CUIDocket No. ER26-2698-000 1

196 FERC ¶ 61,073

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

 

Before Commissioners:  Laura V. Swett, Chairman;

                                        David Rosner, Lindsay S. See,

                                        Judy W. Chang, and David LaCerte.

 

New York Independent System Operator, Inc.

Docket No.

 ER26-2698-000

 

ORDER ACCEPTING TARIFF REVISIONS, SUBJECT TO CONDITION

 

(Issued July 28, 2026)

 

  1.                On May 29, 2026, as supplemented on July 8, 2026, pursuant to section 205 of the Federal Power Act (FPA)[1] and Part 35 of the Commission’s regulations,[2] New York Independent System Operator, Inc. (NYISO) submitted proposed revisions to Attachment HH of NYISO’s Open Access Transmission Tariff (OATT)[3] to incorporate additional efficiencies into its new Cluster Study Process[4] implemented in response to Order                 Nos. 2023 and 2023-A.[5]  As discussed below, we accept NYISO’s proposed OATT revisions, subject to condition, effective July 29, 2026, as requested, and direct NYISO to submit a compliance filing within 30 days of the date of this order.

I.                   Background

  1.                On July 28, 2023, the Commission issued Order No. 2023.  Order No. 2023 required all public utility transmission providers to adopt certain revisions to the generator interconnection process, including revised pro forma Large Generator Interconnection Procedures (LGIP) and a revised pro forma Large Generator Interconnection Agreement (LGIA),[6] to ensure that interconnection customers are able to interconnect to the transmission system in a reliable, efficient, transparent, and timely manner, and to prevent undue discrimination.[7]  In Order No. 2023, the Commission revised the pro forma LGIP and pro forma LGIA to require transmission providers to study interconnection requests in clusters.[8] 
  2.                The Commission explained in Order No. 2023 that variations from the Commission’s pro forma LGIP and pro forma LGIA would be reviewed under the same standard allowed by Order Nos. 2003, 2006, and 845.[9]  In Order No. 2003, the Commission permitted Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent System Operators (RTO/ISO) to seek “independent entity variations” for pricing and                     non-pricing provisions, and stated that RTOs/ISOs “shall therefore have greater flexibility to customize [their] interconnection procedures and agreements to fit regional needs.”[10]  The Commission stated that this approach recognizes that an RTO/ISO is less likely to act in an unduly discriminatory manner than a transmission provider that is a market participant.[11]  The Commission has granted independent entity variations from interconnection-related rulemakings where the RTO/ISO demonstrates that the proposed variation:  (1) is just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential; and    (2) accomplishes the purposes of the order.[12] 
  3.                In May 2024, NYISO submitted its initial proposal to comply with the requirements of Order No. 2023.  Through several orders on compliance, the Commission accepted certain aspects of NYISO’s compliance proposals, granted a number of independent entity variations, and directed further compliance.[13]  Among other things, the Commission granted NYISO’s requested independent entity variation to adopt a 460-day, two-phase cluster study for both small and large generating facilities, with a decision period to enter each study phase, in place of the cluster study, cluster restudy, and individual facilities study structure adopted in Order No. 2023.[14]  On July 14, 2026, NYISO’s latest filing to comply with Order No. 2023 was accepted without further compliance directives.[15]

II.                Filing

  1.                NYISO states that it initiated its inaugural Cluster Study Process – the Transition Cluster Study – on August 1, 2024.[16]  NYISO asserts that this study began with nearly 400 projects and more than 70 GW of proposed generation, double NYISO’s peak load, which created unique challenges that stemmed from excessive iterations of deficiency reviews driven by inconsistent or incomplete interconnection request submissions, as well as delays caused by lengthy deficiency cure periods, withdrawals, and resolution of disputes.[17]  To address these challenges, NYISO proposes revisions to Attachment HH of its OATT to incorporate efficiencies into its Cluster Study Process.  NYISO states that these proposed revisions build on its existing independent entity variations to revise and clarify tariff provisions that have proven to be ambiguous or unduly difficult to implement in NYISO’s experience or to otherwise improve the existing procedures based on lessons learned.[18]
  2.                NYISO proposes several tariff revisions to improve the efficiency in the submission and validation of interconnection requests, including:  (1) eliminating unnecessary or redundant fields and clarifying submission requirements on its interconnection request form; and (2) revising its interconnection request information requirements to establish that technical data and modeling data submitted with the Pending Project’s interconnection request need not be resubmitted with the Contingent Project’s interconnection request submission because NYISO is able to populate this information itself.[19]  NYISO explains that these proposed changes will reduce administrative burdens on the interconnection customer, eliminate possible inconsistencies arising between two submissions for the same project, and minimize deficiencies and corresponding withdrawals.[20]
  3.                NYISO next proposes several tariff revisions to improve the Phase 1 and Phase 2 Studies.[21]  First, NYISO proposes an avenue through which the next-in-line Cluster Study Project can proceed to use an available Point of Interconnection due to a higher queued Cluster Study Project’s failure to proceed.[22]  For example, a Cluster Study Project that has been deemed Physically Infeasible in the Customer Engagement Window because the Point of Interconnection could only accommodate one Cluster Study Project would be permitted to request conditional entry into the Phase 1 Study if the higher-queued project did not meet Phase 1 Study entry requirements, such as providing Readiness Deposit 1.  NYISO contends that these revisions provide additional opportunities for interconnection customers to advance through the interconnection process without burdening other parties.[23]  Second, NYISO proposes to clarify that the timing requirements for the performance of the Phase 1 Study apply to only those Affected Transmission Owners that NYISO identifies in response to the interconnection customer’s submission of its interconnection request.  Thus, if an Affected Transmission Owner is subsequently identified during the Phase 1 Study process, the Affected Transmission Owner may complete its Phase 1 Study as part of the Phase 2 Study process.  NYISO states that it is not always able to identify an Affected Transmission Owner based solely on the information submitted by the interconnection customer with its interconnection request because certain system impacts may only become clear as part of the study process or with additional input from the Connecting Transmission Owners.  For example, if an Affected Transmission Owner is identified later in the process, NYISO states that it may have difficulty completing any required Phase 1 Study within the timeframes for that study established in the OATT, which can result in delays to the completion of the             Phase 1 Study process for all Cluster Study Projects.  NYISO explains that its proposed revisions will reduce the impact on the timeframe for the overall Cluster Study of those Affected Transmission Owners that are not immediately identified, and contends that they provide a reasonable period of time for those Affected Transmission Owners to perform a Phase 1 Study without delaying the progression of the Cluster Study.[24]  Third, NYISO proposes two revisions to improve coordination among the parties in the Cluster Study Process:  (1) Connecting Transmission Owners and Affected Transmission Owners must review comments from interconnection customers and NYISO and provide responses with the finalized Phase 1 Study report; and (2) NYISO will provide a Cluster Study upgrade summary after the completion of each Cluster Study.
  4.                NYISO next proposes several tariff revisions to limit the impact of Cluster Study Project withdrawals.[25]  First, NYISO proposes to clarify the scenarios in which a project may be deemed Physically Infeasible.[26]  For example, NYISO proposes to clarify that all three existing criteria under Scenario No. 1 must be met to determine that a Cluster Study Project is Physically Infeasible:  (1) the substation for the selected Point of Interconnection does not have any available bus positions; (2) the substation is not expandable electrically or within the existing substation footprint; and (3) adjacent usable vacant land is not available.  NYISO also proposes adding to the third criterion in Scenario No. 1 that the transmission owner is the party determining whether adjacent usable vacant land is available.  NYISO also proposes various other clarifications to the Physically Infeasibility scenarios.  NYISO contends that these proposed changes will ensure consistent application when applying the Physical Infeasibility definition and thus help to eliminate unnecessary withdrawals and reduce the number of disputes.[27]  NYISO also proposes limiting the scope of transmission owner-specific technical information requests and aligning all deficiency cure periods for post-interconnection request validation informational requests to all be 10 business days, specifically aligning on business days as a unit of measure, which NYISO argues will clarify requirements and reduce confusion.[28] 
  5.                NYISO further proposes to eliminate withdrawal cure periods for certain              time-critical deficiencies, namely:  (1) failure to submit the initial study deposit or timely respond to information requests during the Application Window and Customer Engagement Window; (2) failure to submit Readiness Deposit 1 or meet the deadline to proceed to Phase 1; (3) failure to submit Readiness Deposit 2; and (4) failure to meet the deadlines for the Final Decision Period or Additional System Deliverability Upgrades (SDU) Decision Period.[29]  NYISO also proposes to remove an exception which provides for a 10 business day cure period for failure to timely make a payment or submit deposits.[30]  NYISO states that the standard 15 business day cure period set forth in Section 40.6.4.1 will apply to withdrawals due to non-payment, other than those listed above.[31]  For example, if an interconnection customer fails to timely pay a monthly invoice for study costs, it will be subject to withdrawal and afforded 15 business days to make the required payment.  NYISO argues that these revisions will reduce the potential for study delays and notes that the interconnection customer will still be able to initiate Dispute Resolution concerning the deficiencies that led to the withdrawal.  NYISO notes that the tariff language included with its Initial Filing inadvertently misnumbered the categories of exceptions to the 15 business day cure period in Section 40.6.4.1, creating the potential for confusion.[32]  NYISO consents to the Commission conditioning its acceptance of the filing on NYISO submitting a compliance filing to correct this misnumbering, and NYISO proposes illustrative tariff language that would be included in this compliance filing.
  6.           In addition, NYISO proposes to permit an interconnection customer to conditionally enter the Phase 1 Study or Phase 2 Study if it has a pending dispute.  NYISO contends that this revision will ensure that Cluster Study Projects that are ultimately determined in a dispute resolution proceeding to be eligible to proceed in the Cluster Study are not foreclosed from doing so because they were not permitted to satisfy the requirements to move on to the next process stage.[33]
  7.           NYISO next proposes tariff revisions to provide efficiency improvements in the Cluster Study Process.[34]  NYISO first proposes to clarify rules concerning the timing of Contingent Project withdrawal.[35]  NYISO proposes to provide that, if the interconnection customer accepts the System Upgrade Facilities Project Cost Allocation or the Connecting Transmission Owner Attachment Facilities required for the Energy Resource Interconnection Service for the Pending Project in any decision round in the Final Decision Period, then NYISO shall withdraw the Contingent Project.  NYISO then proposes to clarify its Final Decision Period rule which states that an interconnection customer with increased costs must elect anew in the next round whether to accept its updated project cost allocation and pay cash or post security for the updated amount, unless its costs do not increase by greater than 10%.  NYISO proposes to clarify how it calculates the greater than 10% amount for the Final Decision Period requirements: specifically, the greater than 10% amount will be determined not based on cost increases between individual rounds but based on the cumulative increase in costs that occur across multiple rounds.[36]  NYISO explains that this revision will prevent the interconnection customer from facing the unreasonable situation in which its cost increases end up cumulatively much higher than 10%, but it does not have the opportunity to make a new election.  NYISO also proposes to subject Interconnection Customers to interest for unpaid invoiced amounts and to calculate such interest in accordance with the interest rate established by the Commission’s regulations.[37]  NYISO argues that it cannot postpone its payments for study work incurred in the Cluster Study Process because an interconnection customer fails to timely pay its invoice.[38]
  8.           NYISO proposes tariff revisions to provide pre- and post-Cluster Study Process improvements.[39]  Specifically, NYISO proposes to remove the requirement that the            Pre-Application Report cover up to two Points of Interconnection for each request.[40]  NYISO states that, where there are two Points of Interconnection, there may be two different Connecting Transmission Owners, making a single Pre-Application Report impractical.  NYISO also proposes that, for the Pre-Application Report process, the applicable Connecting Transmission Owner, in coordination with any Affected Transmission Owners, must complete and return to the requesting entity a                             Pre-Application Report.  NYISO further proposes certain revisions to the form to clarify and provide additional detail for certain data elements.  NYISO additionally proposes more flexibility upfront for the parties to establish a realistic Commercial Operation Date as part of the negotiation of an interconnection agreement but will then apply more stringent requirements for subsequent requests to extend that Commercial Operation Date.[41]  Accordingly, NYISO proposes certain reforms to its Commercial Operation Date extension requirements to continue to incentivize progress towards project completion without encouraging speculative or less commercially ready projects to remain in the queue.  NYISO states that this change eliminates unnecessary reporting requirements and will assist NYISO in determining whether a project remains on target for its Commercial Operation Date or must seek an extension.[42]  Additionally, NYISO proposes that, rather than two separate reporting obligations, there be only one quarterly reporting obligation. 
  9.           Finally, NYISO proposes various ministerial tariff revisions to clean-up and clarify existing language, including consolidating study cost allocation rules for                   non-cluster studies into one section of Attachment HH.[43]

III.            Notice and Responsive Pleadings

  1.           Notice of NYISO’s Initial Filing was published in the Federal Register,                             91 Fed. Reg. 33169 (June 3, 2026), with interventions and protests due on or before                  June 22, 2026.  A timely motion to intervene was filed by the New York Transmission Owners.[44]

IV.             Discussion

A.                Procedural Matters

  1.           Pursuant to Rule 214 of the Commission’s Rules of Practice and Procedure,                 18 C.F.R. § 385.214 (2025), the New York Transmission Owners’ timely, unopposed motion to intervene serves to make them parties to this proceeding.

B.                 Substantive Matters

  1.           We accept NYISO’s proposed OATT revisions, effective July 29, 2026, as requested, subject to condition, and direct NYISO to submit a compliance filing within 30 days of the date of this order, as discussed below.[45]  We find that NYISO’s proposal, including the requested independent entity variations, is just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential because the proposal makes various changes and clarifications to NYISO’s interconnection procedures that will improve the efficiency of NYISO’s Cluster Study Process by reducing deficiencies and disputes, streamlining workflows, limiting delays triggered by withdrawals, and increasing predictability and transparency.  We also find that the proposed OATT revisions will accomplish the purposes of Order Nos. 2023 and 2023-A by helping to ensure an efficient, transparent, and timely interconnection study process.[46]  
  2.           We agree with NYISO that its proposed efficiency improvements in the submission and validation of interconnection requests increase efficiency without reducing the information that NYISO needs to process interconnection requests.  We agree that NYISO’s proposed OATT revisions regarding the Phase 1 and Phase 2 Studies will improve coordination and provide additional opportunities for interconnection customers to advance through the interconnection process without burdening other parties.  Regarding NYISO’s proposed clarifications to the timing requirements for the performance of the Phase 1 Study, we agree with NYISO that the proposed revisions will provide a reasonable period of time for Affected Transmission Owners to perform a Phase 1 Study without delaying the progression of the Cluster Study.
  3.           As to NYISO’s proposals to limit the impact of Cluster Study Project withdrawals, we agree with NYISO that the proposed changes provide clarity regarding which Cluster Study Projects will not be able to interconnect so that they can be quickly removed from the interconnection queue, minimizing withdrawal penalties, resources, and time.  Regarding NYISO’s proposed changes to the withdrawal periods, we agree with NYISO that these changes will reduce the potential for study delays.  Interconnection customers will still be able to use dispute resolution concerning the deficiencies that led to withdrawal.  As NYISO clarifies in its Supplemental Filing, interconnection customers will have the standard 15 business day cure period to cure withdrawals due to                        non-payment, barring certain exceptions, rather than the existing 10 business day cure period.  We find that the illustrative tariff language in the Supplemental Filing creates clarity and removes any potential ambiguity as to the scope of proposed exception categories to the standard 15 business day cure period.[47]  We therefore direct NYISO to file, within 30 days of the date of this order, a compliance filing to more clearly delineate the exception categories in accordance with its supplemental illustrative tariff language, as NYISO consents to do in its Supplemental Filing.
  4.           As to NYISO’s proposed efficiency improvements in the Cluster Study Process regarding Contingent Project withdrawal, we agree with NYISO that the proposed revisions will help to avoid confusion regarding the timing of a Contingent Project’s withdrawal from the subsequent cluster study and is thus just and reasonable.  Regarding Final Decision Period rules, wherein NYISO proposes to clarify how it calculates the greater than 10% amount for the Final Decision Period requirements, we agree with NYISO that the proposed clarification will provide the interconnection customer the opportunity to make a new election in a given round when its project cost allocation is greater than 10%.  As to NYISO’s proposal to subject interconnection customers to interest for unpaid invoiced amounts with such interest calculated in accordance with the interest rate established by the Commission’s regulations, we agree with NYISO that its proposal helps to protect NYISO from financial risks and incentivizes timely payments by interconnection customers.
  5.           Regarding NYISO’s proposed pre- and post-Cluster Study process improvements, we agree with NYISO that the changes eliminate unnecessary reporting requirements during the Cluster Study Process and better facilitate NYISO’s ability to track the progress of Cluster Study Projects and that, among other things, these requirements will assist NYISO in determining whether a project remains on target for its Commercial Operation Date included in NYISO’s queue or whether it needs to seek an extension.

The Commission orders:

 

  1.             NYISO’s proposed OATT revisions are hereby accepted, subject to condition, effective July 29, 2026, as requested, as discussed in the body of this order.
  2.              NYISO is hereby directed to submit a compliance filing, within 30 days of this order, as discussed in the body of this order.

 

By the Commission.

 

( S E A L )

 

 

 

Debbie-Anne A. Reese,

Secretary.

 

 


Appendix – Tariff Records

 

New York Independent System Operator, Inc.

NYISO Tariffs

 

[1] 16 U.S.C. § 824d.

[2] 18 C.F.R pt. 35 (2025).

[3] See Appendix for eTariff records accepted in this order.

[4] Capitalized terms used that are not otherwise defined in this order have the meanings ascribed to them in the OATT and NYISO Market Administration and Control Area Services Tariff.

[5] Improvements to Generator Interconnection Procs. & Agreements, Order                 No. 2023, 184 FERC ¶ 61,054, order on reh’g, 185 FERC ¶ 61,063 (2023), order on reh’g, Order No. 2023-A, 186 FERC ¶ 61,199, errata notice, 188 FERC ¶ 61,134 (2024).

[6] The pro forma LGIP and pro forma LGIA establish the terms and conditions under which public utilities that own, control, or operate facilities for transmitting energy in interstate commerce must provide interconnection service to generating facilities larger than 20 MW.  Order No. 2023, 184 FERC ¶ 61,054 at P 2.

[7] Id. P 1.

[8] Id. P 5.

[9] Id. P 1764 (citing Standardization of Generator Interconnection Agreements & Procs., Order No. 2003, 104 FERC ¶ 61,103, at P 826 (2003), order on reh’g, Order               No. 2003-A, 106 FERC ¶ 61,220, order on reh’g, Order No. 2003-B, 109 FERC ¶ 61,287 (2004), order on reh’g, Order No. 2003-C, 111 FERC ¶ 61,401 (2005), aff’d sub nom. Nat’l Ass’n of Regul. Util. Comm’rs v. FERC, 475 F.3d 1277 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Standardization of Small Generator Interconnection Agreements & Procs., Order              No. 2006, 111 FERC ¶ 61,220, at PP 447, 549, order on reh’g, Order No. 2006-A,               113 FERC ¶ 61,195 (2005), order granting clarification, Order No. 2006-B, 116 FERC              ¶ 61,046 (2006); see Reform of Generator Interconnection Procs. & Agreements, Order No. 845, 163 FERC ¶ 61,043, at P 556 (2018), order on reh’g, Order No. 845-A,                    166 FERC ¶ 61,137, order on reh’g, Order No. 845-B, 168 FERC ¶ 61,092 (2019)).

[10] Order No. 2003, 104 FERC ¶ 61,103 at P 827.

[11] Id. P 827.

[12] See, e.g., ISO New England, Inc., 164 FERC ¶ 61,222, at P 9 (2018) (citing Order No. 2003, 104 FERC ¶ 61,103 at PP 26, 827; Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 154 FERC ¶ 61,247, at P 20 (2016); Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., 140 FERC                ¶ 61,070, at P 44 (2012)).

[13] N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 191 FERC ¶ 61,049 (2025) (First Compliance Order); N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 193 FERC ¶ 61,031 (2025) (Second Compliance Order); N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 195 FERC ¶ 61,093 (2026).

[14] First Compliance Order, 191 FERC ¶ 61,049 at PP 90, 104, 113; see also Second Compliance Order, 193 FERC ¶ 61,031 at P 15.

[15] N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., Docket No. ER24-1915-005 (July 14, 2026) (delegated order).

[16] Initial Filing, Transmittal Letter at 1.

[17] Id. at 10.

[18] Id. at 8.

[19] Id. at 11-13.  The Standard Interconnection Procedures include requirements to permit interconnection customers with Cluster Study Projects participating in an ongoing study process (the Pending Project) to submit the same project as a contingent project (Contingent Project) during the Application Window for the next study process.

[20] Id. at 13.

[21] Id.

[22] Id. at 14-15.

[23] Id. at 15.

[24] Id. at 16.

[25] Id. at 17.

[26] Id. at 17-19.  NYISO states that the purpose of its Physical Infeasibility screening is to identify early in the study process, when possible, those Cluster Study Projects that will not be able to interconnect due to physical infeasibility issues, so that such Cluster Study Projects can withdraw without incurring significant costs, time, and resources.  The Physical Infeasibility screen identifies whether the Cluster Study Project falls into one or more of four scenarios regarding substation availability, consistency with Good Utility Practice or Applicable Reliability Requirements, tie line viability, and equipment ratings.  

[27] Id. at 19.

[28] Id. at 21.

[29] Id. at 21-24.  System Deliverability Upgrades are the configuration of electrical equipment that can be used to make the modifications or additions required for the proposed Project to connect reliably.  NYISO, OATT, attach. HH, § 40.1 (Definitions) (3.0.0).

[30] Initial Filing, Transmittal Letter at 24.

[31] Supplemental Filing, Transmittal Letter at 2.

[32] Id. at 3.

[33] Initial Filing, Transmittal Letter at 24-25.

[34] Id. at 25.

[35] Id. at 25-26.

[36] Id. at 26.

[37] Id. at 27-28.

[38] Id. at 27.

[39] Id. at 28-34.

[40] Id. at 28.

[41] Id. at 30.

[42] Id. at 34-35.

[43] Id. at 35-39.

[44] For purposes of this filing, the New York Transmission Owners are:  Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation; Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.; Long Island Power Authority; New York Power Authority; New York State Electric & Gas Corporation; Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation; Orange and Rockland Utilities, Inc.; and Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation.

[45] The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has held that, in certain circumstances, the Commission has “authority to propose modifications to a utility’s [FPA section 205] proposal if the utility consents to the modifications.”  NRG Power Mktg., LLC v. FERC, 862 F.3d 108, 114-15 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (emphasis added). 

[46] Order No. 2023, 184 FERC ¶ 61,054 at P 3 (adopting reforms to “the Commission’s standard interconnection procedures and agreements to ensure that interconnection customers are able to interconnect to the transmission system in a reliable, efficient, transparent, and timely manner, thereby ensuring that rates, terms, and conditions for Commission-jurisdictional services are just, reasonable, and not unduly discriminatory or preferential”).

[47] Supplemental Filing, attach. I (Illustrative OATT Attachment HH), § 40.6.4.1.