.2 Capital Expenditures that are Proposed Additional Costs or Substantiated Additional Costs are eligible for recovery in accordance with the rules set forth in Sections 38.16 and 38.17 of the ISO OATT, Section 23.6.5 of the ISO Services Tariff, Rate Schedule 8 of the ISO Services Tariff, Schedule 14 of the ISO OATT, and any relevant Commission order.

38.17.3 The ISO may agree to permit an Interim Service Provider to recover the cost of Capital Expenditures during the 365 day period that follows the Generator Deactivation Assessment Start Date if (a) recovery is authorized as an Additional Cost under Section 38.16 of the ISO OATT, or (b) the Capital Expenditure is necessary to permit the Interim Service Provider to address the Reliability Need, and Generator Owner enters into a written agreement with the ISO in which the Generator Owner commits that the Capital Expenditure will be completed and placed in-service by a specified date or within a range of dates that fall within the 365 day period that follows the Generator Deactivation Assessment Start Date.

### 38.17.4 ISO Authority to Authorize Capital Expenditures

If the ISO determines that (a) Capital Expenditures are necessary for a Generator to provide service under an RMR Agreement, and (b) work on one or more of the Capital Expenditures must commence in advance of Commission action in order to timely, or more timely, address a Generator Deactivation Reliability Need, then the ISO may authorize the Generator Owner to spend up to 10,000,000 U.S. Dollars if a non-nuclear Generator, or 25,000,000 U.S. Dollars if a nuclear Generator, in total, to develop the Capital Expenditure(s) in advance of receiving an order from the Commission. The ISO shall submit an informational filing to the Commission identifying any Capital Expenditures it is authorizing pursuant to the authority granted in this Section. The ISO may recover the cost of such a Capital Expenditure pursuant to Schedule 14 of the ISO OATT and pay the Generator Owner in accordance with (i) the rules in this Section 38.17, and (ii) Rate Schedule 8 to the ISO Services Tariff. If the Commission issues an order rejecting the proposed Capital Expenditure, then the Generator Owner shall cease work on the Capital Expenditure and take reasonable efforts to minimize the costs it incurs. Reimbursement of a rejected Capital Expenditure shall be limited to actual costs incurred, including reasonable wind-down costs, shall be subject to the dollar limits set forth in this section, and shall be reviewed in accordance with Section 38.17.7 below. Allowed wind-down costs shall be reimbursed as additional Avoidable Costs that are not Capital Expenditures. ISO review pursuant to Section 38.17.7 shall include consideration of whether the Generator Owner timely ceased developing a Capital Expenditure and made reasonable efforts to minimize its wind-down costs.

For an Interim Service Provider, if the ISO determines that (x) the requirements of Section 38.17.3 have been satisfied, and (y) the Capital Expenditure does not exceed 1,000,000 U.S. Dollars on the basis of the total expenditure needed, then the ISO may recover the Capital Expenditure pursuant to OATT Rate Schedule 14 and pay that amount to Generator Owner in accordance with (a) the rules in this Section 38.17 that address the ISO’s payment of Capital Expenditures, and (b) Rate Schedule 8 to the ISO Services Tariff. The ISO shall submit an informational filing to the Commission identifying any Capital Expenditures it is paying to an Interim Service Provider pursuant to the authority granted in this section.

### 38.17.5 Early Termination of RMR Agreement

If the Generator Owner is working to complete a Capital Expenditure consistent with an accepted RMR Agreement or consistent with an approved or accepted Proposed Additional Cost or Substantiated Additional Cost and the RMR Agreement is terminated early because (x) the Generator Deactivation Reliability Need is resolved sooner than expected, or (y) the RMR Generator suffers a forced outage that would require significant costs to repair, or (z) for any other reason that does not involve an uncured Generator Owner default under the RMR Agreement or the RMR Generator failing to satisfy one or more of the operating standards described in Sections 38.19.4(A) and (B) below, and if Generator Owner ceased work on the Capital Expenditure and made reasonable efforts to minimize the costs it incurred, then, following review, the ISO shall recover the actual costs the Generator Owner incurred to construct the Capital Expenditure and to wind-down its work on the Capital Expenditure pursuant to Schedule 14 of the ISO OATT and pay Generator Owner in accordance with (a) the rules in this Section 38.17, and (b) Rate Schedule 8 to the ISO Services Tariff. Allowed wind-down costs shall be reimbursed as additional Avoidable Costs that are not Capital Expenditures. ISO review pursuant to Section 38.17.7 below shall include consideration of whether the Generator Owner timely ceased developing a Capital Expenditure and made reasonable efforts to minimize its wind-down costs.

38.17.6 The ISO shall not reimburse Interim Service Providers for Capital Expenditures that are not completed and placed in service during the 365 day period that follows the Generator Deactivation Assessment Start Date. The ISO shall not pay wind-down costs to Interim Service Providers. Subject to the foregoing requirements, the ISO’s obligation to pay for Capital Expenditures that are not timely completed in accordance with the written agreement between the Generator Owner and the ISO that is described in Section 38.17.3 shall be addressed in that agreement. Even if a Capital Expenditure by an Interim Service Provider or potential Interim Service Provider is not eligible for compensation under Sections 38.17.3 or 38.17.6, the ISO may agree to pay Capital Expenditure costs that were incurred during the 365 day period that follows the Generator Deactivation Assessment Start Date in an RMR Agreement.

### 38.17.7 ISO Review of Actual Costs Incurred Prior to Commencing Payment

After the Generator Owner expends money for an allowed or accepted Capital Expenditure, including expenditures that may be eligible for recovery under Sections 38.17.4 and 38.17.5 above, it shall submit to the ISO copies of original documentation of the expenditure (including the financing costs) and an explanation of any difference between the estimated amount and the actual expenditure. If Generator Owner submits an actual total amount for a Capital Expenditure that is five (5) percent or more above (a) the estimate that was used by the ISO to develop an Availability and Performance Rate or to authorize recovery of a Substantiated Additional Cost; or (b) the estimate that was presented to the Commission to recover Capital Expenditure costs that exceed the dollar thresholds specified in Section 38.11.1, in an Owner Developed Rate, or in a request by the Generator Owner to recover a Proposed or Substantiated Additional Cost; or (c) an appropriate portion of the estimate provided pursuant to (a) or (b) if the Capital Expenditure was not completed plus wind-down costs (if any), then the Generator Owner shall demonstrate to the ISO that reasonable efforts were made to expend the least amount necessary. The ISO shall review, verify and/or validate the actual expenditure provided by the Generator Owner. The ISO may require the Generator Owner to re-submit, information that the ISO determines is not adequately supported or otherwise verifiable. The amount due for Capital Expenditure shall be equal to the amount verified and validated by the ISO as the actual expenditure. If the ISO cannot verify and/or validate, as applicable, the information the Generator Owner provides, or if the ISO determines that reasonable efforts were not made to expend the least amount necessary, then compensation for the Capital Expenditure shall only be due after the Generator Owner submits its Capital Expenditure to the Commission and the Commission determines the amount to be paid.

38.17.7.1 If the Commission specified the amount that it authorized to be recovered for a particular Capital Expenditure in an order, then the ISO shall permit the Generator Owner to recover the actual amount verified and validated by the ISO, up to the limit(s) specified in the Commission order.

### 38.17.8 ISO Payment and Recovery of Authorized or Accepted Capital Expenditures

38.17.8.1 The ISO shall commence paying for Capital Expenditures as soon as practicable after (i) the capital asset that is a Capital Expenditure (a) has been placed into service, or otherwise integrated into the Generator, or (b) was not placed into service solely due to the ISO instructing the RMR Generator to halt implementation of the Capital Expenditure, or issuing a Notice of Shut-down or terminating the RMR Agreement after costs had already been incurred; and (ii) the amount paid by the Owner is verified and /or validated, as applicable, by the ISO as described in Section 38.17.7, or is determined by the Commission.

38.17.8.2 The ISO shall implement a repayment schedule in accordance with the formula specified in Section 38.17.8.2.1 below for each Capital Expenditure that will permit the Capital Expenditure to be completely repaid by the end date specified in Section 2.2.5 of the *Form of Reliability Must Run Agreement* set forth in Appendix C of this Attachment FF or by the equivalent date specified in an RMR Agreement that is not a *Form of Reliability Must Run Agreement*, or by the conclusion of the 365 day notice period if the ISO is repaying an allowed Capital Expenditure to an Interim Service Provider. If an RMR Agreement terminates prior to the end date that is specified in the RMR Agreement, then the ISO maycontinue repaying any Capital Expenditures the Generator Owner remains eligible to receive until that end date.

#### 38.17.8.2.1 Repayment Schedule for Capital Expenditures

For each Capital Expenditure *CapExMonthly Payment* is the amount that Generator Owner is permitted to recover each month:

Where:

= the amount due for a Capital Expenditure, verified and validated by the ISO as an actual expenditure for Generator *g*.

Month *k* is the month in whichRepayment of a Capital Expenditure commences.

Month *E* is the month that includes the end date specified in Section 2.2.5 in the *Form of Reliability Must Run Agreement* or by the equivalent date specified in an RMR Agreement that is not a *Form of Reliability Must Run Agreement* for Generator *g*, or the conclusion of the 365 day notice period for an Interim Service Provider.

= the number of months from month *k* to month *E*, including month *k* and month *E*.

38.17.8.3 The ISO shall pay the Generator Owner amounts due for Capital Expenditures as a component of RMR Avoidable Costs (for an RMR Agreement with an Availability and Performance Rate or an Interim Service Provider) or RMR Cost (for an RMR Agreement with an Owner Developed Rate) under Rate Schedule 8 to the ISO Services Tariff. The ISO shall recover the cost of Capital Expenditures from RMR LSEs in accordance with Schedule 14 to the OATT.

38.17.8.4 Unless the Commission issues an order instructing it to pay, the ISO shall not pay the cost of Capital Expenditures that Section 23.6.5.2 of the ISO Services Tariff prohibits it from paying, even if the Capital Expenditures might otherwise be payable under the rules specified in this Attachment FF.

38.17.8.5 A Generator Owner that recovers the cost of Capital Expenditures may be required to repay to the ISO the depreciated value of the Capital Expenditure costs it recovered before the RMR Generator or Interim Service Provider at or for which the Capital Expenditure was incurred is permitted to be offered into or scheduled in the ISO Administered Markets. *See* Section 15.8.7 of Rate Schedule 8 to the Services Tariff.

## 38.18 Market Monitoring Unit Review of Determinations

38.18.1 The ISO shall seek comments from the Market Monitoring Unit on matters relating to the inputs and the calculations the ISO performed pursuant to Section 38.8 of this Attachment FF.

38.18.2 The ISO shall seek comments from the Market Monitoring Unit on its review of Proposed Additional Costs and its determinations of Substantiated Additional Costs under Section 38.16 of this Attachment FF.

38.18.3 Concurrent with the ISO or a Generator filing with the Commission an RMR Agreement pursuant to Sections 38.11.3, 38.11.4 or 38.11.5, the Market Monitoring Unit shall publish a report. The report shall review the ISO’s determination of the highest net present value offer (or more than one offer) to provide RMR service in accordance with Sections 38.8, 38.9 and 38.10. In the event that cost alone did not provide for a clear delineation between two or more RMR Service Offers, the report shall also review the ISO’s consideration of the Generator Owner’s proposed changes to the *Form of Reliability Must Run Agreement* and the operational, performance and market impacts, and the size of the Generators. If the RMR Agreement contains RMR Avoidable Costs and an Availability and Performance Rate, the report shall also review the inputs to, and ISO’s calculation of, the RMR Avoidable Costs and the Availability and Performance Rate.

38.18.4 The responsibilities of the Market Monitoring Unit that are addressed in this Section 38.18 are also addressed in Section 30.4.6.8.6 of Attachment O of the ISO Services Tariff.

## 38.19 Terminating RMR Agreements

38.19.1 Each RMR Agreement shall include an end date.  RMR Agreements may incorporate a different end date for each RMR Generator that operates pursuant to the RMR Agreement.

38.19.2 RMR Agreements that include more than one RMR Generator shall permit the ISO to terminate the RMR Agreement for an RMR Generator without requiring the ISO to terminate the RMR Agreement for any or all of the other RMR Generator(s) that are operating pursuant to the same RMR Agreement.

38.19.3 The ISO shall timely terminate an RMR Agreement for an RMR Generator when that RMR Generator is no longer needed to address identified Generator Deactivation Reliability Need(s).

38.19.4 The ISO may terminate an RMR Agreement for an RMR Generator under any of the following circumstances:  (A) if the RMR Generator fails to satisfy any of the minimum operating standards specified in the RMR Agreement; (B) if the RMR Generator repeatedly fails to operate as requested when it is called upon by the ISO or by a Transmission Owner to address one or more of the identified Generator Deactivation Reliability Need(s) the RMR Generator is being retained to address; (C) when the RMR Generator suffers a forced outage that will prevent it from being available for 180 or more days to address the identified Generator Deactivation Reliability Need(s) that the RMR Generator is being retained to address; or (D) if significant Additional Costs arise (*see* Section 38.16) that make the RMR Generator more expensive than other solutions to the identified Generator Deactivation Reliability Need(s).

## 38.20 – Reserved

## 38.21 Reserved