179 FERC ¶ 61,198

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

Before Commissioners:  Richard Glick, Chairman;

                                        James P. Danly, Allison Clements,

                                        Mark C. Christie, and Willie L. Phillips.

ORDER ON COMPLIANCE FILING

(Issued June 17, 2022)

1.                On July 19, 2021, as amended on November 19, 2021, New York Independent System Operator, Inc. (NYISO) submitted proposed revisions to its Market Administration and Control Area Services Tariff (Services Tariff) and Open Access Transmission Tariff (OATT)[1] in compliance with the requirements of Order No. 2222,[2] which removes barriers to the participation of distributed energy resource aggregations in the capacity, energy, and ancillary service markets operated by Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent System Operators (RTO/ISO markets).  In this order, we accept NYISO’s compliance filing, subject to a further compliance filing to be submitted within 60 days of the date of issuance of this order, as discussed below.  We also direct NYISO to propose an effective date for its compliance filing in the fourth quarter of 2022, as discussed below.

I.                   Background

2.                In Order No. 2222, the Commission adopted reforms to remove barriers to the participation of distributed energy resource aggregations in the RTO/ISO markets.[3]  The Commission modified section 35.28 of its regulations[4] pursuant to its authority under Federal Power Act (FPA) section 206[5] to require each RTO/ISO to revise its tariff to ensure that its market rules facilitate the participation of distributed energy resource aggregations.  The Commission found that, by removing barriers to the participation of distributed energy resource aggregations in the RTO/ISO markets, Order No. 2222 will enhance competition and, in turn, help ensure that the RTO/ISO markets produce just and reasonable rates.
3.                In Order No. 2222, the Commission amended its regulations to require each RTO/ISO to include tariff provisions addressing distributed energy resource aggregations that: (1) allow distributed energy resource aggregations to participate directly in RTO/ISO markets and establish distributed energy resource aggregators as a type of market participant; (2) allow distributed energy resource aggregators to register distributed energy resource aggregations under one or more participation models that accommodate the physical and operational characteristics of the distributed energy resource aggregations; (3) establish a minimum size requirement for distributed energy resource aggregations that does not exceed 100 kilowatts (kW); (4) address locational requirements for distributed energy resource aggregations; (5) address distribution factors and bidding parameters for distributed energy resource aggregations; (6) address information and data requirements for distributed energy resource aggregations; (7) address metering and telemetry requirements for distributed energy resource aggregations; (8) address coordination between the RTO/ISO, the distributed energy resource aggregator, the distribution utility, and the relevant electric retail regulatory authorities (RERRAs); (9) address modifications to the list of resources in a distributed energy resource aggregation; and (10) address market participation agreements for distributed energy resource aggregators.[6]  Additionally, under Order No. 2222, each RTO/ISO must accept bids from a distributed energy resource aggregator if its aggregation includes distributed energy resources that are customers of utilities that distributed more than 4 million megawatt-hours (MWh) in the previous fiscal year.  An RTO/ISO must not accept bids from a distributed energy resource aggregator if its aggregation includes distributed energy resources that are customers of utilities that distributed 4 million MWh or less in the previous fiscal year, unless the RERRA permits such customers to be bid into RTO/ISO markets by a distributed energy resource aggregator.

II.                Compliance Filing

4.                In its July 19, 2021 filing, NYISO states that its existing Distributed Energy Resource (DER) and Aggregation participation model, which NYISO proposed under FPA section 205 on June 27, 2019 (2019 Aggregation Filing) and the Commission accepted on January 23, 2020,[7] satisfactorily complies with the vast majority of the requirements of Order No. 2222.[8] NYISO explains that its DER and Aggregation participation model establishes: (1) the eligibility, composition, and participation of Aggregations, including Aggregations of DERs; (2) Aggregation participation in
   the energy and ancillary services markets; (3) participation in both the wholesale markets and programs or markets operated to meet the needs of distribution systems or host facilities; (4) metering and telemetry requirements; (5) settlement of Aggregations;
   (6) Aggregation participation in the NYISO-administered Installed Capacity (ICAP) market; (7) interconnection requirements; and (8) other tariff provisions required to account for the physical and operational characteristics of DERs and Aggregations.[9]
5.                NYISO proposes certain revisions to NYISO’s Services Tariff and OATT to comply with the remaining requirements of Order No. 2222.[10] According to NYISO, these limited tariff revisions relate to: (1) the small utility opt-in; (2) interconnection procedures; (3) double-counting of services; (4) single resource Aggregations;
   (5) coordination among NYISO, Distribution Utility, distributed energy resource Aggregator, and RERRA;[11] and (6) market participation agreements.  NYISO argues
   that these limited proposed tariff revisions, combined with its existing DER and Aggregation participation model, demonstrate its compliance with Order No. 2222.
6.                On October 1, 2021, Commission staff issued a data request advising NYISO that additional information was necessary to process its July 19, 2021 filing (Data Request).[12]
7.                On November 19, 2021, in Docket No. ER21-2460-001, NYISO filed a response to the Data Request, which amended its July 19, 2021 filing (Data Request Response).

III.            Notices of Filings and Responsive Pleadings

8.                Notice of NYISO’s July 19, 2021 filing was published in the Federal Register,
   86 Fed. Reg. 39,016 (Jul. 23, 2021), with interventions and protests due on or before August 9, 2021.  On August 3, 2021, the Commission extended the comment date to and including August 23, 2021.[13]
9.                Notice of NYISO’s Data Request Response was published in the Federal Register, 86 Fed. Reg. 67,459 (Nov. 26, 2021), with interventions and protests due on or before December 10, 2021.
10.           Advanced Energy Economy (AEE); Advanced Energy Management Alliance (AEMA); Alliance for Clean Energy New York, Inc. (Alliance for Clean Energy); American Public Power Association; Calpine Corporation; the City of New York; Edison Electric Institute; Enerwise Global Technologies, LLC; Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) and the Sustainable FERC Project (SFP); New York Association of Public Power (NYAPP); New York Battery and Energy Storage Technology Consortium; New York Municipal Power Agency; New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA); NRG Power Marketing LLC; Potomac Economics, Ltd. (Potomac Economics);[14] New York Transmission Owners (NYTO);[15] and Xcel Energy Services Inc. (Xcel) filed timely motions to intervene.
11.           The New York State Public Service Commission (New York Commission) filed a notice of intervention.
12.           AEMA, NYTOs, and NYAPP each filed a timely protest.  AEE, NRDC and SFP collectively filed a timely protest. SFP, NRDC, AEE and the City of New York (collectively, Clean Energy and Consumer Advocates (CECA)) filed a timely protest.  The New York Commission, NYSERDA, New York Power Authority, the City of New York, and the New York Battery and Energy Storage Technology Consortium (collectively, the Clean Energy Coalition) filed a timely protest.
13.           On September 3, 2021, Xcel filed an answer.  On September 7, 2021, NYTOs and Alliance for Clean Energy each filed answers.  On September 10, 2021, the New York Commission and AEMA each filed answers.  On September 14, 2021, NYISO and Potomac Economics each filed answers. 
14.           In response to NYISO’s Data Request Response, AEMA filed timely comments, and AEE filed a timely protest.  Also, on December 16, 2021, SFP and NRDC (collectively, Public Interest Organizations) filed a motion to file comments out-of-time and comments.

IV.             Discussion

A.                Procedural Matters

15.           Pursuant to Rule 214 of the Commission’s Rules of Practice and Procedure,
    18 C.F.R. § 385.214 (2021), the timely, unopposed motions to intervene serve to make the entities that filed them parties to this proceeding. 
16.           Rule 213(a)(2) of the Commission’s Rules of Practice and Procedure, 18 C.F.R. § 385.213(a)(2) (2021), prohibits an answer to a protest or answer unless otherwise ordered by the decisional authority.  We accept the answers filed in this proceeding because they have provided information that assisted us in our decision-making process.

B.                 Substantive Matters

17.           In its filing, NYISO maintains that its existing DER and Aggregation participation model satisfactorily complies with the vast majority of the directives of Order
    No. 2222.  While we recognize NYISO’s efforts to advance the participation of DERs in its markets, we find that NYISO’s proposal partially complies with Order No. 2222.  As explained in further detail below, we accept NYISO’s compliance filing, subject to a further compliance filing to be submitted within 60 days of the date of issuance of this order, as discussed below.  We also direct NYISO to propose an effective date for its compliance filing in the fourth quarter of 2022, as discussed below.
18.           As a preliminary matter, we find that NYISO complies with the following requirements of Order No. 2222: (1) establish a minimum size requirement for distributed energy resource aggregations that does not exceed 100 kW; (2) propose a maximum capacity requirement for individual distributed energy resources participating in its markets through a distributed energy resource aggregation; (3) allow a single qualifying distributed energy resource to avail itself of the proposed distributed energy resource aggregation rules by serving as its own distributed energy resource aggregator; and (4) address distribution factors and bidding parameters for distributed energy resource aggregations. NYISO’s compliance with these requirements is not contested in this proceeding. We address the remaining compliance requirements and comments and protests below.

1.                  Stakeholder Process

a.                  Protests

19.           AEMA and AEE assert that NYISO made the decision to forego a stakeholder process to review compliance requirements of Order No. 2222 and required tariff changes, because NYISO’s tariff amendments accepted in the 2020 Aggregation Order comply with the vast majority of requirements of Order No. 2222.[16]  CECA similarly states that NYISO’s instant filing is not the product of a collaborative stakeholder process and that NYISO identified for stakeholders the specific tariff revisions it planned to include in its compliance filing one business day before it filed the proposal at the Commission.[17]  AEMA argues that NYISO’s proposed tariff revisions are vaguely worded, and, in some cases, increase barriers to participation.[18]  AEMA also asserts that many of the key details about how NYISO will implement the tariffs, including through manuals and other documents, have yet to be developed, which leaves open the potential for further barriers to participation.  AEMA contends that the lack of stakeholder engagement caused numerous issues to be raised in protests about the rules and protocols to implement the DER requirements.  AEE asks the Commission to return NYISO’s compliance filing to NYISO for further explanation and development. 

b.                 Commission Determination

20.           Order No. 2222 did not require each RTO/ISO to conduct a formal stakeholder process before submitting its compliance filing.  Therefore, we find these protests to be beyond the scope of this compliance proceeding. 

2.                  Small Utility Opt-In

21.           In Order No. 2222, the Commission added section 35.28(g)(12)(iv) to the Commission’s regulations to provide that RTOs/ISOs may not accept bids from distributed energy resource aggregators aggregating customers of small utilities unless the RERRA allows such customers of small utilities to participate in distributed energy resource aggregations (i.e., to opt in).[19]  Specifically, the Commission directed each RTO/ISO to amend its market rules as necessary to (1) accept bids from a distributed energy resource aggregator if its aggregation includes distributed energy resources that are customers of utilities that distributed more than 4 million MWh[20] in the previous fiscal year, and (2) not accept bids from distributed energy resource aggregators if its aggregation includes distributed energy resources that are customers of utilities that distributed 4 million MWh or less in the previous fiscal year, unless the RERRA permits such customers to be bid into RTO/ISO markets by a distributed energy resource aggregator (small utility opt-in).[21]  The Commission also required each RTO/ISO to explain how it will implement this small utility opt-in, noting that an RTO/ISO may choose to implement this requirement in a similar manner as it currently implements the small utility opt-in provision under Order No. 719-A.[22]  In Order No. 2222-A, denying a request for clarification, the Commission found that the small utility opt-in established in Order No. 2222 applies to energy efficiency resources.[23]

a.                  Filing

22.           NYISO proposes to prohibit enrollment of an individual DER when (1) the DER is a customer of a small utility, and (2) the RERRA has not affirmatively authorized that small utility’s customers to participate in the wholesale markets in an Aggregation.[24]  Additionally, NYISO proposes tariff revisions to require each Aggregator to identify whether each DER in its aggregation is a customer of a small utility and, if so, attest that the RERRA affirmatively authorizes that small utility’s customers to participate in the wholesale markets in an aggregation.[25]  NYISO proposes to use its own fiscal year—January 1 to December 31—to identify the MWh distributed annually by each utility.  NYISO states that it will require such attestation when it enrolls a DER in an Aggregation, and annually thereafter by April 1.[26]  NYISO proposes to make the attestation effective for a full Capability Year (May 1 – April 30), which, NYISO maintains, reduces administrative burdens to Aggregators and NYISO and will aid in the operation of its markets.  NYISO further proposes that, if it does not receive an annual attestation by April 1, the previously submitted attestation will remain effective.  NYISO states that Aggregators will be responsible for the accuracy of their attestations.  NYISO’s proposed revisions to section 4.1.10 of its Services Tariff are:

An individual Resource that is a customer of a Load Serving Entity[[27]] that distributed less than or equal to four million MWh in [NY]ISO’s immediately prior and completed fiscal year (which runs January 1 through December 31) shall not be enrolled in an Aggregation, unless the Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority affirmatively authorizes the customers of that Load Serving Entity to participate in the [NY]ISO-administered markets in an Aggregation.

An Aggregator shall, upon enrollment of each individual Resource and annually thereafter, (i) determine whether each Resource is a customer of a Load Serving Entity meeting the annual MWh threshold identified above, and (ii) for each Resource that is a customer of a Load Serving Entity that meets such threshold, accurately attest that the Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority has authorized the Load Serving Entity’s customers to participate in an Aggregation.  An attestation completed upon an individual Resource’s initial enrollment shall be effective until the end of the Capability Year in which the Resource was first enrolled.  Each annual attestation shall be completed by April 1, and will be effective for the Capability Year beginning May 1 of that year.  If the [NY]ISO does not receive an updated attestation by April 1, the previously submitted attestation shall remain in effect, and the Aggregator shall be responsible for its accuracy.

b.                 Protests

23.           First, several parties oppose NYISO’s proposal to apply the small utility opt-in to resources that are customers of Load Serving Entities, rather than Distribution Utilities.  AEMA argues that this could be construed as a new requirement for Aggregators to obtain RERRA approval for customers served by small competitive retail suppliers (known as Energy Service Companies in New York) that are also Load Serving Entities.[28]  AEMA argues that such a requirement would make it significantly more difficult for Aggregators to manage RERRA attestations.[29]  AEE, NRDC, and SFP similarly note that the Commission specifically tied the opt-in to utilities that “distribute[d] 4 million MWh or less” and that NYISO’s proposal is inconsistent with
    the plain language of Order No. 2222.[30] They also note that retail choice Load Serving Entities have no role in distribution system operations, whereas the Commission was concerned about the burden placed on smaller utilities.[31]  NYTOs likewise argue that the relevant customer-utility relationship in New York is between a given customer and its Distribution Utility, not between a given customer and its Load Serving Entity.[32]  These parties recommend that the Commission direct NYISO to replace the term “Load Serving Entity” with “Distribution Utility” throughout the proposed amendment to section 4.1.10, and NYTOs also recommend that NYISO move the definition of “Distribution Utility” from section 4.1.10.5 up to the small utility opt-in provision in section 4.1.10.[33]  Similarly, NYTOs claim that the proposed tariff language, “customer of a [Distribution Utility] meeting the annual MWh threshold[,]” is ambiguous and request that the proposed language be revised to clarify that it refers to customers of Distribution Utilities that distributed less than or equal to the four million MWh threshold.[34]
24.           Second, parties express concern about the responsibilities that NYISO imposes on Aggregators under its proposal.  AEE, NRDC, and SFP oppose NYISO’s proposal to require Aggregators to ascertain which distribution utilities are small utilities and, of those, which have opted in.[35]  They argue that NYISO is better suited to complete this task and that it will be burdensome and inefficient for Aggregators to assume this responsibility. 
25.             Third, parties urge the Commission to require NYISO to modify its proposed annual attestation requirement for Aggregators. On one hand, NYAPP urges the Commission to reject NYISO’s proposal to allow attestations to remain valid if the Aggregator fails to recertify annually.[36]  NYAPP requests that attestations only be valid for one year, so that Aggregators pay close attention to the RERRA’s continued authorization.  NYAPP contends this will not be an administrative burden. On the other hand, NYTOs argue that there is no need for the Aggregator to update the attestation unless there is a change in status.[37]  They argue that the status of eligibility is unlikely to change from year to year.  However, they express concern that there is no mechanism for an Aggregator to communicate that a DER that was previously eligible to be enrolled in an Aggregation is no longer eligible; thus, they suggest that NYISO’s proposed tariff language be revised to that effect. 
26.           Fourth, NYAPP requests that the Commission require the Aggregator to submit evidence that each small utility received notice of an attestation (or subsequent attestation) that such small utility opted-in.[38]  NYAPP asserts that, if the Distribution Utility review process is to be meaningful, the host small utility must be notified because DER participation could potentially endanger the safety and reliability of the small utility’s system.  NYAPP also requests that the Commission consider specific penalties for improper attestations, which could have extremely negative consequences, especially for small utilities.   
27.           Fifth, NYTOs express concern about NYISO’s proposal that a customer loses eligibility to participate if, on December 31, the Load Serving Entity distributes four million MWh or less in that fiscal year.[39]  They argue that it would be unreasonable for customers to lose eligibility at midnight December 31, and unworkable to administer.  They recommend that NYISO revise its proposal to specify that ineligibility would apply for the forthcoming Capability Year so that the customer does not lose eligibility during the executory Capability Year.

c.                   Answers

28.           NYISO does not object to identifying small utilities by Distribution Utility rather than Load Serving Entity, so long as the Commission accepts its proposal that the Aggregator be responsible for attesting that the RERRA has opted-in.[40]  NYISO explains that its metering and settlement systems are not designed to measure and calculate energy deliveries by Distribution Utility, and it would require time-consuming and expensive upgrades to do so.  NYISO states that it measures load by sub-zone and, in some cases, sub-zonal load is served by more than one Distribution Utility.  NYISO explains that it proposed to calculate energy deliveries by Load Serving Entity because that is how its settlement systems currently calculate energy deliveries.[41]  NYISO also supports NYTOs’ request to replace the “meets such threshold” language with “that distributed less than or equal to” the four million MWh threshold in Services Tariff, section 4.1.10.[42]  NYISO requests that the Commission direct it to make this clarifying revision.  In addition, the New York Commission supports replacing the term “Load Serving Entity” with the term “Distribution Utility.”[43] The New York Commission asserts that requiring Aggregators to seek RERRA approval for customers served by Energy Service Companies could create significant administrative confusion in New York.[44]  The New York Commission also contends that a Load Serving Entity might also have anti-competitive reasons to not allow its customers to participate in the wholesale markets.
29.           NYISO defends its proposal that the Aggregator attest that it is fully eligible to participate in the wholesale markets.[45]  NYISO argues that Order No. 2222 did not require RTOs/ISOs to relieve Aggregators of the duty to perform tasks necessary for participation in the wholesale market. Moreover, NYISO argues that an Aggregator will have regular and direct contact with the Distribution Utility concerning any resources located in that utility’s service territory.  Thus, NYISO asserts that the Aggregator is best positioned to identify the RERRA and obtain the Distribution Utility’s confirmation about how much it delivers per year and if the RERRA approves wholesale participation.  NYISO also states that it does not expect the Aggregator to collect Distribution Utility meter data to calculate the 4 million MWh threshold, but rather coordinate with the Distribution Utility.
30.           NYISO defends its annual attestation requirement and says that it is consistent with its desire for market efficiency and its experience administering these types of regularly scheduled interval designations.[46]  NYISO further states that the Aggregator will have the obligation to provide accurate information and to notify NYISO of a change in the RERRA’s opt-in determination.  NYISO argues that, if the Commission finds its proposal inconsistent with Order No. 2222, then it prefers NYTOs’ approach among the alternatives because it avoids imposing unnecessary administrative burdens and potential market disruption.[47]  AEMA argues that an annual attestation would be unduly burdensome and discourage aggregation.[48]  AEMA argues that the RERRA’s opt-in determinations, especially in New York, tend not to change very often, if at all.  Given that, AEMA argues that NYAPP’s proposal needlessly risks invalidating a DER registration if the annual attestation is not timely submitted.  AEMA notes that a resource’s contract with an Aggregator covers multiple years, and that Aggregators may be concerned if multi-year participation is not guaranteed.
31.           NYISO supports NYAPP’s request that the small utility be notified when an Aggregator attests that the RERRA has opted-in to wholesale market participation.[49] NYISO requests that the Commission direct NYISO to require the Aggregator to provide such notice and to include in its attestation to NYISO a statement that it provided such notification. AEMA argues that there should be a stakeholder process to discuss what evidence of notice would suffice that would not be an undue burden on the Aggregator.[50]
32.           NYISO supports NYTOs’ request to clarify the timing of a resource’s ineligibility by adding to Services Tariff section 4.1.10 the words “for the forthcoming Capability Year[,]”and requests that the Commission direct NYISO to do so.[51]  AEMA opposes NYTOs’ request and argues that it is unreasonable for existing resources to become unable to participate because their Distribution Utility transformed into a small utility by distributing fewer than 4 million MWhs a year.[52]

d.                 Commission Determination

33.           We find that NYISO’s proposal partially complies with the small utility opt-in requirements of Order No. 2222.[53] In particular, we find that NYISO complies with the requirement to accept bids from a distributed energy resource aggregator if its aggregation includes distributed energy resources that are customers of utilities that distributed more that 4 million MWh in the previous fiscal year.[54]  We find that NYISO partially complies with the requirement to not accept bids from distributed energy resource aggregators if its aggregation includes the distributed energy resources that are customers of utilities that distributed 4 million MWh or less in the previous fiscal year, unless the RERRA permits such customers to be bid into RTO/ISO markets by a distributed energy resource aggregator.[55]  NYISO’s proposal ensures that a resource will not be enrolled in an Aggregation, unless the RERRA affirmatively authorizes its participation in NYISO’s markets in an Aggregation, consistent with Order No. 2222.[56] 
34.           However, we find that NYISO’s proposed application of the small utility opt-in to customers of a Load Serving Entity does not comply with Order No. 2222 because, as several parties note, the small utility opt-in applies to “customers of utilities that distributed 4 million MWh or less in the previous fiscal year,”[57] and not to customers of Load Serving Entities.  Accordingly, we direct NYISO to file, within 60 days of the date of the issuance of this order, a further compliance filing that revises section 4.1.10 of its Services Tariff to replace the term “Load Serving Entity” with “Distribution Utility.” 
35.           To implement this directive, we require NYISO as part of its further compliance filing to make several related revisions.  First, because, on compliance, the term Distribution Utility will initially appear in section 4.1.10 of the Services Tariff, we direct NYISO to move its proposed definition of Distribution Utility from section 4.1.10.5 to section 4.1.10.  Second, to be consistent with the small utility opt-in language in Order No. 2222 related to the distribution utility threshold of 4 million MWh, we direct NYISO to replace: (1) the phrase “meeting the annual MWh threshold identified above” with the phrase “that distributed 4 million MWh or less in the previous fiscal year”; and (2) the phrase “meets such threshold” with the phrase “distributed 4 million MWh or less in the previous fiscal year.”  Accordingly, we direct NYISO to file, within 60 days of the date of the issuance of this order, a further compliance filing that revises section 4.1.10 of its Services Tariff to include these changes in the small utility opt-in provision. 
36.           Next, we find that NYISO partially complies with the requirement to explain how it will implement the small utility opt-in.[58]  NYISO explains that it will implement the opt-in by requiring the Aggregator to determine whether each of its resources is subject to the small utility opt-in and, if so, requiring the Aggregator to submit annually an attestation that the RERRA has authorized such resource’s participation.[59]  
37.           We disagree with parties who oppose NYISO’s proposal that the Aggregator determine whether each resource in its Aggregation is a customer of a small utility and whether the RERRA has opted-in to the resource’s wholesale market participation.  We find that NYISO’s explanation that it will implement its small utility opt-in by placing these responsibilities on the Aggregator as the market participant is reasonable.  As NYISO notes, the Aggregator will have regular contact with the Distribution Utility concerning resources in its service territory, which will facilitate the Aggregator in fulfilling its responsibilities.[60]  As NYISO also notes, it does not expect the Aggregator to calculate the 4 million MWh threshold, but to coordinate with the Distribution Utility to confirm the necessary details.  We also disagree with NYAPP’s proposal that the Aggregator must also notify small utilities of its attestation.  NYAPP supports its request by raising safety and reliability concerns.  We address those concerns below, as they more closely relate to the coordination requirements established by Order No. 2222.[61] 
38.           However, we find that NYISO does not fully explain how it will implement the small utility opt-in for two reasons.  First, we agree with NYTOs that NYISO does not fully explain the timing of a resource’s ineligibility to participate as a result of the small utility opt-in, that is, when a resource that is a customer of a large utility becomes a customer of a small utility.  We note that NYISO in its answer supports NYTOs’ proposal to insert “for the forthcoming Capability Year” in the small utility opt-in provision.  We agree with NYTOs that it would be both unreasonable and impractical for a resource that is a customer of a Distribution Utility that distributed more than 4 million MWh in one fiscal year to become immediately ineligible to participate, i.e., on January 1, if that utility distributes 4 million MWh or less in a subsequent fiscal year.  We find that, if a resource becomes subject to the small utility opt-in provision, then the resource should be ineligible as of May 1, or the forthcoming Capability Year, unless the Aggregator attests that the RERRA authorized the Distribution Utility’s customers to participate.  Accordingly, and consistent with NYISO’s explanation provided in its answer, we direct NYISO to file, within 60 days of the date of the issuance of this order, a further compliance filing that revises section 4.1.10 of its Services Tariff to insert “for the forthcoming Capability Year” in the small utility opt-in provision.[62]
39.           Second, we find that NYISO does not clearly explain the process by which an Aggregator must notify NYISO of a change in the RERRA’s opt-in determination, specifically, when a RERRA that previously authorized the participation of a resource that is a customer of a small utility decides to bar such participation.  While NYISO states in its answer that the Aggregator must notify NYISO if an attestation becomes out of date, the proposed NYISO tariff language instead merely states that the Aggregator must submit an attestation annually, but if it does not, then the previous attestation remains in effect and the Aggregator shall be responsible for its accuracy.[63]  Accordingly, we direct NYISO to file, within 60 days of the issuance of this order, a further compliance filing that clarifies the Aggregator’s responsibilities associated with changes to a RERRA’s opt-in determination, and clarifies the timing of a resource’s ineligibility when the small utility decides to prohibit its participation.
40.           Lastly, we decline to establish penalties for improper attestations, as suggested by NYAPP, because Order No. 2222 did not establish such a requirement.   

3.                  Interconnection

41.           In Order No. 2222, the Commission declined to exercise its jurisdiction over the interconnections of distributed energy resources to distribution facilities for the purpose of participating in RTO/ISO markets exclusively as part of a distributed energy resource aggregation.[64]  The Commission therefore stated that it will not require standard interconnection procedures and agreements or wholesale distribution tariffs for such interconnections.  The Commission also stated that Order No. 2222 does not revise the Commission’s jurisdictional approach to the interconnections of Qualifying Facilities (QF) that participate in distributed energy resource aggregations.[65] In Order No. 2222-A, the Commission clarified that the Commission declined to exercise jurisdiction over the interconnections of distributed energy resources, including the interconnections of QFs, to distribution facilities for the purpose of participating in RTO/ISO markets exclusively as part of a distributed energy resource aggregation.[66]
42.           Recognizing that distributed energy resources may already have interconnected pursuant to procedures that were accepted by the Commission prior to the effective date of Order No. 2222, the Commission stated that it is not requiring distributed energy resources that already interconnected under Commission-jurisdictional procedures to convert to state or local interconnection agreements.[67]  The Commission required each RTO/ISO to make any necessary tariff changes to reflect this guidance.[68]

a.                  Filing

43.           NYISO proposes to modify OATT Attachment Z, sections 32.1.1 and 32.5 to comply with the Commission’s directive.[69] Specifically, NYISO proposes to modify OATT section 32.1.1 to add an additional category of interconnection not subject to the Small Generator Interconnection Procedures, namely “interconnection of facilities participating in the ISO markets exclusively through an Aggregation.”[70] NYISO proposes to make a corresponding change to the definition of Small Generating Facility in OATT section 32.5 to make clear that facilities participating in the NYISO-administered markets solely through an Aggregation, including an Aggregation of a single resource, are not subject to NYISO’s Small Generator Interconnection Procedures.[71] Specifically, in section 32.5, NYISO proposes to revise the definition of Small Generating Facility so that it excludes facilities participating in the ISO markets exclusively through an Aggregation.  According to NYISO, consistent with the Commission’s directive in Order No. 2222, the interconnection of a facility for the exclusive purpose of participation in an Aggregation, and not subject to the Small Generator Interconnection Procedures, will not constitute a “first use” of the facility for the purpose of determining whether the distribution facility is subject to Commission jurisdiction. 
44.           NYISO states that the 2019 Aggregation Filing included modifications to the tariff language that governs the participation of capacity resources to make the tariff requirements broadly and generally applicable to all capacity resources.[72]  NYISO states that Services Tariff section 5.12.11.5 contains the requirements that are applicable to installed capacity suppliers with energy duration limitations, which generally apply to energy storage resources and DERs, such as the requirement to obtain Capacity Resource Interconnection Service (CRIS), pursuant to Attachments S and X of NYISO’s OATT.[73]

b.                 Protest

45.           AEE, NRDC, and SFP contend that undergoing CRIS review is a time-consuming and administratively burdensome process for DERs and raises a barrier to entry for smaller DERs.[74] They urge the Commission to direct NYISO to not require CRIS review for any individual DER or DER Aggregation less than 5 MW.

c.                   Answers

46.           NYISO states that the Commission should reject AEE, NRDC, and SFP’s request not to require CRIS for DERs or Aggregations less than 5 MW.[75] NYISO contends that it applies its deliverability requirements for CRIS requests on a comparable basis to all resources that seek to participate in its capacity market and that its existing processes include flexibility for the evaluation of CRIS requests, including the Class Year or an Expedited Deliverability Study.  NYISO contends that AEE, NRDC, and SFP present no valid basis for a DER-specific exception here.
47.           Xcel states that AEE, NRDC, and SFP fail to provide any justification for the 5 MW threshold they propose.[76] Xcel also states that there could be significant negative implications for reliability if DERs or Aggregations of 5 MW or less are unable to provide needed capacity when called upon. Xcel believes it would be irresponsible, as well as unduly discriminatory, to waive capacity accreditation requirements for an entire tranche of market resources simply because, on an individual basis, the components of the tranche are small.

d.                 Data Request Response

48.           In its Data Request, Commission staff asked NYISO to explain whether its proposed tariff revisions would exempt from its interconnection procedures all interconnections of resources participating in NYISO’s markets exclusively through an Aggregation, even those interconnected to the New York State Transmission System, and if so, how its proposed tariff revisions are consistent with the Commission’s guidance.[77]  In response, NYISO explains that its proposed tariff revisions inadvertently applied the Commission’s directive to the interconnection of DERs on both the distribution system and the New York State Transmission System.[78]  NYISO states that its proposed tariff revisions were intended to apply only to interconnections of DERs on the distribution system. Therefore, NYISO requests that the Commission instruct it to revise OATT Attachment Z such that only those DERs that propose to interconnect to the distribution system for the purposes of participating in the wholesale markets through an Aggregation are not subject to the Small Generator Interconnection Procedures.
49.           In its Data Request, Commission staff also asked NYISO to explain how NYISO will evaluate each individual DER seeking to provide ICAP service in order to award CRIS, whether all resources are evaluated for deliverability through NYISO’s Class Year process, and if different-sized resources are treated differently during this deliverability analysis.[79]  In response, NYISO states that Attachment S of the OATT contains the procedures for the Class Year study in which a project must participate to obtain CRIS with limited exceptions, and that a resource must possess CRIS to qualify as an ICAP Supplier.[80]  NYISO states that DERs that consist of a single asset and that can operate for 24 hours a day will be evaluated for CRIS like other resources of the same resource type.  NYISO contends that resource-specific requirements are necessary in light of the physical and operational characteristics of certain facilities.[81]  NYISO also explains that Attachment S clarifies how a CRIS request would be treated for a multi-unit facility composed of multiple units of the same or several different technology types.  According to NYISO, these rules align a facility’s maximum CRIS level as close as possible to the facility’s maximum possible ICAP market contribution.[82]  However, NYISO explains, all resources are not required to go through NYISO’s full Class Year study process to obtain CRIS if they are only requesting CRIS and meet the requirements for the Expedited Deliverability Study process.[83]  One such requirement, according to NYISO, is being in service or having completed a particular study, which may include a utility interconnection study if the facility is not subject to NYISO’s interconnection procedures.[84]  In addition, NYISO states that its interconnection procedures do not require a developer of a generating facility that is requesting 2 MW or less of CRIS to be evaluated for deliverability under NYISO’s Deliverability Interconnection Standard, which reflects NYISO’s long-standing de minimis threshold.

e.                   Data Request Response Protest

50.           Public Interest Organizations assert that the requirement for all DERs to obtain CRIS awards is unnecessary, burdensome, and does not comply with Order No. 2222 because it prohibits DERs from providing capacity they are technically capable of providing.[85]  They point out that NYISO’s Data Request Response simply notes that individual DERs must obtain CRIS on the same terms as other wholesale market resources, but that NYISO does not attempt to address the Commission’s finding that reform is necessary to correctly measure the impact of DERs on ICAP requirements.[86]  They argue that NYISO needs to reform how CRIS requirements apply to DERs to comply with the requirement of Order No. 2222 to allow DERs to provide capacity up to their technical capability and avoid procurement of unnecessary capacity, and to reflect the locational benefits of DERs.  Public Interest Organizations also point out that NYISO’s proposed Transmission Node evaluation process provides an opportunity to resolve the barriers created by the proposed CRIS requirement because it appears to consider the same factors that allow DERs to provide resource adequacy while avoiding or easing load on the transmission system.[87]  They therefore request that the Commission find that requiring CRIS for all DERs does not comply with Order No. 2222 and direct NYISO to:  (1) develop screening criteria or other means to identify the amount of capacity from DERs that can be accepted at each Transmission Node without further study and allow DERs to supply capacity accordingly; or (2) explain why such an approach is not technically feasible and propose an alternative that considers DERs’ ability to provide resource adequacy without use of the transmission system.[88] 
51.           In addition, Public Interest Organizations argue that NYISO’s approach to limit the CRIS award to no greater than the DER’s Energy Resource Interconnection Service (ERIS), which is obtained through NYISO interconnection studies, suffers from two fatal flaws.[89]  First, they argue that this aspect of NYISO’s proposal is not compliant with Order No. 2222 because the Commission specifically declined to exercise jurisdiction over the interconnection of individual DERs, yet NYISO proposes to require each individual DER wishing to provide capacity to go through a Commission-jurisdictional interconnection process.  They point out that NYISO proposes to conduct the ERIS studies for individual DERs, not DER Aggregations, which will result in an overwhelming volume of interconnection requests that they believe Order No. 2222 sought to avoid.  Public Interest Organizations contend that NYISO’s approach does not allow the value of heterogeneous Aggregations to be fully recognized because the capacity value of an Aggregation will be simply the sum of the capacity values of each individual resource.[90] 
52.           Second, Public Interest Organizations claim that NYISO’s proposal is internally contradictory because despite NYISO’s proposal to require a DER wishing to provide capacity as part of Aggregation to obtain ERIS, a resource participating in an Aggregation may not be eligible to obtain ERIS, because NYISO proposes to modify its Small Generator Interconnection Procedures to exclude them.[91] They also argue that NYISO’s proposed DER rules would subject a resource to a variety of distribution utility and retail regulatory reviews and procedures that are irrelevant once a resource completes a wholesale interconnection process such as ERIS, because the Commission has jurisdiction over its interconnection.[92]  Public Interest Organizations argue that the best remedy is for the Commission to order NYISO to provide a method for DERs to provide capacity without going through interconnection studies.[93]  In the alternative, they request that the Commission find NYISO’s proposed rules for awarding CRIS to DERs unreasonable and order NYISO to file new rules that incorporate the findings and directives of Order No. 2222.

f.                   Commission Determination

53.           We find that NYISO’s proposal partially complies with Order No. 2222 with respect to interconnection. In order to reflect the Commission’s decision in Order No. 2222 to decline to exercise jurisdiction over the interconnections of distributed energy resources, NYISO proposes to modify OATT section 32.1.1 to exempt from the Small Generator Interconnection Procedures the interconnections of facilities participating in NYISO’s markets exclusively through an Aggregation.  As NYISO notes in response, NYISO’s proposal inadvertently applied the Commission’s directive to interconnections of DERs on both the distribution system and the transmission system.[94] 
54.           We agree with NYISO that the tariff revision should apply only to interconnections of DERs on the distribution system to appropriately reflect the Commission’s directives in Order No. 2222.[95]  Accordingly, we direct NYISO to file, within 60 days of the date of the issuance of this order, a further compliance filing that revises OATT Attachment Z sections 32.1.1 and 32.5, respectively, to: (1) specify that the interconnection to the distribution system of facilities participating in NYISO’s markets exclusively through an Aggregation is not subject to the Small Generator Interconnection Procedures; and (2) revise the definition of Small Generating Facility to exempt facilities connecting to the distribution system that participate in NYISO’s markets exclusively through an Aggregation from the Small Generator Interconnection Procedures.[96]  
55.           We find that NYISO’s proposal to apply its existing deliverability requirements for CRIS requests on a comparable basis to all resources, including to DER Aggregations, is appropriate because it enables Aggregations to demonstrate that they are technically capable of providing capacity in NYISO, consistent with Order No. 2222.  In Order No. 2222, the Commission found that distributed energy resource aggregations must be able to meet the qualification and performance requirements to provide the service that they are offering into RTO/ISO markets.[97]  As NYISO explains, to qualify as an ICAP supplier, a resource, including an Aggregation, must obtain CRIS, i.e., interconnection service that allows participation in NYISO’s ICAP market to the extent of the facility’s deliverable capacity, pursuant to Attachment S of the OATT.[98]  In other words, Aggregations must meet NYISO’s deliverability requirements to provide capacity.  Contrary to protesters’ requests, including Public Interest Organizations’ request that we direct NYISO to develop screening criteria or other means to identify the amount of capacity from DERs that can be accepted at each Transmission Node without further study and allow DERs to supply capacity accordingly, Order No. 2222 does not require NYISO to reform or otherwise apply different or preferential treatment with respect to CRIS review to DERs or Aggregations that are less than 5 MW, which would be inconsistent with NYISO’s existing qualification and performance requirements to provide capacity.  Further, as NYISO explains, NYISO’s existing processes include flexibility for the evaluation of CRIS requests, including the Class Year or an Expedited Deliverability Study, which may alleviate some of the concerns raised by protesters about barriers to entry.[99] We also note that the requirement to possess CRIS applies only to a facility larger than 2 MW.[100]
56.           We disagree with Public Interest Organizations’ argument that NYISO cannot subject DERs or Aggregations to the necessary interconnection studies to obtain CRIS and ERIS while still being consistent with the Commission’s interconnection guidance in Order No. 2222.  We note that in Order No. 2222, with respect to arguments that distributed energy resources should only be required to have one interconnection study at the distribution interconnection stage, the Commission found that there could be different approaches to this issue that would work in appropriate circumstances.[101]  Therefore, in Order No. 2222, the Commission expressly declined to create new universal requirements or initiate a process to standardize tariffs with respect to studying distributed energy resources.  As discussed above, NYISO’s revisions to OATT Attachment Z, sections 32.1.1 and 32.5—though subject to further compliance[102]—are intended to satisfy the Commission’s directive in Order No. 2222 because they exempt distribution-level DERs from NYISO’s Small Generator Interconnection Procedures.  In contrast, the provisions regarding CRIS and ERIS are found in Attachment S, and processes to obtain CRIS and ERIS constitute qualification and performance requirements for Aggregations to provide capacity and energy, respectively.[103] 
57.           However, we agree with Public Interest Organizations that NYISO’s tariff may contain inconsistencies and ambiguities.  For example, section 25.1.1 of Attachment S appears to only apply to facilities that are subject to the Large Generator Interconnection Procedures or the Small Generator Interconnection Procedures:

The rules in this Attachment S to the ISO OATT cover (i) Large Facilities greater than 20 MW subject to the Large Facility Interconnection Procedures set out in Attachment X to the ISO OATT (“LFIP”), (ii) Small Generating Facilities no larger than 20 MW subject to the Small Generator Interconnection Procedures set out in Attachment Z to the ISO OATT (“SGIP”) that are required to enter a Class Year Study pursuant to Section 32.3.5.3.2 of the SGIP, and facilities greater than 2 MW that seek to obtain or increase CRIS beyond the levels permitted by this Attachment S, Section 30.3.2.6 of the LFIP and Section 32.4.11.1 of the SGIP, as applicable (each a “Project” and collectively, “Projects” for purposes of this Attachment S).

We find that such language in Attachment S—which incorporates the Small Generator Interconnection Procedures by reference, and to which distribution-level Aggregations are exempt—creates an inconsistency that appears to exempt Aggregations from the requirements to obtain CRIS and/or ERIS.[104] In addition, because NYISO’s proposal exempts Aggregations from the definition of Small Generating Facility, we find that it is unclear how Aggregations obtain ERIS.  The definition of ERIS in section 25.1.2 of Attachment S refers only to a Large Generating Facility, Class Year Transmission Project, or Small Generating Facility.[105]  Accordingly, we direct NYISO to file, within
60 days of the date of the issuance of this order, a further compliance filing that:
(1) revises OATT Attachment S and any other affected tariff provisions to resolve
the apparent inconsistencies and ambiguities in its tariff, or explains why such revisions are not necessary; and (2) identifies and explains the relevant tariff provisions that codify the rules by which DERs that are not subject to the Small Generator Interconnection Procedures may obtain CRIS and ERIS.

4.                  Definitions of Distributed Energy Resource and Distributed Energy Resource Aggregator

58.           In Order No. 2222, the Commission amended section 35.28(b) of the Commission’s regulations to define a distributed energy resource as “any resource located on the distribution system, any subsystem thereof or behind a customer meter.”[106]  The Commission stated that these resources may include, but are not limited to, resources that are in front of and behind the customer meter, electric storage resources, intermittent generation, distributed generation, demand response, energy efficiency, thermal storage, and electric vehicles and their supply equipment – as long as such a resource is “located on the distribution system, any subsystem thereof or behind a customer meter.”[107]  The Commission explained that its adopted definition of distributed energy resource is technology-neutral, thereby ensuring that any resource that is technically capable of providing wholesale services through aggregation is eligible to do so, which enhances competition in the RTO/ISO markets and, in turn, helps to ensure that these markets produce just and reasonable rates.
59.           The Commission stated that energy efficiency and demand response resources are capable of providing demand reductions at customer sites, and therefore “customer sites capable of demand reduction” may meet the definition of a distributed energy resource.[108]  In response to requests for regional flexibility, the Commission noted that RTOs/ISOs can propose their own definitions of distributed energy resource for the Commission’s evaluation as long as the scope and applicability of the proposed definitions are consistent with the Commission’s definition of distributed energy resource and consistent with all aspects of Order No. 2222.
60.           In Order No. 2222, the Commission also amended section 35.28(b) of the Commission’s regulations to define a distributed energy resource aggregator as “the entity that aggregates one or more distributed energy resources for purposes of participation in the capacity, energy and/or ancillary service markets of the regional transmission organizations and/or independent system operators.”[109]  The Commission stated that, because demand response falls under the definition of distributed energy resource, an aggregator of demand response could participate as a distributed energy resource aggregator, but Order No. 2222 does not affect existing demand response rules.

a.                  Filing

61.           NYISO states that it defines a DER as “(i) a facility comprising two or more Resource types behind a single point of interconnection with an Injection Limit of 20 MW or less; or (ii) a Demand Side Resource; or (iii) a Generator with an Injection Limit of 20 MW or less, that is electrically located in the [New York Control Area (NYCA)].”[110]  NYISO argues that its definition of DER will permit any DER located on the distribution system, a subsystem thereof or the New York State transmission system to participate in an Aggregation. NYISO asserts that its definition permits electric storage resources, thermal storage, intermittent generation, distributed generation, thermal generation, and Demand Side Resources to qualify as DER.  In addition, NYISO explains that a DER may also be a single facility that combines multiple resource types behind the same point of interconnection (e.g., a facility that combines demand reduction capability with an electric storage resource behind the same point of interconnection).
62.           NYISO states that it defines an Aggregator as a “Supplier that offers Capacity, Energy, and/or Ancillary Services for an Aggregation.”[111]  NYISO explains that, under this definition, the Aggregator is the market participant, i.e., supplier, offering the collective capability of DER into NYISO’s markets.

b.                 Data Request Response

63.           In its Data Request, Commission staff asked NYISO whether its definition of DER is technology neutral and encompasses all potential technology types.[112]  NYISO states that its definition of DER is technology neutral and encompasses all potential technology types that are capable of providing wholesale services by responding to commitment and dispatch instructions as a generator or Demand Side Resource.[113]  NYISO asserts that its definition of DER captures all of the resource types that its software will be capable of accommodating, and that it is broad enough to capture technologies that are not yet commercially viable, such as fuel cells or resources that consume hydrogen to produce electricity, which are capable of operating as generators or Demand Side Resources.[114]  NYISO explains that its definition of DER was not designed, developed, or intended to accommodate resources that are not capable of responding to NYISO’s dispatch instructions.[115] 

c.                   Commission Determination

64.           We find that NYISO’s definition of DER complies with Order No. 2222 because it is technology-neutral and encompasses every resource that is technically capable of providing wholesale services through aggregation.[116]  While NYISO’s definition of DER includes the defined terms generator and Demand Side Resource, the underlying definitions of these resource types are broad enough such that there would likely be no need to further clarify or revise the definition as new technologies are developed.[117]  Further, while NYISO does not propose to explicitly include the phrase “located on the distribution system, any subsystem thereof or behind a customer meter” in its definition of DER, we find that NYISO’s proposed definition is consistent with the definition established in Order No. 2222 because it encompasses any applicable resource “that is electrically located in the NYCA.”[118]  We note that, while NYISO’s definition of DER also includes resources that are interconnected directly to the transmission system and not located behind a customer meter, the Commission in Order No. 2222 did not prohibit RTOs/ISOs from proposing a broader definition.[119] 
65.           In addition, we find that NYISO’s definition of Aggregator complies with Order No. 2222 because it is consistent with the definition established in Order No. 2222.[120]

5.                  Eligibility to Participate in RTO/ISO Markets through a Distributed Energy Resource Aggregator

a.                  Participation Model

66.           In Order No. 2222, the Commission added section 35.28(g)(12)(i) to the Commission’s regulations to require each RTO/ISO to establish distributed energy resource aggregators as a type of market participant and to allow distributed energy resource aggregators to register distributed energy resource aggregations under one or more participation models in the RTO’s/ISO’s tariff that accommodate the physical and operational characteristics of the distributed energy resource aggregation.[121]  The Commission explained that each RTO/ISO can comply with the requirement to allow distributed energy resource aggregators to participate in its markets by modifying its existing participation models to facilitate the participation of distributed energy resource aggregations, by establishing one or more new participation models for distributed energy resource aggregations, or by adopting a combination of those two approaches.[122]  The Commission stated that it will evaluate each proposal submitted on compliance to determine whether the proposal meets the goals of Order No. 2222 to allow distributed energy resources to provide all services that they are technically capable of providing through aggregation.[123]   

i.                    Filing

67.           NYISO states that its DER and Aggregation participation model allows distributed energy resource aggregations to participate directly in the RTO/ISO markets, in compliance with Order No. 2222.[124]  NYISO states that its DER and Aggregation participation model comprises a comprehensive set of market rules that allows an Aggregator to combine individual facilities as a single unit—the Aggregation—to provide energy, ancillary services, and capacity in the NYISO-administered markets.[125]  NYISO states that under its rules, an Aggregation is treated as a single resource for the purpose of bidding, scheduling, dispatching, settling, and meeting minimum eligibility and performance requirements.[126] NYISO asserts that the Aggregation (rather than the individual facilities or DERs that make up the Aggregation) will be required to satisfy the minimum eligibility and performance requirements for wholesale market participation, and as such, its participation model addresses the physical and operational characteristics of DER and Aggregations.[127]  NYISO explains that the type and quantity of each service will be defined by the technical capability of the individual resources that compose the Aggregation.  In addition, NYISO explains that the Aggregator is the market participant that interfaces with NYISO concerning the participation of the Aggregation.[128]
68.           NYISO asserts that the market rules that apply to a given Aggregation depend on the Aggregator’s composition.[129]  NYISO states that a homogeneous Aggregation (i.e., composed entirely of a single resource type), with the exception of Demand Side Resources, will be subject to the existing rules for that particular resource type, along with the general rules that apply to all Aggregations.[130]  According to NYISO, this approach provides market participants with the ability to aggregate facilities, while ensuring that the market rules applicable to specific resource types continue to apply.  Further, NYISO claims that this approach maintains comparability among Aggregations of single resource types and stand-alone resources of the same type so as not to unduly advantage any one participation model over another.[131]  In contrast, NYISO states that a heterogeneous aggregation, defined as a DER Aggregation, is an Aggregation that includes (1) more than one resource type, or (2) only Demand Side Resources.[132]   
69.           NYISO contends that its DER and Aggregation participation model complies with Order No. 2222 because it allows homogeneous and heterogeneous Aggregations to participate as resources directly in its energy, ancillary services, and capacity markets.[133]  For energy, NYISO explains that it will treat Aggregations as dispatch-only resources and will not require or evaluate commitment parameters from Aggregations.[134] Instead, NYISO will require Aggregations to submit fully dispatchable continuous bid curves that represent the entire operating range of the Aggregation. NYISO argues it does not have the means or operational visibility of the distribution system to effectively optimize the starts and stops of individual facilities within an Aggregation. In addition, according to NYISO, the individual facilities that make up the Aggregation may have a primary function other than providing energy and ancillary services to NYISO and may already be operating to perform their primary function. NYISO states that, when it filed its existing DER and Aggregation participation model, it made corresponding tariff revisions that were accepted by the Commission to reflect that NYISO will not be committing Aggregations or evaluating commitment-related parameters.[135]
70.           For ancillary services, NYISO states that Aggregations may be eligible to qualify to provide regulation and operating reserves but will not be eligible to supply voltage support.[136]  NYISO explains that the specific ancillary services each Aggregation may qualify to provide will depend on the individual facilities in the Aggregation. For regulation service, NYISO states that an Aggregation will not be eligible to provide regulation unless each of the generating units in the Aggregation use inverter-based energy storage technology.[137] NYISO states that regulation services require output or demand to be raised or lowered as necessary in six-second increments. NYISO states that, when an Aggregation comprising one or more generating units is dispatched, there is no certainty that the next increment of output will be provided by a unit that is currently online and synchronized to the system. NYISO states that, for this reason, its accepted rules limit regulation service to facilities that utilize inverter-based energy storage technology, which can respond instantly to dispatch instructions.
71.           For operating reserves, NYISO explains that it procures three different products (10-minute synchronized, 10-minute non-synchronized, and 30-minute reserves) and that an Aggregation’s eligibility to provide a particular product will depend on the characteristics and operating status of the individual facilities in the Aggregation.[138]  NYISO states that an Aggregation may provide 10-minute synchronous reserves when it: (1) is bid as ISO-Committed Flexible or Self-Committed Flexible;[139] (2) is operating within the dispatchable portion of its operating range; (3) is capable of responding to NYISO instructions to change its operating level within 10 minutes; and (4) meets the qualifications identified in NYISO’s procedures.[140] Aggregations comprising one or more generating units and Aggregations that include Demand Side Resources that facilitate demand reductions using a generator may only provide spinning reserves if all of the generating units in their Aggregation use inverter-based energy storage technology and they meet the criteria in NYISO’s procedures. An Aggregation may provide 10-minute non-synchronized reserve if it consists of generating units and is capable of increasing its supply level within 10 minutes and meets the criteria in NYISO’s procedures.[141] According to NYISO, an Aggregation may provide 30-minute synchronized reserve when it: (1) is offered as ISO-Committed Flexible or Self-Committed Flexible, and (2) is operating within the dispatchable portion of its operating range.[142] As described above, an Aggregation may not provide 30-minute synchronous reserves if it has one or more generating units, unless all such generating units utilize inverter-based energy storage technology. NYISO states that an Aggregation whose facility mix includes one or more generating units is eligible to provide 30-minute non-synchronous reserve.  NYISO clarifies that, consistent with current requirements for generators, Aggregations using the Self-Committed Fixed Bid[143] mode are not eligible to provide any kind of operating reserves.[144]
72.           For voltage support service, NYISO explains that it prohibits Aggregations from providing voltage support service given that Aggregations, being composed of facilities connected to the distribution system, are unlikely to provide measurable and beneficial voltage support to the bulk electric system because any reactive power provided on the distribution system will experience high losses due to motors, transformers, and impedance at the distribution level.[145]
73.           For capacity, NYISO argues that its DER and Aggregation participation model allows comparable treatment of all eligible resources and facilitates the participation of DERs in NYISO’s capacity market.[146] NYISO explains that all resources that seek to qualify as capacity suppliers, other than Responsible Interface Parties,[147] must be able to participate in NYISO’s energy market and be capable of responding to the direction and control of NYISO.[148] NYISO also highlights that the Commission accepted and NYISO implemented on March 1, 2021 substantial changes to market rules applicable to resources with energy duration limitations that are not capable of operating 24-hours each day.[149] According to NYISO, its market rules value capacity from a resource with an energy duration limitation on the basis of its contribution to meeting resource adequacy. NYISO explains that an Aggregation of a single resource type will largely be treated as if it were an individual resource of the relevant type, e.g., an Aggregation composed solely of batteries will be treated as a single energy storage resource.[150]

ii.                  Protests

74.           AEMA contends that NYISO’s proposal to prohibit homogeneous Aggregations of a single type of DER, other than Demand Side Resources, from participating as a DER Aggregation is an unnecessary and artificial barrier to participation.[151]  AEMA contends that it is entirely reasonable for the Aggregator to have the option of participating under the DER Aggregation model or its resource-specific models.  AEMA claims that allowing homogeneous Aggregations to participate as DER Aggregations preserves operational flexibility, enables homogeneous Aggregations to more easily become heterogeneous Aggregations, and would avoid re-registration requirements and other administrative burdens associated with modifying Aggregation types.[152]  AEMA therefore states that NYISO’s proposal violates the Commission’s directive not to limit the types of resources that participate in distributed energy resource aggregations.[153] 
75.           AEE, NRDC, and SFP assert that NYISO does not explain how its participation model considers the capabilities of the Aggregation as a whole, especially one that is heterogeneous, and therefore does not accommodate the physical and operational characteristics of the Aggregation.[154] For example, they point out that an Aggregation composed primarily of solar resources would be exempted from binding day-ahead market schedules under NYISO’s rules for intermittent power resources.  Conversely, they explain that the addition of a single small storage resource would subject the entire Aggregation to binding day-ahead schedules.  They therefore state that a behind-the-meter solar and behind-the-meter storage Aggregation would be precluded from providing the services it is technically capable of providing despite the fact that this
    is a DER use-case that is fast growing and that the Commission highlighted in Order
    No. 2222.[155]  Similarly, AEE, NRDC, and SFP state that adding any amount of energy storage to an Aggregation of solar resources would impose stringent scheduling and dispatch requirements that are applied to energy storage resources alone to the entire Aggregation, a result at odds with the physical and operational characteristics of that Aggregation given that it includes solar resources.  They assert that NYISO could address this challenge by creating one or more participation models that allow solar and storage resources to operate like intermittent power resources during solar performance hours similar to the approach taken by PJM Interconnection L.L.C. (PJM) for solar-battery hybrids.
76.           In addition, AEE, NRDC, and SFP and AEMA argue that NYISO’s proposed participation model is limited by the characteristics of the least capable resource within the Aggregation, which fails to account for the characteristics of the entire heterogeneous Aggregation and prevents it from providing all wholesale services that it is technically capable of providing.[156]  More specifically, they provide examples to demonstrate that NYISO’s requirement that an Aggregation may only qualify to offer the ancillary services that all individual facilities are qualified to provide will preclude many heterogeneous Aggregations from participating or, if they do participate, from providing all services that they are technically capable of providing.[157]  For example, they state that under NYISO’s model, adding any amount of solar to an Aggregation of energy storage resources would render the entire Aggregation ineligible to provide regulation service or operating reserves because the solar cannot individually provide these services, despite the fact that a portion of the Aggregation is technically capable of doing so.  According
    to these protesters, to be compliant with Order No. 2222, NYISO’s model must allow Aggregations to provide all wholesale services that each DER within an Aggregation qualifies to provide.[158]
77.           Finally, AEE, NRDC, and SFP argue that NYISO’s existing buyer-side market power mitigation rules should not be applied to DERs with the capability to inject energy because the rules risk artificially stifling competition and the development of cost-effective and competitive DERs.[159] They request that the Commission direct NYISO to submit a further compliance filing with:  (1) tariff revisions to ensure that buyer-side market power mitigation is not applied to DERs participating in Aggregations; or (2) an explanation of why it is just and reasonable to apply buyer-side market power mitigation to these resources.  The Clean Energy Coalition likewise asserts that not directing NYISO to address its existing buyer-side market power mitigation rules will have an adverse impact on DER expansion in NYISO’s market.[160] 

iii.               Answers

78.           NYISO states that the Commission should reject AEMA’s request that homogeneous Aggregations of a single resource type should have the option to elect to participate as heterogenous DER Aggregations because, NYISO argues, the two types of Aggregations are subject to different energy and capacity market participation rules.[161]  NYISO explains that it developed its participation models for energy storage resources and intermittent power resources with the operating characteristics of those resources in mind.  NYISO states that, if homogeneous Aggregations participate as heterogenous DER Aggregations, rather than Aggregations of their resource type, they may be assessed undergeneration charges if they are unable to meet NYISO dispatch and will not be paid for excess generation.[162]  Further, NYISO explains that it models the resource adequacy contributions of the two Aggregations differently, and if a solar Aggregation operates as a DER Aggregation, it will be modeled as being capable of operating at its full capability for any six consecutive hours for purposes of establishing the Resource Adequacy Requirements used in the capacity market, which could have negative reliability implications.[163] 
79.           With respect to AEE, NRDC, and SFP’s protest regarding heterogeneous Aggregations of solar resources and electric storage resources, NYISO states that energy storage resources should not gain the benefit of the special exceptions to the operating and settlement rules that apply to intermittent power resources.[164]  NYISO states that it would have reliability concerns if fully controllable resources would be permitted to operate in a manner that is inconsistent with NYISO’s dispatch instructions.[165] Further, NYISO notes that AEE, NRDC, and SFP’s request was proposed in NYISO’s stakeholder process as a possible future market participation model and contends that the idea should be considered in that process and should only be implemented after acceptable rules to govern operation of such hybrid resources are in place.
80.           In response to protests about NYISO’s proposal that Aggregations only be able to qualify to offer the ancillary services that all individual facilities in the Aggregation are qualified to provide, NYISO states that, pursuant to Northeast Power Coordinating Council (NPCC) Directory 5, Requirement 6, NYISO is required to ensure that all resources it relies upon to provide operating reserves can sustain operation for at least one hour following activation.[166]  NYISO maintains that it can only meet this requirement by ensuring that all resources in an Aggregation can satisfy this NPCC sustainability requirement.  As for protests about heterogeneous Aggregations being required to operate using a fully dispatchable, continuous bid curve, NYISO reiterates that it does not have the means to effectively and economically optimize the starts and stops of individual facilities within an Aggregation or to know which facilities are operating.[167]  NYISO states that adding resource commitment to its DER rules would require a complete redesign of its participation model and might not be technically feasible.[168] 
81.           NYISO asserts that concerns about buyer-side market power mitigation should be addressed in NYISO’s stakeholder process for its Grid in Transition initiative.[169]

iv.                Data Request Response

82.           In its Data Request, Commission staff asked NYISO to explain how the DER and Aggregation participation model accommodates the physical and operational characteristics of heterogenous Aggregations, particularly heterogeneous Aggregations with mostly one resource type.[170]  In response, NYISO explains that the market rules for DER Aggregations were specifically designed to accommodate two or more different resource types operating together in a single Aggregation, such as energy storage resources with renewable or thermal generation, to satisfy energy and capacity market obligations.[171]  NYISO contends that the DER Aggregation participation model is designed to accommodate resource Aggregations that are capable of following dispatch instructions and provides a broad range of configuration options that allow an Aggregator to configure its Aggregations appropriately.[172]  Conversely, NYISO explains that the rules developed to address participation by intermittent power resources are a better match to the operating characteristics of Aggregations of solar intermittent power resources than the more generic rules NYISO developed for DER Aggregations.  NYISO explains that it would be unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory, and inconsistent with NYISO’s market design for the Commission to excuse resources that are capable of following NYISO’s dispatch instructions (e.g., energy storage resources) from doing so because an Aggregator chooses to include an energy storage resource in an Aggregation of solar intermittent power resources that cannot follow dispatch instructions.  In addition, according to NYISO, Aggregators are expected to make prudent decisions about how best to configure their available resources consistent with NYISO’s tariff rules.  Finally, NYISO argues that, if it is instructed to change how it implements the DER rules that the Commission accepted in the 2019 Aggregation Filing, then NYISO may not meet its 2022 implementation goal and DER implementation may be delayed for all resources.[173]
83.           In its Data Request, Commission staff asked NYISO to explain how its proposal would not present a barrier to the formation of heterogeneous Aggregations.[174]  NYISO explains that its market rules do not present a barrier but instead provide transparent market signals to inform developers and investors of the types of resources and combination of resources that can best meet the needs of New York’s electric system.[175]  NYISO asserts that Order No. 2222 does not require every DER participation model to optimally accommodate all possible DER resource configurations.  NYISO states that it has worked to accommodate in its software a reasonable set of resource attributes that will allow market participants to represent their resource’s operating characteristics.
84.           In its Data Request, Commission staff asked NYISO to explain how Aggregations composed largely, but not exclusively, of solar resources would avoid penalties and not result in resource adequacy concerns.[176]  NYISO states that the accepted DER and Aggregation market design permits Aggregators to choose how to assemble their available resources into one or more Aggregations and encourages Aggregators to make prudent decisions about how best to configure their available resources consistent with NYISO’s tariff rules.[177]  NYISO explains that the financial incentives provided by the DER market design do not encourage an Aggregator to create a DER Aggregation that almost exclusively comprises solar intermittent power resources.
85.           In its Data Request, Commission staff asked NYISO to explain how its requirements for Aggregations to provide ancillary services comply with North American Electric Reliability Corporation, NPCC, and New York State Reliability Committee Rules.[178]  NYISO states that it procures ancillary services, including operating reserves, to support grid reliability.  NYISO states that suppliers only qualify as eligible to provide the operating reserve products that the least capable technologies within an Aggregation can support, and that this requirement is not limited to DERs.[179] NYISO states that it issues dispatch instructions at the Aggregation level, which limits its ability to verify that individual DERs utilized by the Aggregator satisfy established operating reserve and regulation service reliability requirements.  In addition, NYISO states that it requires conventional standalone resources providing operating reserves and regulation service to achieve stringent reliability requirements; thus, it is paramount to system reliability that those same standards be applied to Aggregations and that NYISO not simply assume, based on the declaration of an Aggregator, that an Aggregation is capable of a service that its individual DER may not be qualified to provide when evaluated on a stand-alone basis.[180] NYISO states that it is currently working with stakeholders to develop an integrated hybrid participation model which will explore the feasibility and technical requirements necessary to allow an integrated hybrid storage resource to provide operating reserves based on the energy capabilities of each of the individual components of the hybrid storage resource.

v.                  Data Request Response Protests

86.           AEE and Public Interest Organizations argue that NYISO’s proposal to require heterogeneous Aggregations to be fully dispatchable in the same manner as traditional generators suggests that Aggregators must choose to pursue only homogeneous Aggregations, despite the Commission’s explicit directive that heterogeneous Aggregations be accommodated.[181]  Further, Public Interest Organizations assert that NYISO’s proposal ignores the directive of Order No. 2222 to develop heterogeneous aggregations that “ensur[e] that complementary resources, including those with different physical and operational characteristics, can meet qualification and performance requirements.”[182]  AEE claims that the inability to follow dispatch instructions like traditional technologies is a key physical and operational characteristic of Aggregations composed of mostly variable renewable resources that the Commission expected would be accommodated in new or revised DER Aggregation participation models.[183]  AEE adds that NYISO’s market rules must give DER Aggregations the opportunity to compete to provide the services they are technically capable of providing, while leaving to Aggregators and market participants the choice and risk of how to pursue Aggregations.[184] 
87.           AEE and Public Interest Organizations contend that NYISO’s response does not address why its proposed rules, which limit the participation of heterogeneous Aggregations by the least capable resource within the Aggregation, are technically necessary or compliant with Order No. 2222, given that such rules prevent heterogeneous Aggregations from offering all of the services they are technically capable of providing.[185]  Public Interest Organizations note that, instead, NYISO argues that its current rules for homogeneous Aggregations are superior to the rules for heterogeneous Aggregations, and that Aggregators can avoid some of the shortcomings of poorly fitting participation models by optimizing how they enroll their resources in various Aggregations.[186]  They assert that NYISO seeks to substitute its judgment for that of the Commission on the value of heterogeneous Aggregations.[187]   

vi.                Commission Determination

88.           We find that NYISO’s proposal partially complies with the participation eligibility requirements of Order No. 2222.  Specifically, we find that NYISO complies with the requirement to establish distributed energy resource aggregators as a type of market participant.[188]  Consistent with this requirement, NYISO defines an Aggregator as the market participant that interfaces with NYISO concerning the participation of the Aggregation.[189]
89.           We find that NYISO partially complies with the requirement to allow distributed energy resource aggregators to register distributed energy resource aggregations under one or more participation models in NYISO’s tariff that accommodate the physical and operational characteristics of the distributed energy resource aggregation.[190]  As expressly permitted by Order No. 2222, NYISO’s DER and Aggregation participation model comprises a combination of existing participation models:  (1) an existing DER Aggregation participation model; and (2) existing resource-specific participation models.[191]  Under NYISO’s proposal, the DER Aggregation participation model accommodates the physical and operational characteristics of heterogeneous Aggregations and homogeneous Aggregations of demand response, whereas NYISO’s resource-specific participation models accommodate the physical and operational characteristics of other types of homogeneous Aggregations (e.g., homogeneous Aggregations of electric storage resources or generators).[192]  In Order No. 2222, the Commission afforded each RTO/ISO the flexibility to modify its existing participation models to facilitate the participation of distributed energy resource aggregations, as NYISO proposes here, and did not require that each RTO/ISO establish a single participation model that could accommodate every possible aggregation, so long as its proposal allows distributed energy resources to provide all services that they are technically capable of providing through aggregation.[193]  With one exception discussed below, we find that NYISO’s DER and Aggregation participation model satisfies this requirement because it allows homogeneous and heterogeneous Aggregations to participate as resources directly in NYISO’s energy, ancillary services, and capacity markets. 
90.           We disagree with AEMA’s contention that Order No. 2222 requires that a homogeneous Aggregation be allowed to participate in NYISO as a DER Aggregation, rather than as a homogeneous Aggregation subject to the existing market rules of its resource type, and that such a restriction creates a barrier by denying homogeneous Aggregations the flexibility to easily become heterogeneous Aggregations.  As NYISO states, the proposed rules for homogeneous Aggregations better accommodate the physical and operational characteristics of such Aggregations than the more generic DER Aggregation rules.[194] For example, NYISO developed its electric storage resource rules specifically to accommodate the operating characteristics of that type of resource, and those rules would similarly accommodate the operating characteristics of an aggregation of electric storage resources, whereas NYISO’s DER Aggregation rules are more generic. We find it reasonable and consistent with the flexibility that the Commission afforded to the RTOs/ISOs in Order No. 2222 for NYISO to require Aggregations to participate under market rules that best accommodate the characteristics of that Aggregation.  In doing so, NYISO is not limiting certain types of resources from participating in Aggregations, as AEMA contends, but rather specifying which market rules apply to such Aggregations.  AEMA does not argue that, under NYISO’s proposal, homogeneous Aggregations are limited in the services that they can provide in NYISO’s markets as a result of being required to participate as a homogeneous Aggregation.  Moreover, NYISO’s proposal allows resources to switch between participation models annually, which we believe sufficiently addresses AEMA’s concerns.[195] 
91.           We also disagree with protesters’ assertions that NYISO’s DER and Aggregation participation model does not accommodate the physical and operational characteristics of heterogeneous Aggregations, such as DER Aggregations comprising solar and electric storage resources.  As NYISO explains, intermittent power resources (e.g., solar resources) are afforded special operating and settlement treatment based on their physical and operational characteristics because their output is not controllable.[196]  We agree with NYISO that a heterogeneous Aggregation of solar and electric storage resources would not warrant the same treatment as intermittent power resources because, with the addition of an electric storage resource, such an Aggregation is capable of following NYISO dispatch instructions.  We find that NYISO’s DER and Aggregation participation model is broadly designed to accommodate the physical and operational characteristics of any heterogeneous Aggregation, not only one that consists of solar and electric storage resources, and as such is compliant with Order No. 2222.  Nonetheless, while creation
    of such a model is not required by Order No. 2222, we also recognize that NYISO
    may be considering development of a new hybrid participation model that will better accommodate the characteristics of solar and electric storage resource Aggregations than the DER Aggregation market rules.  
92.           However, we find that any DERs that an Aggregator uses to satisfy NYISO’s relevant technical, operational, and/or performance requirements should be allowed to provide ancillary services through aggregation.[197]  We understand protesters are concerned that NYISO’s proposal unreasonably limits the ancillary services (i.e., regulation service and operating reserves) that a heterogeneous Aggregation can provide in scenarios where one or more DERs within that Aggregation is not capable of providing that service. 
93.           We also recognize that NYISO has voiced a reliability concern related to its argument that it is required to ensure that all resources it relies upon to provide operating reserves can sustain operation for at least one hour following activation and that,
    because the Aggregator will dispatch the individual facilities in its Aggregation, NYISO will lack visibility into which resource is being used to provide the next increment of energy or ancillary services.  We believe, however, that NYISO could address its reliability concerns by means other than requiring that all individual DERs within the Aggregation satisfy the relevant reliability requirements, such as the one-hour sustainability requirement.  Therefore, so long as some of the DERs in the Aggregation can satisfy the relevant requirements to provide certain ancillary services (e.g., the one-hour sustainability requirement), we find that those DERs should be able to provide those ancillary services through aggregation, in accordance with the goal of Order No. 2222 to allow distributed energy resources to provide all services that they are technically capable of providing through aggregation.[198]  At the same time, we agree with NYISO that this change should not be made at the expense of ensuring compliance with reliability standards nor delay the timely implementation of its Aggregation model.  Thus, we clarify that NYISO should implement its Aggregation model in the fourth quarter of 2022, as proposed, and further propose a reasonable effective date by which it will comply with the requirement to allow DERs to provide all the ancillary services they are technically capable of providing through aggregation while also addressing NYISO’s reliability and visibility concerns.  Accordingly, we direct NYISO to file, within 60 days of the date of issuance of this order, a further compliance filing proposing an effective date by which it will allow DERs in heterogeneous Aggregations to provide all of the ancillary services that they are technically capable of providing through aggregation.  To the extent that NYISO may need additional information from Aggregators regarding the individual DERs in an Aggregation in order to address NYISO’s concern, we note that it should include such requirements among the information and data that an Aggregator must provide about the physical and operational characteristics of its Aggregation, including any necessary physical parameters to be submitted in registration, and any necessary information that must be submitted for the individual DERs,[199] or additional bidding parameters.[200]  
94.           Finally, we find that protesters’ argument that DERs with the capability to inject energy should not be subject to buyer-side market power mitigation is outside the scope of this proceeding.  The Commission in Order No. 2222 neither addressed buyer-side market power mitigation rules nor required RTOs/ISOs to revise those rules for distributed energy resource aggregations. 

b.                 Types of Technologies

95.           To implement section 35.28(g)(12)(ii)(a) of the Commission’s regulations, the Commission required that each RTO’s/ISO’s rules not prohibit any particular type of distributed energy resource technology from participating in distributed energy
    resource aggregations.[201]  In addition, to implement section 35.28(g)(12)(ii)(a) of the Commission’s regulations, the Commission required each RTO/ISO to revise its tariff to allow different types of distributed energy resource technologies to participate in a single distributed energy resource aggregation (i.e., allow heterogeneous distributed energy resource aggregations).[202]  The Commission explained that requiring that RTOs/ISOs allow heterogeneous aggregations will further enhance competition in RTO/ISO markets by ensuring that complementary resources, including those with different physical and operational characteristics, can meet qualification and performance requirements, such as minimum run times, which will help ensure that RTO/ISO markets produce just and reasonable rates.[203] 
96.           With respect to the participation of demand response resources in distributed energy resource aggregations, the Commission stated that the benefits of allowing heterogeneous aggregations outweigh commenters’ preferences to limit the types of resources that can participate in aggregations.[204]  The Commission stated that the requirements in Order No. 745 would apply to demand response resources participating in heterogeneous aggregations.[205] 
97.           In Order No. 2222-B, the Commission stated that only those reductions that meet the definition of demand response in the Commission’s regulations and are used to reduce customer load from a validly established baseline pursuant to Order Nos. 745 and 745-A must be compensated consistent with those orders.[206]  In addition, the Commission clarified that, if an individual distributed energy resource is a behind-the-meter generator, it may participate within a distributed energy resource aggregation as a demand response resource or as a different type of distributed energy resource.[207]  The Commission stated that, if the distributed energy resource participates as demand response, the requirements in Order No. 745 would apply, and the RTOs/ISOs are required to allow that distributed energy resource to aggregate with other types of distributed energy resources in a heterogeneous distributed energy resource aggregation.  The Commission stated that, if the behind-the-meter resource participates as another type of distributed energy resource (i.e., not as a demand response resource), the requirements in Order No. 745 would not apply.

i.                    Filing

98.           NYISO argues that its DER and Aggregation participation model is technology neutral and permits a combination of technology types to be eligible to participate that were not previously fully capable of doing so.[208] NYISO states that it has other, narrowly tailored market rules for certain resource types that address the technical capabilities, unique operational abilities or configurations (e.g., limited energy storage resources, municipally-owned generation, or behind-the-meter net generation) that its DER and Aggregation participation model was not designed to address. Therefore, NYISO explains that it will not permit facilities that utilize these narrowly tailored market participation models (i.e., generators with Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) contracts, limited control run-of-river resources, behind-the-meter net generation resources, municipally-owned generation, system resources, and control area system resources) to participate in an Aggregation utilizing those existing participation models’ market rules.  NYISO notes that to the extent that a resource qualifies to use one of the identified participation models but chooses not to utilize that participation model, it may seek to qualify to participate in an Aggregation.
99.           NYISO explains that its market rules permit both homogeneous and heterogeneous Aggregations and that, with the exception of Demand Side Resources, homogeneous Aggregations will be subject to the existing rules for that particular resource type along with the general rules that apply to all Aggregations.[209]
100.       NYISO also argues that its DER and Aggregation participation model maintains compliance with Order No. 745 for Aggregations that include Demand Side Resources.[210] Under NYISO’s proposal, an Aggregation that includes Demand Side Resources will not be required to declare in its day-ahead or real-time offers what portion of its offer constitutes demand reductions. Instead, NYISO states that it will evaluate each Aggregation’s performance (via telemetry and revenue-quality meter data) after the fact to establish compliance with Order No. 745.  Specifically, NYISO states that it will evaluate an Aggregation’s actual demand reductions against the monthly net benefit threshold after the fact and will compensate demand reductions only when the real-time locational based marginal price (LBMP) meets or exceeds the monthly net benefit threshold. NYISO explains that demand reductions that are not compensable pursuant to Order No. 745 will nonetheless be included in NYISO’s evaluation of whether the Aggregation achieved its NYISO-issued base point signal.

ii.                  Protests

101.       CECA states that NYISO’s proposal fails to remove barriers to the direct participation of energy efficiency resources in Aggregations in NYISO’s capacity market which, according to CECA, was required by Order No. 2222.[211]  CECA contends that the Commission recognized in Order No. 2222 that energy efficiency resources are technically capable of providing capacity market services.[212]  CECA believes that energy efficiency resources, which CECA states are able to reliably deliver verifiable reductions in demand during peak hours, are technically capable of providing capacity as a supply-side resource.[213] 
102.       CECA states that energy efficiency resources currently participate as supply-side resources in the capacity markets of other RTOs/ISOs, including ISO New England Inc., PJM, and Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc. (MISO).[214]  CECA argues that NYISO’s continuation of its “dispatchability” requirement for capacity resources fails to “accommodate the physical and operational characteristics of each [DER] aggregation,” as required by Order No. 2222, and prohibits certain DER technologies—i.e., energy efficiency resources, behind-the-meter solar generation, and other passive (non-dispatchable) demand resources—from participating in the NYISO capacity market through Aggregation.  In addition, CECA asserts that there are numerous benefits from including energy efficiency in NYISO’s capacity market, including avoided infrastructure and reductions in production cost.[215]
103.       CECA states that energy efficiency resources can be accounted for on the supply or demand side of capacity markets, but that in practice, limiting energy efficiency resources to the demand side creates barriers to entry and undercounts their value to the system.[216]  CECA argues that demand side-only approaches present barriers to entry for merchant (non-utility) energy efficiency resource aggregators, load forecast challenges, and other practical limitations that obstruct the participation of energy efficiency resources.[217]  CECA therefore states that they support supply-side participation, which they assert unlocks additional energy efficiency demand reductions and unlocks capacity value by enabling energy efficiency aggregators to earn capacity revenues.  CECA argues that supply-side participation bridges the gap between the low marginal price that consumers face for capacity and the higher marginal value of that capacity on the system.
104.       Finally, CECA notes that developing a model for energy efficiency resources to participate in NYISO’s capacity market is a complicated undertaking that is best informed by a robust stakeholder process, but asserts that such a process should not delay implementation of the rest of NYISO’s DER participation model.[218]  CECA requests that the Commission direct NYISO to initiate a stakeholder process to examine energy efficiency applications and to identify, evaluate, and remove barriers to entry of energy efficiency resource Aggregations.[219]

iii.               Answers

105.       ACE NY supports CECA’s protest and urges the Commission to require NYISO to allow energy efficiency resources to participate in DER Aggregations.[220]
106.       Potomac Economics and NYISO disagree with CECA. While Potomac Economics agrees that energy efficiency provides substantial benefits, it believes that the most accurate and straightforward way to compensate energy efficiency is for buyers and consumers to face lower capacity and energy charges based on their respective load reductions.[221]  Potomac Economics disagrees that supply-side treatment of energy efficiency is needed to address barriers to participation of energy efficiency because energy efficiency suppliers can engage directly with retail customers and most energy efficiency investment is promoted through state and utility subsidies.[222]  Potomac Economics argues that a supply-side energy efficiency model in New York would primarily direct payments to ratepayer-funded utility programs.[223]  Potomac Economics notes that, contrary to CECA’s claim that such a model is needed to support merchant energy efficiency providers, merchant energy efficiency in neighboring New England accounts for only 0.7% of total energy efficiency participation in the last capacity auction, while the vast majority was made up of utility and government programs.  Potomac Economics states that capacity payments are not needed to fund energy efficiency investments because this funding is provided through retail rates.
107.       NYISO also argues that the Commission should reject CECA’s request.[224]  NYISO states that it permits all resources to participate in DER Aggregations subject to the same requirements, terms, and conditions as other resources.  NYISO explains that, to participate in the capacity market, all resources must be able to provide energy and respond to the direction and control of NYISO.[225]  NYISO argues that the Commission should not require NYISO to change its DER rules to enable energy efficiency to participate in the capacity market based on a different set of requirements that are more favorable and permissive than the rules that apply to other DERs.  NYISO further argues that, because energy efficiency reduces demand, it should be accounted for as a demand-side resource.  If the Commission does opt to require NYISO to allow energy efficiency to participate as a supply-side resource in its capacity market, NYISO requests that the Commission allow sufficient time to implement this requirement separately from the implementation of its DER Aggregation rules.[226]
108.       Potomac Economics and NYISO state that they have significant concerns about the practicability of verifying the capacity contributions of energy efficiency on the supply side.[227]  For example, according to Potomac Economics, a supply-side model would have major drawbacks, including inaccurate capacity accreditation, adverse incentives, cost shifting, double compensation, and inaccurate load forecasting.[228]  In addition, NYISO points out that Potomac Economics recently recommended that MISO terminate the participation of energy efficiency in its capacity market citing measurement and verification concerns.[229]  NYISO also indicates that PJM’s Independent Market Monitor, Monitoring Analytics, has raised concerns about the measurement and verification of energy efficiency programs that receive capacity revenues.  According to NYISO, these measurement and verification concerns will become reliability concerns if NYISO is required to permit energy efficiency resources to participate in its capacity market and they do not perform as promised.

iv.                Data Request Response

109.       In its Data Request, Commission staff asked why the DER and Aggregation participation model cannot be revised to accommodate the specific traits of certain resource types, such as generators with PURPA contracts or municipally-owned generation.[230]  In response, NYISO states that its narrowly-tailored, market participation models address or incorporate preexisting regulatory rights, longstanding tariff authority, technical capability, operating characteristics, and specific operating configurations.[231]  NYISO states that these participation models are not compatible with NYISO’s DER and Aggregation participation model.  For example, some have unique settlement rules, some would require duplicative DER functionality, and others would be administratively burdensome and infeasible.

v.                  Commission Determination

110.       We find that NYISO’s proposal complies with the requirements of Order No. 2222 with respect to types of technologies.  We find that NYISO complies with the requirement to not prohibit any particular type of distributed energy resource technology from participating in distributed energy resource aggregations.[232]  NYISO’s proposal includes a technology-neutral definition for DER and thus does not prohibit any type of technology from participating in an Aggregation.[233] 
111.       We find that NYISO’s proposal, which specifies that certain resource types participating under existing participation models[234] are ineligible to participate in an Aggregation, is also compliant with Order No. 2222.  As NYISO explains, the region has specific, narrowly tailored market rules for certain resource types that address the technical capabilities, operation, and configurations of those resources.  NYISO does not prohibit such resources from participating as DERs if they are otherwise eligible, so long as they do not also simultaneously participate in NYISO markets using other existing participation models.[235]  We find nothing inconsistent with Order No. 2222 in NYISO requiring DERs that are eligible for multiple participation models to choose one. 
112.       We also are not persuaded by protesters’ arguments that Order No. 2222 requires NYISO to change its existing performance requirements to accommodate a specific type of resource, in this case energy efficiency, to participate in NYISO’s capacity market as part of an Aggregation.  Order No. 2222 does not require NYISO to change its existing market qualification and performance requirements; rather, “distributed energy resource aggregations must be able to meet the qualification and performance requirements to provide the service that they are offering into RTO/ISO markets.”[236]  Accordingly, we agree with NYISO that it should not be required to change its capacity market qualification requirements to enable energy efficiency resources (or any other resource type that currently does not qualify) to participate in NYISO’s capacity market.[237]  We find that NYISO’s existing capacity market requirement that all Demand Side Resources be able to perform in a manner consistent with the directions and control of NYISO is itself technology neutral,[238] and that irrespective of whether energy efficiency resources are capable of providing resource adequacy in other RTO/ISO markets, these resources are not capable of meeting all of the current operational requirements to provide resource adequacy in NYISO. Further, because Order No. 2222 does not require RTOs/ISOs to model energy efficiency in a certain way, we reject as out of scope the arguments raised by various parties on whether energy efficiency should be modeled as supply or demand side participation. 
113.       In addition, we find that NYISO complies with the requirement to allow heterogeneous aggregations.[239] We find that NYISO’s DER Aggregation participation model complies with this directive by allowing both injecting and demand-curtailing resources to aggregate and participate in NYISO’s markets as a single Aggregation.[240] 
114.       Furthermore, we find that NYISO’s proposal complies with the requirement to apply the requirements of Order No. 745 to demand response resources participating in heterogeneous aggregations.[241]  To apply the requirements of Order No. 745, NYISO’s proposal requires that Aggregations independently measure energy injections, withdrawals, and demand reductions.  After the fact, NYISO will evaluate each Aggregation’s performance providing actual demand reductions against the monthly net benefit threshold, and only compensate demand reductions when the real-time LBMP meets or exceeds the monthly net benefit threshold.[242] 

c.                   Double Counting of Services

115.       To implement section 35.28(g)(12)(ii)(a) of the Commission’s regulations, the Commission in Order No. 2222 allowed RTOs/ISOs to limit the participation of resources in RTO/ISO markets through a distributed energy resource aggregator that are receiving compensation for the same services as part of another program.[243]  More specifically, the Commission required each RTO/ISO to revise its tariff to: (1) allow distributed energy resources that participate in one or more retail programs to participate in its wholesale markets; (2) allow distributed energy resources to provide multiple wholesale services; and (3) include any appropriate restrictions on the distributed energy resources’ participation in RTO/ISO markets through distributed energy resource aggregations, if narrowly designed to avoid counting more than once the services provided by distributed energy resources in RTO/ISO markets.[244] 
116.       The Commission in Order No. 2222 found that it is appropriate for RTOs/ISOs to place narrowly designed restrictions on the RTO/ISO market participation of distributed energy resources through aggregations, if necessary to prevent double counting of services.[245]  Thus, the Commission found that it is appropriate for RTOs/ISOs to place restrictions on the RTO/ISO market participation of distributed energy resources through aggregations after determining whether a distributed energy resource that is proposing to participate in a distributed energy resource aggregation is (1) registered to provide the same services either individually or as part of another RTO/ISO market participant;[246] or (2) included in a retail program to reduce a utility’s or other Load Serving Entity’s obligations to purchase services from the RTO/ISO market.[247]  The Commission provided RTOs/ISOs with regional flexibility with respect to the restrictions that they propose in their tariffs to minimize market impacts caused by the double counting of services provided by distributed energy resources in RTO/ISO markets.[248]
117.       In Order No. 2222-A, the Commission clarified that, when the Commission stated that “if a distributed energy resource is offered into an RTO/ISO market and is not added back to a utility’s or other Load Serving Entity’s load profile, then that resource will be double counted as both load reduction and a supply resource,” the Commission was indicating that, for planning purposes, double counting of services would occur if the same distributed energy resource reduces the amount of a service that an RTO/ISO procures on a forward-looking basis in a certain time period while also acting as a provider of that same service in that same delivery period.[249]  Further, the Commission clarified that, to the extent that an RTO/ISO already has restrictions in place to avoid double counting of services, it is not required to propose new restrictions but rather must explain on compliance how these existing restrictions prevent double counting.[250]  Such restrictions would only be appropriate “if necessary to prevent double counting of services,”[251] and each RTO/ISO must otherwise “allow distributed energy resources that participate in one or more retail programs to participate in its wholesale markets.”[252] 
118.       In Order No. 2222-B, the Commission clarified that payment of full locational marginal price (LMP) in the energy market to behind-the-meter distributed energy resources participating as demand response resources in distributed energy resource aggregations does not constitute double counting, so long as the requirements of Order No. 745, including the net benefits test, are satisfied.[253]

i.                    Filing

119.       NYISO states that it permits simultaneous generator and Demand Side Resource participation in the wholesale markets and in programs or markets operated to meet the needs of distribution systems located in the NYCA.[254] NYISO explains that, effective with the rules accepted in the 2019 Aggregation Filing, DERs will also be permitted to participate simultaneously in the wholesale markets and in programs or markets operated for distribution systems in the NYCA.[255]  NYISO argues that its dual participation rules and operational coordination procedures were developed in conjunction with the NYTOs and include special bidding rules to ensure that NYISO and the applicable transmission owner have adequate situational awareness and understand the resource’s operating status.  NYISO states that, in accordance with the Commission’s directive that authorizes a Distribution Utility to override NYISO’s dispatch of an Aggregation, NYISO proposes to strike the final sentence of Services Tariff section 4.1.11, which gives NYISO the authority to determine schedules for resources engaged in dual participation. 
120.       NYISO states that it does not propose any tariff revisions to comply with the Commission’s directive to permit DERs to provide multiple wholesale market services because the Commission-accepted provisions proposed in the 2019 Aggregation Filing will allow each Aggregation to be able to qualify to provide energy, ancillary services, and ICAP.[256]
121.       NYISO proposes modifications to Services Tariff section 4.1.10 to avoid double counting of services.[257]  First, NYISO explains that pursuant to Services Tariff section 4.1.10.1, Aggregators may not offer any resource as part of an Aggregation that is participating in the NYISO-administered markets in a different Aggregation or as an individual resource.  NYISO asserts that this existing rule avoids the potential for a DER’s capability to be offered more than once in the wholesale markets.
122.       In addition, NYISO proposes to revise Services Tariff section 4.1.10.6 to prohibit an Aggregator from enrolling a new DER that “provides the same or substantially similar service in a retail market or program” that it provides in the NYISO-administered markets.[258]  NYISO states that this proposed revision will help maintain reliability by preventing a DER from offering the same MW for the same service in two different places, and ensure rates are just and reasonable by preventing the DER from being compensated twice.

ii.                  Protests

123.       AEE, NRDC, and SFP raise concerns about NYISO’s proposal, in Services Tariff section 4.1.10.6, to prohibit resources that provide service in a retail market or program from providing the same or substantially similar service in the wholesale market.[259]  They argue that NYISO’s proposal to prohibit double counting of services is redundant, unacceptably vague, and likely to pose a barrier to participation.  NYTOs contend that the term “substantially similar” is too ambiguous and does not sufficiently define what would constitute a substantially similar service.[260]  The Clean Energy Coalition also opposes this language and argues that it erects a substantial barrier to dual market participation, which is in conflict with Order No. 2222.[261] AEE, NRDC, and SFP argue that the prohibition should be against compensation for identical service, not the same or functionally similar service, as NYISO proposed.  AEE, NRDC, and SFP, and AEMA assert that NYISO’s prohibition is overly broad and redundant given existing prohibitions on double counting by NYISO and the New York Commission.[262]  AEMA argues that the New York Commission’s prohibitions satisfy the Commission’s objectives of preventing double counting, and NYISO’s proposed language will only create confusion.
124.       AEMA requests that the Commission direct NYISO to delete the proposed language in section 4.1.10.6 of the Services Tariff.[263] If the Commission does not direct NYISO to delete this language, AEMA requests that the Commission direct NYISO to list what existing state programs it deems fall into the category of  “same or substantially similar service.”  AEE, NRDC, and SFP, and AEMA also request that the Commission direct NYISO to clarify why existing restrictions against double counting are not sufficient.
125.       NYTOs argue that the Commission should require NYISO to explain, with examples, what would constitute a substantially similar service and greater explanatory detail should be developed through NYISO’s stakeholder process and included in the applicable NYISO manual.[264] 

iii.               Answer

126.       NYISO states that it does not object to removing the phrase “or substantially similar service” from Services Tariff section 4.1.10.6.[265] NYISO states that it carefully considered the arguments raised in several of the protests and agrees that the language “substantially similar service” creates uncertainty about which programs are prohibited.  NYISO states that it also agrees with protests indicating that the New York Commission has specified when participants in certain retail programs cannot participate in the wholesale markets. 
127.       To implement revised Services Tariff section 4.1.10.6, NYISO also requests that the Commission direct NYISO to amend its Aggregator attestation requirement, in section 4.1.10.5 of the Services Tariff, to require that an Aggregator also attest that the individual DERs participating in the Aggregation are not providing through a retail market or program the same service(s) that the Aggregation will be providing in the NYISO-administered markets.[266]
128.       NYISO asserts that its proposal in Services Tariff section 4.1.10.6—to prohibit an Aggregator from enrolling a new DER that provides the same service in a retail market or program that it provides in the NYISO-administered markets—is the narrowest measure that NYISO can enforce.  As to arguments that NYISO’s proposal is insufficiently narrow, NYISO contends that it lacks the ability to determine whether a DER in an Aggregation is providing a service in the wholesale markets that it is ineligible to provide, or whether a DER is providing the same service in the retail and wholesale markets at the same time.[267]  According to NYISO, monitoring for such double counting would necessitate more intrusive and expensive metering and telemetry requirements, and more extensive software upgrades than NYISO is currently developing. 

iv.                Data Request Response

129.       In its Data Request, Commission staff asked NYISO to describe what role, if any, the Distribution Utility will play in helping NYISO verify that an Aggregator is not providing the same or substantially similar service in the NYISO-administered markets.[268]  In response, NYISO states that it and the Distribution Utilities are developing a matrix that will specifically identify retail markets and programs and the corresponding wholesale market service (if any).[269]  NYISO states that it intends to post this matrix on its public website once finalized.  NYISO states that it will update the document when notified by a Distribution Utility of a new retail market service or program, or when an existing wholesale or retail market service has changed.  NYISO states that it will continue to rely on an Aggregator’s attestation that the DER it enrolls are not providing the same service in a retail market or program, and that the matrix will assist Aggregators in identifying incompatible services and programs.

v.                  Data Request Response Protests

130.       AEE claims that NYISO does not identify with sufficient detail the criteria that will be used to create the matrix that will identify retail markets and programs administered by the Distribution Utilities and the corresponding wholesale market service, which creates significant ambiguity for DER owners and Aggregators seeking
     to participate in the market through Aggregation.[270]  AEE adds that the oversight and dispute resolution process that will apply is not defined.  AEE suggests that the role of RERRAs in the process of determining whether double counting will occur, and the dispute resolution process, must be described in NYISO’s tariff.
131.       AEMA states that NYISO’s plan to develop the matrix is unnecessary given the existing mechanisms in NYISO and RERRA to avoid double counting.[271]  AEMA argues that, with respect to potential double counting of identical retail and wholesale services, the RERRA, as the Commission has recognized, is the appropriate jurisdictional entity to make that determination.[272]  AEMA requests that the Commission direct NYISO to revise its tariff to explicitly designate this responsibility under the role of the RERRA.  AEMA states that, if NYISO and the Distribution Utilities move forward with the development of a matrix, the process should be transparent and allow for stakeholder input through the stakeholder process.   
132.       Public Interest Organizations state that NYISO’s proposed process to identify double counting appears reasonable in substance, but the process does not provide for adequate stakeholder or regulatory review, and the process should be described in NYISO’s tariff.[273]  In particular, they assert that a Distribution Utility-led process provides no opportunity for review of the results by the Commission or stakeholders.  They argue that, consistent with the Commission’s rule of reason policy,[274] the Commission should require NYISO to amend its tariff to include NYISO’s proposed list of specific retail programs that foreclose participation in specific wholesale markets because it determines a resource’s eligibility for market participation.

vi.                Commission Determination

133.       We find that NYISO’s proposal partially complies with the double counting requirements of Order No. 2222.  We find that NYISO’s existing DER and Aggregation participation model complies with the requirement to allow distributed energy resources that participate in one or more retail programs to participate in its wholesale markets.[275]  In particular, the existing model affords DERs the opportunity to participate simultaneously in one or more retail programs and in NYISO-administered wholesale markets.[276]
134.       In addition, we find that NYISO’s proposal complies with the requirement to allow distributed energy resources to provide multiple wholesale services.[277]  NYISO’s proposal allows Aggregations to provide multiple wholesale services, akin to other supply resources.[278]  Further, NYISO’s proposal does not restrict an Aggregation that meets the relevant eligibility requirements from any market or from providing any service, except for ancillary services, as discussed above.[279]
135.       We find that NYISO’s proposal partially complies with the requirement to include appropriate restrictions on the participation of distributed energy resources in NYISO’s markets through distributed energy resource aggregations, if narrowly designed to avoid counting more than once the services provided by distributed energy resources in NYISO’s markets.[280]  NYISO proposes two such restrictions.  First, pursuant to section 4.1.10.1 of its Services Tariff, Aggregators may not offer any resource as part of an Aggregation that is participating in the NYISO-administered markets in a different Aggregation or as an individual resource.  We find that this restriction complies with Order No. 2222 because it prevents a DER in an Aggregation from providing energy, ancillary services, or capacity as part of another Aggregation or as an individual resource and being double counted for providing the same service in NYISO’s markets.[281]  Second, NYISO’s proposal revises section 4.1.10.6 of its Services Tariff to prohibit Aggregators from enrolling new resources that would provide “the same or substantially similar service” in NYISO-administered markets as they already provide in retail services or programs.  We find that NYISO’s proposal to include the phrase “or substantially similar” in its tariff results in a restriction that is not narrowly designed, as discussed by protesters.  We agree with protesters and NYISO’s answer that this phrase is too broad and ambiguous as to which retail programs would overlap with wholesale markets.  In accordance with NYISO’s request in its answer, we direct NYISO to file, within 60 days of the date of issuance of this order, a further compliance filing that deletes “or substantially similar” from section 4.1.10.6 of NYISO’s Services Tariff and likewise replaces “Installed Capacity or a substantially similar service” with “Installed Capacity” in the third sentence in this tariff section. 
136.       Moreover, in accordance with NYISO’s request in its answer, we direct NYISO to file, within 60 days of the date of issuance of this order, a further compliance filing that amends section 4.1.10.5 of NYISO’s Services Tariff to require an Aggregator to attest that resources enrolled in the Aggregation are not providing the same service in a retail service or program as they are in the NYISO-administered markets.  As NYISO states in its answer, this attestation requirement will enable NYISO to administer the appropriate restrictions for double counting of services.
137.       We disagree with protesters who allege that the restriction to prevent double counting in section 4.1.10.6of the Services Tariff is not narrowly designed and therefore non-compliant with Order No. 2222.  With the revisions directed above,[282] we find that this tariff provision is narrowly designed because it does not broadly prohibit an Aggregation’s participation unless the Aggregation is providing the same service in a retail program.[283]  We acknowledge the complexity of defining the same service, as explained by NYISO, and note that Order No. 2222 allows flexibility regarding any proposed restrictions.[284]  We also disagree with AEE, NRDC, and SFP’s, and AEMA’s protests that NYISO’s proposed tariff provisions to prevent double counting are unnecessary and redundant given existing prohibitions by NYISO and the New York Commission. Although RERRAs such as the New York Commission can condition participation in retail distributed energy resource programs on those resources not also participating in RTO/ISO markets,[285] Order No. 2222 requires RTOs/ISOs to place appropriate restrictions on participation in RTO/ISO markets to avoid counting more than once the services provided by distributed energy resources in RTO/ISO markets.  We find that NYISO’s proposal complies with this requirement for the reasons discussed above and that the existing New York Commission restrictions identified by protesters do not conflict with NYISO’s proposed tariff provisions.
138.       In addition, we find that NYISO’s plans to rely on its Aggregation enrollment and attestation processes are compliant with the requirement to properly account for the different services that distributed energy resources provide in the RTO/ISO markets.[286] NYISO’s proposal would appropriately restrict resources’ participation when providing the same service, and the Commission provided flexibility to regions to determine the appropriate restrictions for their market in Order No. 2222.[287]  We also disagree with AEE’s and AEMA’s argument that the tariff must define a RERRA’s role in determining whether double counting occurs.  As NYISO notes, the attestation that we direct NYISO to revise is consistent with Services Tariff section 4.1.10.7.3, which requires the Aggregator to comply with all RERRA rules.  As discussed below, we find that this provision sufficiently establishes the RERRA’s role in accordance with the requirements of Order No. 2222.[288]
139.       In response to the Data Request, NYISO explains that it is developing a matrix to identify corresponding retail services and programs that overlap with NYISO-administered markets and will post the matrix on its public website. We disagree with Public Interest Organizations that NYISO’s proposal to post the matrix on its public website is insufficiently transparent, because, as NYISO explains, the matrix merely serves to assist Aggregators in identifying incompatible services and programs. We find that NYISO’s proposal provides market participants additional clarity beyond the Commission’s requirements in Order No. 2222.  We also decline to require NYISO to include the matrix in its tariff, because the matrix would only provide guidance, and NYISO will rely on an Aggregator’s attestation that its Aggregation does not include any resources providing the same service in both retail programs and wholesale markets.

6.                  Locational Requirements

140.       In Order No. 2222, the Commission added section 35.28(g)(12)(ii)(b) to the Commission’s regulations to require each RTO/ISO to revise its tariff to establish locational requirements for distributed energy resources to participate in a distributed energy resource aggregation that are as geographically broad as technically feasible.[289]  Given the variety of approaches to locational requirements proposed by commenters,
     the Commission provided each RTO/ISO with flexibility to determine the locational requirements for its region, as long as it demonstrates that those requirements are as geographically broad as technically feasible.  To the extent that an RTO/ISO seeks to continue its currently effective locational requirements for distributed energy resources, it must demonstrate that its approach meets this requirement.  The Commission stated that each RTO/ISO must provide a detailed, technical explanation for the geographical scope

of its proposed locational requirements.[290]  While each RTO/ISO must provide a detailed, technical explanation for the geographical scope of its proposed locational requirements, the Commission provided RTOs/ISOs with a certain degree of flexibility as to the technical aspects of a locational requirement that is as geographically broad as possible.[291]

a.                  Filing

141.       NYISO explains that its DER and Aggregation participation model requires each individual facility within an Aggregation to be electrically located in the NYCA and electrically connected to the same NYISO-identified Transmission Node.[292]  NYISO states that it will identify Transmission Nodes throughout the NYCA, following consultation with the NYTOs, and will map the collection of electrical facilities (e.g., distribution feeder lines) associated with the Transmission Node to which individual facilities may aggregate.[293]  NYISO states that the process for identifying Transmission Nodes and mapping electrical facilities to Transmission Nodes first considers a broad set of electrical facilities for each Transmission Node, and then, if necessary, the set of electrical facilities is reduced for the Transmission Node until NYISO and the applicable Transmission Owner agree that the Transmission Node appropriately reflects the electrical conditions on the system.[294]  NYISO explains that it will identify each Transmission Node on its public website alongside the list of generator names, load names, and other general system information.[295] 
142.       NYISO states that it will review the set of Transmission Nodes annually and update the set of Transmission Nodes, if necessary, to account for changing conditions on the New York State Transmission System and underlying distribution systems.[296]  NYISO explains that, if it determines changes to the set of Transmission Nodes are necessary, it will post a notice about changes at least 90 days prior to the start of the Capability Year, and these changes will take effect on the first day of that Capability Year.[297]
143.       NYISO asserts that modeling facilities that participate in an Aggregation close to their electrical location will enable NYISO to manage transmission constraints and reliability concerns.  NYISO states that its approach to identifying Transmission Nodes seeks to maximize the area of the distribution system covered, while minimizing bulk power system concerns.[298]  NYISO states that these requirements will also enable NYISO to facilitate settlements at the individual Transmission Node LBMP rather than the zonal average LBMP, which will encourage DERs to locate where they will provide greater benefits.[299]

b.                 Protests

144.       AEE, NRDC, and SFP assert that NYISO’s proposal to base locational requirements on mapping distribution feeder lines to a Transmission Node should theoretically appropriately balance geographic flexibility and reliability constraints, but they express concern that the mapping process has not begun and that it is unclear whether it will ultimately ensure that Aggregations can be assembled over the largest possible geographic area.[300]  AEMA similarly contends that, while NYISO’s Transmission Node mapping process should, in theory, result in the largest geographic areas within which Aggregators may form aggregations, it is unclear whether multi-nodal aggregation will be possible because the initial mapping has not been shared with market participants.[301]  AEMA asserts that it is impossible to assess without more information whether the Transmission Node concept is just and reasonable and otherwise complies with Order No. 2222.  AEE, NRDC, and SFP ask the Commission to require NYISO to make an informational filing once Transmission Nodes have been established to allow the Commission and stakeholders to assess whether NYISO achieves the balance sought in Order No. 2222.[302] 
145.       AEMA and AEE, NRDC, and SFP also note that NYISO’s proposed timeline to update Transmission Nodes does not align with NYISO’s proposed timeline for Distribution Utility review such that some Aggregations may be precluded from registering Aggregations far enough in advance to allow for timely market participation.[303]  AEE, NRDC, and SFP explain that Transmission Nodes will be updated 90 days prior to the beginning of the Capability Year but Aggregators may face up to a 90-day review period in addition to other NYISO network modeling processes, and therefore, may face a lag of a month or more before being able to participate.  According to AEMA, the 90-day notice of changes to Transmission Nodes will effectively preclude Aggregators from participation in the summer strip ICAP auction, which would cause unnecessary fluctuations in the supply resources available to NYISO and result in unjust and unreasonable rates.[304] AEMA and AEE, NRDC, and SFP ask the Commission to direct NYISO to adjust the timing of Transmission Node updates to avoid any delays in market participation.[305]

c.                   Answer

146.       NYISO argues that protesters’ concerns about NYISO’s implementation of Transmission Nodes are premature because NYISO is still working to implement the proposal that the Commission accepted in the 2019 Aggregation Filing as just and reasonable.[306] 

d.                 Data Request Response

147.       In its Data Request, Commission staff asked NYISO to describe the status of the ongoing process to identify Transmission Nodes and what criteria NYISO is planning to use to identify Transmission Nodes.[307]  Regarding how NYISO will ensure that the Transmission Nodes that it identifies will provide locational requirements that are as geographically broad as technically possible, NYISO states that it has been working with the applicable Member Systems individually to identify Transmission Nodes.[308]  NYISO also states that the total number of Transmission Nodes identified in the NYCA is 115, which it states should not change significantly prior to implementation.  NYISO provides a chart that details the number of Transmission Nodes in each Load Zone.  NYISO states that it and the Member Systems have considered a number of factors to establish Transmission Nodes, including:  (1) transmission and/or distribution system load pockets; (2) thermal limits of local transmission and distribution lines and protective equipment; (3) distribution and transmission system footprints; (4) concentration of load relative to total average system load; and (5) distribution system substation topology.[309]  NYISO asserts that, using these and other factors, NYISO and Member Systems identified the Transmission Nodes that send efficient market signals to developers without compromising distribution system reliability.  NYISO explains that, in areas of NYCA that are more heavily networked with adequate hosting capacity, Transmission Nodes are geographically and electrically broad, whereas more constrained areas of NYCA require Transmission Nodes to cover smaller geographic and electrical footprints that better align with expected transmission constraints.
148.       NYISO states that it also intends to add the list of Transmission Nodes as an attachment to a business practice manual.[310] NYISO states that it may publish a technical bulletin in advance of the business practice manual completion, if necessary, to provide Aggregators sufficient time to develop their Aggregations.  NYISO also states that it will review and update, if needed, the identified Transmission Nodes on an annual basis prior to the start of a Capability Year.  NYISO explains that it intends to discuss the set of Transmission Nodes with its stakeholders through its shared governance process prior to the implementation of the participation model, and when changes are made to the set of Transmission Nodes.[311]  Finally, NYISO states that its system is being designed such that affected Aggregators will be notified automatically via email when changes are made to the Transmission Nodes to which an Aggregation is modeled and that the Aggregator must re-enroll an Aggregation at the newly applicable Transmission Node. 
149.       With respect to whether the proposed timeline of posting the Transmission Nodes at least 90 days prior to the start of the Capability Year will provide sufficient notice to Aggregators, NYISO explains that the 90-day notice accounts for the previously accepted 30-day notice requirement to modify Aggregations, and provides Aggregators 60 days to evaluate and, if necessary, modify Aggregations.[312]  NYISO states that it proposes to provide Distribution Utilities the full 60-day review period authorized by Order No. 2222.  NYISO states that it agrees with AEE, NRDC, and SFP’s concerns that the 60-day Distribution Utility review upsets NYISO’s intended 2-month period for an Aggregator to modify its Aggregation in response to changes to Transmission Nodes.  NYISO asserts that, if the Commission accepts NYISO’s proposed 60-day Distribution Utility review period, NYISO will propose a corresponding modification to Services Tariff section 4.1.10.2 to adjust the posting date for Transmission Node change notifications to 150 days to address AEE and SPP’s concerns and account for NYISO’s proposed 90 days, which includes NYISO’s 30-day review period and then the Distribution Utility’s 60-day review period.[313]

e.                   Data Request Response Comments and Protests

150.       While AEE considers NYISO’s proposal to identify Transmission Nodes as a
     step in the right direction, AEE contends that DER Aggregators cannot make use of topological information unless there are means to map Transmission Nodes to real-world information, such as utility account numbers, street addresses, or geographic information system shape files, and without such means, the nodes themselves do not provide DER Aggregators access to sufficient information to permit them to participate.[314]  AEE asserts that development of fulsome meter to Transmission Node mapping should be conducted through a stakeholder process. AEMA likewise argues that additional information and/or tools must be made available regarding the Transmission Nodes to allow DER Aggregators to correctly identify and map planned DERs.[315]
151.       Public Interest Organizations state that NYISO’s proposed criteria for evaluating Transmission Nodes for DER Aggregation purposes are reasonable, provided that the indicated studies are carried out with a level of transparency and stakeholder participation equivalent to other transmission study processes.[316] 

f.                   Commission Determination

152.       We find that NYISO’s proposal partially complies with the locational requirements of Order No. 2222.  We find that NYISO complies with the requirement to provide a detailed, technical explanation for the geographical scope of its proposed locational requirements.[317]  As NYISO explains, NYISO will work with the NYTOs, on an annual basis, to identify Transmission Nodes and associated distribution feeder lines to which individual facilities may aggregate prior to the start of the Capability Year and will maximize the area of the distribution system covered while minimizing bulk power system concerns.[318]  We agree with commenters that, based on NYISO’s representations, the proposed Transmission Node framework should appropriately balance geographic flexibility and reliability constraints.  For instance, NYISO describes the factors that it and Member Systems will consider in identifying Transmission Nodes that send efficient market signals to developers without compromising distribution system reliability.[319]  We find reasonable NYISO’s explanation that Transmission Nodes are geographically and electrically broad in areas of NYCA that are heavily networked with adequate hosting capacity, while more constrained areas require Transmission Nodes to cover smaller geographic and electrical footprints.[320] 
153.       However, we find that NYISO does not comply with the requirement to revise its tariff to establish locational requirements for distributed energy resources to participate in a distributed energy resource aggregation that are as geographically broad as technically feasible.[321]  We find that NYISO’s tariff is insufficiently clear regarding how NYISO will identify or change its Transmission Nodes.  NYISO’s tariff does not include the criteria that it will use to: (1) establish a set of Transmission Nodes in the NYCA at which individual DERs may aggregate; and (2) review and, as needed, update the identified Transmission Nodes on an annual basis to be as geographically broad as technically feasible.  Under the Commission’s precedent, “[d]ecisions regarding whether an item should be placed in a tariff or in a business practice manual are guided by the Commission’s rule of reason policy, under which provisions that ‘significantly affect rates, terms, and conditions’ of service, are readily susceptible of specification, and are not generally understood in a contractual agreement must be included in a tariff, while items better classified as implementation details may be included only in the business practice manual.”[322]  We find that NYISO’s processes to identify and update Transmission Nodes significantly affect rates, terms, and conditions of service because they will determine how broadly resources may aggregate and under what conditions NYISO may change the nodes at which resources may have already aggregated. Accordingly, we direct NYISO to file, within 60 days of the date of issuance of this order, a further compliance filing to specify in its tariff the criteria it will use to:  (1) establish a set of Transmission Nodes in the NYCA at which individual distributed energy resources may aggregate;[323] and (2) review and, if needed, update the identified Transmission Nodes on an annual basis.
154.       We decline to direct NYISO to undertake a formal stakeholder process to map its Transmission Nodes, as AEE requests.[324]  In response to AEE’s concern that Aggregators will not be able to make use of topological information, we believe that NYISO’s commitment to discuss the set of Transmission Nodes with its stakeholders through its shared governance process prior to implementation of the participation model and when Transmission Nodes are updated should provide a forum for stakeholders to ask questions and provide comments.[325]  We also note that NYISO plans to notify Aggregators automatically if a change is made to the Transmission Node at which the Aggregation is modeled.[326]  In addition, NYISO will post the Transmission Nodes on its website and in the business practice manual, along with other general system information, load names, and generator names.[327]  We expect that the additional clarity we have directed NYISO to include in the tariff regarding the Transmission Node identification and review process, along with NYISO’s proposed measures to inform stakeholders of Transmission Node identification and review, will provide sufficient transparency for stakeholders. 
155.       Finally, we note that, in its Data Request Response, NYISO states that it agrees with AEE, NRDC, and SFP that the addition of a 60-day Distribution Utility review period upsets NYISO’s intended two-month period for an Aggregator to modify its Aggregations in response to changes to Transmission Nodes.[328]  NYISO states that, if the Commission accepts its proposed 60-day Distribution Utility review period, NYISO will propose a modification to Services Tariff section 4.1.10.2 adjusting the posting date for changes to Transmission Nodes to 150 days before the start of the Capability Year to address commenters’ concern.  As discussed below, we find that NYISO’s 60-day Distribution Utility review period complies with Order No. 2222.[329]  Accordingly, we acknowledge NYISO’s commitment to propose to modify section 4.1.10.2 of its Services Tariff to state that notice of changes to Transmission Nodes will be posted 150 days (rather than 90 days) before the start of the Capability Year. 

7.                  Information and Data Requirements

156.       In Order No. 2222, the Commission added section 35.28(g)(12)(ii)(d) to the Commission’s regulations to require each RTO/ISO to establish market rules that address information requirements and data requirements for distributed energy resource aggregations.[330]  As discussed in more detail below, the Commission required each RTO/ISO to revise its tariff to: (1) include any requirements for distributed energy resource aggregators that establish the information and data that a distributed energy resource aggregator must provide about the physical and operational characteristics of its aggregation; (2) require distributed energy resource aggregators to provide a list of the individual resources in their aggregations; and (3) establish any necessary information that must be submitted for the individual distributed energy resources.  The Commission also required each RTO/ISO to revise its tariff to require distributed energy resource aggregators to provide aggregate settlement data for the distributed energy resource aggregation and to retain performance data for individual distributed energy resources in a distributed energy resource aggregation for auditing purposes. 
157.       First, the Commission required each RTO/ISO to revise its tariff to include any requirements for distributed energy resource aggregators that establish the information and data that a distributed energy resource aggregator must provide about the physical and operational characteristics of its aggregation.  The Commission required each RTO/ISO to revise its tariff to establish any necessary physical parameters that distributed energy resource aggregators must submit as part of their registration process only to the extent these parameters are not already represented in general registration requirements or bidding parameters applicable to distributed energy resource aggregations.[331]
158.       Next, the Commission directed each RTO/ISO to revise its tariff to require distributed energy resource aggregators to provide a list of the individual distributed energy resources participating in their aggregations to the RTO/ISO.[332]  The Commission stated that, if an RTO/ISO needs additional information beyond this list, the RTO/ISO should identify and explain in its compliance filing what additional specific information about the individual distributed energy resources within an aggregation the RTO/ISO needs.  The Commission stated that each RTO/ISO should also propose how the information requested must be shared with the RTO/ISO and affected distribution utilities.  As part of these tariff revisions, the Commission stated that each RTO/ISO must also require that the distributed energy resource aggregator update that list of individual resources and associated information as it changes.[333]  The Commission also found that the distributed energy resource aggregator, not an individual distributed energy resource in the aggregation, is the single point of contact with the RTO/ISO, and that the aggregator would be responsible for managing, dispatching, metering, and settling the individual distributed energy resources in its aggregation.[334]
159.       The Commission found that aggregate settlement data for a distributed energy resource aggregation, as well as performance data for individual distributed energy resources in a distributed energy resource aggregation are necessary for the participation of any type of resource in RTO/ISO markets and to enable the RTOs/ISOs to perform necessary audit functions.[335]  Therefore, the Commission required each RTO/ISO to revise its tariff to require each distributed energy resource aggregator to maintain and submit aggregate settlement data for the distributed energy resource aggregation, so that the RTO/ISO can regularly settle with the distributed energy resource aggregator for its market participation.  The Commission also required each RTO/ISO to revise its tariff to require each distributed energy resource aggregator to provide, upon request from the RTO/ISO, performance data for individual resources in a distributed energy resource aggregation for auditing purposes. 
160.       The Commission stated that the requirements for settlement and performance data should be consistent with the settlement and auditing data requirements for other market participants.[336]  To reduce the burden on distributed energy resource aggregators and the RTOs/ISOs, the Commission found that distributed energy resource aggregators should only be required to retain that performance data for individual distributed energy resources in an aggregation that the RTO/ISO deems necessary for auditing purposes.  The Commission stated that, to the extent that an RTO/ISO does not need certain performance data from individual distributed energy resources in a distributed energy resource aggregation for auditing purposes, it should not require a distributed energy resource aggregator to retain that information for individual distributed energy resources participating in a distributed energy resource aggregation. 

a.                  Filing

161.       NYISO proposes that, similar to other market participants, each Aggregator must comply with the registration and metering requirements in NYISO’s tariffs and manuals and designate one or more persons to receive communications from NYISO.[337]  In addition to these requirements, NYISO states that Aggregators are responsible for submitting information about the Aggregation as a whole and the individual facilities comprising the Aggregation.[338] 
162.       However, NYISO states that it has not finalized or presented to its stakeholders the processes and procedures for registering Aggregations and enrolling individual facilities.[339]  NYISO explains that it is currently working to develop a new business practice manual that exclusively addresses participation of Aggregations and intends to finalize these processes and procedures. Once NYISO completes the development of its new Aggregation management software and related systems, and is able to finalize the list of attributes necessary to register an Aggregation and enroll individual DER, NYISO commits to providing that information to stakeholders.  NYISO states that its tariffs do not generally specify resource registration and data requirements and that its proposal to include these requirements in the applicable market participant registration materials and the various business practice manuals and applicable user guides is consistent with requirements for other resources.
163.       For the Aggregation as a whole, NYISO provides an overview of the types of information that it will require.[340]  NYISO states that it will require Aggregators to provide the load zone, subzone, and applicable Transmission Node at which the individual facilities will aggregate as well as the designated meter authority and the Aggregations collective capabilities including upper and lower operating limits. According to NYISO, each Aggregation will be identified by a specific identification number, name, and resource type (i.e., DER Aggregation or Aggregation of a single resource type).
164.       NYISO proposes that each Aggregator must identify each individual resource participating in its Aggregation to help NYISO validate the composite characteristics and capability of the resources, confirm that the facilities have the appropriate authorizations to provide wholesale market services, and permit NYISO to verify that the individual facilities are not participating in another Aggregation.[341]
165.       For the individual facilities participating in the Aggregation, NYISO similarly provides an overview of the information that it will require.  NYISO states that it will collect information on, among other things, the interconnection of the facility, ERIS and CRIS values, generator sub-types (e.g., energy limited resources), and fuel types.[342]  NYISO will also require facility-specific data related to a facility’s operating capability including whether it engages in dual participation.  NYISO states that it continues to evaluate and develop the list of characteristics it will require Aggregators to provide as it develops its Aggregation management software and intends to document this information in a forthcoming business practice manual.
166.       With respect to settlement data, NYISO states that all bids, schedules, dispatch, and settlement will occur at the Aggregation level under its DER and Aggregation participation model.[343] NYISO states that its metering and telemetry standards will provide NYISO with real-time operational data and after-the-fact settlement data to ensure Aggregations are responding to NYISO direction and are accurately settled.[344]  NYISO will require Aggregations to provide separate settlement data to permit NYISO to evaluate and settle energy injections, energy withdrawals, and demand reductions.[345]  NYISO will recombine the components of the aggregate response to settle the Aggregation as a whole.  To provide NYISO the ability to audit meter data, NYISO states that customers, including Aggregators, are required to keep a complete and accurate record of service taken or provided under the Services Tariff, including meter readings.[346]  Customers must keep the settlement information for at least 24 months from the date provided to NYISO.[347] 

b.                 Protest

167.       AEE, NRDC, and SFP explain that NYISO has not finalized the list of attributes necessary to register Aggregations and enroll individual DERs, and that NYISO plans to include this information in its manuals and users guides, rather than its tariff.[348]  They argue that this proposal ignores the requirement of Order No. 2222 that each RTO/ISO must “identify and explain in its compliance filing what additional specific information about the individual distributed energy resources within an aggregation that the RTO/ISO needs.”[349] They ask the Commission to require NYISO to include the information and data requirements in its tariff and to conduct a robust stakeholder process to develop them.  Absent a robust stakeholder process, they contend that NYISO must, at a minimum, define the information and data requirements in its further compliance filing and describe why these requirements are necessary for participation. 

c.                   Answer

168.       In response to protesters’ requests to more clearly define in its tariff the information and data requirements for individual DERs participating in an Aggregation, NYISO urges the Commission to accept NYISO’s proposed approach.[350] NYISO states that its proposed approach is consistent with the approach for registering other resources and that the information and data requirements are typically contained in the applicable market participant registration materials and business practice manuals.  NYISO explains that since 2020, it has been working to develop software and hardware necessary to implement its Aggregation participation model, which includes developing the processes and procedures for registering Aggregations and enrolling DERs. NYISO further explains that it intends to automate components of the DER registration process partially due to the anticipated high volume of DERs and that information and data requirements must be consistent with the software under development.  NYISO reiterates that its filing explains the types of information that it expects to require of DER Aggregations and individual DER, but that the final information and data requirements remain under development in concert with development of the required software and systems.

d.                 Commission Determination

169.       We find that NYISO’s proposal partially complies with the information and data requirements of Order No. 2222. We find that NYISO complies with the requirement that each distributed energy resource aggregator maintain and submit aggregate settlement data for the distributed energy resource aggregation, so that the RTO/ISO
     can regularly settle with the distributed energy resource aggregator for its market participation, and to provide, upon request from the RTO/ISO, performance data for individual resources in a distributed energy resource aggregation for auditing purposes.[351]  NYISO proposes to require Aggregators to meet all of the standards applicable to generators for metering and telemetry, including maintaining and submitting aggregate settlement data.[352]  We further find that NYISO’s proposed requirements for settlement data are consistent with the settlement and auditing data requirements for other market participants because NYISO applies requirements to Aggregators that are similar to those applied to generators and other customers.[353]  For instance, NYISO proposes to require customers, including Aggregators, to keep a complete and accurate record of service taken or provided under NYISO’s Services Tariff for at least 24 months from the date the settlement information was provided to NYISO.[354]  Finally, we find that, consistent with Order No. 2222, NYISO does not require Aggregators to retain information for individual DERs participating in an Aggregation that NYISO does not need for auditing purposes.[355]
170.       We also find that NYISO complies with the requirement to require distributed energy resource aggregators to provide a list of the individual resources in their Aggregations because NYISO proposes to require Aggregators to identify each individual facility in an Aggregation.[356]  However, we find that NYISO does not comply with the requirement to require the distributed energy resource aggregator to update that list of individual resources and associated information as it changes.[357] Accordingly, we direct NYISO to file, within 60 days of the date of issuance of this order, a further compliance filing that revises its tariff to require the Aggregator to update the list of individual resources and associated information as it changes. 
171.       Additionally, we find that NYISO does not comply with the requirements to revise its tariff to include: (1) any requirements for distributed energy resource aggregators
     that establish the information and data that a distributed energy resource aggregator
     must provide about the physical and operational characteristics of its aggregation; and
     (2) any necessary information that must be submitted for the individual distributed energy resources.[358]  Further, we find that NYISO has not clearly identified the necessary physical parameters that distributed energy resource aggregators must submit as part of their registration process to the extent these parameters are not already represented in general registration requirements or bidding parameters applicable to distributed energy resource aggregations.[359]  Specifically, while NYISO provides an overview of its intended information requirements, this overview reflects an unfinished proposal that is insufficient to meet the requirements of Order No. 2222.  Furthermore, we find that NYISO’s proposed approach to include all of these requirements in its various registration materials, business practice manuals, and user guides does not comply with the requirement of Order No. 2222 to include these requirements in the tariff.[360]  We therefore agree with AEE, NRDC, and SFP that NYISO must include these information and data requirements in the tariff, consistent with Order No. 2222. Finally, we find that NYISO’s proposal does not satisfy the Commission’s finding in Order No. 2222 that each RTO/ISO should propose how any information regarding individual distributed energy resources within an aggregation the RTO/ISO requests must be shared with the RTO/ISO and affected distribution utilities.[361] 
172.       Accordingly, we direct NYISO to file, within 60 days of the date of issuance of this order, a further compliance filing to:  (1) revise its tariff to include any requirements for distributed energy resource aggregators that establish the information and data that a distributed energy resource aggregator must provide about the physical and operational characteristics of its aggregation, including any necessary physical parameters to be submitted in registration; (2) revise its tariff to establish any necessary information that must be submitted for the individual distributed energy resources; (3) propose how any information regarding individual distributed energy resources within an aggregation the RTO/ISO requests must be shared with the RTO/ISO and affected distribution utilities; and (4) establish any necessary physical parameters that distributed energy resource aggregators must submit as part of their registration process to the extent these parameters are not already represented in general registration requirements or bidding parameters applicable to distributed energy resource aggregations.

8.                  Metering and Telemetry System Requirements

173.       In Order No. 2222, the Commission added section 35.28(g)(12)(ii)(f) to the Commission’s regulations to require each RTO/ISO to revise its tariff to establish market rules that address metering and telemetry hardware and software requirements necessary for distributed energy resource aggregations to participate in RTO/ISO markets.[362]  The Commission explained that it understood the need to balance, on one hand, the RTO’s/ISO’s need for metering and telemetry data for settlement and operational purposes, and, on the other hand, not imposing unnecessary burdens on distributed energy resource aggregators.[363] Therefore, the Commission stated that it would not prescribe the specific metering and telemetry requirements that each RTO/ISO must adopt; rather, the Commission provided the RTOs/ISOs with flexibility to establish the necessary metering and telemetry requirements for distributed energy resource aggregations, and required each RTO/ISO to explain in its compliance filing why such requirements are just and reasonable and do not pose an unnecessary and undue barrier to individual distributed energy resources joining a distributed energy resource aggregation.
174.       To implement this requirement, the Commission directed each RTO/ISO to explain, in its compliance filing, why its proposed metering and telemetry requirements are necessary.[364]  The Commission stated that this explanation should include a discussion about whether, for example, the proposed requirements are similar to requirements already in existence for other resources and steps contemplated to avoid imposing unnecessarily burdensome costs on the distributed energy resource aggregators and individual resources in distributed energy resource aggregations that may create an undue barrier to their participation in RTO/ISO markets.

175.       In Order No. 2222, the Commission stated that the distributed energy resource aggregator is the single point of contact with the RTO/ISO, responsible for managing, dispatching, metering, and settling the individual distributed energy resources in its aggregation.[365]  The Commission further found that the distributed energy resource aggregator is the entity responsible for providing any required metering and telemetry information to the RTO/ISO.
176.       The Commission stated that it would not require uniform metering requirements across all RTOs/ISOs, nor would it require each RTO/ISO to impose uniform metering requirements on individual distributed energy resources.[366]  Rather, the Commission provided flexibility to RTOs/ISOs to propose specific metering requirements, including any that may apply to individual distributed energy resources that the RTO/ISO demonstrates are needed to obtain any required performance data for auditing purposes and to address double compensation concerns.  Similarly, the Commission provided flexibility to the RTO/ISO as to whether to propose specific telemetry requirements for individual distributed energy resources in an aggregation.  The Commission stated that the need for such requirements may depend, for example, on whether the RTO/ISO allows multi-node aggregations or how multi-node aggregations are implemented. 
177.       The Commission stated that it would not require RTOs/ISOs to establish metering and telemetry hardware and software requirements for distributed energy resource aggregations that are identical to those placed on existing resources, or to establish different or additional metering and telemetry requirements for distributed energy resource aggregations.[367]  Rather, the Commission expected that RTOs/ISOs will base any proposed metering and telemetry hardware and software requirements for distributed energy resource aggregations on the information needed by the RTO/ISO while avoiding unnecessary requirements that may act as a barrier to individual distributed energy resources joining distributed energy resource aggregations or to distributed energy resource aggregations participating in the wholesale markets.  However, the Commission required that metering data for settlement purposes at the distributed energy resource aggregation level be consistent with settlement data requirements for other resource types.
178.       The Commission stated that each RTO’s/ISO’s proposed metering requirements should rely on meter data obtained through compliance with distribution utility or local regulatory authority metering system requirements whenever possible for settlement and auditing purposes.[368] The Commission further found that this requirement also applies to existing telemetry infrastructure.  With respect to jurisdictional concerns raised by some commenters, the Commission noted that any additional RTO/ISO metering and telemetry requirements would not change those required by state or local regulatory authorities and would be required solely to assist with settlements and audits of activity in RTO/ISO markets, or to provide RTOs/ISOs with the real-time information needed to reliably and efficiently dispatch their systems.
179.       In response to concerns about potential costs and burdens that could be imposed on distribution utilities as a result of the requirement that RTOs/ISOs rely on metering and telemetry data obtained through compliance with distribution utility or local regulatory authority metering system requirements whenever possible, the Commission stated that it expected that, in general, this information will be provided by individual distributed energy resources to distributed energy resource aggregators, and from distributed energy resource aggregators to RTOs/ISOs.[369]  However, to the extent that the RTO/ISO proposes that such information come from or flow through distribution utilities, the Commission required that RTOs/ISOs coordinate with distribution utilities and RERRAs to establish protocols for sharing metering and telemetry data, and that such protocols minimize costs and other burdens and address concerns raised with respect to privacy and cybersecurity.
180.       Finally, the Commission found that the RTO/ISO tariffs should include a basic description of the metering and telemetry practices for distributed energy resource aggregations as well as references to specific documents that will contain further technical details.[370]

a.                  Filing

181.       According to NYISO, the metering and telemetry requirements for Aggregations will be similar to the metering and telemetry requirements for other resources.[371]  NYISO states that its metering and telemetry rules are necessary to implement effective measurement and verification requirements to review resources’ responses and performance in real-time and provide appropriate compensation. NYISO states that its metering and telemetry requirements proposed in its 2019 Aggregation Filing are the result of an extensive effort to modify its previous requirements as necessary to reduce costs and lower barriers to entry for advanced technologies.
182.       NYISO states that it will collect revenue-quality meter data from the Aggregation, rather than from individual facilities, for settlement purposes.[372]  NYISO states that Aggregations of a single resource type will be subject to the existing metering rules for that particular resource type.  For instance, NYISO explains, an Aggregation composed of electric storage resources will be subject to the specific Services Tariff Section 13.2.4 metering requirements applicable to electric storage resources.[373]  NYISO notes that its electric storage resource-specific rules require that energy injections and energy withdrawals of each electric storage resource in an Aggregation must be directly metered, and the hourly meter data must be reported as two separate components (energy injections and energy withdrawals).
183.       NYISO states that Aggregators of DER Aggregations are required to provide three streams of after-the-fact, revenue-quality meter data: (1) energy injections, (2) energy withdrawals by withdrawal-eligible generators; and (3) demand reductions.[374]  NYISO states that it requires this information for measuring both performance and settlements.  NYISO states that it requires the individual signals to pair with the different revenue-grade meter files that are submitted one day after dispatch.[375] 
184.       Under NYISO’s DER and Aggregation model, NYISO states that the Aggregation will receive real-time base point signals from NYISO and the Aggregation will, in turn, provide real-time telemetry signals to NYISO in addition to the after-the-fact revenue-quality meter data for the Aggregation’s energy injections, withdrawals, and demand reductions.[376] NYISO states that these distinct streams of data will permit NYISO to account for the Aggregation’s operations including, for example, to apply the Order No. 745 net benefit threshold to the Aggregation’s demand reductions.[377]
185.       NYISO states that, consistent with the rules for generators, Aggregations will be required to send telemetry signals 24 hours a day, seven days a week, nominally on a six-second basis.[378]  NYISO states that the Aggregator must measure the injection, withdrawal, and load reduction of all individual facilities in the Aggregation, without regard to the resources it directs to operate, in order to achieve the NYISO dispatch. NYISO explains that this requirement is crucial for NYISO to maintain the reliability of the New York Bulk Power System and provides two-way communications of operational data between the Aggregation and NYISO.  NYISO states that it relies on telemetry data for the situational awareness necessary to balance supply and demand within the NYCA and to identify and respond to normal and abnormal conditions.
186.       NYISO explains that individual facilities within an Aggregation will not need to receive real-time base point signals, provide real-time telemetry, or submit revenue-quality meter data to NYISO; these requirements will instead apply to the Aggregation.[379]  NYISO proposes that Aggregators will be responsible for ensuring that all measurements for metering and telemetry for the individual facilities it represents derive from either directly measured or calculated values, or a combination thereof, in accordance with the requirements set forth in NYISO’s procedures.[380]  NYISO asserts that communicating with the Aggregation, rather than individual facilities, will minimize real-time and after-the-fact administrative burdens on all parties involved.

b.                 Protests

187.       AEE, NRDC, and SFP and AEMA argue that NYISO’s metering and telemetry requirements are overly burdensome and are not adequately tailored to the services provided.[381]  With respect to metering, AEE, NRDC, and SFP support some elements of NYISO’s proposal and state that NYISO has appropriately allowed third-party metering, which gives flexibility for DERs to utilize a range of configurations to participate in an Aggregation.  However, AEE, NRDC, and SFP and AEMA contend that NYISO’s requirement, in section 3.2.1.2 of NYISO’s Accounting and Billing Manual, that meter data be submitted the next operating day creates a barrier because Aggregators will not have access to utility meter data by that time.[382]  AEE, NRDC, and SFP state that NYISO has failed to achieve the balance Order No. 2222 requires of meeting NYISO’s need for meter data for settlement and operational purposes, on the one hand, and not imposing unnecessary burdens on Aggregators, on the other.
188.       With respect to telemetry, AEE, NRDC, and SFP argue that NYISO has not explained, as Order No. 2222 requires, why its blanket requirement for six-second telemetry is needed for all services, i.e., six-second telemetry may be necessary for regulation service but not for capacity and energy market participation.[383] They argue that NYISO’s requirement will preclude residential-scale DERs from participating in Aggregations.  AEMA argues that there must be an evaluation of the benefits of telemetry from DERs versus the costs and barriers to participation that the telemetry requirements create.[384]  AEMA asserts that the requirements for Aggregators to provide multiple streams of telemetry and revenue quality meter data exceeds requirements for generators.  AEMA argues that NYISO’s metering and telemetry requirements will require each DER in an aggregation to have metering and telemetry, in addition to having metering and telemetry on the load at the point of interconnection, which will serve as a barrier to customers smaller than 1 MW.  AEMA argues that in many cases, for resources greater than 100 kW and under one MW and residential-scale DERs, the cost of direct telemetry capable of providing values on a six-second basis would be prohibitive and will exclude them from participating in a DER Aggregation.  AEE, NRDC, and SFP also dispute NYISO’s contention that six-second telemetry is required for all resources for reliability reasons.[385]  They assert that this contention is difficult to reconcile with the fact that there are a large number of DERs already operating in New York through New York’s robust net metering program and injecting into NYISO’s system without any telemetry.
189.       AEE, NRDC, and SFP argue that the limited flexibility that NYISO’s proposal provides is insufficient. For example, they assert that the fact that telemetry is only required from the Aggregation as opposed to the individual DERs within the Aggregation does lessen the administrative burden but does not resolve the cost and logistical barriers posed by the requirement.[386]  Similarly, they contend that the option to use a combination of measured or calculated values based on five-minute data is still burdensome because that five-minute data is not generally available for residential customers.
190.       NYAPP requests that the Commission confirm that NYISO’s proposed tariff provisions on metering and telemetry were developed in negotiations between NYISO and the NYTOs, and that NYISO relies on its existing market rules for DER and DER Aggregator participation as the basis for compliance with Order No. 2222.[387]  NYAPP states that these proposed provisions are not suitable for small utilities, serve as a barrier to small utilities considering whether to opt in, and should not be applied to NYAPP members at this time.  NYAPP requests that the Commission require NYISO to establish suitable metering and telemetry tariff provisions that account for the needs of small utilities.

c.                   Answers

191.       NYISO contends that the Commission should accept NYISO’s proposed metering and telemetry requirements without modification.[388]  NYISO states that Order No. 2222 does not specify the metering and telemetry requirements each RTO/ISO must use but rather directs the RTOs/ISOs to develop requirements that meet the needs of their respective regions, and to explain why those requirements are just and reasonable and do not pose unnecessary or undue barriers on DERs. 
192.       In response to protests about NYISO’s requirement that Aggregations provide six-second telemetry, NYISO argues that this requirement is just and reasonable and does not create an undue burden.[389] NYISO explains that the six-second scan rate applicable to all generators and Aggregations is needed to: (1) maintain situational awareness of the NYCA electric system; (2) operate NYISO’s automatic generation control process to maintain load and generation balance; (3) meet mandatory bulk power system reliability criteria, including criteria unique to New York State; and (4) respond to emergency conditions. In addition, NYISO claims that it currently uses six-second telemetry signals to meet mandatory New York State Reliability Council criteria, Requirement D.1 for Mitigation of Major Emergencies, which requires that when a transmission facility experiences a thermal overload, NYISO must take immediate corrective action within five minutes.  NYISO argues that it needs six-second information from resources to respond to thermal overload, and to schedule resources in a manner that mitigates the issue in compliance with the reliability standard.
193.       NYISO notes that the Commission accepted its metering and telemetry rules proposed in its 2019 Aggregation Filing and that the substantive concerns raised here are the same as those raised in that proceeding.[390]  NYISO notes that the Commission found NYISO’s six-second telemetry requirement “is necessary to meet reliability standards and respond to emergencies, and also is consistent with NYISO’s requirements for other resources.”[391]  NYISO contends that the Commission should not permit protesters to re-litigate issues that the Commission has already considered and decided. Moreover, NYISO argues that its metering and telemetry rules are already being coded in its software and that new changes would delay implementation of its DER and Aggregation participation model.
194.       In response to arguments that NYISO’s proposed telemetry requirements would exclude residential customers, NYISO maintains that it has established flexible rules for small DERs with a response of under 100 kW that allow the option to utilize alternative measurement and verification tools, such as calculating six-second telemetry values derived from five-minute data in place of real-time measurement.[392]  According to NYISO, this will avoid the need for small facilities to install more costly hardware and software that is required for conventional resources. NYISO further contends that protesters are incorrect that DERs using calculated (rather than six-second telemetered) values will be prohibited from providing ancillary services.  NYISO explains that Aggregations containing one or more facilities that utilize calculated values will not meet the eligibility requirements to provide regulation service but will be allowed to provide operating reserves. In response to AEMA’s argument that NYISO’s requirement poses an undue barrier because, in certain circumstances, each asset in a DER Aggregation must have its own metering and telemetry in addition to having metering and telemetry on the load at the point of interconnection, NYISO reiterates that the Commission already approved this requirement and that these requirements are essential to obtain required performance data for real-time operations and for settlement purposes.[393] 
195.       NYISO disagrees with AEMA’s argument that the cost of six-second telemetry creates an undue barrier.[394]  NYISO explains that its own cost estimates are well below AEMA’s and argues that the cost of providing telemetry—at any scan rate—is a cost that must be borne by Aggregators and owners of individual DERs.  NYISO also points out that, as a result of its evaluation of new telemetry technologies in 2019, it will allow the use of software defined wide area networks as an alternative to existing multi-protocol label switching, which will reduce installation and connection times and costs.  In response to AEMA’s assertion that NYISO’s requirements to provide multiple streams of telemetry and revenue quality meter data exceeds the requirements for other generators, NYISO states that such requirements are necessarily more complex because Aggregations consist of multiple separate resource types.[395]  However, NYISO maintains that the metering and telemetry requirements that apply to Aggregations consisting of multiple resource types, taken as a whole, are not any greater than the combined requirements of the participating resource types.
196.       In response to AEE, NRDC, and SFP’s and AEMA’s arguments that not all Aggregations should require the same telemetry depending on size and services provided, NYISO reiterates that its six-second telemetry requirement is necessary for reliability, situational awareness, and to respond to emergencies.[396] In response to the argument that the requirement that settlement-quality meter data be submitted by noon on the day after an operating day creates barriers to participation, particularly for smaller entities, NYISO clarifies that the Aggregator is not required to submit meter data.[397] Rather, NYISO states that the applicable metering authority is required to submit the data. NYISO explains that an Aggregator may act as the meter authority for its Aggregation if it chooses to be a Meter Services Entity, but it may decide to utilize the applicable Transmission Owner or third-party Meter Services Entity to play this role, in which case the Transmission Owner or third-party would be required to submit the data.
197.       In response to NYAPP’s concerns regarding the impact of telemetry and metering on small utilities, NYISO explains that its requirements are only applicable to Aggregations and Aggregators and not small utilities.[398]  However, NYISO states that it is willing to work with small utilities to address specific concerns.
198.       Xcel recommends that the Commission reject the relief that AEE, NRDC, and SFP and AEE request with respect to telemetry, metering, and settlement, and specify that any holdings in this proceeding will not predetermine the measures appropriate in other regions.[399]  In response to arguments that NYISO has not reconciled its six-second telemetry requirement for DER Aggregations with the fact that net metered customers in NYISO are not subject to telemetry, Xcel argues that telemetry for DER Aggregations and telemetry for existing net metered customers are fundamentally different.[400]  Xcel states that Load Serving Entities have learned how to adjust their forecasting models and incorporate net-metered output into their load forecasts.  In contrast, Xcel asserts that managing DER Aggregations will require different tools, because the nature of services DER Aggregations provide differ from net-metered resources’ simple injections that occur with more predictable patterns. Xcel states that market efficiency will suffer if operators do not have a clear picture of how all dispatched resources are responding to dispatch instructions. 
199.       With respect to metering and settlement, Xcel suggests that all resources at a site should aggregate through a single point of interconnection meter to avoid substantial upgrades to Load Serving Entities’ settlement and customer billing systems.[401]  Xcel states that rules must be put into place to allow Load Serving Entities ample time to update their billing and settlement systems before DERs can switch between DER Aggregations. 

d.                 Data Request Response

200.       In its Data Request, Commission staff asked NYISO whether it will allow Aggregators to rely on meter data from the relevant Distribution Utility or RERRA.[402]
     In response, NYISO states that its tariff, as accepted in the 2020 Aggregation Order and in a subsequent filing, designates that an Aggregator may obtain metering from either: (1) the Member System for the transmission district in which the entity is located;
     (2) a Meter Services Entity, which is a third party entity authorized by NYISO to provide metering services; or (3) a municipal electric utility.[403]  NYISO further states that, pursuant to NYISO’s rules, the transmission provider or applicable municipal electric utility will be the default provider of metering and meter data services.  NYISO states that the only type of RERRA authorized to provide metering and meter data services is a municipal electric utility.
201.       In its Data Request, Commission staff also asked NYISO to clarify whether there are circumstances under which metering and telemetry data will come from, or flow through, Distribution Utilities, and if so, whether NYISO has coordinated with Distribution Utilities and RERRAs to establish protocols for sharing metering and telemetry data.[404]  NYISO states that the default providers of metering and meter data services are Member Systems or the applicable municipal electric utility, unless an Aggregator elects to use a Meter Services Entity.[405]  NYISO states the real-time telemetry data communication requirements accepted in the 2020 Aggregation Order allow Aggregation telemetry data to be communicated only with the applicable Member System, or communicated with both the Member System and NYISO in parallel.[406]  NYISO states that it requires that telemetry data be provided to the applicable Member System in the event of a NYISO contingency.
202.       In its Data Request, Commission staff asked NYISO to explain the circumstances under which NYISO will accept directly measured (as opposed to calculated) metering and telemetry data.[407] In response, NYISO states that NYISO’s metering rules require Aggregators to collect directly metered data from each facility within an Aggregation for settlement purposes, regardless of resource size, type, or the services provided, after which the Aggregator will combine the revenue-quality meter data to transmit to NYISO.[408]  NYISO states that each facility will also be required, with limited exceptions, to provide directly measured real-time telemetry data on a six-second basis to the Aggregator.  To reduce the potential barrier to entry for small facilities due to the costs of traditional telemetry solutions, NYISO explains that it allows Aggregators to seek authorization to use an alternative telemetry scheme for individual facilities with a capability of 100 kW or less.  NYISO explains that it identified the 100 kW or less threshold as a way for smaller resources to initially be included in the market without creating unmanageable reliability risk.  NYISO states that these small facilities must still be capable of providing directly measured telemetry with a periodicity of five minutes or less.

e.                   Data Request Response Protests

203.       AEMA reiterates that NYISO’s proposed requirements are unnecessary and create barriers to the entry of small resources, and it requests that the Commission reject NYISO’s compliance filing and direct NYISO to engage with stakeholders to ensure that NYISO’s proposed requirements meet the intent of Order No. 2222 to not create new barriers.[409]  AEE asserts that NYISO’s description of its metering and telemetry requirements that apply to individual DERs within an Aggregation are overly burdensome.  AEE contends that the alternative telemetry scheme approach for smaller resources was created prior to the issuance of Order No. 2222, and that the alternative telemetry approach creates an economic barrier to DER participation.[410]
204.       AEE states that NYISO’s proposed Meter Service Entity construct still requires the meter authority to submit the meter data by noon the following operating day.[411]  However, AEE asserts that DER Aggregators will be unable to receive that information from the utilities in time and will be required to install metering to obtain that data on their own, which presents a significant barrier to entry.  AEE contends that it is unclear what the penalty will be when the metering authority does not submit the data that they are responsible for providing.  Finally, AEE requests that the Commission request clarification from NYISO on whether NYISO coordinated with Distribution Utilities and RERRAs to establish protocols for sharing metering and telemetry data.[412] 

f.                   Commission Determination

205.       We find that NYISO’s proposal partially complies with the metering and telemetry system requirements of Order No. 2222.  In particular, we find that NYISO’s proposal partially complies with the requirement to establish market rules that address metering and telemetry hardware and software requirements necessary for distributed energy resource aggregations to participate in RTO/ISO markets because its tariff lacks the deadline for meter data submission for settlements and does not include references to the specific documents that contain further technical details.[413]  In addition, we also find that NYISO partially complies with the requirement to explain why its proposed metering and telemetry requirements for distributed energy resource aggregations are just and reasonable and do not pose an unnecessary and undue barrier to individual distributed energy resources joining a distributed energy resource aggregation.  We find that NYISO has explained the majority of its proposed metering and telemetry requirements, but we find that NYISO’s filing lacks clarity regarding its protocols for sharing metering and telemetry data and the meter data submission deadline.[414] 
206.       As an initial matter, we find that NYISO’s proposed metering and telemetry requirements are consistent with the Commission’s finding in Order No. 2222 that the distributed energy resource aggregator is the entity responsible for providing any required metering and telemetry information to the RTO/ISO.[415]  While an Aggregator may choose to have a NYISO-authorized Meter Services Entity or applicable Member System provide Aggregation metering services on its behalf, each Aggregation is responsible for meeting the applicable metering standards under NYISO’s Services Tariff.[416]  Likewise, under NYISO’s proposal, Aggregations are required to provide telemetry data to NYISO.[417] 
207.       With respect to metering, we find that NYISO’s proposal partially complies with the requirement to revise its tariff to establish market rules that address metering requirements necessary for distributed energy resource aggregations to participate in RTO/ISO markets.[418]  In Order No. 2222, the Commission explained that “the RTO/ISO tariffs should include a basic description of the metering and telemetry practices for distributed energy resource aggregations as well as references to specific documents that will contain further technical details.”[419]  As discussed below, we find that NYISO’s basic description of its metering practices for Aggregations in its tariff is incomplete because while the tariff specifies that each Aggregation must submit revenue-quality meter data and meet the metering standards in NYISO’s tariff and procedures,[420] it lacks the deadline for meter data submission for settlements. We also find that the tariff does not include references to the specific documents that contain further technical details, as Order No. 2222 requires.
208.       Protesters express concern about NYISO’s meter data submission deadline, which is in section 3.2.1.2 of its Accounting and Billing Manual, and contend that the penalty for late meter data submission is unclear.[421]  Section 3.2.1.2 of NYISO’s Accounting and Billing Manual states that the Member System[422] is responsible for submitting all available hourly meter to NYISO by noon of the first business day following a service day.[423]  In its answer, NYISO explains that the requirement to submit meter data by noon applies to the applicable metering authority, rather than the Aggregator.  NYISO explains that the meter authority could be the applicable Member System, a third-party Meter Services Entity, or the Aggregator if it chooses to become a Meter Services Entity and assume the role of meter authority for the Aggregation.[424]  We find that there is a lack of clarity in the record regarding which entity submits the meter data for settlement.  However, we disagree with AEE that NYISO’s Tariff is unclear as to what the penalty will be for late meter data submission, because section 13.3.1.2 of the Services Tariff provides the applicable penalties for noncompliant metering or meter data services for Aggregators.[425]  We find that specification of the meter data submission deadline and which entity must meet the meter data submission deadline is a key component of metering practices for Aggregators and therefore should be included in the basic description of metering and telemetry practices in the tariff, as Order No. 2222 requires.[426]  For example, failure to meet the meter data submission deadline may result in financial consequences for Aggregators, and as such, may significantly impact Aggregators’ participation in NYISO’s markets.  Accordingly, we direct NYISO to file, within 60 days of the date of issuance of this order, a further compliance filing to revise NYISO’s tariff to include the meter data submission deadline for settlement and specify which entity must submit meter data.[427]  In addition, we acknowledge that Aggregators may be in the position of compiling meter data for numerous individual DERs within an Aggregation, and that meeting the meter data submission deadline may consequently pose additional challenges for Aggregators compared to standalone resources.  Thus,
     we encourage NYISO to discuss its proposed meter data submission deadline for Aggregators with stakeholders before filing.  Finally, as part of its compliance filing, we direct NYISO to include in its tariff references to specific documents that contain further technical details with respect to metering, as Order No. 2222 requires.
209.       In addition, we find that NYISO’s proposal partially complies with the requirement to explain why its proposed metering requirements are just and reasonable and do not pose an unnecessary and undue barrier to individual DERs joining a distributed energy resource aggregation because NYISO does not propose protocols for sharing metering data, as discussed further below.[428]  We find that NYISO has supported its need for after-the-fact meter data in order to accurately implement its settlement process for market participants, including Aggregations.[429]  We find reasonable NYISO’s explanation that it requires multiple streams of revenue quality meter data where Aggregations consist of multiple resource types to produce accurate settlements and properly settle demand reductions consistent with Order No. 745.[430]  We further find that NYISO’s option to provide flexibility to Aggregators to utilize alternative measurement and verification tools, such as calculating values through a NYISO-approved methodology in place of real-time measurement, is reasonable in order to avoid the need for small facilities to install additional hardware and software.[431]
210.       We also find that NYISO’s proposal complies with the requirement in Order
     No. 2222 that metering requirements should rely on meter data obtained through compliance with Distribution Utility or local regulatory authority metering system requirements whenever possible for settlement and auditing purposes, given that NYISO will permit Aggregators to use data obtained from revenue-quality retail billing meters (e.g., hourly interval meters).[432]  In addition, we find that NYISO’s proposed settlement data requirements are similar to those for other resource types,[433] and NYISO therefore complies with the requirement of Order No. 2222 that meter data for settlement purposes at the distributed energy resource aggregation level be consistent with settlement data requirements for other resource types.[434]    
211.       As discussed in more detail below, with respect to telemetry, we find that NYISO complies with certain requirements related to the establishment of telemetry requirements, including supporting the need for Aggregators to provide six-second telemetry requirement while providing flexibility for smaller resources and proposing use of existing telemetry infrastructure where possible. However, we find that NYISO’s tariff lacks references to specific documents that contain further technical details on telemetry requirements and its proposal lacks specificity regarding protocols for sharing metering and telemetry data.
212.       We find that NYISO’s proposal partially complies with the requirement to revise its tariff to establish market rules that address telemetry requirements necessary for distributed energy resource aggregations to participate in RTO/ISO markets.  We find that NYISO’s proposal includes a basic description of its telemetry requirements.  As NYISO explains, its proposal requires Aggregations to send telemetry signals 24 hours a day, seven days a week, nominally on a six-second basis, consistent with the rules for generators to allow NYISO to maintain the reliability of the New York Bulk Power System.  However, we find that NYISO does not comply with the requirement to include references to the specific documents that contain further technical details.[435]  Accordingly, we direct NYISO to file, within 60 days of the date of issuance of this order, a further compliance filing to include references to specific documents that contain further technical details with respect to telemetry, as Order No. 2222 requires.
213.       In addition, with one exception, we find that NYISO’s proposal complies with the requirement to explain why its proposed telemetry requirements are just and reasonable and do not pose an unnecessary and undue barrier to individual DERs joining a distributed energy resource aggregation due to the lack of clarity regarding its protocols for sharing telemetry data, as discussed further below.[436]  We find that NYISO has supported the need for Aggregations to provide six-second telemetry, consistent with its requirements for other suppliers, in order to meet the New York-specific local reliability rule that requires NYISO to respond to thermal overloads in under five minutes.[437]  We are not persuaded by protesters who argue that NYISO could continue to meet this reliability standard without NYISO’s existing six-second telemetry requirement.  We note that the Commission has previously found that NYISO’s six-second telemetry requirement is necessary to meet NYISO’s specific reliability requirement,[438] and that protesters present no new arguments here to show why six-second telemetry is no longer needed to meet local reliability criteria in New York.
214.       Similarly, we are not persuaded by protesters’ arguments that the telemetry requirement presents undue costs to individual DERs and Aggregators.  Protesters do not show that a lesser telemetry requirement, such as a 60-second interval, would remove the cost and logistical barrier of small resources’ equipment needs.  Further, we agree with NYISO that the cost of providing telemetry is a cost that must be borne by Aggregators who wish to participate in NYISO’s markets.  We find that NYISO’s proposed telemetry requirements do not cause undue barriers for smaller resources including residential DERs because they provide flexibility by accepting telemetry and metering based on calculated values.[439]  Contrary to protesters’ claims, we find that this accommodation strikes a reasonable balance between removing barriers to participation and meeting reliability and metering and settlement needs. 
215.       We also find that NYISO complies with the requirement that an RTO’s/ISO’s proposed telemetry requirements should rely on existing telemetry infrastructure whenever possible.[440]  As noted above, NYISO has established flexible rules for small DERs with a response of under 100 kW that allow the option to utilize alternative measurement and verification tools.[441]  As NYISO explains, this should avoid the need for small facilities to install more costly hardware and software that is required for conventional resources.[442]  To the extent protesters argue that even NYISO’s alternative telemetry scheme for smaller resources could require additional cost-prohibitive equipment, we reiterate our finding that NYISO’s proposed telemetry requirements do not cause undue barriers for smaller resources because they provide flexibility for such resources while still allowing NYISO to meet its reliability and metering and settlement needs.
216.       However, we find that NYISO does not comply with the requirement that, to the extent that an RTO/ISO proposes that metering and telemetry data comes from or flows through distribution utilities, an RTO/ISO must coordinate with distribution utilities and RERRAs to establish protocols for sharing metering and telemetry data, and that such protocols minimize costs and other burdens and address concerns raised with respect to privacy and cybersecurity.[443]  Under NYISO’s proposal, Aggregators may choose that the applicable Member System provide its meter data to NYISO, and it appears that NYISO’s proposed definition of Distribution Utility may encompass Member Systems.[444]  We agree with AEE that NYISO’s proposal does not clearly specify the protocols for sharing metering and telemetry data, and does not explain how such protocols minimize costs and other burdens and address privacy and cybersecurity concerns, as Order No. 2222 requires.[445]  While NYISO notes in its Data Request Response that telemetry data must be provided to the applicable Member System in the event of a NYISO contingency, NYISO must specify its metering and data sharing protocols to satisfy this requirement.[446]  Accordingly, we direct NYISO to file, within 60 days of the date of issuance of this order, a further compliance filing that establishes protocols for sharing metering and telemetry data, and that such protocols minimize costs and other burdens and address concerns raised with respect to privacy and cybersecurity, as Order No. 2222 requires.
217.       Finally, in response to the requests AEMA and NYAPP make regarding further process and procedure, we note that those issues are beyond the scope of this compliance proceeding, and we acknowledge NYISO’s willingness to work with small utilities to address resource-specific concerns.  Lastly, with respect to Xcel’s request that the Commission specify that any findings in this proceeding will not predetermine the measures that are appropriate in other regions, we emphasize that the Commission’s findings here pertain to NYISO’s proposal and that we do not prejudge any other RTO’s/ISO’s filing here.